REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICITON

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.298  OF 2011 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) 9803 of 2009)

Smt. Mona Panwar ..,. Appellant

Versus

The Hon’ble High Court of Judicature At Allahabad through its Registrar and others     ...  Respondents

J U D G M E N T

J.M. Panchal, J.

Leave granted.

2. The present appeal is filed by the appellant, who is  

member  of  judicial  service  of  the  State  of  Uttar  

Pradesh,  for  expunging the remarks made by  the  

learned  Single  Judge  of  the  High  Court  of

Judicature  at  Allahabad  in  Criminal  Misc.  

Application No. 21606 of 2009 while  setting aside  

order  dated  August  1,  2009,  passed  by  the  

appellant in case No. nil of 2009 titled as Shabnam  

vs.  Irshad registering  the  application  filed  by  the  

respondent No. 3 under Section 156(3) of the Code  

of  Criminal  Procedure  (“Code”  for  short)  as  

complaint and directing the Registry to present the  

file  before  the  appellant  on  August  9,  2009  for  

recording the statement of the complainant, i.e., of  

Shabnam under Section 200 of the Code.

3. The facts giving rise to the present appeal  are as  

under:

The respondent No. 3 is wife of one Mustqeem and  

resides  at  Village  Sayyed  Mazra,  District  Saharanpur  

with her husband and in-laws.  It may be stated that the  

accused  is  her  father-in-law.   According  to  the  

respondent No. 3 her father-in-law had bad eye on her  

since her marriage.  The case of the respondent No. 3  

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was that in the intervening night of June 18/19, 2009 at  

about  3 O’clock she was all  alone in her  room as her  

husband  had  gone  out  and  she  was  sleeping  but  the  

doors  of  the  room were  kept  open  due  to  heat.   The  

allegation made by the respondent No. 3 is that Irshad,  

i.e., her father-in-law came inside her room, caught hold  

of her with bad intention, scratched her breasts, forcibly  

pushed cloth in her mouth and forcibly committed rape  

on  her.   The  case  of  the  respondent  No.  3  was  that  

though she  offered resistance,  Irshad did  not  pay  any  

heed and committed rape on her.  The allegation made by  

her  was  that  because  of  the  incident  she  became  

unconscious and in the morning she narrated the whole  

incident to her mother-in-law Bindi, but she advised her  

not to disclose the incident to anyone as it was a matter  

of reputation of the family.  According to respondent No.  

3 she telephoned her mother, who arrived at her in-laws’  

place along with Muneer, her brother-in-law, on a motor  

cycle but Irshad in the meanwhile had fled away from the  

village.  The case projected by the respondent No. 3 was  

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that  as  her  condition  was  deteriorating,  she  was  got  

medically  examined  in  District  hospital  by  her  mother  

and thereafter she had gone to the Police Station, Nakur,  

but the police had refused to register her FIR.  It  was  

claimed  by  the  respondent  No.  3  that  under  the  

circumstances she had moved an application before the  

Senior Superintendent of Police, Saharanpur but he had  

also not taken any action and, therefore, she had filed an  

application under Section 156(3) of the Code before the  

learned Judicial Magistrate II, Court No. 14, Saharanpur  

mentioning therein as to how the incident of rape with  

her had taken place and praying the learned Magistrate  

to direct the Officer-in-charge of Police Station, Nakur, to  

register her complaint and investigate the case against  

the accused under Section 156 (3) of the Code.

4. On receipt of the application the appellant called for  

report from the concerned police station.  As per the  

report received no case was registered regarding the  

incident  narrated  by  the  respondent  No.  3.   The  

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respondent  No.  3  had  filed  her  own  affidavit  in  

support of the case pleaded in the application filed  

before the appellant and produced a carbon copy of  

the  application  sent  by  her  to  the  Senior  

Superintendent  of  Police,  Saharanpur  with  its  

postal registration as well as photocopy of medical  

certificate.   The  learned  Magistrate  perused  the  

averments  made  by  the  respondent  No.  3  in  her  

application  as  well  as  documents  annexed  to  the  

said application.  The appellant was of the view that  

the respondent No. 3 was acquainted with the facts  

and circumstances of the case and was also familiar  

with the accused and knew the witnesses too.  The  

appellant was of the view that the respondent No. 3  

would be able to produce all  the evidence herself.  

The appellant referred to the principles of law laid  

down by the Allahabad High Court in Gulab Chand  

vs.  State  of  U.P. 2002  Cr.L.J.  2907,  Ram Babu  

Gupta vs.  State  of  U.P. 2001  (43)  ACC  50,  

Chandrika Singh vs.  State of U.P. 2007 (50) ACC  

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777 and  Sukhwasi  S/o Hulasi vs.  State  of  U.P.  

2007  (59)  ACC  739  and  after  taking  into  

consideration the principles laid down in the above  

referred to decisions the appellant was of the view  

that  this  was not  a fit  case to be referred to  the  

police for investigation under Section 156(3) of the  

Code  and,  therefore,  directed  that  the  application  

submitted by the respondent under Section 156(3)  

of the Code be registered as complaint and further  

ordered the Registry to present the file before her on  

August 28, 2009 for recording the statement of the  

respondent No. 3 i.e. the original complainant under  

Section 200 of the Code.

5. Feeling  aggrieved,  the  respondent  No.  3  invoked  

jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of  

the  Code  by  filing  Criminal  Misc.  Application  No.  

21606 of 2009 and prayed the High Court to quash  

the  order  dated  August  1,  2009,  passed  by  the  

appellant  and  to  direct  the  police  to  register  her  

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F.I.R.  filed  against  Irshad  and  to  investigate  the  

same as provided under Section 156(3) of the Code.

6. The learned Single  Judge of  the High Court,  who  

heard the matter, was of the view that the appellant  

had done the gravest injustice to the respondent No.  

3.   According to the learned Single  Judge though  

the appellant is a lady Magistrate yet she could not  

think about the outcome of ravishing the chastity of  

daughter-in-law by her father-in-law and the nature  

of  crime  committed  by  the  accused.   After  going  

through the order dated August 1, 2009, passed by  

the appellant,  the learned Single Judge expressed  

the  view  that  the  order  indicated  total  non-

application of mind by the appellant.  The learned  

Single Judge noticed that the incident had occurred  

inside the room in early hours of June 19, 2009 and  

there was no mention of any witness in application  

filed by the respondent but in the order passed by  

the appellant it was noted that the victim was in the  

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knowledge of  all  the  facts  and that  the  witnesses  

were  also  known  to  her,  which  indicated  non-

application of mind by the appellant.  The learned  

Single  Judge  while  setting  aside  the  order  dated  

August 1, 2009, passed by the appellant, observed  

that the order was a blemish on justice meted out to  

a married lady who was ravished by her own father-

in-law.   The  learned  Single  Judge  expressed  the  

view  that  the  appellant  had  passed  the  order  

ignoring all  judicial  disciplines and had not at all  

applied her judicial mind and had only referred to  

some of the judgments of the Allahabad High Court,  

which were contrary to the opinion expressed by the  

Apex  Court  rendered  in  many  decisions.   After  

observing that a judicial order should be passed by  

applying  judicial  mind,  the  learned  Single  Judge  

severely criticized the conduct of the appellant and  

recorded  his  serious  displeasure  against  the  

appellant  for  passing  such  type  of  illegal  orders.  

The  learned  Single  Judge  further  warned  the  

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appellant for future and cautioned the appellant to  

be  careful  in  passing  the  judicial  orders.   The  

learned  Single  Judge  observed  that  the  appellant  

should have thought that the rape not only causes  

physical injury to the victim but also leaves scars on  

the mind of the victim for the whole life and implant  

the victim with such ignominy which is worse than  

her death.  The learned Single Judge expressed the  

view that he was inclined to refer the matter to the  

Administrative Committee for taking action against  

the appellant but refrained from doing so because  

the  appellant  is  a  young  officer  and  has  a  long  

career  to  go.   The  learned  Single  Judge  by  his  

judgment  dated  September  9,  2009  set  aside  the  

order  dated  August  1,  2009,  passed  by  the  

appellant, and directed the appellant to decide the  

application of the respondent No. 3 within the ambit  

of her power under Section 156(3) of the Code and  

also directed her to pass order for registration of FIR  

against the erring police officers, who had refused to  

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register  the  FIR  of  the  respondent  No.  3.   The  

learned  Single  Judge  directed  the  Registry  of  the  

High Court to send a copy of his judgment to the  

appellant  for  her future guidance  and also to the  

Senior  Superintendent  of  Police,  Saharanpur.   As  

noted above, the disparaging remarks made by the  

learned Single Judge while setting aside the order  

passed  by  the  appellant  has  given  rise  to  the  

present appeal.

7. This Court  has heard the learned counsel  for  the  

appellant  as  well  as  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

State  Government  and  the  learned  counsel  

representing  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  

Allahabad.    The record shows that the Respondent  

No.3 i.e. the original complainant is duly served in  

the matter but she has neither appeared through a  

lawyer or in person nor has filed any reply in the  

matter.   This  Court  has  also  considered  the  

documents forming part of the present appeal.

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8. On receipt of notice issued by this Court, Mr. Anand  

Kumar,  Deputy  Superintendant  of  Police,  

Saharanpur,  U.P.  has  filed  reply  affidavit  

mentioning inter alia that as per the office record  

maintained at  the Police  Station, Nakur or in the  

officer  of  the  Senior  Superintendant  of  Police,  

Saharanpur  does  not  disclose  receipt  of  any  

complaint  from  the  Respondent  No.  3.   It  is  

mentioned  in  the  reply  that  when  the  impugned  

judgment dated September 10, 2009 passed by the  

learned Single Judge of High Court was brought to  

the  notice  of  the  authorities  concerned  a  first  

information report was lodged at the Police Station,  

Nakur being FIR 36/2009 against  accused Irshad  

and offence punishable under Section 376 IPC was  

registered.   The  reply  proceeds  to  state  that  the  

Investigating Officer had recorded the statement of  

the Respondent No. 3 as well as that of her mother  

and the statement of her brother-in-law.  But the  

mother and the brother-in-law had mentioned that  

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they were not  eye-witnesses to the  incident.   The  

reply mentions that inquiries made by Investigating  

Officer  with  the  neighbourers  of  the  accused  

indicated that Respondent No. 3 was a divorcee and  

was residing at her parents house from the date of  

divorce.  As per the reply of Deputy Superintendant  

of Police almost all neighbourers had unanimously  

informed  the  Investigating  Officer  that  the  

Respondent No.  3 was not seen at her husband’s  

house on 17th, 18th and 19th June, 2009 and thus  

the incident referred to by Respondent No. 3 in her  

complaint was found to be a concocted story.  The  

reply further mentions that the Investigating Officer  

had  recorded  the  statement  of  doctor  who  had  

medically examined the Respondent No. 3 and the  

doctor  had  categorically  stated  that  medical  

examination  of  the  Respondent  No.  3  did  not  

confirm allegation of  rape made by her.   What is  

relevant to notice is that in the reply it is stated that  

on  completion  of  investigation  the  Investigating  

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Officer had closed the investigation and submitted  

the final report as contemplated by Section 169 of  

the Code on December 18, 2009.

9. Section 156(1) of the Code authorizes the police to  

investigate  into  a  cognizable  offence  without  

requiring  any  sanction  from  a  judicial  authority.  

However, sub-section (3) of Section 156 of the Code  

provides  that  any  Magistrate  empowered  under  

Section  190  of  the  Code  may  order  such  an  

investigation as mentioned in sub-section (1) of the  

said Section.  Section 190 of the Code deals with  

cognizance of offences by Magistrates and inter alia  

provides that any Magistrate of the first class may  

take cognizance of an offence (a) upon receiving a  

complaint of facts which constitute such offence, (b)  

upon  a  police  report  of  such  facts  and  (c)  upon  

information received from any person other than a  

police officer or upon his own knowledge that such  

offence has been committed.  Neither Section 154  

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nor  Section  156  of  the  Code  contemplates  any  

application to be made to the police under Section  

156(3)  of  the  Code.   What  is  provided  in  Section  

156(1) of the Code is that any officer in charge of a  

police  station  may,  without  the  order  of  a  

Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a  

Court having jurisdiction over the local area within  

the  limits  of  such  station  would  have  power  to  

inquiry into or try under the provisions of Chapter  

XIII.  However, this Court finds that in the present  

case it was alleged by the respondent No. 3 that she  

had filed complaint before police but according to  

her, the police officer in charge of the police station  

had refused to register her complaint and, therefore,  

she  had  made  application  to  the  Senior  

Superintendent  of  Police  as  required  by  Section  

154(3) of the Code, but of no avail.  Therefore, the  

respondent  No.  3  had  approached  the  appellant,  

who  was  then  discharging  duties  as  Judicial  

Magistrate II, Court No. 14, Saharanpur.  When the  

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complaint was presented before the appellant, the  

appellant had mainly two options available to her.  

One  was  to  pass  an  order  as  contemplated  by  

Section 156(3) of the Code and second one was to  

direct  examination  of  the  complainant  upon  oath  

and the witnesses present, if any, as mentioned in  

Section 200 and proceed further with the matter as  

provided  by  Section  202  of  the  Code.   An  order  

made under  sub-section (3)  of  Section 156 of  the  

Code is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or  

intimation to the police to exercise its plenary power  

of  investigation  under  Section  156(1).   Such  an  

investigation  embraces  the  entire  continuous  

process which begins with the collection of evidence  

under Section 156 and ends with the final  report  

either under Section 169 or submission of  charge  

sheet under Section 173 of the Code.  A Magistrate  

can under  Section 190 of  the  Code  before  taking  

cognizance ask for investigation by the police under  

Section 156(3) of the Code.  The Magistrate can also  

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issue  warrant  for  production,  before  taking  

cognizance.  If after cognizance has been taken and  

the  Magistrate  wants  any  investigation,  it  will  be  

under Section 202 of the Code.  The phrase “taking  

cognizance of” means cognizance of offence and not  

of the offender.  Taking cognizance does not involve  

any formal action or indeed action of any kind but  

occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to  

the  suspected  commission  of  an  offence.  

Cognizance, therefore, takes place at a point when a  

Magistrate first takes judicial notice of an offence.  

This  is  the  position  whether  the  Magistrate  takes  

cognizance  of  an offence  on  a  complaint  or  on  a  

police report or upon information of a person other  

than a police officer.  Before the Magistrate can be  

said to have taken cognizance of an offence under  

Section 190(1)(b) of the Code, he must have not only  

applied his mind to the contents of the complaint  

presented before him, but must have done so for the  

purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and the  

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provisions following that  Section.   However,  when  

the  Magistrate  had  applied  his  mind  only  for  

ordering  an  investigation  under  Section  156(3)  of  

the Code or issued a warrant for the purposes of  

investigation,  he  cannot  be  said  to  have  taken  

cognizance of  an offence.   Taking cognizance is  a  

different  thing  from  initiation  of  the  proceedings.  

One of  the  objects  of  examination of  complainant  

and his witnesses as mentioned in Section 200 of  

the Code is to ascertain whether there is prima facie  

case against the person accused of  the offence in  

the complaint and to prevent the issue of process on  

a  complaint  which  is  either  false  or  vexatious  or  

intended  only  to  harass  such  person.   Such  

examination  is  provided,  therefore,  to  find  out  

whether  there  is  or  not  sufficient  ground  for  

proceeding further.

10. From the order dated August 1, 2009, passed by the  

appellant, it is evident that the appellant had called  

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for  report  from  the  concerned  police  station  and  

considered the said report wherein it was inter alia  

mentioned that no case was registered on the basis  

of  the application made by the respondent No.  3.  

The respondent No. 3 at the time of filing complaint  

before  the  appellant  had  filed  her  own  affidavit,  

carbon copy of the application sent by her to the  

Senior  Superintendent  of  Police,  Saharanpur  with  

its postal registration and photocopy of the medical  

certificate.  Under the circumstances the appellant  

had  exercised  judicial  discretion  available  to  a  

Magistrate and directed that the application, which  

was  submitted  by  the  respondent  No.  3  under  

Section  156(3)  of  the  Code,  be  registered  as  

complaint and directed the Registry to present the  

said complaint before her on August 28, 2009 for  

recording  the  statement  of  the  respondent  No.3  

under  Section  200  of  the  Code.   The  judicial  

discretion  exercised  by  the  appellant  was  in  

consonance  with  the  scheme  postulated  by  the  

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Code.  There is no material on the record to indicate  

that  the  judicial  discretion  exercised  by  the  

appellant  was either  arbitrary  or  perverse.   There  

was  no  occasion  for  the  learned  Single  Judge  of  

High  Court  to  substitute  the  judicial  discretion  

exercised by the appellant merely because another  

view is possible.  The appellant was the responsible  

judicial officer on the spot and after assessing the  

material  placed  before  him  he  had  exercised  the  

judicial  discretion.   In  such  circumstances  this  

Court is of the opinion that the High Court had no  

occasion to  interfere  with the  discretion exercised  

judiciously  in  terms  of  the  provisions  of  Code.  

Normally, an order under Section 200 of the Code  

for  examination  of  the  complainant  and  his  

witnesses would not be passed because it consumes  

the valuable time of the Magistrate being vested in  

inquiring into the matter which primarily is the duty  

of the police to investigate.  However, the practice  

which  has  developed  over  the  years  is  that  

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examination of the complainant and his witnesses  

under Section 200 of the Code would be directed by  

the  Magistrate  only  when  a  case  is  found  to  be  

serious one and not as a matter of routine course.  

If on a reading of a complaint the Magistrate finds  

that  the  allegations  therein  disclose  a  cognizable  

offence and forwarding of the complaint to the police  

for investigation under Section 156(3)  of  the Code  

will not be conducive to justice, he will be justified  

in adopting the course suggested in Section 200 of  

the Code.  Here, in this case the respondent No. 3  

had averred in the application submitted before the  

appellant  that  the  Officer-in-charge  of  the  Nakur  

Police Station had refused to register her complaint  

against  her  father-in-law  regarding  alleged  rape  

committed on her and that no action was taken by  

the  Senior  Superintendent  of  Police  though  

necessary facts were brought to his notice.  Under  

the circumstances, the judicial discretion exercised  

by the appellant, to proceed under Section 200 of  

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the Code in the light of principles of law laid down  

by  the  Allahabad  High  Court  in  various  reported  

decisions could not have been faulted with nor the  

appellant  could  have  been  subjected  to  severe  

criticism as was done by the learned Single Judge.  

There was no occasion for the learned Single Judge  

to observe that the appellant, a Judicial Magistrate,  

had done the gravest injustice to the victim or that  

though the appellant is a lady Magistrate, yet she  

did not think about the  outcome of  ravishing the  

chastity of daughter-in-law by her father-in-law  or  

the  seriousness  of  the  crime  committed  by  the  

accused and  the reason assigned by the learned  

Magistrate in not directing the police to register the  

FIR indicated total non-application of mind by the  

appellant and that the order dated August 1, 2009,  

passed  by  the  appellant,  was  a  blemish  on  the  

justice system.  The learned Single Judge was not  

justified in concluding that the appellant as Judicial  

Magistrate  had passed the order  dated  August  1,  

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2009  ignoring  all  judicial  disciplines  or  that  the  

appellant had not at all  applied her judicial  mind  

and had only referred to some of the judgments of  

the Allahabad High Court, which were contrary to  

the  opinion  of  the  Apex  Court  rendered  in  many  

decisions.   There  was  no  reason  for  the  learned  

Single Judge of the High Court to record his serious  

displeasure against the order of the appellant which  

was challenged before him as an illegal order nor  

the learned Single  Judge was justified in severely  

criticizing the conduct of the appellant as Judicial  

Magistrate because the application submitted by the  

respondent N. 3 was ordered to be registered as a  

complaint and was not dismissed.

11. This  Court  has  laid  down  in  several  reported  

decisions  that  higher  courts  should  observe  

restraint and disparaging remarks normally should  

not  be  made  against  the  learned  members  of  the  

lower  judiciary.   In  Ishwari  Prasad  Mishra vs.  

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Mohd. Isa (1963) 3 SCR 722, a Three Judge Bench  

of  this  Court  has  emphasized  the  need  to  adopt  

utmost  judicial  restraint  against  using  strong  

language  and  imputation  of  motive  against  the  

lower judiciary by noticing that in such matters the  

concerned Judge has no remedy in law to vindicate  

his position.   The law laid down by this Court in  

the  matter  of  expunction  of  remarks  where  a  

subordinate  Judge  has  been  subjected  to  

disparaging  and  undeserved  remarks  by  the  

superior Court, is well settled by this Court in the  

matter  of  ‘K’  a  Judicial  Officer Vs.  Registrar  

General, High Court of Andhra Pradesh 2001 (3)  

SCC  54.   In  the  said  decision  this  Court  has  

succinctly outlined the guidelines in this regard in  

paragraph 15 of the said Judgment as under:

“........The  existence  of  power  in  higher  echelons of judiciary to make observations  even extending to criticism incorporated in  judicial orders cannot be denied.  However,  the  High  Courts  have  to  remember  that  criticisms  and  observations  touching  a  

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subordinate  judicial  officer  incorporated in  judicial  pronouncements  have  their  own  mischievous infirmities.  Firstly, the judicial  officer  is  condemned  unheard  which  is  violative of principles of natural justice.  A  member  of  subordinate  judiciary  himself  dispensing justice should not be denied this  minimal  natural  justice  so  as  to  shield  against  being  condemned  unheard.  Secondly,  the  harm  caused  by  such  criticism or observation may be incapable of  being undone.  Such criticism of the judicial  officer contained in a judgment, reportable  or not, is a pronouncement in the open and  therefore becomes public.   Thirdly, human  nature being what it is such criticism of a  judicial officer contained in the judgment of  a  higher  court  gives  the  litigating  party  a  sense of victory not only over his opponent  but  also  over  the  Judge  who had decided  the case against him.  This is subversive of  judicial  authority  of  the  deciding  Judge.  Fourthly,  seeking  expunging  of  the  observations by a judicial officer by filing an  appeal or petition of his own reduces him to  the status of a litigant arrayed as a party  before the High Court or Supreme Court- a  situation not very happy from the point of  view  of  the  functioning  of  the  judicial  system. And  last  but  not  the  least,  the  possibility of a single or casual aberration of  an otherwise honest, upright and righteous  Judge being caught unawares in the net of  adverse  observations  cannot  be  ruled  out.  Such  an  incident  would  have  a  seriously  demoralizing effect not only on him but also  on  his  colleagues.   If  all  this  is  avoidable  why should it not be avoided?”

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However, this Court has further provided that the  

parameters  outlined  hereinbefore  must  not  be  

understood  as  meaning  that  any  conduct  of  a  

subordinate  judicial  office  unbecoming  of  him  and  

demanding a rebuff should be simply overlooked.   This  

Court  has  outlined  an  alternate  safer  and  advisable  

course of action in such a situation, that is of separately  

drawing  up  proceedings,  inviting  the  attention  of  the  

Hon’ble Chief Justice to the facts describing the conduct  

of  the  subordinate  Judge  concerned  by  sending  a  

confidential  letter  or  note  to  the  Chief  Justice.   The  

actions so taken would all be on the administrative side  

with  the  subordinate  Judge  concerned  having  an  

opportunity  of  clarifying  his  position  and he  would  be  

provided the safeguard of not being condemned unheard,  

and if  the decision be adverse to him,  it  being on the  

administrative  side,  he  would  have  some  remedy  

available to him under the law.

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Again, in K.P. Tiwari vs. State of M.P. 1994 Supp.  

(1) SCC 540, this Court had to remind all concerned that  

using intemperate language and castigating strictures on  

the members of lower judiciary diminishes the image of  

judiciary in the eyes of public and, therefore, the higher  

courts should refrain from passing disparaging remarks  

against the members of the lower judiciary.  The record  

would  show  that  the  appellant  had  discharged  her  

judicial  duties  to  the  best  of  her  capacity.   To  err  is  

human.   It  is  often  said  that  a  Judge,  who  has  not  

committed  an  error,  is  yet  to  be  born.   This  dictum  

applies to all  the learned Judges at all  levels from the  

lowest  to  the  highest.   The  difference  in  views  of  the  

higher  and  the  lower  courts  is  purely  a  result  of  a  

difference  in  approach  and  perception.   But  merely  

because  there  is  difference  in  views,  it  does  not  

necessarily establish that the lower courts are necessarily  

wrong and the higher courts are always right.  Therefore,  

this Court in several reported decision has emphasized  

the  need  to  adopt  utmost  judicial  restraint  against  

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making the disparaging remarks so far  as members of  

lower judiciary are concerned.

12. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case,  

this  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  disparaging  

remarks  referred  to  above,  made  by  the  learned  

Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, were not  

justified at all and, therefore, the appeal will have to  

be accepted.

13. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds.  The  

disparaging  remarks  made  by  the  learned  Single  

Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad  

in  Criminal  Misc.  Application  No.  21606 of  2009,  

decided on September 9, 2009, while setting aside  

order  dated  August  1,  2009,  passed  by  the  

appellant in case No. nil of 2009 titled as Shabnam  

vs.  Irshad directing that the application submitted  

by the respondent No. 3 be registered as complaint  

and  ordering  the  Registry  to  present  the  same  

before her for recording statement of the respondent  

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No. 3 under Section 200 of the Code, are hereby set  

aside  and  quashed.   In  this  Appeal  prayer  is  to  

expunge remarks made by the learned Single Judge  

of  High  Court  against  the  Appellant.   The  other  

directions are not subject matter of challenge in the  

appeal, therefore, those directions are not interfered  

with.   

14. The appeal accordingly stands disposed of.

.....................................J. [J.M. Panchal]

.....................................J. [H.L. Gokhale]

New Delhi; February 02, 2011.

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