28 November 2017
Supreme Court
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MANOHAR LAL SHARMA Vs SANJAY LEELA BHANSALI

Bench: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.M. KHANWILKAR, HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
Judgment by: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
Case number: W.P.(Crl.) No.-000191 / 2017
Diary number: 37869 / 2017
Advocates: PETITIONER-IN-PERSON Vs E. C. AGRAWALA


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 191 OF 2017

MANOHAR LAL SHARMA                              … Petitioner

VERSUS

SANJAY LEELA BHANSALI & ORS.                  … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, CJI.

The  instant  writ  petition  has  been  preferred  under

Article  32  of  the  Constitution  of  India  giving  it  the

nomenclature of public interest litigation basically with twin

prayers  that  a  film  titled  “Padmavati”  should  not  be

exhibited in other countries without obtaining the requisite

certificate  from  the  Central  Board  of  Film  Certification

(CBFC) under the Cinematograph Act, 1952 (for brevity, ‘the

Act’) and the Rules and guidelines framed thereunder and

further to issue a writ of mandamus to the Central Bureau

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of Investigation (CBI), respondent No. 5 herein, to register

an FIR against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and their team

members for offence punishable under Section 7 of the Act

read with Sections 153A, 295, 295A, 499 and 500 of the

Indian  Penal  Code  read  with  Section  4  of  the  Indecent

Representation  of  Women  (Prohibition)  Act,  1986  and  to

investigate and prosecute them in accordance with law.

2. It  needs  to  be  stated  at  the  outset  that  the  reliefs

sought are not only extremely ambitious but also the nature

of  pleadings in the petition have the effect  of  potentiality

that can erode the fundamental conception of pleadings in a

Court of Law. It needs to be stated that neither laxity nor

lack of  sobriety in pleadings is countenanced in law. The

assertions in a petition cannot show carelessness throwing

all sense of propriety to the winds. Rambling of irrelevant

facts  only  indicates  uncontrolled  and  imprecise  thinking

and  exposes  the  inability  of  the  counsel.   On  certain

occasions,  it  reflects  a  maladroit  design  to  state  certain

things which are meant to sensationalize the matter which

has the roots in keen appetite for publicity.   When these

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aspects are portrayed in a nonchalant manner in a petition,

it is the duty of the Court to take strong exception to the

same and deal it with iron hands.

3. We  have  heard  Mr.  Manohar  Lal  Sharma,

petitioner-in-person,  Mr.  Harish  N.  Salve,  learned  senior

counsel assisted by Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, learned counsel,

appearing for the respondent no. 1, and Mr. Shyam Divan,

learned senior counsel for the respondent no. 2.  We have

also taken assistance of Mr. Maninder Singh and Mr. P.S.

Narasimha,  learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  for  the

Union of India.

4. Having stated so, we may now turn to the controversy.

When  the  matter  was  called,  Mr.  Salve,  learned  senior

counsel, who has entered appearance for the respondent No.

1, drew our attention to the dates of events as contained in

pages B to E of the petition. Be it noted, a similar matter

was  filed  in  a  different  manner  by  the  same  petitioner,

forming the subject matter  of  Writ  Petition (Criminal)  No.

186/2017  wherein  this  Court  has  directed  that  such

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pleadings  are  unwarranted.   Resultantly,  in  that  case,  a

substantial portion of the pleadings was struck off.  Despite

this, the same have been reiterated in the present petition.

Mr.  Manohar  Lal  Sharma,  petitioner-in-person,  would

submit that they are not a part of the pleadings.  We are

absolutely shocked by such an approach and submission.

When a writ  petition is  filed and the  dates of  events  are

mentioned, they definitely constitute a part of the pleadings.

It cannot be said that they do not form part of the pleadings.

This contention is absolutely untenable.  Therefore, keeping

in  view  the  nature  of  the  pleadings,  we  strike  off  the

narrations made in pages B to E (marked as 'X' in the paper

book), and further direct that such pleadings shall not be

included anywhere in future, and shall  not be mentioned

anywhere else.

5. On  the  last  occasion,  while  dealing  with  the  writ

petition filed by the petitioner,  we had clearly stated that

when the grant of  certificate is pending before the CBFC,

any kind of comment or adjudication by this Court would be

pre-judging  the  matter.   We  may  fruitfully  reproduce  a

passage  from the  order  dated  20.11.2017 passed  in  Writ

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Petition (Criminal) No. 186/2017:-

“In the course of hearing, we have been apprised  that  the  film  in  question,  i.e., 'Padmavati'  has  not  yet  received  the Certificate from the Central Board of Film Certification.

In  view  of  the  aforesaid,  our interference  in  the  writ  petition  will tantamount  to  pre-judging  the  matter which we are not inclined to do.  The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.”

6. What is submitted by Mr. Manohar Lal Sharma at this

juncture is that the first respondent is planning to exhibit

the  film  in  question  in  certain  countries  which  have  an

international market. Mr. Salve has submitted that for the

present,  the  first  respondent  has  no  intention  to  do  any

such thing, pending consideration of the application by the

CBFC  under  the  Act.  Mr.  Divan,  learned  senior  counsel

appearing  for  the  respondent  No.  2,  has  taken  strong

exception  to  the  approach  of  the  petitioner,  in  making

scurrilous  allegations  in  the  petition  which  defames  the

respondent.  We  appreciate  the  concern  expressed  by  the

learned counsel for the respondents because the scrutiny of

the film is still pending for consideration before the CBFC.

Succinctly  put,  the  prayer  made  in  the  petition  in  this

regard has no foundation and it is bound to flounder and we

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so hold.   Thus, the prayer loses its foundation.

7. The controversy does not end there. As stated earlier,

the  further  prayer  is  for  issuance  of  direction  to  the

respondent  no.  5  –  CBI  to  register  an  FIR  against

respondent  Nos.  1  and  2  and  their  team  members  for

offence  punishable  under  Section  7  of  the  Act  read  with

Sections 153A, 295, 295A, 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal

Code read with Section 4 of the Indecent Representation of

Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986. As far as Sections 499 and

500 of the IPC is concerned, police has no role. As far as the

other offences are concerned, it  is unfathomable how any

offence is  made out.   There is  no basis for  this Court to

direct registration of an FIR and we have no hesitation in

stating that the prayer is absolutely misconceived.   

8. At  this  stage,  we  are  obligated  to  state  that  writ

petitions are being filed even before the CBFC, which is the

statutory  authority,  takes  a  decision.   This  is  a  most

unfortunate situation showing how public interest litigation

can be  abused.   The  hunger  for  publicity  or  some other

hidden motive should not propel one to file such petitions.

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They sully the temple of justice and intend to create dents in

justice dispensation system. That apart, a petition is not to

be filed to abuse others.  The pleadings, as we have stated

earlier, are absolutely scurrilous, vexatious and untenable

in law, and we, accordingly, strike them off the record.   

9. We must say in quite promptitude that when a matter

is pending or going to be dealt with by the CBFC, no one

who  is  holding  any  post  of  public  responsibility  should

comment on how the application for  certification is  to be

processed.  That  tantamounts  to  creating  a  sense  of

prejudice in the mind of the CBFC.  The CBFC is expected to

take decisions with utmost objectivity as per the provisions

contained in the Act, the rules framed thereunder and the

guidelines. If the Court cannot pre-judge the matter before

the  CBFC  takes  a  decision,  we  fail  to  comprehend  how

anyone in public office can pre-judge the issue and make

public utterances.  They are not supposed to do so, and this

position in law is accepted and acceded to by Mr. Maninder

Singh and Mr. P.S. Narasimha, learned Additional Solicitors

General,  whose assistance we have sought.   It  should be

borne in mind that we are governed by the basic tenets of

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the rule of law.  When the matter is pending for grant of

certification, if responsible people in power or public offices

comment on the issue of certification pending consideration

before the statutory authority, that is a violation of the rule

of law.  All concerned shall be guided by the basic premise

of the rule of law and ought not to venture into violating the

same.   We  say  nothing  more  and  nothing  less,  for  the

present.

10. Another aspect needs to be highlighted.  A story told on

celluloid or a play enacted on a stage or a novel articulated

in a broad and large canvas or epic spoken with eloquence

or a poem sung with passion or recited with rhythm has

many  a  layer  of  freedom  of  expression  of  thought  that

requires  innovation,  skill,  craftsmanship  and,  above  all,

individual originality founded on the gift of imagination or

reality  transformed  into  imagination  or  vice  versa.   The

platform  can  be  different  and  that  is  why,  the  creative

instinct is respected and has the inherent protective right

from within which is called artistic licence.  In this regard,

we  may  profitably  reproduce  a  passage  from  Devidas

Ramachandra  Tuljapurkar  v.  State  of  Maharashtra

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and others1:-

“As far as the words “poetic licence”,  are con- cerned, it can never remotely mean a licence as used  or  understood  in  the  language  of  law. There is no authority who gives a licence to a poet. These are words from the realm of litera- ture. The poet assumes his own freedom which is allowed to him by the fundamental concept of poetry. He is free to depart from reality; fly away from grammar;  walk  in  glory  by  not  following systematic metres; coin words at his own will; use  archaic  words  to  convey  thoughts  or  at- tribute  meanings;  hide  ideas  beyond  myths which can be absolutely unrealistic; totally pave a path where neither rhyme nor rhythm prevail; can put serious ideas in satires, ifferisms, noto- rious  repartees;  take  aid  of  analogies, metaphors,  similes  in  his  own  style,  compare like “life with sandwiches that is consumed ev- eryday” or “life is like peeling of  an onion”,  or “society is like a stew”; define ideas that can bal- loon into the sky never to come down; cause vio- lence to  logic  at  his  own fancy;  escape to the sphere of figurative truism; get engrossed in the “universal eye for resemblance”, and one can do nothing except writing a critical appreciation in his  own  manner  and  according  to  his  under- standing. When a poet says “I saw eternity yes- terday night”, no reader would understand the term “eternity” in its prosaic sense. The Hamle- tian question has many a layer; each is free to confer a meaning; be it traditional or modern or individualistic. No one can stop a dramatist or a poet  or  a  writer  to  write  freely  expressing  his thoughts, and similarly none can stop the critics to give their comments whatever its worth. One may  concentrate  on  Classical  facets  and  one may think at a metaphysical level or concentrate on Romanticism as is understood in the poems of Keats, Byron or Shelley or one may dwell on

1 (2015) 6 SCC 1

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Nature  and  write  poems  like  William Wordsworth whose poems, say some, are didac- tic.  One  may  also  venture  to  compose  like Alexander Pope or Dryden or get into individual modernism like Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot or Pablo Neruda. That is fundamentally what is meant by poetic licence.”

We  may  categorically  state  that  the  artistic  licence

should be put on a high pedestal but the same has to be

judged objectively on case to case basis.  

11. In a Grammar of Politics, Harold J. Laski has stated:

“… My freedoms are avenues of choice through which I may, as I deem fit, construct for myself my own course of conduct. And the freedoms I must possess to enjoy a general liberty are those which,  in  their  sum,  will  constitute  the  path through which my best self is capable of attain- ment. That is not to say it will be attained. It is to say only that I alone can make that best self, and that without those freedoms I have not the means of manufacture at my disposal.”

12. In  Sudhir Kumar Saha v. Commissioner of Police

and another2, the Court has observed:-

“The  freedom  of  the  individual  is  of  utmost importance  in  any  civilized  society.  It  is  a human  right.  Under  our  Constitution  it  is  a guaranteed right. It can be deprived of only by due process of law.  The power to detain is an exceptional power to be used under exceptional

2  (1970) 1 SCC 149

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circumstances.”

13. In State of U.P. v. Lalai Singh Yadav3, Krishna Iyer.

J opined:-

“Rights  and  responsibilities  are  a  complex system  and  the  framers  of  our  Constitution, aware of the grammar of anarchy, wrote down reasonable restrictions on libertarian exercise of freedoms.”  

14. Recently, in  Nachiketa Walhekar v. Central Board

of Film Certification & Anr4, the Court has held:-

“The thrust of the matter is whether this Court should entertain the writ petition and pass an order of injunction directing the CBFC to delete the clip and further not to get the movie released in theaters on 17th November, 2017.  It is worthy to  mention  that  freedom  of  speech  and expression  is  sacrosanct  and  the  said  right should not be ordinarily interfered with.  That apart,  when  the  respondent  No.1,  CBFC,  has granted the certificate and only something with regard to the petitioner, which was shown in the media, is being reflected in the film, this Court should restrain itself in not entertaining the writ petition or granting injunction.”

And again:-

“Be it noted, a film or a drama or a novel or a book is a creation of art. An artist has his own freedom to express himself in a manner which is not prohibited in law and  such  prohibitions are

3  (1976) 4 SCC 213 4 W.P. (C) No. 1119 of 2017

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not read by implication to crucify the rights of expressive  mind.  The  human  history  records that there are many authors who express their thoughts according to the choice of their words, phrases, expressions and also create characters who may look absolutely different than an ordi- nary man would conceive of. A thought provok- ing  film should never mean that it has to be di- dactic or in any way puritanical. It can be ex- pressive  and  provoking  the  conscious  or  the sub-conscious  thoughts  of  the  viewer.  If  there has to be any limitation, that has to be as per the prescription in law.”

15. When  we  say  so,  we  are  also  reminded  of  the  line

spoken  by  Benjamin  Cardozo5 which  is  to  the  following

effect:-

“Complete freedom – unfettered and undirected – there never is.”

16. It  is  settled in law that no right is  absolute but the

fetters  for  enjoying  the  rights  should  be  absolutely

reasonable more so when it relates to the right to freedom of

speech and expression and right to liberty. The Court has to

see what kinds of fetters are being imposed and the impact

of the same.

5 CARDOZO, Benjamin N., The Growth of the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1924), p.61

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17. Ordinarily,  we  would  have  imposed  costs.   As  the

petitioner-in-person is a practising counsel in this Court, we

refrain  from  doing  so.   However,  we  caution  him  to  be

careful in future.

18. In view of the aforesaid analysis,  the writ petition is

dismissed with no order as to costs.

..............................CJI.      [Dipak Misra]

.…..............................J.  [A.M. Khanwilkar]

...................................J. New Delhi;                                       [Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud] November 28, 2017.