MANOHARLAL Vs STATE OF M.P
Bench: DIPAK MISRA,UDAY UMESH LALIT
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001407-001407 / 2013
Diary number: 39529 / 2012
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Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1407 OF 2013
MANOHARLAL …. Appellant
Versus
STATE OF M.P. …. Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
1. This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated
31.08.2012 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore
Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 442 of 1998 affirming the judgment
and order of conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions Judge,
Ratlam in Sessions Trial No.18 of 1997.
2. The instant matter arises out of FIR No.93 of 1997 lodged on
31.07.1997 at about 6:10 a.m. by PW-2 victim to the effect that in the
previous night the appellant herein had committed rape on her and
following was her version. The victim, an adivasi woman, though
married was staying with her parents at Devipada. On 30.07.1997
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after having visited her brother at Khetalpur, she had returned by bus
and alighted at Bajna bus stand at about 10:00 P.M. She was sitting
near a Ghumti when the appellant approached her and suggested to
her to spend the night at Dharamshala with his children. She then
accompanied him to Dharamshala but since there were no children he
took her to the house of another person. There a man suffering from
fever was sleeping and on the appellant suggesting that the victim be
allowed to sleep there, said man raised objection. Thereupon the
appellant went to get the keys of his house, during which time she
came back to Dharamshala situated at the bus stand. The appellant
came back and finding the victim to have fallen asleep, woke her up
and tried to take her to his house. The victim having refused to go, he
caught her hand and forcibly took her to his house. In the house the
appellant had forcible sexual intercourse with her, after which he
asked the victim to spend the night at his house. However she ran
away and returned to Dharamshala and slept there. The appellant
came back to Dharamshala and suggested that he could make
arrangements for her in the bus at which time a policeman also came.
At Dharamshala the victim told everything to one Riyaz who was like
a brother to her.
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3. Next day i.e., on 31.07.1997 she reached the police station and
lodged FIR exhibit P-2 as stated above, on the basis of which the
investigation was undertaken. The victim was sent for medical
examination and was examined by Dr. Sarojini Ben Patel (PW-1) who
found no injuries on the private or external parts of her body and the
doctor could not give any opinion about rape. The appellant having
been apprehended was also sent for medical examination and was
found to be capable of having sexual intercourse. After due
investigation, the appellant was charged for having committed offence
under Section 376 IPC and under Section 3 (2) (5) of the SC/ST
Atrocities Act, 1989.
4. In the trial the victim was examined as PW-2 who reiterated her
version as stated above. Riyaz who was examined as PW-3 however
did not support the case of the prosecution and was declared hostile.
Going by the medical evidence the trial court found that no definite
opinion could be given about commission of rape. However relying
on the testimony of the victim it convicted the appellant under section
376 IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
seven years and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- in default whereof to suffer
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further imprisonment for two months. The Trial Court however
acquitted the appellant of the offence under section 3 (2) (5) of the SC
and ST Atrocities Act, 1989.
5. In the appeal preferred by the appellant the High Court relied
on the testimony of the victim and confirming the order of conviction
and sentence it dismissed the appeal. The present appeal arises at the
instance of the appellant challenging his conviction and sentence.
While granting special leave to appeal the appellant was directed to be
released on bail vide order dated 09.09.2013. We have heard
Mr. Ram Ekbal Roy, learned Advocate for the appellant and
Ms. Ayesha Chaudhary, learned Advocate for the State.
6. Though as a matter of law the sole testimony of the prosecutrix
can sufficiently be relied upon to bring home the case against the
accused, in the instant case we find her version to be improbable and
difficult to accept on its face value. The law on the point is very
succinctly stated in Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi)
reported in (2012) 7 SCC 178, to which one of us (Dipak Misra, J).
was a party, in following terms.
“20. It is a settled legal proposition that once the statement of the prosecutrix inspires confidence
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and is accepted by the court as such, conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the court for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a condition for judicial reliance is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case.
21. A prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. Her testimony has to be appreciated on the principle of probabilities just as the testimony of any other witness; a high degree of probability having been shown to exist in view of the subject-matter being a criminal charge. However, if the court finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial which may lend assurance to her testimony…..”
Having found it difficult to accept her testimony on its face
value, we searched for support from other material but find complete
lack of corroboration on material particulars. First, the medical
examination of the victim did not result in any definite opinion that
she was subjected to rape. Secondly, Riyaz who was like a brother to
the victim and thus a close confidant, has not supported the case of the
prosecution and has completely denied having met her when she
allegedly narrated the incident to him. Thirdly the person who was
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suffering from fever and to whose house she was first taken by the
appellant was not examined at all. Fourthly, the policeman who the
victim met during the night was also not examined. Fifthly, neither
the brother nor any of the parents of the victim were examined to
corroborate the version that she had come from the village of her
brother and alighted around 10:00 P.M. at Bajna bus stand. Lastly,
the sequence of events as narrated would show that she had allegedly
accompanied the appellant to various places. In the circumstances, we
find extreme difficulty in relying upon the version of the victim alone
to bring home the charge against the appellant. We are inclined to
give benefit of doubt to the appellant.
7. We, therefore, set aside the order of conviction and sentence
passed against the appellant. The present appeal is thus allowed and
the appellant is acquitted of the charge leveled against him. The
appellant who was released on bail, is discharged of his bail bonds.
………………………..J. (Dipak Misra)
………………………..J. (Uday Umesh Lalit)
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New Delhi, November 21, 2014
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