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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  2835 /2014 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 7555 of 2010)

Nand Kumar                                                                … Appellant

vs.

State of Bihar  & Ors.                                                    …  Respondent  

(With CA No(s)  2836-2837, 2838, 2839-2841, 2842 and  2843 of   2014 @ SLP (C) No(s) 8865-8866/2010 , 10876/2010, 20833- 20835/2010, 30317 and 30818/2010)

J U D G M E N T

Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Six  writ  petitions  were  filed  before  the  High  Court  of  Patna  

which were taken up and disposed of by the High Court by a  

common  order  dated  December  9,  2009.   The  High  Court

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rejected  the  prayer  made  by  the  writ  petitioners  for  

absorption/regularisation in their posts.  

3. The facts of the case, briefly, are as follows:  

3.1 The appellants were appointed on daily wages. It is not in  

dispute that some of the appellants had also worked as daily  

wagers  for  a  long  period.  It  is  also  not  in  dispute  that  the  

services  of  said  daily  wagers  varied  from period  to  period.  

Nand Kumar, appellant, was appointed as an Accounts Clerk on  

daily  wage  basis  on  September  18,  1982.  Similarly,  others  

(appellants  in  civil  appeals  arising  out  of  SLP [C]  Nos.8865-

66/2010,  10876/2010,  20833-20835/2010  and  30317/2010)  

were also appointed, from time to time, and served as daily  

wagers. It is not in dispute that some of the appellants received  

monthly  salary  in  the  minimum  pay  scale  with  usual  

allowances.

3.2 In 2006, the State Legislature passed the Bihar Agriculture  

Produce Market (Repeal) Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as  

the Repeal Act, 2006) with effect from September 1, 2006. As a  

result whereof, the Bihar Agriculture Produce Market Act, 1960  

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and rules framed thereunder in the year 1975 stood repealed,  

save and except certain decisions rendered earlier as well as  

disciplinary  proceedings  initiated  or  pending  against  its  

employees were saved.  It  appears that in these appeals the  

appellants are not challenging the validity of the Repeal Act.  

The claim of the appellants is that they have worked on daily  

wage  basis  for  a  long  period  and  cannot  be  relieved  from  

service by virtue of  Section 6 of  the Repeal  Act,  2006 and,  

furthermore,  such  decision  is  violative  of  the  principles  of  

natural justice and accordingly is arbitrary.

4. A question has also been raised in these appeals whether the  

daily wage employees are included within the meaning of “all  

officers and employees” as used in Section 6(i) of the Repeal  

Act, 2006. The High Court while answering the said question  

and dealing with the writ petitions, has observed that the said  

Section under  the Repeal  Act  itself  maintains the distinction  

between  the  status  of  daily  wage  employees  and  regular  

employees of the Board.

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5. It appears to us that under Section 4 of the said Repeal Act, the  

assets and liabilities of the Bihar Agriculture Produce Marketing  

Board  or  of  the  Marketing  Committees  or  Bazar  Samitis  

constituted under the Act of 1960,  have vested in the State  

Government. The State Government by virtue of Section 5 of  

the said Act, has the authority, power and jurisdiction to issue  

necessary directions and/or orders to secure the object of the  

Repeal Act, 2006.

6. In the backdrop of the facts of this case, Section 6 is relevant  

for the purpose of deciding the cases of the appellants and to  

find out whether it provides for absorption of the daily wagers  

who  worked  for  a  longer  period  with  the  Board.  It  further  

appears that by virtue of the said Repeal Act, a Committee of  

Secretaries was constituted under Section 6(ii) and whether the  

said  Committee  has  the  power  to  prepare  a  scheme  for  

absorption/regularisation,  denying  the  absorption  of  the  

appellants on the ground that they have been appointed by the  

Board/Market Committee/Bazar Samiti on daily wages or they  

have a duty to prepare a scheme for such absorption.

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7. Now it is necessary for us to reproduce Section 6 of the said Act  

which reads as follows :  

“Section  6: Absorption  of  officers  and  employees  of  Bihar  Agriculture  Marketing  Board/Market Committee/Bazar Samiti. –  

(i) On and from the date of repeal of the Act, all   officers  and  employees  of  the  Board,  shall   remain in employment, as if the Act has not   been repealed and they shall continue to be  paid  same  salary  and  allowances  as  was   payable on the date of repeal of the Act till   such time State Government has taken such   final decision as is provided hereafter.  

(ii) The  State  Government  shall  constitute  a   committee of Secretaries consisting of three  Secretaries  who  shall  prepare  detailed   scheme  of  absorption,  retirement,   compulsory  retirement  or  voluntary  retirement,  other  service  conditions  of   officers and employees of the Board and the   Committee.  Scheme  prepared  by  group  of   Secretaries shall be placed before the State   Government within two months from the date   of enforcement of the present Act. The State   Government  shall  thereafter  approve  the   scheme;  

Provided  that  it  shall  be  open  to  the  State   Government  to  modify,  amend  or  suggest   modification  or  amendment  and  the  scheme  thereafter shall be made operational in such form  and  intent  as  finally  approved  by  the  State   Government.  Scheme  approved  by  the  State   Government  shall  be  considered  as  statutory   scheme framed under this Act.  

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(iii)  After  the  scheme  approved  by  the  State   Government  is  enforced it shall be fully implemented in its   form and intent within three months from the   date of its enforcement.  

(iv) Group of Secretaries constituted under sub- section  (ii)  above  shall  be  competent  to   decide utility and deployment of officers and   employees  of  the  Board  or  the  Committee   during transition  period  and it  shall  not  be   open to any officer or employee to question  decision of group of Secretaries.  

(v) Scheme  framed  under  this  Act  shall  have  effect,  notwithstanding  any  other  Act,   Ordinance,  Rule,  regulation,  direction,  order   or  instruction  and  condition  of  service  of   officers and employees of the Board or the   Committee, shall be governed and regulated  under the scheme to the extent provision has   been made in the scheme.

Provided further that it shall be competent   for the State Government to amend, modify, alter   or substitute the scheme so framed for removal of   difficulties in implementation of the scheme.”  

8. Mr.  V.Shekhar,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  

appellants  in  civil  appeals  arising  out  of  SLP  (C)  Nos.  

30317/2010  and  30318/2010  has  contended  that  the  daily  

wagers  have asked for  pay parity  with the State employees  

treating  them at  par.  The  appellants  claimed  to  have  been  

working  against  the  posts  of  Agriculture  Produce  Marketing  

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Divisions on muster roll basis for the last 5 to 15 years and are  

in the employment of the Board. He further submitted that the  

recommendation  of  the  Committee  of  Secretaries  which  has  

decided not to absorb the daily wage employees, is nothing but  

illegal and malafide. According to him, after working for such a  

long time and since they have been allowed to draw the pay  

scale along with usual allowances, would automatically entitle  

them to the benefit of a regular employee. He further stated  

that the appellants worked under the duly sanctioned posts. He  

further drew our attention to the Secretary, State of Karnataka  

& Ors. V. Umadevi (3) & Ors. [2006 (4) SCC 1, paras 40, 41 and  

53]  and  submitted  that  the  State  should  take  steps  to  

regularise all these appellants by way of one-time measure.

9. Mr.  A.  Sharan,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  

appellants in civil appeals arising out of SLP [C] Nos.7555/2010  

and 8865-8866/2010, submitted that the appellant has worked  

in the post for a long time and he should be regularised in the  

said post since he has already obtained the status of employee  

working in the Board. He relied upon the judgment reported in  

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State of Karnataka & Ors. v.M.L. Kesari & Ors.  [2010 (9) SCC  

247].  

10. It  is  further  submitted  that  an  

advertisement was issued for filling up vacancies by the Board.  

Some of the petitioners applied for the said post but no steps  

were  taken to  fill  the  said  post  by  the  Board.  Board  issued  

directions to pay equal pay for equal work to the daily wagers  

who were working in Grade III and Grade IV. It is also stated  

that  on  27th September,  2006  Executive  Engineer,  

Muzaffarnagar Division Marketing Board sent a report about the  

strength  of  the  employees  in  the  said  division.  In  the  said  

report,  it  was  also  mentioned  that  Nand  Kumar  has  been  

working as an accounts clerk from 17th September, 1992 and it  

has also been mentioned that he will complete his 60 years on  

30th September,  2018.  Accordingly,  it  is  submitted  that  the  

petitioner and similarly situated persons have not been treated  

as daily wages employees.

11. Our attention has already been drawn  

by  the  learned  senior  counsel  to  the  report  of  the  three  

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Member Committee constituted in terms of section 6(ii) of the  

Repeal Act which recommended the termination of services of  

all  illegal and irregular employees and was submitted to the  

Government  recommending  absorption  of  only  regular  

employees  in  para  3.1  and  further  recommended  for  

termination of daily wagers in para 3.6 of the said report.

12. It is submitted by the appellants that  

the appellants who have been working for more than 25 years  

getting  regular  pay  scales  and  work  against  the  vacant  

sanctioned  posts  cannot  be  treated  as  ordinary  daily  wage  

employees. The provision in the Section 6 of the Repeal  Act  

deals with “all officers and employees” which includes the daily  

wagers and section 6 of the Repeal Act also provide that all  

officers of the Board shall remain in employment as if the Act  

has not been repealed and they would continue on the basis of  

the regular pay scale, dearness pay and dearness allowances.  

Therefore, it is submitted by the appellants that the rights of all  

employees  working  were  adequately  protected  in  the  said  

section 6 of the Repeal Act.

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13. It is contended by the appellant that  

the  Committees  of  Secretaries  have  wrongly  treated  the  

appellant  Nand Kumar  and similar  situated  persons  as  daily  

wagers without appreciating the facts that they were working  

in the said post for more than 20-25 years and drawing the  

salaries in pay scale with dearness allowance. Therefore they  

cannot  be  treated  differently  from  regular  employees.  It  is  

further  contended that  the term existing employees used in  

section  6(ii)  of  the  Repeal  Act  includes  all  the  employees  

including the petitioners, who were daily wagers.  Accordingly,  

it  is submitted that the appellants must get a chance in the  

matter  to  be  considered  by  the  authorities  for  

absorption/regularization in their posts and cannot be treated  

differently than that of regular employees.

14. It  is  further  contended  by  the  

appellants  that  the  phrase  “all  officers  and  employees”  in  

Section 6 of the Repeal Act means all employees without any  

permutation and combination or without any reservation and  

qualification. The legislature was fully aware of different types  

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of  employees  that  could  be  in  service  like  contractual  

employees,  daily  wage  employees,  work  charged employees  

etc.  But  legislature  chooses  the  expression  “all  officers  and  

employees”.  Sub-section  (i)  of  Section  6  makes  clear  the  

legislative  intent  that  the  services  of  “all  officers  and  

employees” would continue as if the Principal Act had not been  

repealed, meaning thereby that there would not be change in  

service condition of whatsoever till the scheme was finalised as  

contemplated under section 6(ii)  of the Act. Section 6 of the  

Repeal Act, 2006 provided that all  officers and employees of  

the Board shall  remain in employment, as if the Act has not  

been repealed and they continue on the basis of regular pay  

scale,  dearness pay and dearness allowance.  Section 6(ii)  of  

the  Repealing  Act  gives  jurisdiction  to  the  Committee  to  

prepare  “detailed  scheme  of  absorption,  retirement,  

compulsory  retirement  or  voluntary  retirement  of  existing  

employees”.  The term “existing employees”  used in  the Act  

does not distinguish between contractual or regular employee  

or  employees  working  on  sanctioned,  vacant  post  for  more  

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than 25 years and getting salary in minimum pay scale and  

also dearness allowance.

15. The  appellant  further  submitted  that  the  appellants  are  

squarely coming within the purview of Umadevi (supra) and drew  

our attention to para 53 which reads as follows:

“53.  One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be  cases  where  irregular  appointments  (not  illegal  appointments) as explained in  State of Mysore v. S.V.   Narayanappa 1967  (1)  SCR 128,  R.N.Nanjundappa v.  T.Thimmiah 1972  (1)  SCC  409  and  B.N.Nagarajan  v.  State of Karnataka 1979 (4) SCC 507 and referred to in  para  15  above,  of  duly  qualified  persons  in  duly  sanctioned vacant  posts  might  have been made and  the employees have continued to work for ten years or  more  but  without  the  intervention  of  orders  of  the  courts or of tribunals. The question of regularisation of  the  services  of  such  employees  may  have  to  be  considered  on  merits  in  the  light  of  the  principles  settled by this Court in the cases abovereferred to and  in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union  of  India,  the  State  Governments  and  their  instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as a  one-time  measure,  the  services  of  such  irregularly  appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in  duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of  the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that  regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant  sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases  where temporary employees or daily wagers are being  now  employed.  The  process  must  be  set  in  motion  within six months from this date. We also clarify that  regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice,  need  not  be  reopened  based  on  this  judgment,  but  

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there  should  be  no  further  bypassing  of  the  constitutional requirement and regularising or making  permanent,  those  not  duly  appointed  as  per  the  constitutional scheme.”

16. Per contra, it was submitted by counsel appearing on behalf  

of the State that the words “absorption, retirement, compulsory  

retirement  or  voluntary  retirement”  used  in  Section  6  of  the  

Repeal  Act,  2006  have  been  used  with  reference  to  only  the  

permanent  employees  of  the  Board.  That  absorption  in  the  

present case does not mean regularisation. It is further submitted  

that all the appellants worked on daily wage basis and had not  

been regularised till the date of repeal of the said Act. It is further  

submitted  that  with  undoing  of  the  establishment,  there  is  no  

regulation of the market and as such there is no procurement of  

revenue. In these circumstances, there cannot be any scope for  

regularisation. He further pointed out that the daily wagers are  

engaged  in  view  of  work  exigencies  prevailing  in  the  

establishment but in the event of dissolution of the establishment,  

there cannot be any work exigency.  He further  submitted that  

regularisation is not a matter of course, it has to follow the mode  

of recruitment. The Committee constituted under Section 6 of the  

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Repeal Act duly examined the cases of daily wagers and clause  

3.1 of the Resolution prepared by the Market Committee clearly  

states that any appointment without recommendation or proper  

authority will be considered as illegal and irregular. It is pointed  

out that engagement of the appellants was without following any  

norms and in violation of the rules of recruitment and principles of  

equality. Accordingly, he submitted that Section 6 of the Repeal  

Act, 2006 has a provision for protection of permanent employees  

and not daily wage employees, and such a provision is in violation  

of Article 14 of the Constitution.  The daily wagers constitute a  

class  within  themselves  and  all  the  daily  wagers  have  been  

retrenched and not even a single one has been retained in these  

cases.

17. The  High  Court  dismissed  the  writ  

petition which was filed before it on the ground that petitioners  

cannot claim themselves as a part of same class and the Three  

Member  Committee  did  not  commit  any  wrong  in  not  

recommending absorption of the petitioners.  

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18. We have also noticed that Constitution Bench of this Court in  

paras 44, 45 & 47 of Umadevi (supra) held :

“44.  The  concept  of  “equal  pay  for  equal  work”  is  different from the concept of conferring permanency on  those  who  have  been  appointed  on  ad  hoc  basis,  temporary basis, or based on no process of selection as  envisaged  by  the  rules.  This  Court  has  in  various  decisions applied the principle of equal pay for equal  work  and  has  laid  down  the  parameters  for  the  application of that principle. The decisions are rested on  the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in  the light of the directive principles in that behalf. But  the  acceptance  of  that  principle  cannot  lead  to  a  position where the court could direct that appointments  made without following the due procedure established  by law,  be deemed permanent  or  issue directions  to  treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negation  of the principle of equality of opportunity. The power to  make  an  order  as  is  necessary  for  doing  complete  justice  in  any  cause  or  matter  pending  before  this  Court, would not normally be used for giving the go-by  to the procedure established by law in the matter of  public  employment.  Take  the  situation  arising  in  the  cases before us from the State of Karnataka. Therein,  after  the decision  in  Dharwad  District  PWD  Literate  Daily  Wage  Employees  Assn.  v.  State  of  Karnataka  [1990  (2)  SCC  396],  the  Government  had  issued  repeated  directions  and  mandatory  orders  that  no  temporary  or  ad hoc employment  or  engagement  be  given.  Some of  the  authorities  and  departments  had  ignored those directions or defied those directions and  had  continued  to  give  employment,  specifically  interdicted by the orders issued by the executive. Some  of the appointing officers have even been punished for  their defiance. It would not be just or proper to pass an  order  in  exercise  of  jurisdiction  under  Article 226 or 32 of  the  Constitution  or  in  exercise  of  

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power under Article 142 of the Constitution permitting  those persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made  permanent,  based  on  their  appointments  or  engagements.  Complete  justice  would  be  justice  according to law and though it would be open to this  Court to mould the relief, this Court would not grant a  relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality.

45.  While  directing  that  appointments,  temporary  or  casual, be regularized or made permanent, the courts  are swayed by the fact that the person concerned has  worked  for  some  time  and  in  some  cases  for  a  considerable length of time. It is not as if the person  who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual  in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment.  He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be  true that  he is  not  in  a position to bargain --  not  at  arm’s length -- since he might have been searching for  some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and  accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it  would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional  scheme of  appointment  and to  take the  view that  a  person who has temporarily or casually got employed  should  be  directed  to  be  continued  permanently.  By  doing  so,  it  will  be  creating  another  mode  of  public  appointment which is not permissible. If the court were  to void a contractual employment of this nature on the  ground  that  the  parties  were  not  having  equal  bargaining power, that too would not enable the court  to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on  such casual or temporary employment is not possible,  given the exigencies of administration and if imposed,  would only mean that  some people who at  least  get  employment  temporarily,  contractually  or  casually,  would  not  be  getting  even  that  employment  when  securing  of  such  employment  brings  at  least  some  succour to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our  vast country are in search of employment and one is  not  compelled  to  accept  a  casual  or  temporary  employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an  

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employment.  It  is  in  that  context  that  one  has  to  proceed  on  the  basis  that  the  employment  was  accepted  fully  knowing  the  nature  of  it  and  the  consequences  flowing  from  it.  In  other  words,  even  while accepting the employment, the person concerned  knows  the  nature  of  his  employment.  It  is  not  an  appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The  claim  acquired  by  him  in  the  post  in  which  he  is  temporarily  employed  or  the  interest  in  that  post  cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to  enable the giving up of the procedure established, for  making regular appointments to available posts in the  services of the State. The argument that since one has  been working for some time in the post, it will not be  just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of  the nature of the employment when he first took it up,  is  not  one  that  would  enable  the  jettisoning  of  the  procedure  established  by  law  for  public  employment  and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone  of  constitutionality  and  equality  of  opportunity  enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.

x x x x x

47. When a person enters a temporary employment or  gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and  the engagement is not based on a proper selection as  recognized  by  the  relevant  rules  or  procedure,  he  is  aware of the consequences of the appointment being  temporary,  casual  or  contractual  in  nature.  Such  a  person  cannot  invoke  the  theory  of  legitimate  expectation for  being confirmed in the post when an  appointment  to  the  post  could  be  made  only  by  following a proper procedure for selection and in cases  concerned,  in  consultation  with  the  Public  Service  Commission.  Therefore,  the  theory  of  legitimate  expectation  cannot  be  successfully  advanced  by  temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot  also be held that the State has held out any promise  while engaging these persons either to continue them  

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where they are or to make them permanent. The State  cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also  obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a  positive relief of being made permanent in the post.”

19. Therefore,  considering  the  facts  of  the  present  case,  it  

appears to us that the appellants were never appointed through a  

proper procedure. It is not in dispute that they all served as daily  

wagers.  Therefore,  it  was  within  their  knowledge  all  the  

consequences of appointment being temporary, they cannot have  

even a right to invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for  

being confirmed in the post. Accordingly, we cannot accept the  

contention  of  the  appellants  in  the  matter.  We  have  further  

considered the case of the appellants in the light of Section 6 of  

the Repeal Act which has made it clear that the employees of the  

Board and the appellants cannot be said to be of the same status  

and  cannot  enjoy  the  benefit  given  under  Section  6(i)  of  the  

Repeal  Act,  2006.  Therefore,  we  are  unable  to  accept  the  

contention  that  the  daily  wagers  would  also  come  within  the  

meaning of “all officers and employees” as specifically stated in  

Section  6  of  the  Repeal  Act.  In  these  circumstances,  we  are  

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unable  to  accept  the  submission  of  learned  senior  counsel  

appearing on behalf of the appellants.

We have also considered the decision in M.L.Kesari (supra) of  

this Court which deals with the exception contained in para 53 of  

Umadevi (supra) but considering the facts of this case, we do not  

have any hesitation to hold that the said decisions can not be a  

help to the appellants.  

20. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We have also  

perused the records placed before us. We find that the status of  

the appellants was continuing to be as daily wagers. They cannot  

be  treated  as  permanent  Government  employees.  They  all  

worked as employees of the Board. We have also found that no  

steps  were  followed  by  the  Board  to  safeguard  the  service  of  

these appellants. We have not been able to find out whether any  

advertisement was issued by the Government to regularise them.  

In these circumstances, in view of the submission which has been  

advanced on behalf of the appellants, we do not find that there is  

any substance in the matter/arguments put forwarded before us  

on behalf of the appellants as we have been able to find out that  

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the appellants have served as daily wagers and we do find that  

Section 6(i) makes it clear that after the repeal of the Agriculture  

Produce Act, 1960, all officers and employees of the Board are to  

continue in employment and they shall continue to be paid what  

they were getting earlier as salary and allowance till  such time  

the State Government takes an official decision as per the further  

provisions  of  Section  6.  Such  provision  certainly  allows  

continuance  of  the  officers  and  employees  of  the  Board  to  

continue in  employment in  the same status.  The status of  the  

daily  wage  employees  and  regular  employees  of  the  Board  is  

eminent from the said provision. It cannot be said that the status  

of the daily wage employees can enjoy or acquire the same status  

as that of the regular employees. In these circumstances, we do  

not find that there was any discrimination between the daily wage  

employees and the regular employees as is tried to be contended  

before us. Therefore, such submission has no substance, in our  

opinion,  for  the  reason  that  the  difference  continues  and  is  

recognised under the said provision of the Repeal Act. So far as  

the power of the Committee of Secretaries constituted in terms of  

section 6(ii)  of  the Repeal  Act  is  concerned,  it  is  to  prepare a  

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scheme  of  absorption  as  well  as  of  retirement,  compulsory  

retirement or voluntary retirement and other service conditions of  

officers and employees of the Board. In our opinion, the scheme  

which was prepared by the Committee of Secretaries is only in  

the nature of recommendation and the State has the power either  

to accept, modify or amend the same before granting its official  

approval.  Therefore,  after  the  sanction  is  granted  by  the  

Government  in  respect  of  the  said  scheme,  it  would  gain  the  

status of statutory scheme framed under the said Act and would  

be enforced within the time to be indicated in section 6(iii) of the  

Repeal Act, 2006.

21. Therefore, in the light of the said provision, we do not find  

that the Committee of Secretaries can be faulted in treating the  

daily  wage  employees  on  a  different  footing  and  deciding  for  

removal of their services.  

22. We have consciously noted the aforesaid decisions of this  

Court. The principle as has been laid down in Umadevi (supra) has  

also been applied in relation to the persons who were working on  

daily wages. According to us, the daily wagers are not appointees  

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in the strict sense of the term ‘appointment’. They do not hold a  

post. The scheme of alternative appointment framed for regular  

employees of  abolished organisation cannot, therefore, confer a  

similar entitlement on the daily wagers of abolished organisation  

to  such  alternative  employment. [See  Avas  Vikas  Sansthan  v.   

Avas Vikas Sansthan Engineers Association (2006 (4) SCC 132)].  

Their relevance in the context of appointment arose by reason of  

the concept of regularisation as a source of appointment. After  

Umadevi (supra),  their  position  continued  to  be  that  of  daily  

wagers. Appointment on daily wage basis is not an appointment  

to a post according to the rules. Usually, the projects in which the  

daily  wagers  were  engaged,  having  come  to  an  end,  their  

appointment  is  necessarily  terminated  for  want  of  work.  

Therefore, the status and rights of daily wagers of a Government  

concern are not equivalent to that of a Government servant and  

his claim to permanency has to be adjudged differently.    

23. In  these  circumstances,  in  our  considered  opinion,  the  

regularisation/absorption  is  not  a  matter  of  course.  It  would  

depend  upon  the  facts  of  the  case  following  the  rules  and  

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regulations  and  cannot  be  de  hors  the  rules  for  such  

regularisation/absorption.

24. Accordingly, we do not find any substance with regard to the  

arguments advanced before us on behalf of the appellants. We do  

not  find  any  merit  in  the  appeals.  Accordingly,  we uphold  the  

decision of the High Court and affirm the same, dismissing these  

appeals.               

.....……………………..J. (Surinder Singh Nijjar)

New Delhi;                                                      ......... …………………….J. February 25, 2014.                         (Pinaki Chandra  Ghose)

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