REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL    NO.1880 OF 2011

MOHAN LAL ....APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF PUNJAB      ...RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

NAVIN SINHA, J.

The appellant assails his conviction under Section 18 of

the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

(hereinafter referred as “the NDPS Act”), sentencing him to

rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and a fine of

Rs.1,00,000/­ (Rupees one lakh only), with a default

stipulation.

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2. An F.I.R. was lodged on 03.02.1997 by PW­1, Chand

Singh, Sub­Inspector of Balianwali Police Station, that while

on patrol duty, he  was accompanied by  Darshan  Singh,

Sarpanch and Assistant Sub­Inspector Balwinder Singh.

The witness  entertained doubts  about the  appellant  upon

seeing him.   PW­4, Shri Rajinder N. Dhoke, IPS, a gazetted

officer, was called and the appellant was searched, leading to

recovery of  4  kg of  opium in a bag carried by him.   The

consent memo, Exhibit­ PB was signed by Darshan Singh

and PW­1.  The seized opium was separated into a sample of

20 gm. and 3kg 980 gm.  The specimen seal was prepared by

PW­1 and after use, the seal was handed over to ASI,

Balwinder Singh.   “Ruqa” was prepared by PW­1 and

forwarded to Balianwali Police Station.   PW­3, Assistant

Sub­Inspector,  Darshan Singh registered  the formal  F.I.R.

and handed over investigation to PW­1.  Upon conclusion of

investigation, the appellant was charge­sheeted, put on trial,

and convicted.  

3. Sh. Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, learned counsel for the

appellant submitted that the NDPS Act being a stringent law

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carrying a  reverse burden of  proof, there had to be strict

adherence to the law and procedures.  The investigation was

not  only  required to be  fair  and  judicious,  but must also

appear to have been so.  The investigation ought not to be in

a manner leaving a genuine apprehension in the mind of the

accused that it was not fair and bonafide.  No reasons have

been furnished why Darshan Singh and ASI Balwinder Singh

have not been examined by the prosecution.  No explanation

has  been  furnished  by  PW­1 why  he  did  not  deposit the

seized narcotics in the malkhana.   Likewise, the delay of 9

days in sending the sample for chemical analysis also

remains unexplained.   The investigation was fundamentally

flawed.  PW­1, being the informant, he could not have been

the investigating officer himself. Reliance was placed on

Bhagwan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, (1976) 1 SCC 15,

Megha Singh vs. State of Haryana, 1996 (11) SCC 709,

State by Inspector of Police, Narcotics Intelligence

Bureau,  Madurai,  Tamilnadu vs.  Rajangam,  2010 (15)

SCC 369.

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4. Ms. Jaspreet Gogia, learned counsel for the respondent

contended that the appellant was searched in presence of a

Gazetted  Officer, PW­4.   The failure to examine  Darshan

Singh or ASI Balwinder Singh was inconsequential  as the

search and recovery were duly proved by PW­1 and PW­4.

Merely because they were police officers, their evidence does

not stand vitiated. There shall be a presumption that official

duties were regularly performed.   The burden of  proof for

innocence lay  upon the  accused in view  of the statutory

presumption under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act,

which  he failed to discharge.   The investigation  was  not

vitiated because PW­1 may have been the informant himself.

Reliance was placed on State of Punjab vs. Baldev Singh,

(1999) 6 SCC 172,  Bhaskar Ramappa Madar & Ors. vs.

State of Karnataka, (2009)11 SCC 690,  Surender vs.

State of Haryana, (2016) 4 SCC 617.  

5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the

parties.   The primary question for our consideration in the

present appeal is, whether in a criminal prosecution, it will

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be in consonance with the principles of justice, fair play and

a  fair investigation, if the informant  and  the  investigating

officer were to be the same person.  In such a case,  is  it

necessary for the accused to demonstrate prejudice,

especially under laws such as NDPS Act, carrying a reverse

burden of proof.

6. Darshan Singh was an illiterate person.  He is stated to

have been accompanying PW­1 in a police vehicle while on

official duty along with ASI Balwinder Singh.   This to our

mind, is certainly not in the normal course of events.   The

consent memo Exhibit­PB was stated to have been signed by

Darshan Singh,  despite  his  being  an  illiterate,  along with

PW­1.   The seal sample was prepared by PW­1, and signed

by Darshan Singh and ASI Balwinder Singh.   The seal was

then handed over to ASI Balwinder Singh.  The case property

was retained by PW­1 in his possession and was not

deposited in the malkhana nor entered in the roznamcha.

There is  no  explanation  for the  same.    The  sample  was

retained by PW­1 in his private custody in a rented

accommodation.  No explanation is forthcoming from  the

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prosecution why Darshan Singh, and ASI Balwinder Singh

were not examined despite service of summons on the official

witness and issuance of bailable warrants against the

private witness.  In their absence, neither the consent memo

nor the seal can be stated to have been proved.   There was

nine days’ delay in sending the sample for chemical analysis.

No explanation has been furnished in respect of the same.

PW­4 acknowledged that the recovery memo, Exhibit­PC was

not  signed  by the  accused  and  that  copies  of  documents

were  not supplied to the  accused  nor any  memo in this

regard prepared  in his presence.   Exhibit­PB, the consent

memo only mentioned that he was the ASP, Phul.  

7.  The presence of a private person in a police vehicle while

on patrol duty, the individual being an illiterate, but having

signed the consent memo were surely matters for

investigation. Similarly, why the signature of ASI Balwinder

Singh or PW­4 was not obtained on the consent memo was

again a subject matter of investigation.   The veracity of the

sample seal handed over to ASI Balwinder Singh was likewise

a matter for investigation as to whether it was the same as

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the seal on the case property retained in his private custody

by PW­1 and that sent for chemical analysis.   The mere fact

that there may have been a seal cannot lead to any

presumption in absence of the examination of ASI Balwinder

Singh.   Likewise, it was also a subject of  investigation why

PW­1 did not make any roznamcha entry of the seized

property and the reason why he retained the case property

and sample in his private custody in a rented house despite

the  availability of a  malkhana.   The  delay in sending the

sample for chemical analysis, in the facts and circumstances

of the case was again a matter for investigation.   Had the

investigator been different from the complainant, the issues

for consideration may have been entirely different.   The

appellant in his defence under Section 313 Cr.P.C. had

specifically taken a plea of false implication by PW­1 on

account of a dispute with regard to purchase of a tractor.

8.  The view taken by the High Court that under Section

55 of the NDPS Act, that PW­1 was empowered to keep the

case property and sample in his individual safe custody is

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completely erroneous on the face of it.   The provision reads

as follows:

“55. Police to take charge of articles seized and delivered­

An officer­in­charge of a police station shall take charge of and keep in safe custody, pending the orders of the Magistrate, all articles seized under this Act within the local area of that police station and which may be delivered to him, and shall allow any officer who may accompany such articles to the police station  or who may be deputed for the purpose, to affix his seal to such articles or to take samples of and from them and all samples so taken shall also be sealed with a seal of the officer­in­charge of the police station.”(emphasis added)

A plain reading of the provision makes it manifest that

it is the duty of the police officer to deposit the seized

material in the police station malkhana.

9. Standing  Order  No.  1  of  88 issued  by the  Narcotics

Control Bureau in clause 1.13 reads as follows:

“Mode and time limit for dispatch of sample to Laboratory.

The  samples  should be sent either by insured post or through special messenger duly authorised for the purpose. Dispatch of samples

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by registered post or ordinary mail should not be resorted to.  Samples must be dispatched to the Laboratory  within 72  hours of seizure to avoid any legal objection.”(emphasis added)

The Drug Law Enforcement­Field  Officer’s  Hand Book

issued by the Narcotics Control Bureau also provides that:

“28.  Were the seized goods and samples deposited in the Malkhana at the earliest opportunity after seizure, an acknowledgement receipt obtained from the Malkhana­in­Charge? (emphasis added)

29. Were the samples sent to the designated laboratory for analysis and report within 72 hours of seizure?”

In Noor Aga vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417,

under the NDPS Act, it was held :  

“91. The logical corollary of these discussions is that the guidelines such as those present in the Standing Order cannot be blatantly flouted and substantial compliance therewith must be insisted upon for so that sanctity of physical evidence in such cases remains intact. Clearly, there has been no substantial compliance with these guidelines by the investigating authority which leads to drawing of an adverse inference against them to the effect that had such evidence been produced, the same would have gone against the prosecution.”

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10. Unlike the general principle of criminal jurisprudence

that an accused is presumed innocent unless proved guilty,

the NDPS Act carries a reverse burden of proof under

Sections 35 and 54.  But that cannot be understood to mean

that the moment an allegation is made and the F.I.R. recites

compliance  with  statutory  procedures leading to recovery,

the burden of proof from the very inception of the

prosecution shifts to the accused, without the prosecution

having to establish or prove anything more.   The

presumption is rebuttable.  Section 35 (2) provides that a

fact can  be said to  have  been  proved if it is established

beyond reasonable doubt and not on preponderance of

probability.  The stringent provisions of the NDPS Act, such

as Section 37, the minimum sentence of ten years, absence

of any  provision for remission,  do  not dispense  with the

requirement  of the  prosecution to  establish  a  prima  facie

case beyond reasonable doubt after investigation, only after

which the burden of proof shall shift to the accused.   The

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case of the prosecution cannot be allowed to rest on a

preponderance of probabilities.   

11. A fair  trial  to an accused, a constitutional guarantee

under Article 21 of the  Constitution,  would be a hollow

promise if the investigation in a NDPS case were not to be

fair or raises serious questions about its fairness apparent

on the face of the investigation.  In the nature of the reverse

burden of proof, the onus  will lie on the prosecution to

demonstrate on the face of it that the investigation was fair,

judicious with no circumstances that may raise doubts

about its veracity.   The obligation of proof beyond

reasonable doubt will take within its ambit a fair

investigation, in absence of which there can be no fair trial.

If the investigation itself is unfair, to require the accused to

demonstrate  prejudice will  be  fraught  with danger  vesting

arbitrary powers in the police which may well lead to false

implication also.   Investigation in such a case would then

become an empty formality and a farce.   Such an

interpretation therefore naturally has to be avoided.

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12. That investigation in a criminal offence must be free

from objectionable features or infirmities which may

legitimately lead to a grievance on part of the accused was

noticed in  Babubhai vs. State of Gujarat, (2010) 12 SCC

254 as follows:  

“32.  The investigation into a criminal offence must be free from objectionable features or infirmities which may legitimately lead to a grievance on the part of the accused that investigation was unfair and carried out with an ulterior motive. It is also the duty of the investigating  officer to conduct the investigation avoiding any kind of mischief and harassment to any of the accused. The investigating officer should be fair and conscious so as to rule out any possibility of fabrication of evidence and his impartial conduct must dispel any suspicion as to its  genuineness.  The investigating  officer “is not merely to bolster up a prosecution case with such evidence as may enable the court to record a conviction but to bring out the real unvarnished truth”.  

33.  In  State of Bihar  v.  P.P. Sharma  this Court has held as under:  

“57. … Investigation is a delicate painstaking  and dextrous  process.  Ethical conduct is absolutely essential for investigative  professionalism.  … Therefore, before countenancing such allegations of mala fides or bias it is salutary and an onerous duty and responsibility of the court, not only to insist upon making specific and definite allegations of personal

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animosity against the investigating officer at the start of the investigation but also must insist to establish and prove them from the facts and circumstances to the satisfaction of the court.

* * * 59.  Malice in law could be inferred from doing of wrongful act intentionally  without any just cause or excuse or without there being reasonable relation to the purpose of the exercise of statutory power. …

61. An  investigating  officer who is not sensitive to the constitutional mandates, may be prone to trample upon the personal liberty of a person when he is actuated by mala fides.”

13.    The duty of the prosecution under the NDPS Act,

considering the reverse burden of proof, was noticed in Noor

Aga (supra) observing: ­

“58……An initial burden exists upon the prosecution and only when it stands satisfied, would the legal burden shift. Even then, the standard of proof required for the accused to  prove  his innocence is  not as high as that of the  prosecution.  Whereas the standard of proof required to prove the guilt  of the accused on the prosecution is “beyond all reasonable doubt” but it is “preponderance of probability” on the accused. If the prosecution fails to prove the foundational facts so as to attract the rigours of Section 35 of the Act, the actus reus which is possession of contraband by

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the  accused  cannot  be said to  have  been established.  

59. With a view to bring within its purview the requirements of Section 54 of the Act, element of possession of the contraband was essential  so as to shift  the burden on the accused. The provisions being exceptions to the general rule, the generality thereof would continue to be operative, namely, the element of possession will have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.”

Furthermore, the sample not having been deposited in

the malkhana, coupled with non­examination of the private

witnesses,  an adverse  inference  was drawn therein against

the prosecution.  This principle has been reiterated in Bhola

Singh vs. State of Punjab, 2011(11) SCC 653.   

14. In a criminal prosecution, there is an obligation cast on

the investigator not only to be fair, judicious and just during

investigation, but also that the investigation on the very face

of it must appear to be so, eschewing any conduct or

impression which may give rise to a real and genuine

apprehension in the  mind of an accused and not  mere

fanciful, that the investigation was not fair.   In the

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circumstances,  if  an informant police official  in a criminal

prosecution,  especially  when carrying a  reverse burden of

proof, makes the allegations, is himself asked to investigate,

serious doubts will naturally arise with regard to his fairness

and impartiality.  It is not necessary that bias must actually

be proved.  It would be illogical to presume and contrary to

normal human conduct, that he would himself at the end of

the investigation submit a closure report to conclude false

implication with all its attendant consequences for the

complainant himself.   The result of the investigation would

therefore be a foregone conclusion.

15. The discussion in the present case may not be

understood as confined to the requirements of a fair

investigation under the  NDPS Act  only  carrying  a reverse

burden of proof.  Baldev Singh  (supra) related to a

prosecution under Section 165A of the IPC.  Nonetheless, it

observed that if the informant were to be made the

investigating officer, it was bound to reflect on the credibility

of the prosecution case.   Megha Singh (supra) concerned a

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prosecution under the  Terrorist and  Disruptive Activities

(Prevention) Act, 1985.  It was held that the Head Constable

being the complainant himself could not have proceeded

with the investigation and it was a practice, to say the least,

which should not be resorted to so that there may not be

any occasion to suspect fair and impartial investigation.

Rajangam  (supra) was a prosecution under the NDPS Act,

an objection  was taken that PW­6  who apprehended the

accused could not have investigated the case.  Upholding the

objection, relying on Megha Singh (supra) the accused was

acquitted. The view taken by the  Madras  High  Court in

Balasundaran vs. State, 1999 (113) ELT 785 (Mad.), was

also noticed as follows :

“16. Learned Counsel for the appellants also stated that P.W. 5 being the Inspector of  Police who was present at  the time of search and he was the investigating officer and as such it is fatal to the case of the prosecution. P.W. 5, according to the prosecution, was present with PWs 3 and 4  at the time  of search. In fact,  P.W.  5 alone took up investigation in the case and he had examined the witnesses. No doubt the successor to P.W. 5 alone had filed the charge sheet. But there is no material to show that he had examined any other witness. It therefore follows that P.W. 5

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was the person who really investigated the case. P.W. 5 was the person who had searched the appellants in question and he being the investigation officer, certainly it is not proper and correct. The investigation ought to have been done by any other investigating agency.  On this score also, the investigation is bound to suffer and as such the entire proceedings will be vitiated.”

16. Bhaskar Ramappa Madar  (supra) concerned a

prosecution under Section 304B, I.P.C. which also carries a

reverse burden of proof. The Trial Court held that the

investigating officer who was also the complainant could not

have investigated, and on that ground, held the prosecution

to be tainted.  The acquittal was reversed by the High Court.

In appeal, this Court declined to interfere with the

conviction.   After referring to  Bhagwan Singh  (supra) and

Megha Singh  (supra), it  was observed that the principles

laid down therein had to be confined to the facts of the said

cases and that the matter would have to be decided on the

facts of each case without any universal generalisation.

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17. Hardip Singh vs. State of Punjab, 2008 (8) SCC 557

concerned a prosecution under the NDPS Act.   The

contention was that the Inspector, PW­5 being the

complainant himself would be an interested person and

should not have been made the investigating officer.  The

argument was repelled relying on  State rep. by Inspector

of Police, Vigilance and Anti­Corruption, Tiruchirapalli,

Tamil Nadu vs. V. Jayapaul,  2004 (5) SCC 223 observing

as follows:

“6…. We find no principle or binding authority to hold that the moment the competent police officer, on the basis of information received, makes out an FIR incorporating his name as the informant, he forfeits his right to investigate. If at all, such investigation could only be assailed on the ground of bias or real  likelihood of bias on the part of the investigating officer. The question of bias would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and it is not proper to lay down a broad and unqualified proposition, in the manner in which it has been done by the High Court, that whenever a police officer proceeds to  investigate after registering the FIR on his own, the investigation would necessarily be unfair or biased.”

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Significantly,  V. Jayapaul, (supra) related to a

prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act which

sought to distinguish Megha Singh, (supra) on its facts.

18. Baldev Singh, (supra) relied upon by the State is

distinguishable on its own facts concerning an irregularity in

an investigation by an officer not especially empowered

under the NDPS Act to do so.

19. In  Surender  (supra),  the  prosecution was  under the

NDPS Act. There was no independent witness.  The objection

that PW­6, Sub­inspector Satbir Singh being the

complainant could not have investigated relying on

Rajangam, (supra) and Megha Singh, (supra) was rejected

on the ground that he was not the sole person investigating

the case, and that the ground had not been raised before the

High Court in appeal.  

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20. In the nature of the controversy, it would be useful to

also notice the view taken by different High Courts on the

issue.   In  State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Atul Sharma

2015 (2) shimLC 693 (Crl. Appeal No. 246 of 2008, decided

on 28.02.2015),  under the  NDPS Act, it  was  observed  as

follows:

“10.8  In present case it is proved on record that complainant is SI Bahadur Singh as per FIR Ext.PW12/A and it is proved on record that entire investigation has been conducted by complainant himself and there is no evidence on record  in order to  prove  that investigation was handed over to some other independent Investigating Officer. It is not the case of prosecution that no other independent Investigating Officer was available to conduct impartial investigation.  We are of the opinion that conducting entire investigation i.e. preparation of seizure memo, site plan, recording statements of witnesses by complainant himself has caused miscarriage of justice to accused qua fair investigation.”

21. A similar view has been taken in  Shri Fayas Ali vs.

State  of  Mizoram  Crl.  Appeal  No. 26 of 2013 (J) dated

19.09.2013, relating to prosecution under the NDPS Act, by

the Gauhati High Court as follows:  

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“From the evidence of PWs 1 and 4, it is clearly found that the  major part of the investigation including the arrest of the accused, preparation of seizure, taking of sample, examination of the seizure witnesses and examination of the accused person, was completed by the PW1, who was the informant/complainant in the present case. Therefore, it is clearly found that the investigation, in its true sense, was done by the complainant himself. In the case of State by Inspector of Police, Narcotic Intelligence Bureau, Madurai(supra), the  Supreme Court, relying on the decision  held in the case of  Megha  Singh (supra), observed that the investigation is to be done  by  a person other than the complainant and that the investigation done by the complainant is  bound  to  suffer  and  vitiate the entire proceeding.”

22. The Punjab & Haryana High Court in Gannu and Ors.

vs. State of Punjab,  2017 (3) RCR (criminal)  566 (Crl.

Appeal No. 1688­SB of 2004 dated 26.05.2017) relating to

the NDPS Act, after referring to  Noor Aga,  (supra) and the

views of the Calcutta High Court also apart from  Atul

Sharma (supra), concluded as follows:

“14. Another aspect of the matter is that in sheer violation of the  principles  of fair  and  impartial investigation, the complainant and the investigating  officer is the same  person,  which makes the  prosecution  case  doubtful. In  Laltu Prasad v.  State  of  West  Bengal, 2017(2)  R.C.R.

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(Criminal)  237 (Calcutta) (DB), it  was held that the complainant himself acting as the investigating officer violating the principles of fair and impartial investigation is a practice, to say the least, should not be resorted to and it  is a disturbing feature. To the same effect, is a Division Bench judgment of Hon'ble Himachal Pradesh High Court reported as State of Himachal  Pradesh v.  Atul  Sharma  and  others, 2015 (6)  R.C.R.  (Criminal)  949, wherein, it  has been  held that  where the complainant  himself conducts  investigation, it  causes miscarriage of justice to accused qua fair investigation.”

23. A Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in  Naushad

vs. State of Kerala, 2000 (1) KLT 785, relating to the NDPS

Act held as follows:

“…In a case of this nature, when the complainants himself is a Police Official, the investigation should  have been conducted by his top ranking officer and the final report also ought to have been filed by the higher official. A complainant being a police officer cannot be an Investigating  Officer. For, in such case, the accused and the prosecution will be deprived of their valuable rights of contradicting and corroborating, the previous information recorded under Ss. 154 or 155 Cr.P.C. and previous statement of the witness, being a police officer, complaint recorded, under S. 161 Cr.P.C. enjoined in S. 145 and 157 of the  Indian Evidence Act and proviso of  S. 162 Cr.P.C. In the instant case, before me, PW1 is an Assistant Sub Inspector of Police,

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25.  In view of the conflicting opinions expressed by

different two Judge Benches of this Court, the importance of

a fair investigation from the point of view of an accused as a

guaranteed constitutional right under Article 21 of the

Constitution of India, it is considered necessary that the law

in  this regard be laid  down with  certainty.  To leave the

matter for being determined on the individual facts of a case,

may not only lead to a possible abuse of powers, but more

importantly will leave the police, the accused, the lawyer and

the courts in a state of uncertainty and confusion which has

to be avoided.   It is therefore held that a fair investigation,

which is  but the  very foundation of fair trial,  necessarily

postulates that the informant and the investigator must not

be the same person.   Justice must not only be done, but

must appear to be done also.   Any possibility of bias or a

predetermined conclusion has to be excluded.   This

requirement is  all the more  imperative in  laws carrying a

reverse burden of proof.

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26. Resultantly, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.   The

prosecution is held to be vitiated because of the infraction of

the constitutional guarantee of a fair investigation. The

appellant is  directed to  be  set  at liberty forthwith  unless

wanted in any other case.

…………...................J. [RANJAN GOGOI]

…………...................J. [R. BANUMATHI]

…………...................J. [NAVIN SINHA]

NEW DELHI AUGUST 16, 2018

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