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REPORTABLE   

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 305 OF 2007

Manzoor Ali Khan        ...   Petitioner (s)

Versus

Union of India & Ors.        ...   Respondent  

(s)

J U D G E M E N T

Adarsh Kumar Goel, J.

1. This  petition,  by  way  of  public  interest  litigation,  seeks  

direction to declare Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption  

Act, 1988 (“PC Act”) unconstitutional and to direct prosecution  

of all cases registered and investigated under the provisions of  

PC Act  against  the politicians,  M.L.As,  M.Ps  and Government  

officials, without sanction as required under Section 19 of the  

PC Act.   

2. According  to  the  averments  in  the  writ  petition,  the  

petitioner  is  a  practising  advocate  in  the  State  of  Jammu &  

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Kashmir.   In the said State, several Government officials have  

been  charged for  corruption  but  in  the  absence  of  requisite  

sanction, they could not be prosecuted.  Referring to several  

instances  including  those  noticed  by  this  Court  in  various  

orders,  it  is  submitted  that  the  provision  for  sanction  as  a  

condition  precedent  for  prosecution  is  being  used  by  the  

Government  of  India  and  the  State  Governments  to  protect  

dishonest and corrupt politicians and Government officials.  The  

discretion to grant sanction has been misused.   

3. The petition refers to various orders of this Court where  

incumbents  were  indicted  but  not  prosecuted  for  want  of  

sanction.   In  Common  Cause,  a  registered  Society vs.  

Union  of  India  &  Ors. (1996)  6  SCC  593,  Captain  Satish  

Sharma, the then Minister for Petroleum and Natural Gas was  

held to have acted in arbitrary manner in allotting petrol pumps  

but since sanction was refused, he could not be prosecuted.  In  

Shiv Sagar Tiwari vs.  Union of India & Ors. (1996) 6 SCC  

599, Smt. Shiela Kaul, the then Minister for Housing and Urban  

Development,  Government  of  India  was  indicted  for  making  

arbitrary, mala fide and unconstitutional allotments but still she  

could not be prosecuted. In M.C. Mehta (Taj Corridor Scam)  

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vs. Union of India & Ors., (2007) 1 SCC 110, Ms. Mayawati,  

the then Chief Minister of U.P. and Shri Nasimuddin Siddiqui, the  

then  Minister  for  Environment,  U.P.  were  indicted  and  

allegations against them were noticed but they could not be  

prosecuted in the absence of sanction.  It is further stated that  

in Prakash Singh Badal & Anr. vs. State of Punjab & Ors.,  

2007 (1) SCC 1, Lalu Prasad @ Lalu Prasad Yadav vs. State  

of  Bihar  Thr.  CBI(AHD)  Patna 2007  (1)  SCC  49  and  K.  

Karunakaran vs. State of Kerala 2007 (1) SCC 59, validity of  

requirement of sanction was not gone into on the ground of  

absence of challenge to its validity. In Shivajirao Nilangekar  

Patil vs. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi (Dr.) & Ors. (1987) 1 SCC  

227, this Court noticed that there was a steady decline of public  

standards and morals.  It was necessary to cleanse public life  

even before cleaning the physical atmosphere.  The provision  

for sanction under the PC Act confers unguided and arbitrary  

discretion on the Government to grant or not to grant sanction  

to prosecute corrupt and dishonest politicians, M.Ps, M.L.As and  

Government officials.

4. In response to the notice issued by this Court, affidavits  

have  been  filed  by  several  State  Governments  and  Union  

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Territories but no counter affidavit has been filed by the Union  

of India.  The stand taken in all the affidavits is almost identical.  

According to the said stand, the object of Section 19 of the PC  

Act is to protect public servants against irresponsible, frivolous  

and vexatious proceedings for acts performed in good faith in  

the discharge of their official duties and to protect them from  

unnecessary  harassment  of  legal  proceedings  arising  out  of  

unfounded and baseless complaints.  In the absence of such a  

provision, the public servant may not be inclined to offer his/her  

free and frank opinion and may not be able to function freely.

5. We  have  heard  Mr.  D.K.  Garg,  learned  counsel  for  the  

petitioner and Mr. P.S.  Narasimha, learned Additional Solicitor  

General for the Union of India and learned counsel for various  

States.

6. Section 19 of the PC Act is as follows:-

“19.  Previous  sanction  necessary  for   prosecution.— (1) No  court  shall  take  cognizance  of  an   offence  punishable  under  sections  7,  10,   11,  13  and  15  alleged  to  have  been  committed by a public servant, except with   the previous sanction,— (a) in the case of a person who is employed   in connection with the affairs of the Union   and is not removable from his office save   

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to  prosecute  and  punish  the  corrupt  is  no  ground  to  deny  

protection to the honest.  Mere possibility of abuse cannot be a  

ground  to  declare  a  provision,  otherwise  valid,  to  be  

unconstitutional.  The exercise of power has to be regulated to  

effectuate the purpose of law.  The matter has already been  

dealt with in various decisions of this Court.  

9. In Vineet Narain & Ors. vs. Union of India & Anr.  

(1996) 2 SCC 199, this Court observed in paragraph 3 as  

follows:

“3. The  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  present case do indicate that it is of utmost   public  importance  that  this  matter  is   examined  thoroughly  by  this  Court  to   ensure  that  all  government  agencies,   entrusted with the duty to discharge their   functions  and  obligations  in  accordance  with law, do so, bearing in mind constantly   the  concept  of  equality  enshrined  in  the   Constitution and the basic tenet of rule of   law: “Be you ever so high, the law is above   you.”  Investigation  into  every  accusation   made against each and every person on a   reasonable  basis,  irrespective  of  the  position and status of that person, must be   conducted  and  completed  expeditiously.   This  is  imperative  to  retain  public   confidence in the impartial working of the   government agencies.”

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10. Again  in  a  later  order  in  the  same  case,  i.e.,  Vineet  

Narain & Ors. vs. Union of India & Anr., reported in (1998) 1  

SCC 226, it was observed as under:

“55. These principles of  public  life  are of   general application in every democracy and   one is expected to bear them in mind while   scrutinising the conduct of every holder of   a public office. It is trite that the holders of   public  offices  are  entrusted  with  certain  powers  to  be  exercised  in  public  interest   alone and, therefore, the office is held by   them in trust for the people. Any deviation   from the path of rectitude by any of them  amounts to a breach of trust and must be   severely dealt with instead of being pushed  under the carpet. If the conduct amounts to   an  offence,  it  must  be  promptly   investigated  and  the  offender  against   whom  a  prima  facie  case  is  made  out   should be prosecuted expeditiously so that   the majesty of law is upheld and the rule of   law vindicated. It is the duty of the judiciary   to enforce the rule of law and, therefore, to   guard against erosion of the rule of law.

56. The adverse impact of lack of probity in   public  life  leading  to  a  high  degree  of   corruption is manifold. It also has adverse   effect  on  foreign  investment  and  funding  from the International  Monetary Fund and  the  World  Bank  who  have  warned  that   future aid to underdeveloped countries may  be  subject  to  the  requisite  steps  being  taken  to  eradicate  corruption,  which  prevents  international  aid  from  reaching  those  for  whom  it  is  meant.  Increasing   corruption  has  led  to  investigative  journalism  which  is  of  value  to  a  free  society. The need to highlight corruption in   

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public  life  through  the  medium  of  public   interest  litigation  invoking  judicial  review  may  be  frequent  in  India  but  is  not   unknown in other countries:  R. v.  Secy. of  State  for  Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Affairs, 1995 (1) WLR 386. ................................ ................................ 58. ......................... 15. Time-limit of three months for grant of   sanction  for  prosecution  must  be  strictly   adhered to. However, additional time of one   month may be allowed where consultation   is required with the Attorney General (AG)   or any other law officer in the AG’s office.”

11. In  a  recent  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Subramanian  

Swamy vs.  Manmohan Singh & Anr., (2012) 3 SCC 64, the  

question for  consideration was whether  a private citizen has  

locus to prosecute a public servant and to obtain sanction and  

how an application for sanction was to be dealt with.  It was  

held that any application for sanction sought even by a private  

citizen must be looked into expeditiously and decided as per  

the observations of this Court in  Vineet Narain case (supra)  

and guidelines framed by the CVC which were circulated vide  

Office  Order  No.  31/5/05  dated  12.05.2005.   The  relevant  

clauses have been quoted in the said judgment.  In paragraphs  

30, 33, 49, 50 of the leading judgment, it was observed:

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“30. While dealing with the issue relating  to  maintainability  of  a  private  complaint,   the  Constitution  Bench  observed:  (A.R.  Antulay  vs.  Ramdas  Sriniwas  Nayak  and  Anr. (1984) 2 SCC 500, para 6) “6.  It  is  a  well-recognised  principle  of   criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set   or put the criminal law into motion except   where the statute enacting or creating an   offence  indicates  to  the  contrary.  The  scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure   envisages  two  parallel  and  independent  agencies  for  taking  criminal  offences  to   court. Even for the most serious offence of   murder, it was not disputed that a private   complaint can, not only be filed but can be  entertained and proceeded with according  to law. Locus standi of the complainant is a   concept  foreign  to  criminal  jurisprudence  save  and  except  that  where  the  statute   creating  an  offence  provides  for  the  eligibility of the complainant, by necessary   implication  the  general  principle  gets   excluded  by  such  statutory  provision.  Numerous  statutory  provisions,  can  be  referred to in support of this legal position   such  as  (i)  Section  187-A  of  the  Sea  Customs  Act,  1878  (ii)  Section  97  of  the  Gold  (Control)  Act,  1968 (iii)  Section 6 of   the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947  (iv)  Section  271  and  Section  279  of  the   Income Tax Act, 1961 (v) Section 61 of the  Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, (vi)  Section  621  of  the  Companies  Act,  1956  and  (vii)  Section  77  of  the  Electricity   (Supply)  Act,  1948.  This  list  is  only   illustrative  and  not  exhaustive.  While  Section  190  of  the  Code  of  Criminal   Procedure permits anyone to approach the  Magistrate  with  a  complaint,  it  does  not   prescribe any qualification the complainant   is  required to fulfil  to be eligible to file  a   

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complaint. But where an eligibility criterion  for a complainant is contemplated specific   provisions have been made such as to be   found in Sections 195 to 199 CrPC. These   specific  provisions  clearly  indicate  that  in   the  absence  of  any  such  statutory   provision, a locus standi of a complainant is   a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence.   In  other  words,  the  principle  that  anyone  can set or  put the criminal  law in motion   remains intact unless contra-indicated by a   statutory provision. This general principle of   nearly universal application is founded on a   policy  that  an  offence  i.e.  an  act  or   omission made punishable by any law for   the time being in force … is not merely an   offence committed in relation to the person  who  suffers  harm  but  is  also  an  offence   against society. The society for its orderly   and peaceful development is interested in   the punishment of the offender. Therefore,   prosecution  for  serious  offences  is   undertaken  in  the  name  of  the  State   representing  the  people  which  would  exclude any element of private vendetta or   vengeance.  If  such  is  the  public  policy   underlying  penal  statutes,  who  brings  an  act or omission made punishable by law to   the  notice  of  the  authority  competent  to   deal  with  it,  is  immaterial  and  irrelevant   unless the statute indicates to the contrary.   Punishment of the offender in the interest   of  the  society  being  one  of  the  objects   behind  penal  statutes  enacted  for  larger   good  of  the  society,  right  to  initiate   proceedings  cannot  be  whittled  down,   circumscribed or fettered by putting it into   a  straitjacket  formula  of  locus  standi   unknown  to  criminal  jurisprudence,  save  and except specific statutory exception. To  hold that such an exception exists that  a   private complaint for offences of corruption   

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committed  by  public  servant  is  not   maintainable,  the  court  would  require  an   unambiguous  statutory  provision  and  a   tangled web of argument for drawing a far- fetched implication, cannot be a substitute   for an express statutory provision.” (emphasis supplied)

33. In  view of  the  aforesaid  judgment  of   the Constitution Bench in  Antulay case,  it  must  be  held  that  the  appellant  has  the   right to file a complaint for prosecution of   Respondent  2  in  respect  of  the  offences  allegedly committed by him under the 1988  Act.

49. CVC, after taking note of the judgment   of  the  Punjab and Haryana High Court  in   Jagjit  Singh v.  State  of  Punjab,  State  of  Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, Supt. of Police (CBI) v.  Deepak  Chowdhary,  framed  guidelines  which were circulated vide Office Order No.   31/5/05  dated  12-5-2005.  The  relevant  clauses  of  the  guidelines  are  extracted  below: “2 (i) Grant of sanction is an administrative   act.  The  purpose  is  to  protect  the  public   servant  from  harassment  by  frivolous  or   vexatious prosecution and not to shield the  corrupt. The question of giving opportunity  to the public servant at that stage does not   arise. The sanctioning authority has only to   see  whether  the  facts  would  prima  facie   constitute the offence.

(ii) The  competent  authority  cannot   embark upon an inquiry to judge the truth  of  the  allegations  on  the  basis  of   representation which may be filed by the  accused  person  before  the  sanctioning  authority,  by  asking  the  IO  to  offer  his   

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comments  or  to  further  investigate  the  matter in the light of representation made  by  the  accused  person  or  by  otherwise   holding a  parallel  investigation/enquiry  by   calling  for  the  record/report  of  his   department. * * * (vii) However,  if  in  any  case,  the   sanctioning authority after consideration of   the  entire  material  placed  before  it,   entertains  any  doubt  on  any  point  the   competent authority may specify the doubt   with sufficient particulars and may request   the authority  who has sought  sanction to   clear the doubt. But that would be only to   clear the doubt in order that the authority   may apply its mind properly, and not for the   purpose of considering the representations   of the accused which may be filed while the  matter is pending sanction.

(viii) If the sanctioning authority seeks the  comments  of  the  IO  while  the  matter  is   pending before it for sanction, it will almost   be impossible for the sanctioning authority   to adhere to the time-limit allowed by the   Supreme Court in Vineet Narain case.”

50. The aforementioned guidelines  are  in   conformity with the law laid down by this   Court  that  while  considering  the  issue  regarding grant or refusal of sanction, the   only thing which the competent authority is   required  to  see  is  whether  the  material   placed  by  the  complainant  or  the  investigating agency prima facie discloses   commission of an offence. The competent   authority  cannot  undertake  a  detailed  inquiry  to  decide  whether  or  not  the  allegations made against the public servant   are true.”

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In concurring judgment, it was further observed:

“68. Today,  corruption  in  our  country  not   only poses a grave danger to the concept   of  constitutional  governance,  it  also   threatens the very foundation of the Indian   democracy  and  the  Rule  of  Law.  The  magnitude of corruption in our public life is   incompatible with the concept of a socialist   secular  democratic  republic.  It  cannot  be  disputed  that  where  corruption  begins  all   rights  end.  Corruption  devalues  human  rights,  chokes  development  and  undermines  justice,  liberty,  equality,   fraternity which are the core values in our   Preambular  vision.  Therefore,  the  duty  of   the court is that any anti-corruption law has   to be interpreted and worked out in such a   fashion as to strengthen the fight against   corruption.  That  is  to  say  in  a  situation   where  two  constructions  are  eminently  reasonable, the court has to accept the one   that  seeks  to  eradicate  corruption  to  the   one which seeks to perpetuate it.

70. The  learned  Attorney  General  in  the  course  of  his  submission  fairly  admitted   before us that out of the total 319 requests   for  sanction,  in  respect  of  126  of  such  requests, sanction is awaited. Therefore, in   more  than  one-third  cases  of  request  for   prosecution  in  corruption  cases  against   public  servants,  sanctions  have  not  been   accorded.  The  aforesaid  scenario  raises   very important constitutional issues as well   as some questions relating to interpretation   of such sanctioning provision and also the  role  that  an  independent  judiciary  has  to   play  in  maintaining  the  Rule  of  Law  and   common  man’s  faith  in  the  justice- delivering system. Both the Rule of Law and  

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equality before law are cardinal questions  (sic principles) in our constitutional laws as   also in international law and in this context   the role of the judiciary is very vital. In his   famous  treatise  on  Administrative  Law,  Prof. Wade while elaborating the concept of   the Rule of Law referred to the opinion of   Lord Griffiths which runs as follows:

“… the judiciary accepts a responsibility for   the  maintenance  of  the  rule  of  law  that   embraces  a  willingness  to  oversee  executive  action  and  to  refuse  to  countenance  behaviour  that  threatens  either  basic  human  rights  or  the  rule  of   law.”  [See  R. v.  Horseferry  Road  Magistrates’ Court, ex p Bennett, AC at p.  62 A.] I  am  in  respectful  agreement  with  the  aforesaid principle.

74. Keeping those principles in mind, as we  must, if we look at Section 19 of the PC Act   which bars a court from taking cognizance  of  cases  of  corruption  against  a  public   servant under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15   of the Act, unless the Central or the State   Government,  as  the  case  may  be,  has  accorded sanction, virtually imposes fetters   on private citizens and also on prosecutors   from  approaching  court  against  corrupt   public servants.  These protections are not   available to other citizens. Public servants   are  treated  as  a  special  class  of  persons   enjoying  the  said  protection  so  that  they  can perform their  duties without fear and  favour  and  without  threats  of  malicious   prosecution.  However,  the  said  protection   against  malicious  prosecution  which  was  extended in public interest cannot become  a shield to protect  corrupt officials. These  provisions being exceptions to the equality   

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provision of Article 14 are analogous to the   provisions of protective discrimination and  these protections must be construed very   narrowly.  These  procedural  provisions  relating to sanction must be construed in   such a manner as to advance the causes of   honesty and justice and good governance  as opposed to escalation of corruption.

75. Therefore,  in  every  case  where  an   application  is  made  to  an  appropriate  authority  for  grant  of  prosecution  in   connection  with  an  offence  under  the  PC  Act it is the bounden duty of such authority   to apply its mind urgently to the situation   and  decide  the  issue  without  being  influenced  by  any  extraneous  consideration.  In  doing  so,  the  authority   must make a conscious effort to ensure the   Rule  of  Law  and  cause  of  justice  is   advanced.  In  considering  the  question  of   granting  or  refusing  such  sanction,  the   authority  is  answerable  to  law  and  law  alone.  Therefore,  the requirement  to  take   the decision with a reasonable dispatch is   of the essence in such a situation. Delay in   granting sanction proposal  thwarts  a very   valid social purpose, namely, the purpose of   a speedy trial with the requirement to bring  the culprit to book. Therefore, in this case   the right of the sanctioning authority, while   either  sanctioning  or  refusing  to  grant   sanction, is coupled with a duty.

76. The sanctioning authority must bear in   mind  that  what  is  at  stake  is  the  public   confidence in the maintenance of the Rule   of  Law  which  is  fundamental  in  the   administration of justice. Delay in granting   such  sanction  has  spoilt  many  valid   prosecutions  and  is  adversely  viewed  in  public mind that in the name of considering   

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a prayer for sanction, a protection is given   to a corrupt public official as a quid pro quo   for services rendered by the public official   in the past or may be in the future and the   sanctioning  authority  and  the  corrupt   officials were or are partners in the same   misdeeds.  I  may  hasten  to  add  that  this   may not be the factual position in this (sic  case) but the general demoralising effect of   such a popular perception is profound and  pernicious.

77. By  causing  delay  in  considering  the  request  for  sanction,  the  sanctioning  authority  stultifies  judicial  scrutiny  and   determination  of  the  allegations  against   corrupt official  and thus the legitimacy of   the judicial  institutions is  eroded.  It,  thus,   deprives  a  citizen  of  his  legitimate  and   fundamental right to get justice by setting  the  criminal  law  in  motion  and  thereby   frustrates  his  right  to  access  judicial   remedy  which  is  a  constitutionally   protected  right.  In  this  connection,  if  we  look at Section 19 of the PC Act,  we find  that no time-limit is mentioned therein. This   has  virtually  armed  the  sanctioning  authority  with  unbridled  power  which  has   often resulted in protecting the guilty and   perpetuating  criminality  and  injustice  in   society.

79. Article  14  must  be  construed  as  a   guarantee  against  uncanalised  and  arbitrary power. Therefore, the absence of   any  time-limit  in  granting  sanction  in   Section  19  of  the  PC  Act  is  not  in   consonance  with  the  requirement  of  the   due  process  of  law  which  has  been  read  into  our  Constitution  by  the  Constitution   Bench  decision  of  this  Court  in  Maneka  Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.

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80. I  may  not  be  understood  to  have  expressed  any  doubt  about  the  constitutional validity of Section 19 of the   PC  Act,  but  in  my  judgment  the  power   under  Section  19  of  the  PC  Act  must  be   reasonably  exercised.  In  my  judgment  Parliament  and  the  appropriate  authority   must  consider  restructuring Section  19 of   the PC Act in such a manner as to make it   consonant with reason, justice and fair play.

81. In my view, Parliament should consider   the constitutional  imperative of  Article 14   enshrining  the  Rule  of  Law wherein  “due  process  of  law”  has  been  read  into  by   introducing a time-limit in Section 19 of the  PC Act, 1988 for its working in a reasonable   manner.  Parliament  may,  in  my  opinion,   consider the following guidelines:

(a) All proposals for sanction placed before   any  sanctioning  authority  empowered  to   grant  sanction for  prosecution of  a  public   servant  under  Section  19  of  the  PC  Act   must  be decided within  a period of  three   months  of  the  receipt  of  the  proposal  by   the authority concerned.

(b) Where consultation is required with the   Attorney General or the Solicitor General or   the Advocate General of the State, as the   case may be, and the same is not possible   within  the  three  months  mentioned  in  clause  (a)  above,  an  extension  of  one  month  period  may  be  allowed,  but  the   request  for  consultation  is  to  be  sent  in   writing within the three months mentioned  in  clause  (a)  above.  A  copy  of  the  said   request  will  be  sent  to  the  prosecuting   agency  or  the  private  complainant  to   

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intimate them about the extension of  the   time-limit.

(c)  At  the  end of  the  extended period  of   time-limit, if no decision is taken, sanction   will be deemed to have been granted to the   proposal  for  prosecution,  and  the  prosecuting  agency  or  the  private   complainant will proceed to file the charge- sheet/complaint in the court to commence  prosecution within 15 days of the expiry of   the aforementioned time-limit.”

The above observations fully cover the issue raised in this  

petition.

12. Thus while it is not possible to hold that the requirement  

of sanction is unconstitutional, the competent authority has to  

take  a  decision  on  the  issue  of  sanction  expeditiously  as  

already observed. A fine balance has to be maintained between  

need to protect a public servant against mala fide prosecution  

on the one hand and the object  of  upholding the  probity  in  

public  life  in  prosecuting  the  public  servant  against  whom  

prima  facie material  in  support  of  allegation  of  corruption  

exists, on the other hand.   

13. In  view  of  the  law  laid  down  by  this  Court,  no  further  

directions are necessary.   

14. The writ petition is disposed of.  

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   .............................................J.           [ T.S. THAKUR ]

  .............................................J.     [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]

New Delhi August 06, 2014

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