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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL  NO(S). 1143 OF 2018 [Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No(s). 7158 OF 2018]

MAQBOOL                     … APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER    …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

KURIAN, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. In an acid attack, if the injury is simple, whether an offence

under Section 326A of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred

to as ‘IPC’) is attracted, is the main question for consideration in

this case. And if the injury is only simple, whether charge can be

framed under Section 326B is the incidental issue.  

3.  Section  326A  was  introduced  by  The  Criminal  Law

(Amendment)Act,  2013  pursuant  to  the  recommendations

contained in  the  Report  of  the Committee  on Amendments  to

Criminal Law, popularly known as J.S. Verma Committee Report.

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The pre-amended provision covering such injuries is Section 326.

To quote: “326. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous  weapons  or  means.—Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily  causes  grievous  hurt  by  means  of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or  any heated substance,  or  by means of any  poison  or  any  corrosive  substance,  or  by means of any explosive substance, or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be  punished  with  1[imprisonment  for  life],  or with  imprisonment  of  either  description  for  a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”   

4. “Grievous  hurt”  is  defined  under  Section  320  of  IPC  and

“hurt” under Section 319 of IPC. To quote:

“319. Hurt.—Whoever causes bodily pain,  disease or infirmity to any person is said to  cause hurt.”

“320.  Grievous hurt.—The  following  kinds  of hurt only are designated as “grievous”:—

First          — Emasculation. Secondly — Permanent privation of the sight of

  either eye. Thirdly     — Permanent privation of the hearing  

of either ear, Fourthly   —  Privation of any member or joint. Fifthly       —  Destruction or permanent im-

pairing  of   the  powers   of   any member  or  joint.

Sixthly      —   Permanent disfiguration of the head  or face.

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means, with the intention of causing per- manent or partial damage or deformity or burns or maiming or disfigurement or dis- ability  or  grievous  hurt  to  that  person, shall  be  punished  with  imprisonment  of either description for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation I.—For the purposes of section 326A and this section, "acid" in- cludes any substance which has acidic or corrosive  character  or  burning  nature, that  is  capable  of  causing  bodily  injury leading to scars or disfigurement or tem- porary or permanent disability.

Explanation 2.— For the purposes of section 326A and this section, permanent or partial damage or deformity shall not be required to be irreversible.”

6. Section 326A carries  title  of  “voluntarily  causing grievous

hurt by use of acid” whereas Section 326B does not carry any

such  indication  in  the  title  regarding  the  nature  of  injury  as

grievous.  But  on closer analysis,  it  can be seen that  both the

Sections  provide  for  eight  types  of  injuries  -   (i)  permanent

damage,  (ii)  partial  damage,  (iii)  deformity,  (iv)  burns,  (v)

maiming, (vi) disfigurement, (vii) disability or (viii) grievous hurt.

7. The first seven of the injuries referred to in the Sections are

classified based on the normal aftereffect of acid attack whereas

the eighth one is  on the gravity of  the effect.  Under Sections

326A  and  326B,  grievous  hurt  is  only  one  among  the  eight

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injuries.  In  view  of  the  explanation  under  Section  326B,  the

resultant  damage  or  deformity  under  326A  or  326B  is  not

required to be irreversible. The other seven injuries may be either

simple or grievous. The nature of injury being simple or grievous,

is irrelevant for distinguishing between Section 323 and Section

326A of IPC or between Section 326A and Section 326B of IPC. If

the injury referred to under Section 326A or 326B is one among

the specified eight injuries, whether the seven of them be simple

or grievous, the special provisions are attracted.

8. The basic difference between Sections 326A and 326B of IPC

is the presence of actual injury under Section 326A. The resultant

injury  has  made  the  offence  more  serious  with  a  mandatory

minimum  punishment  of  ten  years  which  may  extend  to

imprisonment for life and, in either case, with a fine. The fine is

mandatory and the quantum should be just and reasonable in the

sense  that  it  should  be,  in  any  case,  sufficient  to  meet  the

medical expenses for the treatment of the victim. Therefore, the

second  proviso  under  Section  326A  requires  that  the  fine

imposed should be paid to the litigant. Under Section 326B, the

mere  act  of  throwing  or  attempt  to  throw  or  attempt  to

administer or attempt to use any other means with the intention

of causing any of the injuries referred to in the Section, is to be

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visited with a mandatory minimum imprisonment of five years,

which may extend to seven years and fine.

9.  Thus,  merely  because  the  title  to  Section  326A  of  IPC

speaks about grievous hurt by use of acid, it is not a requirement

under the Section that the injuries caused should be invariably

grievous. Even if the seven injuries are simple, Section 326A, and

under  Section  326B  the  mere  act  of  throwing  or  attempt,  as

indicated in the Section, would attract the offence.

10. The title to the provision need not invariably indicate the

contents of the provision. If the provision is otherwise clear and

unambiguous, the title pales into irrelevance. On the contrary, if

the contents of the provision are otherwise ambiguous, an aid

can be sought from the title so as to define the provision. In the

event of a conflict between the plain expressions in the provision

and the indicated title, the title cannot control the contents of the

provision.  Title  is  only  a  broad  and  general  indication  of  the

nature of the subject dealt under the provision.

11. We  are  benefitted  with  two  precedents  in  this  regard  -

(i)  Raichurmatham Prabhakar  and  another v.  Rawatmal

Dugar  1 and (ii) Union of India (UOI) and another v. National

Federation of the Blind and others  2.   1 (2004) 4 SCC 766 2 (2013) 10 SCC 772

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12. In Raichurmatham Prabhakar (supra), it was held by the

Court at paragraph-14 of the judgment as follows:

“14. The view is now settled that the headings or titles pre-fixed to sections or group  of  sections  can  be  referred  to  in construing an Act  of the legislature.  But conflicting opinions have been expressed on the question as to what weight should be  attached  to  the  headings  or  titles. According  to  one  view,  the  headings might  be  treated  as  preambles  to  the provisions  following  them  so  as  to  be regarded as giving the key to opening the mind  of  the  draftsman  of  the  clauses arranged  thereunder.  According  to  the other view, resort to heading can only be taken  when  the  enacting  words  are ambiguous.  They  cannot  control  the meaning  of  plain  words  but  they  may explain  ambiguities.  (See:  Principles  of Statutory  Interpretation  by  Justice  G.P. Singh, 9th Edn., 2004, pp.152,155). In our opinion,  it  is  permissible  to  assign  the heading or title of a section a limited role to  play  in  the  construction  of  statutes. They  may  be  taken  as  very  broad  and general  indicators  of  the  nature  of  the subject-matter dealt with thereunder. The heading or title may also be taken as a condensed  name  assigned  to  indicate collectively  the  characteristics  of  the subject-matter  dealt  with  by  the enactment underneath; though the name would  always  be  brief  having  its  own limitations. In case of conflict between the plain  language of  the  provision  and the meaning  of  the  heading  or  title,  the heading  or  title  would  not  control  the meaning  which  is  clearly  and  plainly discernible  from  the  language  of  the provision thereunder.”

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13. In National Federation of the Blind (supra):   “44. It  is  settled  law  that  while

interpreting any provision of a statute the plain meaning has to be given effect and if  language  therein  is  simple  and unambiguous,  there  is  no  need  to traverse beyond the same. Likewise, if the language of the relevant section gives a simple  meaning  and message,  it  should be interpreted in such a way and there is no  need  to  give  any  weightage  to headings of those paragraphs. This aspect has been clarified in Prakash Nath Khanna and Anr.  v.  Commissioner of Income Tax and Anr. (2004) 9 SCC 686. Paragraph 13 of  the  said  judgment  is  relevant  which reads as under:

“13.  It  is  a  well-settled principle  in  law  that  the  court cannot  read  anything  into  a statutory  provision  which  is  plain and unambiguous.  A statute is  an edict  of  the  legislature.  The language employed in a statute is the  determinative  factor  of legislative  intent.  The  first  and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what  may  be  supposed  and  has been intended but  what has been said.  "Statutes  should  be construed,  not  as  theorems  of Euclid",  Judge  Learned  Hand  said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of  the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage.) The view  was  reiterated  in  Union  of India  v.  Filip  Tiago  De  Gama  of

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Vedem Vasco De Gama and Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N.””

  14.  In the present case, the appellant sought discharge under

Section 326A of IPC on the ground that the injury caused was

simple as  per  the  medical  report.  The trial  court  rejected  the

application and the same has been upheld by the High Court.

Learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that even if the

entire prosecution story is accepted to be true and correct, no

grievous hurt has been caused to the victim since the injuries are

reported to be simple, and hence, he cannot be charged under

Section 326A. Reliance is sought to be placed on two decisions,

one of the High Court of Rajasthan in  Laddu Ram v.  State of

Rajasthan decided  on  06.02.2017  in  Criminal  Miscellaneous

Petition  No.  681  of  2017  and  the  other  of  the  High  Court  of

Madras in  M. Siluvai Murugan @ Murugan v.  State decided

on 30.07.2018 in Criminal  Appeal  No.  861 of 2016 (2018 SCC

OnLine Mad 2332). 15. In  Laddu Ram (supra),  the  High  Court  of  Rajasthan has

taken the view that  the injury caused being simple in  nature,

Section 326A of IPC is not attracted but only Section 326B of IPC

would apply. Similarly, the High Court of Madras in  M. Siluvai

Murugan @ Murugan (supra) held that if the injury caused by

use of acid is simple in nature, there cannot be any conviction

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under Section 326A of IPC. In M. Siluvai Murugan @ Murugan

(supra), though the High Court has analysed the legal position

correctly, it has unfortunately committed a patent error in taking

note of the nature of injury as simple and altering the conviction

to  Section  326B  of  IPC  on  the  ground  that  the  injury  as  per

medical report was simple being chemical injury at twelve per

cent.  16. As  we  have  already  discussed  above,  it  is  not  the

percentage or gravity of injury, which makes the difference. Be it

simple or grievous, if the injury falls under the specified types

under Section 326A on account of use of acid, the offence under

Section 326A is attracted.  Section 326B would be attracted in

case the requirements specified are met on an attempted acid

attack.  Therefore,  both the  High Court  of  Rajasthan in  Laddu

Ram (supra) and High Court of Madras in M. Siluvai Murugan

@ Murugan (supra)do not lay down the correct position of law

and they are overruled. 17. The appeal is hence dismissed. However, we make it clear

that the observations and findings in this Judgment are only for

the  purpose  of  reaching  the  conclusion  as  to  whether  charge

under  Section  326A  of  IPC  has  been  correctly  framed  and

whether  the  trial  court  committed  an  error  in  rejecting  the

application  for  discharge under  Section  326A of  IPC.  All  other

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aspects  would  remain to  be  considered during the trial  which

shall be conducted uninfluenced by any of the observations on

the merits of the matter.

.................................J.                                         [KURIAN JOSEPH]

      ……….......................J.              [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]  

NEW DELHI; SEPTEMBER 07, 2018.