MARUTI NIVRUTTI NAVALE Vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
Bench: P. SATHASIVAM,RANJAN GOGOI
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001376-001376 / 2012
Diary number: 30247 / 2011
Advocates: SHIVAJI M. JADHAV Vs
ASHA GOPALAN NAIR
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1376 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 7337 of 2011
Maruti Nivrutti Navale .... Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Maharashtra & Anr. .... Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
P. Sathasivam, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) This appeal is directed against the final order dated
19.09.2011 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay
in Criminal Application No. 786 of 2011 whereby the High
Court dismissed the application for anticipatory bail filed by
the appellant herein.
3) Brief facts:
(a) The appellant is the Founder President and Managing
Trustee of Sinhgad Technical Education Society, Pune (in
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short ‘the Society’). The Society is engaged in imparting formal
and informal education by establishing various schools,
colleges and institutions in the State of Maharashtra.
Respondent No.1 is the State and Chainsukh Sobhachand
Gandhi-Respondent No.2 herein is the original Complainant
and is a Trustee of Pawan Gandhi Charity Trust (in short ‘the
Trust’) working for the upliftment of economically and socially
impoverished sections of the society.
(b) Respondent No. 2 was running a school on land bearing
Survey No.154/6/1 admeasuring 57 acres situated at
Ambavet, Tal. Mulshi, Dist. Pune, on which a building in the
area of 650 sq. mts. was constructed. In the year 2008, it was
decided to run the School with the help of other educational
institutions by leasing out the property. Respondent No. 2
approached the appellant herein for the same. The appellant
herein has also shown interest in acquiring lease hold rights
in order to run school activities in the said property. Pursuant
to the same, negotiations took place and it was offered to lease
out the said school building for a period of 87 years and to sell
the other property, viz., land bearing Survey No. 165/1
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admeasuring 8500 sq. mts., Survey No. 162 admeasuring
7600 sq. mts., Survey No. 160/1 admeasuring 1900 sq. mts.
and Survey No. 161 admeasuring 21300 sq. mts. situated at
Ambavet, Tal. Mulshi, Dist. Pune for a consideration of Rs.
3,50,00,000/-.
(c) Accordingly, two separate Memorandums of
Understanding (MoUs) were executed on 10.05.2008. Both the
memorandums were duly notarized and registered. On
13.05.2008, in order to realize the object, the Trust leased out
the said property to the Society for a period of 2 years and 11
months commencing from 15.04.2008 and expiring on
09.03.2011 by way of an interim arrangement for an amount
of Rs. 1/- towards lease fee for the entire duration of the lease
granted. This deed was duly registered with the office of sub-
Registrar, Mulshi (Paud) at S.No. 3701/2008.
(d) On 19.02.2011, the appellant-Society received a legal
notice to remove the dead stock and articles kept in the school
within 4 days and further to vacate the school and to
handover the possession in favour of the Trust alleging breach
of the clauses mentioned in lease deed dated 13.05.2008. By
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reply dated 07.03.2011, the appellant-Society denied the said
allegations.
(e) The Trust filed an application under Section 41E of the
Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 before the Joint Charity
Commissioner, Pune seeking prohibitory orders against the
appellant-Society.
(f) Aggrieved by the inaction of the Trust, the appellant-
Society also filed two separate suits bearing Special Civil Suit
bearing Nos. 1146 and 1147 of 2011 before the Civil Court,
Pune.
(g) On 20.07.2011, respondent No.2 filed a complaint with
the Deccan Police Station, Pune under Sections 420, 465, 468
and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
which was registered as S.No. 168 of 2011.
(h) Against the said complaint, the appellant filed an
application bearing No. 2651 of 2011 before the Court of
Additional Sessions Judge, Pune for grant of anticipatory bail.
By order dated 29.08.2011, the Sessions Judge dismissed the
said application.
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(i) Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred
Criminal Application No. 786 of 2011 before the High Court.
By impugned order dated 19.09.2011, the High Court
dismissed the said application. Against the said order, the
appellant has filed this appeal by way of special leave petition.
4) Heard Mr. Mukul Rohtagi and Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned
senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. Chinmoy Khaldkar,
learned counsel for Respondent No.1-State and Mr. Prashant
Bhushan, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2-Complainant.
5) The only point for consideration in this appeal is whether
the appellant has made out a case for grant of anticipatory
bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1908 (in short ‘the Code’).
6) Inasmuch as the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune in the
order dated 29.08.2011 and the High Court in the impugned
order dated 19.09.2011 adverted to all the factual details
relating to the appellant-accused and the Respondent No. 1-
State and Respondent No. 2-Complainant, there is no need to
traverse the same once again except certain aspects which are
essential for the disposal of the present appeal. According to
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the Complainant/respondent No.2 herein – Pawan Gandhi
Charity Trust had been established in the memory of his son
and the Trust had a land on which a building was constructed
for running a school. The appellant claims to be the founder
President and Managing Trustee of the said Society and the
Trust had a land bearing Survey No. 154/6/1 admeasuring 57
acres on which building in the area of 650 sq. mts. was
constructed. An English Medium School was started in the
building in 2005 known as Loyala School. In March, 2008, it
was offered to lease out the said school building for a period of
87 years and also to sell other property of the Trust to the
Society. Based on the negotiations, two separate
Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) dated 10.05.2008
were signed between the parties.
7) It is the claim of the Complainant-respondent No.2
herein that on 13.05.2008, a lease deed for a period of 35
months w.e.f. 15.04.2008 was executed and registered
between the parties and it was agreed not to act upon the two
MoUs. On the expiry of the lease period i.e. on 09.03.2011,
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the Society was to handover the possession of the said
building and the land to the Trust.
8) It is the stand of the first respondent-State and the
second respondent-Complainant that the present appellant
made a forgery in further lease deed dated 07.03.2011
pertaining to the granting of lease for 87 years without the
consent of the Complainant. It is also stated that on the same
date, the appellant also made a forgery by making
additions/alterations in the original draft agreement for lease
which was prepared at the time of executing the MoU and got
it franked. It is also their grievance that the document was
notarized in the year 2008 and even in the said notarized
document, forgery was committed by the appellant. It is the
contention of the Complainant that on the basis of the forged
document, the appellant asserted his claim over the property.
9) During the course of hearing, Mr. Rohtagi, learned senior
counsel for the appellant by taking us through the MoUs and
lease deed and also the corrections in those documents
submitted that those corrections have been made with the
consent of the Complainant and according to him, no forgery
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has been committed as claimed by the respondents. He
pointed out that inasmuch as the sale deed could not take
place and the property of the Trust could be leased out for a
period of more than 3 years without the permission of the
Charity Commissioner, the lease deed for a period of 35
months was executed and registered as stop-gap arrangement
with an understanding that the Trust would approach the
concerned Assistant Charity Commissioner for necessary
permission and, thereafter, the lease deed for a period of 87
years in respect of the school building and the sale deed about
the larger property could be executed and registered.
10) In the course of argument, learned counsel appearing for
the State vehemently opposed the claim of anticipatory bail
and contended that custodial interrogation of the appellant is
necessary because he has forged several documents and also
submitted false information to the Education Department
while obtaining permission for running the school. It is
further pointed out that he has also produced copies of false
document. It is his claim that unless custodial interrogation
of the appellant is granted, it would not be possible to seize all
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those documents from him. In other words, according to the
State, the appellant has committed not only the offence of
forgery in respect of private documents but also made false
representations and committed offence of cheating by giving
false information to the Education Department, thus
committed an offence not only against the State but also
against the public in general.
11) Like the counsel appearing for the State, Mr. Prashant
Bhushan, learned counsel for the second respondent-
Complainant by drawing our attention to various materials
including corrections in the documents and several
communications with the Educational Authorities as well as
the letter dated 04.07.2012 of the Deputy Collector, Maval
Sub-division, Pune addressed to Senior Police Inspector,
Bundgarden Police Station, Pune submitted that in view of the
conduct and involvement in various heinous offences, the
appellant is not entitled indulgence by this Court for any relief.
12) As observed above, all the three counsel appearing for
the parties took us through MoUs, lease deed and other
correspondence/communications with the Educational
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Authorities as well as the report of the Deputy Collector, Pune,
to Senior Police Inspector, Bundgarden Police Station, Pune.
It is also relevant to point out that all these materials were
scrutinized/analyzed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune
and the High Court while considering the application for
anticipatory bail. It is true that the parties have also
approached the Civil Court for various reliefs. At the same
time, as pointed out by counsel for the State and the second
respondent-Complainant, considering the seriousness relating
to corrections/additions/alterations made in various
documents, information furnished to the Educational
Authorities which, according to them, are incorrect, we are of
the view that in order to bring out all the material information
and documents, custodial interrogation is required, more
particularly, to ascertain in respect of the documents which
were alleged to have been forged and fabricated. In the said
documents and other materials which are in the possession of
the appellant and the allegation against him that he has made
false representation before the Public Authority on the basis of
those documents for obtaining necessary permission, as
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pointed out by the State, in order to secure possession of
those documents, custodial interrogation is necessary. For
this reason, the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court
rejected the claim for anticipatory bail.
13) In addition to the same, it is stated by the respondents
that after the order of this Court dated 23.09.2011 granting
interim protection, the appellant has misused his liberty in
creating hindrance to the investigation and continues to
scuttle it and also intimidating and pressurizing the
Complainant as well as the prosecution witnesses.
14) In the light of the above discussion and in view of the
mandate prescribed in Section 438 of the Code, we fully agree
with the conclusion arrived at by the Additional Sessions
Judge and the High Court in rejecting the relief of anticipatory
bail. Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is
dismissed.
15) In view of our order dismissing the appeal, the interim
protection granted by this Court on 23.09.2011 shall stand
vacated and the appellant is granted two weeks time from
today to surrender and seek regular bail. It is also made clear
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that the conclusion arrived at by the courts below including
the present order relates only to eligibility or otherwise of the
relief of anticipatory bail and the trial Court is free to decide
the bail application de hors to the above observation and in
accordance with law.
...…………….…………………………J. (P. SATHASIVAM)
..…....…………………………………J. (RANJAN GOGOI)
NEW DELHI; SEPTEMBER 7, 2012.
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