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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 6363   OF 2004

Narain Pandey …. Appellant

Versus

Pannalal Pandey                                    ….Respondent

-----

JUDGMENT

R.M. Lodha, J.  

The  complainant  is  in  appeal  under  Section  38  of  the  

Advocates  Act,  1961 (for  short,  ‘1961 Act’)  aggrieved by  the judgment  

and order  dated 20.6.2004 passed  by  the Disciplinary  Committee of  the  

Bar Council of India.

2. The appellant  filed  a  complaint  against  the  respondent,  an  

advocate  practicing  in  Tehsil  Gyanpur,  District  Sant  Rabidass  Nagar,  

Bhadohi under Section 35 of the 1961 Act before the Bar Council of Uttar  

Pradesh (for  short, ‘BCUP’) alleging that he is involved in number of  false  

cases  by  forging  and  fabricating  documents  including  settlement  1

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documents  without  the  knowledge  of  the  parties  in  the  Consolidation  

Court. The complainant alleged that besides the cases of  other people, in  

the case  of  the complainant also without  his  knowledge and other  co-

khatedars,  the  respondent  filed  a  compromise  deed  by  forging  and  

fabricating their  signatures  and obtained orders  from the Consolidation  

Court. The complainant gave the details of  four  cases  in this regard. The  

complainant also stated in the complaint that respondent has been earlier  

held guilty of  professional misconduct and, in this regard, referred to the  

judgment in the matter of Diwakar Prasad Shukla v. Panna Lal Pandey. The  

complainant  prayed  that  the  respondent  be  proceeded  with  the  

professional  misconduct  and  be  punished  by  cancelling his  license  to  

practice.

3. The complaint was  referred  to its  Disciplinary  Committee by  

BCUP. The respondent filed written statement to the complaint and denied  

the allegations made in the complaint. In his reply, the respondent denied  

that  he  has  forged  signatures  or  created  any  fictitious  compromise  

documents. He set up the plea that the complaint has been filed against  

him due to enmity.

4. The complainant filed his affidavit in support of  the complaint  

and in the course of enquiry examined seven witnesses. The complainant  

also produced  documentary  evidence.  On the other  hand, although the  

respondent filed his affidavit in support of the reply but neither he offered  

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himself  for  cross-examination nor he let in any evidence in opposition to  

the complaint and in support of his reply.

5. The Disciplinary  Committee, BCUP considered  the  evidence  

tendered by the complainant at quite some length and observed that all the  

witnesses  produced  by  the complainant  had supported  the allegations  

made in the complaint; the witnesses  had stated that compromises which   

were filed by the respondent-advocate were not signed by them and they  

had never  engaged the respondent  as  their  advocate  to conduct  their  

cases  in the Consolidation Court. The Disciplinary  Committee, BCUP also  

observed  that  the  respondent-advocate  did  not  cross-examine  the  

witnesses  of  the complainant on this  point.  On careful  analysis  of  the  

evidence, the Disciplinary Committee, BCUP concluded as follows  :

“From  the  above  discussion  and  from  the  perusal  of  documents it is clear that accused Advocate  is involved   in  a  very  serious  professional  misconduct  by  filing   vakalatnamas without  any  authority  and  later  on  filing   fictitious compromise which  adversely affect  the interest  of the parties concerned……..”      

6. Insofar  as  respondent’s  past  conduct  was  concerned,  the  

Disciplinary Committee, BCUP noted thus :-

“From  the  perusal  of  judgment  passed  by  State  Bar  Council  and  Bar Council  of  India,  it  is established  that   State  Bar  Council  had  taken  lenient  view  by  reprimanding  the  accused  Advocate  which  was  modified  by  Bar  Council  of  India  who  affirmed  the  reprimand  order and   also imposed  Rs. 1000/-  as cost,  failing  which  accused  Advocate  will  be  suspended  for  the period  of six months. The  matter involve  in  the said   case  is  that  accused  Advocate  had  filed  a  fictitious  compromise  in  the  Court  of  Consolidation  Officer.   

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Present complaint  is also about  farzy vakalatnama  and  fictitious compromise.  

7. The  Disciplinary  Committee,  BCUP having  regard  to  the  

respondent’s  previous  professional  misconduct  and the finding that  he  

was  involved  in  a  very  serious  professional  misconduct  by  filing  

vakalatnamas  without  any  authority  and  later  on  filing  fictitious  

compromises,  passed  an  order  dated  28.5.2002  debarring  him from  

practice for a period of seven years from the date of the judgment.

8. The  respondent-advocate,  challenged  the  order  of  the  

Disciplinary Committee, BCUP in appeal under Section 37 of  the 1961 Act   

before  the Disciplinary  Committee of  the Bar Council of  India (BCI). The  

Disciplinary  Committee, BCI heard  the parties  and held that  respondent  

herein (appellant therein) had acted negligently in the matters before the  

Chakbandi Officer. However, the Disciplinary Committee, BCI did not agree  

with the finding of the Disciplinary Committee, BCUP that the advocate had  

forged  the  signatures.  The  Disciplinary  Committee,  BCI,  accordingly,  

modified the order of punishment and reprimanded him and also imposed a  

cost  of  Rs. 1,000/- to be paid by him to the BCI towards  the Advocates   

Welfare Fund and if  the amount was  not paid within one month from the  

date of  the receipt of  the order he would be suspended from practicing  

for  a  period  of  six  months.  The  order  passed  by  the  Disciplinary   

Committee, BCI on 20.6.2004 is the subject matter of appeal.  

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9. The consideration of the matter by the Disciplinary Committee,  

BCI is  clearly  flawed.  It overlooked  the  most  vital  aspect  that  seven  

witnesses tendered in evidence by the complainant had stated clearly and  

unequivocally  that  the  respondent-advocate  had  filed  forged  and  

fabricated  vakalatnamas  on  their  behalf  and  they  had  not  filed  any  

compromise in Consolidation Court. The respondent-advocate had not at  

all cross-examined these witnesses  on the above aspect  although they  

were  cross-examined on other aspects.  There was  ample documentary  

evidence as well which proved the allegations made in the complaint that  

the respondent-advocate had filed forged and fabricated vakalatnamas as  

well  as  compromises  in diverse  proceedings  before  the  Consolidation  

Court. The Disciplinary Committee, BCI accepted the oral submission of the  

respondent-advocate  (appellant  therein)  without  realizing  that  the  

respondent even did not offer  himself for cross-examination in respect of   

the affidavit that he filed in support of  his reply.  As  a matter of  fact,  the  

respondent-advocate did not tender any evidence whatsoever in rebuttal.  

Mere oral submission unsupported by  oral or  documentary  evidence on  

behalf of the respondent-advocate did not justify reversal of thorough and  

well-considered finding by the Disciplinary  Committee, BCUP on analysis  

of  the oral and documentary evidence let in by the complainant in support  

of  the  complaint.  It  is  true  that  the  complainant  and  the  respondent-

advocate are uncle and nephew  and some dispute regarding the property   

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amongst  the family  members  of  the appellant and the respondent  was   

going on but on that basis the well-reasoned and carefully written finding  

recorded  by  the  Disciplinary  Committee,  BCUP was  not  liable  to  be  

reversed by the Disciplinary Committee, BCI.

10. The finding recorded by the Disciplinary Committee, BCI, “this  

Committee on perusal of  the allegations made in the complaint does  not  

agree  with  the  findings  of  appearing  on  behalf  of  both  the  sides  and  

forging the signatures arrived at by the Disciplinary Committee of the State  

Bar  Council  of  Uttar  Pradesh  and  the  order  wherein  the  appellant  is  

debarred from practice for seven years” cannot be sustained.

11. On  careful  consideration  of  the  entire  material  placed  on  

record, we  are of  the considered view  that the findings recorded by the  

Disciplinary Committee, BCUP that the respondent-advocate was  involved  

in a very  serious professional misconduct by filing vakalatnamas without  

any  authority  and later  on filing fictitious compromises  which  adversely   

affected the interest of the parties concerned deserve to be restored and  

we  order accordingly.  

12. The question now  is of award of just and proper punishment.  

As  noted  above,  the  Disciplinary  Committee,  BCUP  debarred  the  

respondent from practice for  a period of  seven  years.  The Disciplinary   

Committee, BCI in the impugned order  while holding that the respondent  

should have been careful in dealing with the matters before the Chakbandi  

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Officer and that he had acted negligently modified the order of punishment  

awarded  by  the  Disciplinary  Committee,  BCUP and  reprimanded  the  

respondent-advocate  (appellant  therein)  and  also  imposed  cost  and  

default punishment, as noted above.

13. The award  of  punishment for  a professional misconduct is a  

delicate  and  sensitive  exercise.  The  Bar  Council  of  India  Rules,  as   

amended from time to time, have been made by the BCI in exercise of  its  

rule making powers  under  the 1961 Act.  Chapter  II, Part VI deals  with  

standards  of  professional conduct  and etiquette. Its preamble reads  as  

under :    

“An  advocate  shall,  at  all  times,  comport  himself  in  a  manner  befitting  his status as an  officer  of  the  Court,  a  privileged  member of the community,  and a gentleman,   bearing  in mind  that what may be lawful  and moral  for a   person who is not a member of the Bar, or for a member   of  the  Bar in  his non-professional  capacity  may  still  be   improper  for  an  Advocate.  Without   prejudice  to  the   generality  of the foregoing  obligation,  an Advocate  shall   fearlessly  uphold  the  interests of  his  client,  and  in  his  conduct  conform to the rules hereinafter mentioned  both   in  letter  and  in  spirit.  The  rules hereinafter  mentioned   contain  canons  of  conduct  and  etiquette  adopted  as  general  guides; yet the specific  mention  thereof shall  not   be  construed  as  a  denial  of  the  existence  of  other  equally  imperative though not specifically  mentioned.”

14. The matters relating to professional misconduct of advocates   

under  the 1961 Act  have reached this  Court from time to time. It is not  

necessary  to deal with  all such cases;  reference to some of  the cases   

shall  suffice.  In  Bar  Council  of  Maharashtra  v.  M.V.  Dabholkar  and  

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others1,  a  seven-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  was  concerned  with  an  

appeal  filed  under  Section  38  of  the  1961  Act  by  the  Bar  Council  of   

Maharashtra  and  the  main  controversy  therein  centered  around  the  

meaning of the expression “person aggrieved”. While dealing with the said  

controversy,  V.R.  Krishna  Iyer,  J.  in  his  concurring  opinion  made the  

following weighty observations with regard to the Bar and its members:

“52. The  Bar is not a private guild,  like that of ‘barbers,  butchers and candlestick-makers’ but, by bold  contrast,  a  public  institution  committed  to  public  justice  and   pro  bono  publico  service.  The  grant  of  a  monopoly   licence  to practice  law is based on three assumptions:  (1) There is a socially  useful  function  for the lawyer to   perform,  (2) The  lawyer  is a  professional  person  who  will  perform that function,  and (3) His performance  as a  professional  person  is regulated  by  himself  not  more   formally,  by  the  profession  as a  whole.  The  central   function  that  the  legal  profession  must  perform  is  nothing  less than  the  administration  of  justice  (‘The   Practice of Law is a Public  Utility’  — ‘The Lawyer, The   Public  and  Professional  Responsibility’  by  F.  Raymond  Marks  et  al  — Chicago  American  Bar  Foundation,  1972,  p.  288-289).  A  glance  at  the   functions of  the  Bar Council,  and  it  will  be  apparent   that  a rainbow of public  utility  duties, including  legal   aid  to the poor, is cast on these bodies in  the national   hope  that  the  members  of  this  monopoly  will  serve  society  and  keep  to  canons  of  ethics  befitting  an  honourable  order.  If  pathological  cases of  member   misbehaviour  occur,  the  reputation  and  credibility  of   the Bar suffer a mayhem and who, but the Bar Council,   is more  concerned  with  and  sensitive  to  this potential   disrepute  the  few  black  sheep  bring  about?  The   official  heads of the Bar i.e.  the Attorney-General  and   the  Advocates-General  too  are  distressed if  a  lawyer  “stoops to  conquer” by resort to  soliciting,  touting  and   other corrupt practices.”

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15. In  V.C.  Rangadurai v.  D.  Gopalan  and Others 2,  a majority  

judgment in an appeal filed under  Section 38 of  the 1961 Act  speaking  

through V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. observed as follows:

“4. Law is a noble  profession, true; but it is also an elitist  profession. Its ethics, in  practice,  (not in theory, though)   leave  much  to be desired,  if  viewed as a profession  for   the  people .  When  the  Constitution  under  Article  19  enables professional  expertise to enjoy  a privilege  and   the  Advocates Act  confers a monopoly,  the  goal  is not   assured income  but  commitment  to  the  people  — the  common  people  whose  hunger,  privation  and   hamstrung  human  rights  need  the  advocacy  of  the   profession  to  change  the  existing  order  into  a  Human   Tomorrow.  This  desideratum  gives  the  clue  to  the   direction  of  the  penance  of  a  deviant  geared  to  correction.  Serve the people  free and  expiate  your sin,  is the hint.

5. Law's nobility  as a profession lasts only so long  as the   members maintain  their  commitment  to  integrity  and   service  to  the  community.  Indeed,  the  monopoly   conferred  on  the  legal  profession  by  Parliament  is  coupled  with  a responsibility  — a responsibility  towards  the people,  especially  the poor. Viewed from this angle,   every  delinquent  who  deceives  his  common  client   deserves to be frowned upon.  This approach  makes it  a  reproach  to  reduce  the  punishment,  as  pleaded  by  learned counsel for the appellant.

6.  But,  as  we  have  explained  at  the  start,  every  punishment,  however  has  a  functional  duality  —  deterrence  and  correction.  Punishment  for professional   misconduct  is no  exception  to  this “social  justice”  test.  In the  present case, therefore,  from the  punitive  angle,   the  deterrent  component  persuades us not  to  interfere  with the suspension from practice  reduced  “benignly” at   the  appellate  level  to  one  year.  From the  correctional   angle,  a  gesture  from  the  Court  may  encourage  the  appellant  to turn a new page. He is not too old  to mend   his ways. He has suffered  a  litigative  ordeal,  but  more   importantly  he  has a  career  ahead.  To  give  him  an  opportunity  to  rehabilitate  himself  by  changing  his  

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ways, resisting  temptations and  atoning  for the  serious  delinquency,  by  a  more  zealous devotion  to  people's  causes like legal  aid  to the  poor,  may be a step in  the   correctional  direction. xxx xxx xxx

11.  Wide  as  the  power  may  be,  the  order  must  be   germane  to  the  Act  and  its  purposes,  and  latitude   cannot  transcend  those  limits.  Judicial  ‘Legisputation’   to borrow a telling  phrase of J. Cohen  [Dickerson : The   Interpretation  and  Application  of  Statutes,  p.  238],  is  not  legislation  but  application  of a given  legislation  to   new or unforeseen needs and  situations broadly  falling   within  the  statutory  provision.  In  that  sense,  ‘interpretation  is inescapably  a kind of legislation’.  This  is not  legislation  stricto  sensu but  application,  and  is  within  the court's province.

12.  We have therefore sought  to adapt  the  punishment   of  suspension  to  serve  two  purposes  —  injury  and  expiation.  We think the  ends of  justice  will  be  served  best in this case by directing  suspension plus a provision   for reduction  on an undertaking to this court to serve the   poor  for  a  year.  Both  are  orders  within  this  Court's  power.”

16. In M. Veerabhadra Rao v.  Tek Chand3, a three-Judge Bench  

of  this Court considered the relevant provisions contained in Bar Council  

of  India Rules with  reference  to standards  of  professional conduct  and  

etiquette and also sub-section (3) of Section 35 of 1961 Act. In paragraph  

28 (Pg. 586) of the Report, this Court observed thus:

“28.  Adjudging  the  adequate  punishment  is  a  ticklish  job  and  it  has  become  all  the  more  ticklish  in  view  of  the  miserable  failure  of  the  peers of  the  appellant  on  whom  jurisdiction  was  conferred  to  adequately  punish  a  derelict   member.  To  perform  this  task  may  be  an  unpalatable  and  onerous duty.  We, however,  do  not  propose to  abdicate  our  function  howsoever  disturbing it may be.”

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16.1. Then in paragraph 30 (Pg. 587), this Court observed that the  

legal profession  was  monopolistic  in character  and this  monopoly itself   

inheres certain high traditions which its members are expected to upkeep  

and uphold. The Court then referred to the decision of  this Court in M.V.  

Dabholkar1 and observed as follows:

“If  these  are  the  high  expectations  of  what  is  described  as  a  noble  profession,  its  members  must  set  an  example  of  conduct  worthy  of  emulation.  If  any  of  them  falls  from  that  high   expectation,  the  punishment  has  to  be  commensurate with the degree and gravity of the   misconduct……..”.

16.2. Then in paragraph 31 of  the Report (Pgs. 588-589) this Court  

held as under:

“31. Having  given  the  matter  our  anxious  consideration,  looking  to  the  gravity  of  the  misconduct  and  keeping  in  view the  motto  that   the  punishment  must be  commensurate  with  the  gravity  of  the  misconduct,  we  direct  that  the   appellant  M.  Veerabhadra  Rao  shall  be   suspended from practice  for a period  of five years  that  is up  to  and  inclusive  of  October  31,  1989.   To  that  extent  we  vary  the  order  both  of  the   Disciplinary  Committee  of  the  State  Bar Council   as well  as the  Disciplinary  Committee  of  the  Bar  Council  of India.”

17. In a recent decision of this Court in Dhanraj Singh Choudhary  

v.  Nathulal  Vishwakarma4,  this  Court speaking through one of  us  (R.M.  

Lodha, J.) in paragraph 23 of the Report (Pg. 747) observed as follows:

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“23.  The  legal  profession is a noble  profession. It  is not  a  business or a  trade.  A person practising   law has to practise in the spirit of honesty and not   in  the spirit  of mischief-making or money-getting.   An advocate’s attitude  towards and dealings with   his  client  have  to  be  scrupulously  honest  and   fair.”

17.1. In paragraph  24  (Pg. 747),  the  observations  made in  V.C.  

Rangadurai2 were  quoted and then in paragraph 25 of  the Report  (Pg.  

747), the Court held as under :

“25.  Any compromise with  the  law’s nobility  as a  profession  is  bound  to  affect  the  faith  of  the  people  in  the  rule  of  law  and,  therefore,   unprofessional  conduct  by an advocate  has to be  viewed  seriously.  A person practising  law has an  obligation  to maintain  probity  and  high  standard  of professional  ethics and morality.”

17.2. The Court in para 32 (Pg. 748) observed that the punishment  

for  professional  misconduct  has  twin  objectives  –  deterrence  and  

correction.

18. In light  of  the  above  legal  position,  we  now  consider  the  

question of  punishment. We have restored the finding of  the Disciplinary   

Committee, BCUP viz.,  that  the respondent-advocate  was  involved in a  

very  serious professional misconduct by filing vakalatnamas without any  

authority  and  later  on  filing  fictitious  compromises.  The  professional  

misconduct committed by the respondent is extremely grave and serious.   

He has indulged  in mischief-making.  An advocate found guilty of  having  12

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filed vakalatnamas without authority and then filing fictitious compromises  

without  any  authority  deserves  punishment  commensurate  with  the  

degree of  misconduct  that meets  the twin  objectives  – deterrence  and  

correction. Fraudulent conduct of a lawyer cannot be viewed leniently lest  

the interest of the administration of justice and the highest traditions of the  

Bar may become casualty.  By showing undue sympathy and leniency in a  

matter such as this where  the advocate has been found guilty of  grave  

and serious  professional misconduct,  the purity  and dignity  of  the legal  

profession will be compromised.  Any compromise with the purity, dignity   

and nobility of  the legal profession is surely bound to affect  the faith and  

respect  of  the  people  in  the  rule  of  law.  Moreover,  the  respondent-

advocate  had  been  previously  found  to  be  involved  in a  professional  

misconduct and he was  reprimanded. Having regard to all these aspects,   

in our  view,  it would  be just  and proper  if  the respondent-advocate  is  

suspended from practice for a period of three years from today. We order  

accordingly.   

19.  The  order  passed  by  the  Disciplinary  Committee,  BCI is  

modified  and  the  respondent-advocate  is  awarded  punishment  for  his  

professional misconduct,  as  indicated above.  Civil Appeal is allowed  to  

that extent with no order as to costs.   

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20. The Registrar shall send copies of the order to the Secretary,   

State Bar Council, Uttar Pradesh and the Secretary,  Bar Council of  India  

immediately.   

         ………………………J.           (R.M. Lodha)

    .....……………………J.                        (Anil R. Dave)  

NEW DELHI DECEMBER 10, 2012.

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