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       REPORTABLE    

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 1278-1279 OF 2010

Mohinder Singh               .... Appellant(s)

Versus

State of Punjab     .... Respondent(s)      

J U D G M E N T

P.Sathasivam,J.

1)  These  appeals  are  filed  against  the  common  final  

judgment and order dated 30.05.2008 passed by the High  

Court  of  Punjab  and  Haryana  at  Chandigarh  in  Murder  

Reference No. 8 of 2007 and Criminal Appeal No. 1033-DB of  

2007 whereby the High Court accepted the murder reference  

and confirmed the death sentence imposed on the appellant  

herein  by  the  Sessions  Judge,  Ludhiana  by  order  dated  

22.11.2007 in Session Case No. 32 of  2006 and dismissed  

the appeal filed by him.  

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2) Brief facts:

(a) According  to  the  prosecution,  on  08.01.2006,  the  

appellant-accused has committed murder of his wife-Veena  

Verma  and  daughter-Geetu  Verma  in  the  background  of  

inimical  relationship between them on account  of criminal  

cases registered against him by his wife for committing rape  

on  his  minor  daughter–Geetu  Verma,  for  which  he  was  

sentenced  to  rigorous imprisonment  for  12  years,  and  for  

attacking  her  after  release on parole  in  January,  2005 for  

which an FIR was registered against him.

(b)  On the date of incident, i.e., 08.01.2006, at around 06:30  

p.m., when Shalu Verma-the complainant,  daughter of the  

appellant-accused was present along with her mother-Veena  

Verma  and  sister-Geetu  Verma  in  their  house  at  village  

Partap  Singh  Wala,  Haibowal,  Ludhiana,  at  that  time,  the  

appellant-accused,  who  was  living  separately  in  a  rented  

accommodation, came to the said place carrying a Kulhara  

(axe)  in  his  hand.   The complainant  informed her  mother  

about the same.  When Veena Verma came to the lobby of  

the house, the appellant-accused gave an axe blow on her  

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head.  She fell on the ground and, thereafter, he gave two  

more blows using axe on her neck and hand.  Immediately  

after  that,  he  stepped  towards  Geetu  Verma  and  gave  3  

repeated blows on her head.  Both of them smeared with  

blood and died on the spot.  When he approached Shalu, she  

went into the room and bolted the same from inside.  The  

appellant-accused  fled  away  leaving  the  axe  at  the  spot.  

After sometime, she came outside the room and raised hue  

and cry.   

(c) On the basis of the statement of Shalu (PW-2), a First  

Information Report (FIR) being No. 6 was registered against  

the appellant-accused under Section 302 of the Indian Penal  

Code, 1860 (in short “the IPC”) at P.S. Haibowal, Ludhiana.  

On the same day, the appellant-accused was arrested from  

his rented house and the case was committed to the Court of  

Session, Ludhiana and numbered as Session Case No. 32 of  

2006   

(d) The  Sessions  Judge,  Ludhiana,  by  order  dated  

22.11.2007, convicted the appellant under Section 302 of IPC  

and sentenced him to death.  

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(e) Against  the  said  order,  the  appellant  preferred  an  

appeal before the High Court and the State filed a reference  

under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973  

(in short ‘the Code’) for confirmation of death sentence.  By a  

common impugned order dated 30.05.2008, the High Court  

while accepting the murder reference confirmed the death  

reference  imposed  by  the  trial  Court  and  dismissed  the  

appeal filed by the appellant-accused.   

(f) Aggrieved  by  the  said  judgment,  the  appellant  

preferred these appeals by way of special leave before this  

Court.   

(g) This Court, by order dated 20.07.2009, issued notice on  

the special leave petitions confining to sentence only.  Even  

on 16.07.2010 when this Court granted leave, nothing has  

been stated about the above said initial notice.  Hence, in  

these  appeals,  we  are  concerned  about  the  quantum  of  

sentence imposed on the appellant.

3) Heard  Mr.  Tripurari  Raj,  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant and Mr. V. Madhukar, learned Additional Advocate  

General for the respondent-State.

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4) Though at the outset, learned counsel for the appellant  

insisted us to go into the entire merits of the case including  

the circumstances relied on by the prosecution and accepted  

by the Courts below, in view of the fact that this Court has  

issued  notice  confining  to  sentence  only,  we  rejected  his  

plea.

5) We are conscious of the fact that in terms of Section  

366(1)  of  the  Code,  when  the  Court  of  Session  passes  a  

sentence of death, the proceedings shall be submitted to the  

High Court, and the sentence shall not be executed unless it  

is confirmed by the High Court.  The scope and application of  

the above section is only in cases where a sentence of death  

has  been  passed  by  the  Court  of  Session.   The  Court  of  

Session should refer the proceedings to the High Court and  

the  High  Court  can  only  deal  with  them  as  a  Court  of  

reference.  It is the practice of the High Court to be satisfied  

on the facts as well as the law of the case, that the conviction  

is right, before it proceeds to confirm that sentence.  In other  

words, the High Court has to come to its own independent  

conclusion  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused,  

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independently of the opinion of the Judge.  In a reference for  

confirmation  of  death  sentence,  the  High  Court  must  

examine  the  entire  evidence for  itself  independent  of  the  

Session  Court’s  views.   While  confirming  the  capital  

sentence,  the  High  Court  is  under  an  obligation  to  itself  

consider  what  sentence  should  be  imposed  and  not  be  

content  with the trial  Court’s decision on the point  unless  

some reason is  shown for  reducing  the  same.   Where,  in  

addition  to  an  appeal  filed  by  an  accused  sentenced  to  

death,  the  High Court  has  to dispose of the  reference for  

confirmation  of  death  sentence  under  Section  366  of  the  

Code, the High Court, while dealing with reference, should  

consider the proceedings in all its aspects and come to an  

independent conclusion on the material on record apart from  

the views expressed by the Sessions Judge.  The confirmation  

of death sentence cannot be based only on the precedents  

and  or  aggravating  facts  and  circumstances  of  any  other  

case.   

6) Keeping the above principles in mind, let us analyze the  

materials  placed  before  the  trial  Judge  as  well  as  the  

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confirmation order of the High Court.  In view of the limited  

notice  and  in  the  light  of  the  mandates  provided  under  

Section 366 of the Code relating to confirmation of death  

sentence  by  the  High  Court,  we  are  of  the  view  that  

considering  two  earlier  orders  passed  by  this  Court  on  

20.07.2009 and 16.07.2010 confining to  the  sentence,  we  

intend  to  concentrate  only  to  the  question,  namely,  

acceptability or otherwise of the “sentence” hereunder.

7) No doubt, it is a case of double murder by the appellant-

accused who murdered his wife and daughter in a gruesome  

manner in the background of inimical relationship between  

the family on account of criminal  cases registered against  

the appellant-accused at the instance of his deceased wife –  

Veena  Verma  and  deceased  daughter-  Geetu  Verma  for  

which  he  was  sentenced  to  rigorous  imprisonment  for  12  

years’ for committing rape on his daughter-Geetu Verma.  In  

that case his deceased wife was a witness.  It is seen that  

after release on parole in January, 2005, he attacked on his  

wife and an FIR was registered against him for violating the  

conditions of release.   It  is  further  seen that  the  accused  

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committed  the  offence  in  the  presence  of  his  youngest  

daughter Shalu (PW-2).  It is also proved that the appellant  

had  entered  the  scene  of  occurrence  to  commit  the  said  

offence carrying a deadly weapon i.e. ‘Kulhara’ (Axe) which  

was  used  in  the  commission  of  both  the  killings.   The  

members  present  in  the  house were  his  family  members,  

viz., wife and two daughters.

8) We noticed the following special reasons given by the  

trial Court for warranting the death sentence and the High  

Court for confirming the same which are as follows:

i) The appellant-accused had earlier  committed rape on  

his deceased daughter – Geetu Verma in the year 1999 when  

she was a minor after giving beatings and threat to her and  

in that case his wife-Veena Verma (since deceased) was a  

witness and that a case under Sections 376 and 506 IPC was  

registered  against  him  which  finally  resulted  in  rigorous  

imprisonment for 12 years.

ii) While on parole in January 2005, the appellant-accused  

having violated the conditions of release, attacked his wife-

Veena Verma and an FIR being No. 58 dated 06.04.2005 was  

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registered against him under Sections 323, 324 and 506 IPC  

which is pending in the Court of JMIC, Ludhiana on the date of  

alleged occurrence.

iii) The appellant-accused entered into the  house with  a  

deadly  weapon  ‘Kulhara’  (Axe)  and  caused  unprovoked  

brutal attacks on the victims.   

iv) The appellant-accused caused repeated  blows on the  

vital parts of the body of his wife and daughter resulting in  

instantaneous  deaths  in  the  presence  of  his  youngest  

daughter  of  tender  age,  who by running  into a  room and  

bolting  its  from  inside,  saved  herself  when  the  accused  

proceeded towards her.  

v)   The appellant-accused gave first blow to his wife – Veena  

Verma from behind with Kulhara (axe) on her head and when  

she fell down on the ground he caused successive blows on  

her  neck  and  the  head  and,  thereafter,  he  attacked  his  

daughter–Geetu Verma and caused repeated Kulhara blows  

till  her  death.   Thereafter,  he  proceeded  towards  his  

youngest daughter Shalu (PW-2) and showed Kulhara to her,  

who ran into a room and bolted it from inside.

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vi) In the case of the deceased - Veena Verma, out of 4  

incised  wounds,  Injury  Nos.  1  &  2  were  caused  on  head,  

Injury  No.3  on  neck  and  Injury  No.  4  resulted  in  partial  

amputation  of  left  index  finger  from  1/3rd with  clean  cut  

margins.  Regarding the deceased - Geetu Verma, who had  

been  earlier  subjected  to  diabolical  act  of  rape  by  the  

appellant-accused during her minority in 1999, as many as 9  

injuries were caused, out of which 7 were incised wounds and  

2 were abrasions.  Further,  out of 7 incised wounds 3 had  

been caused on head region itself, 1 on the left mastoid and  

rest 3 on left and right elbow and fingers.  In both the cases,  

the victims died instantaneous death.

vii) Apart  from  taking  revenge  for  his  conviction  and  

sentence, the appellant-accused has committed the offence  

for personal gain as he wanted the house, being occupied by  

his  deceased  wife  and  children,  to  be  vacated  for  his  

personal use.

9) The crime of double murder of his wife and daughter in  

a gruesome and diabolical manner will irrefutably be taken  

into consideration as aggravating circumstance.   However,  

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for some reasons, the High Court did not find any mitigating  

circumstance  in  favour  of  the  accused  for  the  purpose of  

balancing  aggravating  against  mitigating.   Even,  the  High  

Court recorded at page 38 of the impugned order as under:-

“…  In  this  background,  looking  for  a  strong  mitigating  circumstance,  may not  yield any result  and this  offence  has in  fact,  ceased to  remain  a  simple  case of  murder.  This  has  rather  acquired  an  enormity  to  the  extent  of  rushing into the category of the “rarest of rare case.”

It is pertinent to mention that in spite of the onerous duty  

bestowed on the reference court to balance the aggravating  

and  mitigating  circumstances,  the  High  Court  evaded  the  

same.   

10) On the other hand, the Sessions Court had attempted to  

draw a balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances  

by stating two mitigating circumstances as follows:

1. Firstly, his age at the time of commission of crime  

i.e. 41 years.

2. Secondly, that the accused is a poor man, who had  

no livelihood.

While it is true that the above two circumstances alone will  

not  make  good for  commuting  the  death  sentence  to  life  

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sentence,  however,  before we move on to enumerate  the  

other mitigating circumstances in this case, it is necessary to  

consider few case laws which reiterate that brutality is not  

the sole criterion of determining whether a case falls under  

the “rarest of rare” categories.

11) In  Panchhi & Ors.  vs.  State of U.P.,  (1998) 7 SCC  

177, this Court held that brutality is not the sole criterion of  

determining whether a case falls under the “rarest of rare”  

categories,  thereby  justifying  the  commutation  of  a  death  

sentence to life imprisonment.  This Court observed:

“No doubt brutality looms large in the murders in this case  particularly  of  the old and also the tender age child.   It  may  be  that  the  manner  in  which  a  murder  was  perpetrated may be a ground but not the sole criterion for  judging  whether  the  case  is  one  of  the  “rarest  of  rare  cases” as indicated in Bachan Singh’s case.”

12) The  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court,  by  a  majority,  

upheld  the  constitutional  validity  of  death  sentence  in  

Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684.  This  

Court took particular care to say that death sentence shall  

not normally be awarded for the offence of murder and that  

it must be confined to the “rarest of rare” cases when the  

alternative  option  is  foreclosed.   In  other  words,  the  

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Constitution Bench did not find death sentence valid in all  

cases  except  in  the  aforesaid  cases  wherein  the  lesser  

sentence would be wholly inadequate.  

13) In  Machhi  Singh  and  Ors. vs.  State  of  Punjab,  

(1983) 3 SCC 470, a three-Judge Bench of this Court while  

following  the  ratio  in  Bachan  Singh  (supra) laid  down  

certain guidelines amongst which the following is relevant in  

the present case:

“A  balance-sheet  of  aggravating  and  mitigating  circumstances  has  to  be  drawn  up  and  in  doing  so  the  mitigating  circumstances  have  to  be  accorded  full  weightage and a just balance has to be struck between the  aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before the  option is exercised.”

14) We have extracted the above reasons of the two courts  

only to point out that, in a way, every murder is brutal, and  

the difference between the one from the other may be on  

account  of  mitigating  or  aggravating  features  surrounding  

the murder.

15) In the instant case, as already mentioned, the accused  

had earlier committed rape on his deceased daughter-Geetu  

Verma in 1999 and in that case, his deceased wife - Veena  

Verma  was a  witness  wherein  the  accused  was convicted  

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under Sections 376 and 506 IPC and sentenced to RI for 12  

years.   It  is  also  subsequently  taken  on  record  that  his  

deceased wife sent the accused out of his house and as a  

consequence,  he had to live separately in a rented house  

with  no  means  of  livelihood.   It  was  thirst  for  retaliation,  

which became the motivating factor in this case.  In no words  

are  we  suggesting  that  the  motive  of  the  accused  was  

correct rather we feel it does not come within the category of  

“rarest of rare” case to award death penalty.  

16) The doctrine of “rarest of rare”  confines two aspects  

and when both the aspects are satisfied only then the death  

penalty can be imposed.  Firstly, the case must clearly fall  

within the ambit of “rarest of rare” and secondly, when the  

alternative  option  is  unquestionably  foreclosed.   Bachan  

Singh (supra) suggested selection of death punishment as  

the penalty of last resort when, alternative punishment of life  

imprisonment will be futile and serves no purpose.

17) In  life  sentence,  there  is  a  possibility  of  achieving  

deterrence,  rehabilitation  and  retribution  in  different  

degrees.   But  the  same does not  hold true  for  the  death  

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penalty.  It is unique in its absolute rejection of the potential  

of convict to rehabilitate and reform.  It extinguishes life and  

thereby  terminates  the  being,  therefore,  puts  an  end  

anything  to  do  with  the  life.   This  is  the  big  difference  

between  two  punishments.   Thus,  before  imposing  death  

penalty, it is imperative to consider the same.  

18) “Rarest of rare” dictum, as discussed above, hints at  

this  difference  between  death  punishment  and  the  

alternative punishment of life imprisonment.   The relevant  

question  here  would  be  to  determine  whether  life  

imprisonment  as  a  punishment  would  be  pointless  and  

completely  devoid  of  any  reason  in  the  facts  and  

circumstances  of  the  case.   As  discussed  above,  life  

imprisonment can be said to be completely futile, only when  

the  sentencing  aim  of  reformation  can  be  said  to  be  

unachievable.  Therefore, for satisfying the second aspect to  

the “rarest of rare” doctrine, the court will have to provide  

clear evidence as to why the convict is not fit for any kind of  

reformatory and rehabilitation scheme.  

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19) Treating the case on the touchstone of the guidelines  

laid  down  in  Bachan  Singh (supra),   Machhi  Singh  

(supra) and other decisions and balancing the aggravating  

and mitigating circumstances emerging from the evidence  

on record, we are not persuaded to accept that the case can  

appropriately be called the “rarest of rare” case warranting  

death  penalty.   We  also  find  it  difficult  to  hold  that  the  

appellant is such a dangerous person that sparing his life will  

endanger the community.  We are also not satisfied that the  

circumstances of the crime are such that there is no other  

alternative  but  to  impose  death  sentence  even  after  

according  maximum  weightage  to  the  mitigating  

circumstances in favour of the accused.  In our considered  

view, this case is the one in which humanist approach must  

be taken in the matter of awarding punishment.  

20) It is well settled law that awarding of life sentence is a  

rule and death is an exception.  The application of the “rarest  

of rare” case principle is dependant upon and differs from  

case  to  case.   However,  the  principles  laid  down  and  

reiterated in various decisions of this Court show that in a  

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deliberately  planned  crime,  executed  meticulously  in  a  

diabolic  manner,  exhibiting  inhuman  conduct  in  a  ghastly  

manner,  touching the conscience of everyone and thereby  

disturbing  the  moral  fiber  of  the  society,  would  call  for  

imposition of capital  punishment in order to ensure that it  

acts as a deterrent.  While we are convinced that the case of  

the prosecution based on the evidence adduced confirms the  

commission of offence by the appellant, however, we are of  

the considered opinion that still the case does not fall within  

the four corners of the “rarest of rare” case.  

21) Life imprisonment cannot be equivalent to imprisonment  

for 14 years or 20 years or even 30 years, rather it always  

means the whole natural life.  This Court has always clarified  

that  the  punishment  of  a  fixed  term  of  imprisonment  so  

awarded would be subject to any order passed in exercise of  

clemency powers of the President of India or the Governor of  

the  State,  as  the  case  may  be.   Pardons,  reprieves  and  

remissions under Article 72 or Article 161 of the Constitution  

of India are granted in exercise of prerogative power.  As  

observed in  State of Uttar Pradesh vs.  Sanjay Kumar,  

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(2012) 8 SCC 537, there is no scope of judicial review of such  

orders  except  on  very  limited  grounds  such  as  the  non-

application  of  mind  while  passing  the  order,  non-

consideration of relevant material, or if the order suffers from  

arbitrariness.  The power to grant pardons and to commute  

sentences is coupled with a duty to exercise the same fairly,  

reasonably and in terms of restrictions imposed in several  

provisions of the Code.  

22) In order to check all arbitrary remissions, the Code itself  

provides  several  conditions.   Sub-sections  (2)  to  (5)  of  

Section 432 of the Code lay down basic procedure for making  

an application to the appropriate Government for suspension  

or remission of sentence either by the convict or someone on  

his behalf.  We are of the view that exercise of power by the  

appropriate  Government  under  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  

432 of the Code cannot be  suo motu for the simple reason  

that this is only an enabling provision and the same would be  

possible subject  to fulfillment of certain conditions.  Those  

conditions  are  mentioned  either  in  the  Jail  Manual  or  in  

statutory rules.  This Court in various decisions has held that  

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the power of remission cannot be exercised arbitrarily.  In  

other words, the decision to grant remission has to be well  

informed, reasonable and fair to all concerned.  The statutory  

procedure  laid  down  in  Section  432  of  the  Code  itself  

provides this check on the possible misuse of power by the  

appropriate Government.  As rightly observed by this Court  

in  Sangeet  and  Anr. vs.  State  of  Haryana,  2012  (11)  

Scale 140, there is misconception that a prisoner serving life  

sentence has an indefeasible right to release on completion  

of  either  14  years  or  20  years  imprisonment.  A  convict  

undergoing  life  imprisonment  is  expected  to  remain  in  

custody  till  the  end  of  his  life,  subject  to  any  remission  

granted by the appropriate Government under Section 432 of  

the Code which in turn is subject to the procedural checks  

mentioned  in  the  said  provision  and  further  substantive  

check in Section 433-A of the Code.  

23) One significant factor in this case, which we should not  

loose sight  of is  that  he did not harm his other  daughter,  

namely, Shallu (PW-2) even though he had a good chance for  

the same.  Further, it was highlighted that he being a poor  

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man and unable to earn his livelihood since he was driven  

out of his house by his deceased wife.  It is also his claim that  

if he was allowed to live in the house, he could easily meet  

both  his  ends  and  means,  as  the  money  which  he  was  

spending by paying rent would have been saved.  It is his  

further grievance that his deceased wife was adamant and  

he should live outside and should not lead a happy married  

life  and  that  was  the  reason  that  their  relations  were  

strained.   This  also  shows  that  the  accused  was  feeling  

frustrated because of the attitude of his wife and children.  

Moreover, the probability of the offender’s rehabilitation and  

reformation is not foreclosed in this case.  Likewise, we can  

see from the affidavit filed by the sister of the accused that  

his family has not totally renounced as yet.  This is also clear  

that  pending  the  above  appeals,  the  appellant-accused,  

through  his  sister  –  Pramjit  Kaur,  filed  an  application  for  

modification of earlier orders of this Court dated 20.07.2009  

and 16.07.2010 for widening the scope of the appeals and  

sought  permission to raise all  available  grounds.   For this  

application, only his sister – Pramjit Kaur has filed an affidavit  

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strengthening the above points.  As mentioned above, the  

affidavit  of his sister  shows that  his family has not totally  

renounced him.  Hence, there is a possibility for reformation  

in  the  present  appellant.   Keeping  in  mind  all  these  

materials, we do not think that the present case warrants the  

award of the death penalty.  

24) For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion  

that  this  is  not  a  case  where  death  penalty  should  be  

imposed.  The appellant-accused, therefore, instead of being  

awarded  death  penalty,  is  sentenced  to  undergo  rigorous  

imprisonment for life, meaning thereby, the end of his life but  

subject  to  any  remission  granted  by  the  appropriate  

Government satisfying the conditions prescribed in Section  

432  of  the  Code  and  further  substantiate  check  under  

Section 433-A of the Code by passing appropriate speaking  

orders.  The appeals are disposed of on the above terms.          

…………………..………….…………………………J.    (P. SATHASIVAM)                                  

..……………….………….………………………..…J.            (FAKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA)  

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NEW DELHI; JANUARY 28, 2013.

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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S).1278-1279 OF 2010

Mohinder Singh ….Appellant VERSUS

State of Punjab ….Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.

1. I had the opportunity of reading the judgment of my  

learned brother Justice P. Sathasivam who has dealt with the  

issue in extenso while modifying the death sentence to one  

of imprisonment for life i.e. till the end of his life. I only wish  

to supplement my views while fully endorsing and concurring  

with  the  judgment  of  His  Lordship  Justice  P.  Sathasivam.  

Since,  the  facts  have  been  elaborately  stated  in  the  

judgment  of  His  Lordship Justice  P.  Sathasivam, I  do not  

refer the same in detail. For the purpose of my reasoning, in  

toeing  with  the  conclusion  of  His  Lordship  Justice  P.  

Sathasivam, I only wish to refer to certain factors to support  

our conclusions.  

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2. These  appeals  were  entertained  on  20.07.2009,  

however, while issuing notice, the appeals were confined to  

sentence only. The appellant was found guilty of the offence  

under  Section  302  IPC  and  was  sentenced  to  death  for  

committing  the  murder  of  his  wife  Veena  Verma  and  his  

daughter Geetu Verma on 08.01.2006 in the area of Pratap  

Singh Wala, Ludhiana. The above appeals arose out of the  

confirmation  of  death  sentence  in  Murder  Reference  

No.8/2007  as  well  as  the  connected  Criminal  Appeal  

No.1033-DB of 2007 filed by the appellant.

3. It is necessary to state that the appellant indulged in  

grotesque  crime of  murdering  his  wife  and  daughter  one  

after another on 08.01.2006. The motive for such a heinous  

crime was that there was a dispute between him and his wife  

Veena Verma as regards the house which he owned and that  

he was deprived of having access to his own house. In fact it  

was a matter of record that in the year 1999 there was an  

FIR against the appellant in FIR No.27 wherein the appellant  

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was charged for offences under Sections 376 and 506 IPC for  

having  committed  rape  on  his  deceased  daughter  Geetu  

Verma  which  ended  in  a  conviction  of  12  years  rigorous  

imprisonment by judgment dated 15.05.2001. There was yet  

another FIR No.58 dated 06.04.2005 against the appellant  

for  offences  under  Sections  323  and  506  IPC  for  having  

assaulted  and  for  having  given  threat  to  his  wife  Veena  

Verma which was also proved as per Ex.PAA. There was yet  

another record of criminal case No.2531 dated 01.08.2005  

(FIR No.58 of 2005) again for offences under Sections 323  

and  324  IPC  which  was  pending  in  the  Court  of  JMIC,  

Ludhiana. In fact, the present offence of murder of his wife  

and daughter was committed by the appellant when he was  

on  parole while  undergoing  rigorous  imprisonment  of  12  

years for the conviction of the offence of rape of his daughter  

committed in the year 1999. It was also relevant to keep in  

mind that for holding the appellant guilty of the charge of  

murder  of  his  wife  and  daughter  apart  from  the  other  

evidence,  the  evidence  of  his  own  minor  daughter  Shalu  

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PW.2 who was an eye-witness to the occurrence weighed to  

very great  extent along with the evidence of his own son  

Malkiat Singh PW.7.  

4. The trial Court having noted the above factors held that  

having regard to his involvement in various criminal cases in  

the past as well as the gravity of the offence of murder of his  

own  wife  and  daughter,  whom  the  appellant  felt  were  

responsible  for  his  conviction  for  the  offence  of  rape  

committed  on  his  own minor  daughter,  took  the  view by  

stating elaborate reasons as to why the case fell within the  

principles of  ‘rarest  of  rare  cases’  for  the  award of death  

sentence and inflicted the same on him.  

5. The High Court after setting out the principles laid down  

in the celebrated Constitution Bench decisions of this Court in  

Bachan Singh Vs.  State of Punjab – (1980) 2 SCC 684  

and the subsequent judgment in Machhi Singh and others  

Vs.  State of  Punjab  – (1983) 3  SCC 470 held  that  the  

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murder reference  deserved to be accepted and the  death  

sentence was, therefore,  confirmed. The Division Bench of  

the High Court took into account the circumstances which  

are to be kept in mind for applying the ‘rarest of the rare  

case’ theory based on the above referred two decisions and  

noted the same as under:

“I. Manner of commission of murder.

II. Motive for commission of murder.

Anti-social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime.

Magnitude of crime

Personality of victim of murder.”

6. The High Court has also noted the injuries found on the  

body of the deceased insofar as it related to Veena Verma,  

the wife of the appellant, who suffered four incised wounds of  

which injury No. 1 was on the right lateral side and upper  

part of the neck and injury No.2 was on the head, third one  

was  on  the  neck  and  fourth  one  resulted  in  partial  

amputation of left index finger from its lower one-third with  

clean cut margins. As far as the deceased daughter Geetu  

Verma is concerned, there were as many as nine injuries out  

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of which seven were incised wounds and two were abrasions.  

Out of the seven incised wounds three were caused on the  

head region itself, fourth was on the left mastoid and the  

remaining three were on left and right elbow and fingers.  

Both  the  victims  had  instantaneous  death.  The  basic  

grievance  of  the  appellant  was  nothing  but  his  desire  to  

occupy his house which was occupied by none else than his  

own wife, daughters and son.

7. By noting the special reasons, the Division Bench held  

that the conduct of the appellant in causing the murder of his  

wife and daughter acquired enormity to the extent that the  

case was fully governed by the principle of ‘rarest of rare  

cases’  and  ultimately  held  that  the  imposition  of  death  

sentence by the trial Court was fully justified.  

8. In this context we analyzed the various principles laid  

down  in  the  subsequent  decisions  reported  in Swamy  

Shraddananda @ Murali  Manohar Mishra  Vs. State of  

Karnataka  - (2008)  13  SCC  767,  Santosh  Kumar  

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Satishbhushan  Bariyar  Vs.  State  of  Maharashtra  -

(2009) 6 SCC 498, Mohd. Farooq Abdul Gafur & Anr. Vs.  

State  of  Maharashtra  -(2010)  14  SCC  641, Haresh  

Mohandas Rajput  Vs.  State of Maharashtra  -(2011) 12  

SCC  56, State  of  Maharashtra  Vs.  Goraksha  Ambaji  

Adsul - AIR 2011 SC 2689 and the recent decision reported  

in Mohammed  Ajmal  Mohammadamir  Kasab  @  Abu  

Mujahid  Vs.  State of  Maharashtra  - JT 2012 (8) SC 4.  

From conspectus consideration of the above decisions apart  

from the four principles laid down in Bachan Singh (supra)  

and also the requirement of a balance sheet of aggravating  

and  mitigating  circumstances,  the  following  principles  are  

required to be borne in mind:

(i)     A conclusion as to the ‘rarest of rare’  

aspect  with  respect  to  a  matter  shall  

entail  identification  of  aggravating  and  

mitigating circumstances relating both to  

the crime and the criminal.

(ii) The  expression  ‘special  reasons’  

obviously means (‘exceptional reasons’)  

founded  on  the  exceptionally  grave  

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circumstances  of  the  particular  case  

relating  to  the  crime  as  well  as  the  

criminal.

(iii) The decision in  Ravji @ Ram Chandra  

Vs. State of Rajasthan – (1996) 2 SCC  

175 which was subsequently followed in  

six  other  cases,  namely,  Shivaji  @  

Dadya  Shankar  Alhat  Vs.  State  of  

Maharashtra  -  (2008)  15  SCC  269,  

Mohan  Anna  Chavan  Vs.  State  of  

Maharashtra  -  (2008)  7  SCC  561,  

Bantu Vs.  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  -  

(2008)  11  SCC  113,  Surja  Ram  Vs.  

State of Rajasthan -(1996) 6 SCC 271,  

Dayanidhi Bisoi Vs. State of Orissa -  

(2003) 9 SCC 310 and  State of Uttar  

Pradesh Vs.  Sattan @ Satyendra  &  

Ors. - (2009) 4 SCC 736 wherein it was  

held  that  it  is  only  characteristics  

relating to crime, to the exclusion of the  

ones  relating  to  criminal,  which  are  

relevant to sentencing in criminal trial,  

was rendered per incuriam qua Bachan  

Singh  (supra) in the decision reported  

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in  Santosh  Kumar  Satishbhushan  

Bariyar (supra) at 529.

(iv) Public  opinion  is  difficult  to  fit  in  the  

‘rarest  of  rare’  matrix.  People’s  

perception  of  crime  is  neither  an  

objective circumstance relating to crime  

nor to the criminal. Perception of public  

is  extraneous  to  conviction  as  also  

sentencing, at least in capital sentencing  

according  to  the  mandate  of  Bachan  

Singh  (supra).  (2009)  6  SCC  498  at  

p.535.

(v) Capital  sentencing  is  one  such  field  

where the safeguards continuously take  

strength  from  the  Constitution.   

(2009) 6 SCC 498 at 539.

(vi) The  Apex  Court  as  the  final  reviewing  

authority  has  a  far  more  serious  and  

intensive  duty  to  discharge  and  the  

Court not only has to ensure that award  

of  death  penalty  does  not  become  a  

perfunctory exercise of discretion under  

Section  302  after  an  ostensible  

consideration of ‘rarest of rare’ doctrine,  

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but  also  that  the  decision-making  

process  survives  the  special  rigours  of  

procedural  justice  applicable  in  this  

regard. (2010) 14 SCC 641 at 692.

(vii) The ‘rarest of rare’ case comes when a  

convict would be a menace and threat to  

the  harmonious  and  peaceful  

coexistence  of  the  society.  The  crime  

may be heinous or brutal but may not be  

in the category of “the rarest of the rare  

case”.  There  must  be  no  reason  to  

believe  that  the  accused  cannot  be  

reformed or rehabilitated and that he is  

likely  to  continue  criminal  acts  of  

violence as would constitute a continuing  

threat to the society. 2011 (12) SCC 56  

at p.63 para 20.

(viii) Life  sentence  is  the  rule  and  the  

death  penalty  is  the  exception.  The  

condition of providing special reasons for  

awarding  death  penalty  is  not  to  be  

construed linguistically but it is to satisfy  

the  basic  features  of  a  reasoning  

supporting and making award of death  

penalty unquestionable.  

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(ix) The  

circumstances  and  the  manner  of  committing  

the  crime  should  be  such  that  it  pricks  the  

judicial  conscience  of  the  Court  to  the  extent  

that the only and inevitable conclusion should be  

awarding of death penalty.(AIR 2011 SC 2689)

(x) When the case falls  

under  the  category  of  ‘rarest  of  rare’  case  

penalty  of  death  is  clearly  called for  and any  

leniency shown in the matter of sentence would  

not only be misplaced but will certainly give rise  

to and foster a feeling of private revenge among  

the  people  leading  to  destabilization  of  the  

society.(AIR 1983 SC 585)

(xi) Death  penalty  

has been held to be constitutionally valid. The  

test is what case would attract death penalty if  

not the case of the appellant.  JT (2012) 8 SC 4.

9. Keeping the above settled principles in mind, when we  

examine the case on hand, it is needless to state that the  

conduct of the appellant, if analyzed, based on the previous  

crimes committed by him, we find that in the year 1999 as  

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found by the courts below the appellant committed rape on  

his deceased daughter  Geetu  Verma when she was minor  

and that  too after  beating her.   To  which beastly  action,  

unfortunately the other deceased (viz) his wife, was an eye-

witness. One cannot comprehend to visualize a situation of  

such nature in which father himself committed rape on his  

own minor daughter in the presence of her own mother. The  

conduct  of  the  appellant  in  the  commission  of  the  said  

offence was not only bordering on immorality of the highest  

order but would be extremely difficult for anyone to lightly  

brush  aside  such  a  conduct  by  stating  that  either  it  was  

committed in a fit  of  anger  or  rage or  such other  similar  

situation.  If  such  grotesque  offence  of  rape  had  been  

committed  by  anyone,  other  than  the  father  himself,  the  

victim would have had every opportunity to cry for solace in  

her father or mother.   In this context, we are only reminded  

of the Tamil proverb “ேவலிேய  பயிைர ேமயநத கைத” which means  

in  English  “When  the  fence  eats  the  crops”.    When  the  

father himself happens to be the assailant in the commission  

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of such beastly crime, one can visualize the pathetic situation  

in which the girl would have been placed and that too when  

such a shameless act was committed in the presence of her  

own mother. When the daughter and the mother were able  

to get  their  grievances redressed by getting the appellant  

convicted for the said offence of rape one would have in the  

normal course expected the appellant to have displayed a  

conduct of remorse. Unfortunately, the subsequent conduct  

of the appellant when he was on parole disclosed that he  

approached the victims in a far more vengeful manner by  

assaulting the hapless victims which resulted in filing of an  

FIR once in the year 2005 and subsequently when he was on  

parole  in  the  year  2006.  The  monstrous  mindset  of  the  

appellant appears to have not subsided by mere assault on  

the victims who ultimately displayed his extreme inhuman  

behaviour  by  eliminating his  daughter  and wife  in  such a  

gruesome manner  in  which  he  committed  the  murder  by  

inflicting the injuries on the vital parts of the body of the  

deceased and that too with all vengeance at his command in  

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order to ensure that they met with instantaneous death. The  

nature  of  injuries  as  described  in  the  postmortem report  

speaks for itself as to the vengeance with which the appellant  

attacked the hapless victims. He was not even prepared to  

spare  his  younger  daughter  (viz)  PW-2  who,  however,  

escaped the wrath of the appellant by bolting herself inside a  

room after she witnessed the grotesque manner in which the  

appellant took away the life of his wife and daughter.

10. Be that as it  may when we come to the question of  

applying the various principles culled out from the decisions  

right from the Constitution Bench decision in Bachan Singh  

(supra)  right  up  to  the  case  Mohammed  Ajmal  

Mohammadamir  Kasab  (supra)  as  held  by  my  learned  

brother  Justice  P.  Sathasivam  for  the  various  reasons  

referred to therein, we find that the case still does not fall  

within the category of ‘rarest of rare case’ though it calls for  

a  stringent  punishment.  Therefore,  while  modifying  the  

sentence  from  one  of  death  penalty  to  that  of  life  

imprisonment  till  the  end of  his  life we apply the  earliest  

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decision of this Court reported in Gopal Vinayak Godse Vs.  

State of Maharashtra & Ors. - AIR 1961 SC 600 wherein  

this Court held in paragraph 5 as under:

“It does not say that transportation for life shall be  deemed to be transportation for twenty years for  all purposes; nor does the amended section which  substitutes  the  words  ‘imprisonment  for  life’  for  ‘transportation for life’ enable the drawing of any  such  all-embracing  fiction.  A  sentence  of  transportation for life or imprisonment for life must  prima  facie  be  treated  as  transportation  or  imprisonment  for  the  whole  of  the  remaining  period of the convicted person’s natural life.”

11. The said principle was followed subsequently in  Mohd.  

Munna Vs. Union of India and Ors. - (2005) 7 SCC 417.  

Applying  the  above  decisions,  we  have  no  hesitation  in  

holding  that  the  appellant  deserves  to  be  sentenced  to  

undergo rigorous imprisonment for life meaning thereby the  

end of his life subject, however, to remission granted by the  

appropriate Government satisfying the conditions prescribed  

in Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and further  

substantiate  check  under  Section  433A  of  the  Code  by  

passing appropriate speaking orders.                       

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 …………………………………………J.

           [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla]

New Delhi; January 28, 2013

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