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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10581 OF 2013

(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 23918 OF 2012)

MANOHARAN                                 …APPELLANT Vs.

SIVARAJAN & ORS.                        …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

V.Gopala Gowda J.

Leave granted.

2. This  appeal  is  filed  by  the  appellant  

questioning  the  correctness  of  the  judgment  and  

final  Order  dated  21.03.2012  passed  by  the  High  

Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in RFA No. 678 of 2011

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urging  various  facts  and  legal  contentions  in  

justification of his claim.  

3. Necessary relevant facts are stated hereunder to  

appreciate the case of the appellant and also to  

find out whether the appellant is entitled for the  

relief as prayed in this appeal.

The appellant approached the respondent no. 1 -  

a  money  lender,  for  a  loan  of 2,20,000/-.  The  

respondent  no.  1  agreed  to  give  him  the  loan  in  

return of execution of a sale deed with respect to 3  

cents of land in re-survey No. 111/13-1 in Block No.  

12 of Maranalloor village by the appellant in his  

favour. It was agreed upon between the parties that  

the respondent no. 1 will reconvey the property in  

favour of the appellant on repayment of the loan.  

The appellant accordingly executed sale deed No. 575  

of 2001 at sub Registrar’s office at Ooruttambalam  

with  respect  to  3  cents  of  land  in  Re-survey  

No.111/13-1 in Block no.12 of Maranalloor village in  

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favour  of  respondent  no.1.  The  respondent  no.  1  

executed  an  agreement  of  re-conveyance  deed  in  

favour  of  the  appellant  regarding  the  above  

mentioned property on the same day.

 4.  The  learned  senior  counsel,  Mr.  Basanth  R.  

appearing on behalf of the appellant argued that the  

appellant  approached  the  respondent  no.1  several  

times with money for re-conveying the property in  

favour of the appellant as was agreed upon between  

them but the respondent no. 1 evaded from doing so.

 5.  It  is  also  the  case  of  the  appellant  that  

respondent no.1, instead of issuing a deed of re-

conveyance, sold the property to Respondent nos. 2  

and 3 without the knowledge of the appellant. The  

appellant sent a legal notice to the respondent no.1  

requesting him to appear before the sub Registrar’s  

office  for  the  execution  of  re-conveyance  deed  

regarding the plaint schedule property to which the  

respondent no. 1 did not oblige. The appellant then  

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filed a suit being OS No. 141/2007 before the Court  

of sub Judge, Neyyattinkara for mandatory injunction,  

for  declaration  of  the  sale  deed  executed  by  

Respondent no.1 in favour of Respondent nos. 2 and 3  

as null and void, for execution of re-conveyance deed  

in his favour and also for consequential reliefs. The  

suit was valued at 3,03,967/- and the court fee was  

valued at 28,797/-. The appellant paid 1/10th of the  

court fee i.e.,  2880/- at the time of filing the  

suit. The Court of sub Judge, Neyyattinkara granted  

injunction in favour of the appellant restraining the  

respondents  from  carrying  out  new  construction  

activities including the parts of the plaint schedule  

property until further orders.

 6. The court of sub Judge, Neyyattinkara heard the  

application  for  extension  of  time  sought  by  the  

appellant for paying the balance court fee. However,  

the application was rejected and the file was closed  

by the learned sub Judge. The appellant then filed  

Regular First Appeal No. 678 of 2011 along with an  

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application for condonation of delay in filing the  

appeal. The High Court dismissed the application for  

condonation of delay on the ground that the delay in  

filing the appeal was not explained by the appellant  

and consequently, dismissed the Regular First Appeal  

filed  by  the  appellant.  The  High  Court’s  opinion  

that  the  appellant  has  not  given  any  ground  for  

delay  in  filing  the  Regular  First  Appeal  is  not  

sustainable  since  the  appellant  has  categorically  

claimed that he was not aware of the rejection of  

the suit of the appellant for delayed payment of  

court fee by the learned sub Judge.

7. In the light of the facts and circumstances of  

the case, the following points would arise for our  

consideration:

1.Whether the learned sub Judge was justified  

in rejecting the suit for non- payment of  

court fee?  

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2.Was the appellant entitled to condonation  

of delay for non- payment of court fee by  

the learned sub Judge?  

3.Whether  the  High  Court  was  right  in  

rejecting  the  application  for  condonation  

of delay filed by the appellant against the  

decision  of  the  learned  sub  judge  who  

rejected the suit of the appellant for non-  

payment of court fee?

4.What Order?

Answer to Point no. 1

8.  Section  149  of  the  Civil  Procedure  Code  

prescribes a discretionary power which empowers the  

Court to allow a party to make up the deficiency of  

court fee payable on plaint, appeals, applications,  

review of judgment etc. This Section also empowers  

the Court to retrospectively validate insufficiency  

of stamp duties etc. It is also a usual practice  

that the Court provides an opportunity to the party  

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to pay court fee within a stipulated time on failure  

of  which  the  Court  dismisses  the  appeal.  In  the  

present case, the appellant filed an application for  

extension of time for remitting the balance court  

fee which was rejected by the learned sub Judge. It  

is the claim of the appellant that he was unable to  

pay  the  requisite  amount  of  court  fee  due  to  

financial difficulties. It is the usual practice of  

the court to use this discretion in favour of the  

litigating parties unless there are manifest grounds  

of mala fide. The Court, while extending the time  

for or exempting from the payment of court fee, must  

ensure  bona  fide  of  such  discretionary  power.  

Concealment  of  material  fact  while  filing  

application  for  extension  of  date  for  payment  of  

court fee can be a ground for dismissal. However, in  

the present case, no opportunity was given by the  

learned sub Judge for payment of court fee by the  

appellant  which  he  was  unable  to  pay  due  to  

financial constraints. Hence, the decision of the  

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learned sub Judge is wrong and is liable to be set  

aside and accordingly set aside.

Answer to Point no.2

9. In the case of State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kameshwar  Prasad  Singh  &  Anr.1, it  was  held  that  power  to  condone the delay in approaching the Court has been  

conferred  upon  the  Courts  to  enable  them  to  do  

substantial  justice  to  parties  by  disposing  the  

cases on merit. The relevant paragraphs of the case  

read as under:

“11.  Power  to  condone  the  delay  in  approaching the Court has been conferred  upon  the  Courts  to  enable  them  to  do  substantial  justice  to  parties  by  disposing of matters on merits. This Court  in  Collector,  Land  Acquisition,  Anantnag  v. Mst. Katiji (1987)ILLJ 500 SC held that  the expression 'sufficient cause' employed  by the legislature in the Limitation Act  is adequately elastic to enable the Courts  to apply the law in a meaningful manner  which subserves the ends of justice-that  being the life purpose for the existence  of  the  institution  of  Courts.  It  was  further observed that a liberal approach  

1 (2000) 9 SCC 94

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is adopted on principle as it is realised  that:

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand  to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result  in  a  meritorious  matter  being  thrown  out at the very threshold and cause of  justice being defeated. As against this  when delay is condoned the highest that  can  happen  is  that  a  cause  would  be  decided  on  merits  after  hearing  the  parties.

3.  'Every  day's  delay  must  be  explained'  does  not  mean  that  a  pedantic approach should be made. Why  not every hour's delay, every second's  delay? The doctrine must be applied in  a  rational  common  sense  pragmatic  manner.

4.  When  substantial  justice  and  technical  considerations  are  pitted  against  each  other,  cause  of  substantial  justice  deserves  to  be  preferred  for  the  other  side  cannot  claim to have vested right in injustice  being done because of a non-deliberate  delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay  is  occasioned  deliberately,  or  on  account of culpable negligence, or on  account of mala fides. A litigant does  not  stand  to  benefit  by  resorting  to  delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is  respected not on account of its power  

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to  legalize  injustice  on  technical  grounds  but  because  it  is  capable  of  removing injustice and is expected to  do so.

XXX XXX XXX

12.  After  referring  to  the  various  judgments reported in New India Insurance  Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [1976] 2 SCR 266,  Brij Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram  (1918)ILR  45 P.C. 94, Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal  Kumari [1969]1 SCR 1006, Concord of India  Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi [1979]  118  ITR  507(SC),  Lala  Mata  Din  v. A.  Narayanan   [1970]  2  SCR  90,   State  of  Kerala v. E.K. Kuriyipe 1981 (Supp)SCC 72,  Milavi Devi v. Dina Nath (1982)3 SCC 366a,  O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh AIR 1984  SC  1744,  Collector,  Land  Acquisition  v. Katiji  (1987)  ILLJ  500  SC,  Prabha  v. Ram Parkash Kalra  1987 Supp(1)SCC 399,  G.  Ramegowda,  Major  v. Sp.  Land  Acquisition  Officer  [1988]  3  SCR  198,  Scheduled Caste Co-op. Land Owning Society  Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1991 SC 730,  Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India  AIR  1993 SC 1245, Shakambari & Co. v. Union of  India AIR 1992 SC 2090, Ram Kishan v. U.P.  SRTC  1994  Supp(2)SCC  507 and  Warlu  v. Gangotribai AIR 1994 SC 466, this Court  in  State  of  Haryana  v. Chandra  Mani  2002(143) ELT 249(SC) held ;

‘……The  expression  'sufficient  cause'  should,  therefore,  be  considered  with  pragmatism  in  justice-oriented  process  approach  rather  than  the  technical  

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detention  of  sufficient  case  for  explaining every day's delay. The factors  which are peculiar to and characteristic  of the functioning of pragmatic approach  injustice  oriented  process.  The  Court  should decide the matters on merits unless  the case is hopelessly without merit. No  separate standards to determine the cause  laid  by  the  State  vis-a-vis  private  litigant  could  be  laid  to  prove  strict  standards  of  sufficient  cause.  The  Government  at  appropriate  level  should  constitute  legal  cells  to  examine  the  cases  whether  any  legal  principles  are  involved  for  decision  by  the  Courts  or  whether  cases  require  adjustment  and  should  authorize  the  officers  to  take  a  decision  to  give  appropriate  permission  for settlement. In the event of decision  to  file  the  appeal  needed  prompt  action  should  be  pursued  by  the  officer  responsible  to  file  the  appeal  and  he  should be made personally responsible for  lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot  be  put  on  the  same  footing  as  an  individual. The individual would always be  quick  in  taking  the  decision  whether  he  would  pursue  the  remedy  by  way  of  an  appeal or application since he is a person  legally  injured  while  State  is  an  impersonal  machinery  working  through  its  officers or servants.’

To the same effect is the judgment of this  Court  in  Special  Tehsildar,  Land  Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma  AIR  1996 SC 2750.

13.  In  Nand  Kishore  v. State  of  Punjab  (1995)6  SCC  614  this  Court  under  the  

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peculiar  circumstances  of  the  case  condoned  the  delay  in  approaching  this  Court  of  about  31  years.  In  N.  Balakrishnan  v. M.  Krishnamurthy  2008(228)ELT 162(SC) this Court held that  the purpose of Limitation Act was not to  destroy  the  rights.  It  is  founded  on  public policy fixing a life span for the  legal remedy for the general welfare. The  primary  function  of  a  Court  is  to  adjudicate  disputes  between  the  parties  and  to  advance  substantial  justice.  The  time limit fixed for approaching the Court  in different situations is not because on  the expiry of such time a bad cause would  transform into a good cause. The object of  providing  legal  remedy  is  to  repair  the  damage caused by reason of legal injury.  If  the  explanation  given  does  not  smack  mala fides or is not shown to have been  put  forth  as  a  part  of  a  dilatory  strategy,  the  Court  must  show  utmost  consideration  to  the  suitor.  In  this  context it was observed in 2008(228) ELT  162(SC) :

It is axiomatic that condonation of  delay is a matter of discretion of  the  Court.  Section 5 of  the  Limitation  Act  does  not  say  that  such  discretion  can  be  exercised  only  if  the  delay  is  within  a  certain limit. Length of delay is  no  matter,  acceptability  of  the  explanation is the only criterion.  Sometimes  delay  of  the  shortest  range may be uncontainable due to a  want  of  acceptable  explanation  whereas  in  certain  other  cases,  delay of a very long range can be  

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condoned as the explanation thereof  is  satisfactory.  Once  the  Court  accepts  the  explanation  as  sufficient,  it  is  the  result  of  positive exercise of discretion and  normally the superior Court should  not disturb such finding, much less  in revisional jurisdiction, unless  the exercise of discretion was on  wholly  untenable  grounds  or  arbitrary or perverse. But it is a  different  matter  when  the  first  Court refuses to condone the delay.  In such cases, the superior Court  would be free to consider the cause  shown for the delay afresh and it  is open to such superior Court to  come  to  its  own  finding  even  untrammelled by the conclusion of  the lower Court.”

10.  In  the  case  in  hand,  it  is  clear  from  the  

evidence on record that the appellant could not pay  

court  fee  due  to  financial  difficulty  because  of  

which his suit got rejected. It is also pertinent to  

note that the appellant had moved the Court claiming  

his substantive right to his property. The appellant  

faced with the situation like this, did not deserve  

the dismissal of the original suit by the Court for  

non- payment of court fee. He rather deserved more  

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compassionate attention from the Court of sub Judge  

in the light of the directive principle laid down in  

Article 39A of the Constitution of India which is  

equally applicable to district judiciary. It is the  

duty of the courts to see that justice is meted out  

to people irrespective of their socio economic and  

cultural rights or gender identity.

 11.  Further,  Section  12(h)  of  the  Legal  Services  

Authorities Act, 1987 provides that every person who  

has to file or defend a case shall be entitled to  

legal services under this Act if that person is:

“in  receipt  of  annual  income  less  than  rupees nine thousand or such other higher  amount as may be prescribed by the State  Government if the case is before a court  other  than  the  Supreme  Court,  and  less  than rupees twelve thousand or such other  higher amount as may be prescribed by the  Central Government, if the case is before  the Supreme Court”

Further,  Section  12  of  the  Kerala  State  Legal  

Services Authorities Rules, 1998 states that:

“12.  Any  person  whose  annual  income  from  all sources does not exceed Rupees Twelve  

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Thousand  shall  be  entitled  to  legal  services under clause (h) of Section 12 of  the Act”.

Therefore,  subject  to  the  submission  of  an  

affidavit  of  his  income,  the  court  fee  of  the  

appellant could have been waivered or provided by  

the District Legal Services Authority, instead of  

rejection of the suit.

12. Further, in the case of State of Maharashtra V.  Manubhai Pragaji Vashi and Others2, it has been held  that:

“17. …… we have to consider the combined  effect of Article 21 and Article 39A of the  Constitution  of  India.  The  right  to  free  legal aid and speedy trial are guaranteed  fundamental rights under Article 21 of the  Constitution.  The  preamble  to  the  Constitution  of  India  assures  'justice,  social,  economic  and  political'. Article  39A of  the  Constitution  provides  'equal  justice'  and  'free  legal  aid'.  The  State  shall  secure  that  the  operation  of  the  legal  system  promotes  justice.  It  means  justice according to law. In a democratic  polity, governed by rule of law, it should  be the main concern of the State, to have a  proper  legal  system. Article  39A mandates  

2 (1995) 5 SCC 730

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that the State shall provide free legal aid  by suitable  legislation  or  schemes  or  in  any other way to ensure that opportunities  for securing justice are not denied to any  citizen  by  reason  of  economic  or  other  disabilities. The  principles  contained  in Article 39A are fundamental and cast a  duty  on  the  State  to  secure  that  the  operation  of  the  legal  system  promotes  justice,  on  the  basis  of  equal  opportunities  and  further  mandates  to  provide  free  legal  aid  in  any  way-by  legislation or otherwise, so that justice  is not denied to any citizen by reason of  economic or other disabilities. The crucial  words  are  (the  obligation  of  the  State)  to provide  free  legal  aid  'by  suitable  legislation or by schemes' of 'in any other  way', so  that  opportunities  for  securing  justice are not denied to any citizen by  reason  of  economic  or other  disabilities. (Emphasis supplied)…….”

13.  Further,  Article  39A  of  the  Constitution  of  

India provides for holistic approach in imparting  

justice  to  the  litigating  parties.  It  not  only  

includes providing free legal aid via appointment of  

counsel  for  the  litigants,  but  also  includes  

ensuring that justice is not denied to litigating  

parties due to financial difficulties. Therefore, in  

the light of the legal principle laid down by this  

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Court, the appellant deserved waiver of court fee so  

that  he  could  contest  his  claim  on  merit  which  

involved  his  substantive  right.  The  Court  of  sub  

Judge erred in rejecting the case of the appellant  

due  to  non-  payment  of  court  fee.  Hence,  we  set  

aside the findings and the decision of the Court of  

sub Judge and condone the delay of the appellant in  

non-payment of court fee which resulted in rejection  

of his suit.  

Answer to Point no. 3

14. Having answered Point nos. 1 and 2 in favour of  

the appellant, we are inclined to answer point no. 3  

as well in his favour.  

 In  the  case  of  Muneesh  Devi  v.  U.P.  Power  

Corporation Ltd. and Ors.3, it was held as under:

“15. In the application filed by her for  condonation of delay, the Appellant made  copious references to the civil suit, the  writ  petition  and  the  special  leave  

3 2013 (9) SCALE 640  

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appellant has not provided sufficient grounds for  

delay in filing the appeal. This decision of the  

High Court is unsustainable in law. The appellant  

has  categorically  stated  that  he  went  to  his  

advocate’s office at Neyyattinkara on 24.05.2011 to  

enquire about the status of the suit. His advocate  

informed him that the learned sub Judge has rejected  

the  suit  on  11.8.2008  for  non-payment  of  balance  

court fee. The advocate claimed that he has informed  

the same to the appellant through a postal card but  

the appellant claims that the same has not reached  

him  and  he  was  under  the  impression  that  his  

application  for  extension  of  time  for  payment  of  

court fee will be allowed by the learned sub Judge.  

He  further  claimed  that  he  had  applied  for  

procurement of the certified copy of the decision of  

the learned sub Judge on the same day.

16. The learned senior counsel Mr. K.P. Kylasantha  

Pillay,  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  respondents  

alleged that the appeal of the appellant before this  

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court is based on wrong and frivolous grounds. The  

material  produced  by  them  in  support  of  their  

contention  is  totally  based  on  the  merit  of  the  

case. Since, we are not deciding the merit of the  

case, the material produced by the respondents in  

support of their contention becomes irrelevant. We  

have condoned the delay in paying the court fee by  

the appellant while answering point nos. 1 and 2. We  

see no reason in rejecting the application filed by  

the appellant for condonation of delay in filing the  

appeal before the High Court as well.  

17. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the impugned  

judgment passed by the High Court is not sustainable  

and is liable to be set aside as per the principle  

laid down by this Court in as much the High Court  

erred in rejecting the application for condonation  

of  delay  filed  by  the  appellant.  We  accordingly,  

condone the delay in filing the appeal in the High  

Court as well.  

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Answer to Point no. 4

18. In view of the reasons assigned while answering  

point nos. 1,2 and 3 in favour of the appellant, the  

impugned judgment passed by the High Court is set  

aside and the application filed by the appellant for  

condonation of delay is allowed. Therefore, we allow  

the appeal by setting aside the judgments and decree  

of  both  the  trial  court  and  the  High  Court  and  

remand the case back to the trial court for payment  

of court fee within 8 weeks. If for any reason, it  

is not possible for the appellant to pay the court  

fee, in such event, he is at liberty to approach the  

jurisdictional district legal service authority and  

Taluk Legal Services Committee seeking for grant of  

legal aid for sanction of court fee amount payable  

on  the  suit  before  the  trial  court.  If  such  

application is filed, the same shall be considered  

by such committee and the same shall be facilitated  

to the appellant to get the right of the appellant  

adjudicated  by  the  trial  court  by  securing  equal  

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C.A.@ SLP© No.23918 of 2012

justice  as  provided  under  Article  39A  of  the  

Constitution  of  India  read  with  the  provision  of  

Section 12(h) of the Legal Services Authorities Act  

read  with  Regulation  of  Kerala  State.  We  further  

direct the trial court to adjudicate on the rights  

of the parties on merit and dispose of the matter as  

expeditiously as possible.  

19.  The  appeal  is  allowed  in  terms  of  the  

observations and directions given as above to the  

trial court. There will be no order as to costs.   

                           ………………………………………………………………………J.

                   [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]

                         ………………………………………………………………………J.

       [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

New Delhi, November 25, 2013   

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