REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 32 OF 2018

MANKASTU IMPEX PRIVATE LIMITED                       ...Petitioner

VERSUS

AIRVISUAL LIMITED                    …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

R. BANUMATHI, J.

This  petition  has  been  filed  under  Section  11(6)  of  the

Arbitration  and  Conciliation  Act,  1996  read  with  Arbitration  and

Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 read with the Appointment of

Arbitrator  by  the  Chief  Justice  of  India  Scheme,  1996  seeking

appointment  of  a  sole  arbitrator  under  Clause  17.2  of  the

Memorandum  of  Understanding  dated  12.09.2016  between

petitioner-Company  incorporated  in  India  and  respondent-

incorporated under the laws of Hong Kong.

2. Brief facts of the case relevant for the purposes of this petition

are as under:-

The  petitioner-company  incorporated  in  India  conducts

business under the brand name “Atlanta Healthcare” and is in the

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business of air quality management and supply of air purifiers, car

purifiers,  anti-pollution  masks  and  air  quality  monitors.  The

respondent  is  a  company  incorporated  under  the  laws  of  Hong

Kong and is in the business of manufacture and sale of air quality

monitors  as  well  as  air  quality  information.  A  Memorandum  of

Understanding (MoU) dated 12.09.2016 was entered into between

the  parties  under  which  the  respondent  agreed  to  sell  to  the

petitioner the complete line of the respondent’s air quality monitors

products for onward sale. As per the terms of the agreement, the

petitioner was appointed as an exclusive distributor for the products

for sale within India. Additionally, non-exclusive rights were given to

the petitioner qua distribution for  sales in  Sri  Lanka, Bangladesh

and Nepal.  This  agreement  was to  continue for  a  period  of  five

years from the starting date, which date was to commence from the

date of delivery of the first lot of Air Quality monitors in India, i.e.

03.10.2016  or  01.11.2016,  whichever  was  later.  As  per  the

petitioner, it  has spent approximately Rs.17,00,000/- in promoting

and creating a brand value for  the products in India. Further the

petitioner  spent  Rs.9,00,000/-  towards promoting the  products  at

over fifteen business events such as Indo-German Natural Health

Fair, India International Trade Fair, etc.

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3. On 14.10.2017, the petitioner received an e-mail from one Mr.

Charl Cater of IQAir AG (Proposed respondent No.2) informing the

petitioner that the respondent is a part of IQAir AG. Attached to the

e-mail  was  a  letter  dated  13.10.2017  by  the  CEO  of  IQAir  AG

stating  that  IQAir  AG  has  acquired  all  technology  and  the

associated  assets  of  the  respondent.  Further,  the  product  of

AirVisual Node has been discontinued and the IQAir AG is in the

process of relaunching a new and improved version which will be

rebranded as IQAir AirVisual Pro. The letter also stated that IQAir

AG  will  not  assume  any  contracts  or  legal  obligations  of  the

respondent and will work on a case to case basis with resellers to

negotiate new contracts and that the IQAir AirVisual products will be

made available under separate dealer agreements.

4. The petitioner sent reply dated 15.10.2017, invoking the terms

of  MoU  with  the  respondent  as  per  which  the  petitioner  holds

exclusive rights for sale of AirVisual Products for five years within

the territory of India. Further the petitioner stated as per the terms of

the  MoU,  in  the  event  of  any  take  out/buy  out  or  change  in

shareholding  of  the  entity,  it  was  obligatory  on  the  part  of  the

respondent to ensure that the party taking over the business/assets

shall honour the contract on the same terms and conditions and it is

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a deemed presumption that the acquisition of business/assets of the

respondent has been done keeping in view the existing liabilities

and obligations.

5. On 31.10.2017, the petitioner sent an e-mail to the respondent

and  IQAir  AG  seeking  Proforma  Invoice  to  enable  it  to  issue

purchase orders. In reply, it  was reiterated by IQAir AG that they

have  not  assumed  any  legal  obligations  of  the  respondent.

However, they offered to supply IQAir branded AirVisual Pro to the

petitioner  under  a  new  non-exclusive  arrangement  with  a  new

wholesale price of USD 172 per unit as against the original price of

USD  110  per  unit  agreed  upon  between  the  petitioner  and  the

respondent.  The petitioner  thereafter  sent  several  e-mails  but  no

response  was  received.  On  08.12.2017,  the  petitioner  issued  a

notice  invoking  the  arbitration  clause  provided  in  Clause  17  the

MoU. The petitioner also proposed the name of Hon’ble Justice RC

Chopra as the arbitrator, subject to consent of the respondent and

IQAir AG.  

6. The petitioner filed a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration

and  Conciliation  Act  before  the  Delhi  High  Court  on  11.12.2017

seeking directions against the respondent and IQAir AG to honour

the terms and conditions of the MoU dated 12.09.2016 and to allow

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the petitioner to continue acting as the authorised distributor for the

sale  of  all  products  in  terms  of  the  MoU  and  to  injunct  the

respondent  and  IQAir  AG  from  terminating  the  MoU  and  from

entering into any contract with third parties for products which are

the subject matter of the MoU. Vide interim order dated 28.02.2018,

the High  Court  restrained the respondent  from selling  any of  its

products in India. The petition filed under Section 9 of the Act by the

petitioner is still pending before the High Court.

7. In  response  to  the  petitioner’s  notice  dated  08.12.2017,

invoking  the  arbitration  clause,  IQAir  vide  its  letter  dated

15.12.2017,  under  its  asset  purchase  agreement  with  the

respondent,  it  has  not  assumed  any  contractual  and  legal

obligations and that  the terms of  the MoU were not  enforceable

against  IQAir  AG.   The  respondent  also  sent  its  reply  dated

05.01.2018 to the notice dated 08.12.2017 stating that Clause 17 of

the MoU provides for arbitration administered and seated in Hong

Kong.  The respondent  averred that  should  the petitioner  wish to

resolve the dispute by arbitration, they should refer the dispute to an

arbitration institution in Hong Kong. Further, it was stated that the

respondent did not agree to ad hoc arbitration but clearly agreed to

administered arbitration in Hong Kong.  It was in this backdrop, the

petitioner  filed petition under Section 11(6)  of  the Arbitration and

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Conciliation  Act  seeking  appointment  of  Sole  Arbitrator  under

Clause 17 of the MoU.

8. According to the petitioner, the proposed arbitration between

the Petitioner and the respondent being an arbitration between a

company registered in India under the Companies Act,  1956 and

the respondent – a body corporate which is incorporated under the

laws of Hong Kong, is an “International Commercial Arbitration” as

per  Section  2(1)(f)  of  the  Arbitration  and  Conciliation  Act,  1996

having seat of arbitration in Delhi. In terms of Section 11(6) read

with  Section 11(9),  the petitioner  therefore seeks appointment  of

arbitrator.   

9. Mr. Vikas Dutta, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted

that  Clause  17.1  of  the  MoU clearly  stipulates  that  the  MoU is

governed by the laws of India and the courts at New Delhi have the

jurisdiction.  It was submitted that the petitioner and the respondent

have  only  agreed  Hong  Kong  as  the  “Venue”  of  arbitration  and

Hong Kong is not  the juridical  seat of  the arbitration.   As to the

decision in  the  case of  Union of  India  v.  Hardy Exploration and

Production (India) INC (2018) 7 SCC 374, the learned counsel for

the petitioner has contended that the ratio of the judgment clearly

postulates that a “venue” can become a “seat” only if – (i) no other

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condition is postulated; (ii) if a condition precedent is attached to the

term “place”, the said condition/indicia has to be satisfied first for

“venue” to be equivalent to “seat”.  It was submitted that in view of

clear Clause 17.1 where the parties have clearly agreed that the

MoU has to be governed by the laws of India and the courts at New

Delhi would have the jurisdiction, Part-I of the Act is applicable and

hence, prayed for appointment of sole arbitrator.

10. Mr. Ritin Rai, learned Senior counsel for the respondent has

submitted that as per Clause 17.2 of the MoU entered into between

the parties, the place of arbitration shall be Hong Kong. Since the

place of arbitration is outside India, Section 11 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation  Act  has  no  application  to  the  present  dispute.  The

learned  Senior  counsel  submitted  that  the  expression  used  in

Clause 17.2 which provides “the place of arbitration shall be Hong

Kong”, in addition to also providing that “all disputes arising out of

the MoU shall be referred to and finally resolved and administered

in Hong Kong” clearly shows that the parties have agreed that the

arbitration between the parties would be seated in Hong Kong and

therefore, Part-I is not applicable and Section 11 has no application

to the present dispute. The learned Senior counsel submitted that

the petitioner is required to approach the Hong Kong International

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Arbitration  Centre  and  the  Indian  Courts  have  no  jurisdiction  to

entertain the petition for appointment of arbitrator.

11. On behalf of the respondent, much reliance was placed upon

BGS  SGS  SOMA JV  v.  NHPC  Ltd. 2019  (17)  SCALE  369 to

contend that the expression “arbitration proceedings” would make it

clear that the “venue” is really the “seat of arbitration proceedings”

as the aforesaid expression does not include just one or more single

or part hearing but the arbitration proceedings as a whole including

making of  the award at  that  place.   It  was submitted that  in the

present case, the word “administered” used in Clause 17.2 of the

MoU between the parties clearly shows that the parties have agreed

that the arbitration between the parties would be seated in Hong

Kong.

12. In  BGS  Soma,  the  expression  used  was  “….arbitration

proceedings shall be held at New Delhi/Faridabad”.  In BGS Soma,

the three-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that in all the

three appeals by the parties, proceedings were held at New Delhi

and  the  awards  were  also  signed  at  New  Delhi  and  not  in

Faridabad.  The learned Bench held that in the absence of contrary

expression expressed by the parties, it leads to the conclusion that

the parties have chosen New Delhi as the seat of arbitration under

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Section 20(1) of the Arbitration Act.  In BGS Soma, the Bench held

that the judgment in Hardy Exploration is contrary to the decision of

the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Bharat Aluminium

Company v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2012) 9 SCC

552 (BALCO) and therefore, cannot be considered good law.

13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that  Hardy

Exploration and BGS Soma, both being by the three-Judges Bench,

declaration by the later Bench that  Hardy Exploration is not a god

law, may not tantamount to an overriding of  Hardy Exploration.  It

was  submitted  that  when both  the  judgments  were  by  Bench of

equal strength, it was not open to the Bench rendering the decision

in  BGS Soma  to hold that the decision in  Hardy Exploration was

incorrect  and  the  learned  Bench  in  BGS  Soma  ought  to  have

referred the matter to larger Bench.  To substantiate the contention,

the  learned  counsel  for  the  petitioner  has  referred  to Chandra

Prakash and others v. State of U.P and another (2002) 4 SCC 234

wherein this Court held that the doctrine of binding precedent is of

utmost  importance  in  the  administration  of  judicial  system  as  it

promotes certainty and consistency in judicial decisions.  However,

considering  Clause  17  of  the  MoU in  the  present  case  and the

definite clauses therein and in the facts and circumstances of the

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case, we are not inclined to go into the question on the correctness

of BGS Soma or otherwise.

14. The question falling for consideration in the present case is, in

view of Clause 17.2 of the MoU whether the parties have agreed

that the seat of arbitration is at Hong Kong and whether this Court

lacks jurisdiction to entertain the present petition filed under Section

11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

15. The petitioner  is  a company incorporated in  India;  whereas

the respondent is a company incorporated under the laws of Hong

Kong.  Section 2(1)(f) of the Act defines “International Commercial

Arbitration”.  As  per  Section  2(1)(f),  to  be  an  “International

Commercial  Arbitration”,  three  factors  ought  to  be  fulfilled  –  (i)

arbitration; (ii) considered as commercial under the laws in force in

India;  and  (iii)  at  least  one  of  the  parties  is  national  or  habitual

resident in any country other than India.  In the present case, since

the respondent is a company incorporated under the laws of Hong

Kong, we are concerned with “International Commercial Arbitration”.

16. As  per  Section  2(2),  Part-I  shall  apply  where  the  place  of

arbitration is in India. If the “International Commercial Arbitration” is

seated in India, then Part-I of the Act shall apply. The interpretation

of Section 2(2) of the Act was considered by the Constitution Bench

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in BALCO, wherein it was held that Part-I of the Act would have no

application to “International  Commercial  Arbitrations”  held outside

India.  In para (194) of the judgment, it was held as under:-

“194. …..Section  2(2)  makes  a  declaration  that  Part  I  of  the

Arbitration Act, 1996 shall apply to all arbitrations which take place

within  India.  We  are  of  the  considered  opinion  that  Part  I  of  the

Arbitration  Act,  1996  would  have  no  application  to  international

commercial  arbitration  held  outside  India.  Therefore,  such  awards

would only be subject to the jurisdiction of the Indian courts when the

same are  sought  to  be  enforced  in  India  in  accordance  with  the

provisions contained in Part II of the Arbitration Act, 1996. ……”

17. In the present case, Clause 17 of the MoU is a relevant clause

governing  the  law  and  dispute  resolution.   Clause  17  reads  as

under:-

17.  Governing Law and Dispute Resolution 17.1  This MoU is governed by the laws of India, without regard to its

conflicts of laws provisions and courts at New Delhi shall have the

jurisdiction.

17.2  Any dispute, controversy, difference or claim arising out of or

relating to this MoU, including the existence, validity, interpretation,

performance, breach or termination thereof or any dispute regarding

non-contractual  obligations arising  out  of  or  relating  to  it  shall  be

referred to and finally resolved by arbitration administered in Hong

Kong.

The place of arbitration shall be Hong Kong.

The number of arbitrators shall be one.  The arbitration proceedings

shall be conducted in English language.

17.3  It  is agreed that a party may seek provisional, injunctive, or

equitable remedies, including but not limited to preliminary injunctive

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relief,  from a  court  having  jurisdiction,  before,  during  or  after  the

pendency of any arbitration proceeding.

18. The learned counsel  for  the petitioner has submitted that  a

perusal of Clause 17.1 of the MoU makes it clear that the petitioner

and the respondent have only agreed that  the proper law of  the

contract to be laws of India and the MoU is clearly silent on the

proper law and the curial law of the arbitration and therefore, Clause

17.1 would govern the proper law and the curial law. According to

the  petitioner,  there  is  no  express  or  implied  exclusion  either  in

Clause 17 or under the entire MoU of the non-applicability of the

laws of India and/or the applicability of the laws of Hong Kong or

any other country.  Contention of the petitioner is that in the absence

of the clear stipulation as to the proper law and curial law of the

arbitration,  laws of  India should be taken as the proper  law and

curial law under the MoU and under no circumstances, the terms in

Clause 17.1 of the MoU be undermined or diluted.  

19. The  seat  of  arbitration  is  a  vital  aspect  of  any  arbitration

proceedings.   Significance  of  the  seat  of  arbitration  is  that  it

determines  the  applicable  law  when  deciding  the  arbitration

proceedings  and  arbitration  procedure  as  well  as  judicial  review

over the arbitration award.  The situs is not just about where an

institution is based or where the hearings will be held.  But it is all

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about  which  court  would  have  the  supervisory  power  over  the

arbitration proceedings.  In  Enercon (India) Limited and others v.

Enercon GMBH and another (2014) 5 SCC 1, the Supreme Court

held that “the location of the Seat will determine the courts that will

have exclusive jurisdiction to oversee the arbitration proceedings.  It

was further held that the Seat normally carries with it the choice of

that country’s arbitration/curial law”.   

20. It  is  well-settled  that  “seat  of  arbitration”  and  “venue  of

arbitration”  cannot  be  used  inter-changeably.  It  has  also  been

established that mere expression “place of arbitration” cannot be the

basis  to  determine  the  intention  of  the  parties  that  they  have

intended that place as the “seat” of arbitration.  The intention of the

parties as to the “seat” should be determined from other clauses in

the agreement and the conduct of the parties.

21. In  the present  case,  the arbitration agreement  entered into

between the parties provides Hong Kong as the place of arbitration.

The agreement between the parties choosing “Hong Kong” as the

place  of  arbitration  by  itself  will  not  lead  to  the  conclusion  that

parties  have chosen Hong Kong as the seat  of  arbitration.   The

words, “the place of arbitration” shall be “Hong Kong”, have to be

read  along  with  Clause  17.2.  Clause  17.2  provides  that  “….any

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dispute, controversy, difference arising out of or relating to the MoU

“shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration administered

in Hong Kong…..”.  On a plain reading of the arbitration agreement,

it is clear that the reference to Hong Kong as “place of arbitration” is

not a simple reference as the “venue” for the arbitral proceedings;

but a reference to Hong Kong is for final resolution by arbitration

administered in Hong Kong.  The agreement between the parties

that  the  dispute  “shall  be  referred  to  and  finally  resolved  by

arbitration  administered  in  Hong  Kong”  clearly  suggests  that  the

parties have agreed that the arbitration be seated at Hong Kong and

that laws of Hong Kong shall govern the arbitration proceedings as

well as have power of judicial review over the arbitration award.

22. As pointed out earlier, Clause 17.2 of the MoU stipulates that

the dispute arising out of or relating to MoU including the existence,

validity, interpretation, breach or termination thereof or any dispute

arising out of or relating to it shall be referred to and finally resolved

by the arbitration administered in Hong Kong.  The words in Clause

17.2 that “arbitration administered in Hong Kong” is an indicia that

the seat  of  arbitration  is  at  Hong Kong.   Once the  parties  have

chosen “Hong Kong” as the place of arbitration to be administered

in Hong Kong, laws of Hong Kong would govern the arbitration. The

Indian courts have no jurisdiction for appointment of the arbitrator.   

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23. Observing  that  when  the  parties  have  chosen  a  place  of

arbitration  in  a  particular  country,  that  choice  brings  with  it

submission  to  the  laws  of  that  country,  in  Eitzen  Bulk  A/S  v.

Ashapura Minechem Ltd. and another  (2016) 11 SCC 508, it was

held as under:-

“34. As  a  matter  of  fact  the  mere  choosing  of  the  juridical  seat  of

arbitration attracts the law applicable to such location. In other words, it

would  not  be  necessary  to  specify  which  law  would  apply  to  the

arbitration  proceedings,  since the  law of  the  particular  country  would

apply  ipso  jure. The following passage  from  Redfern  and  Hunter  on

International Arbitration contains the following explication of the issue:

“It  is  also  sometimes  said  that  parties  have  selected  the

procedural law that will  govern their arbitration, by providing for

arbitration in a particular country. This is too elliptical and, as an

English court itself  held more recently in Breas of Doune Wind

Farm it does not always hold true. What the parties have done is

to choose a place of arbitration in a particular country. That choice

brings with it submission to the laws of that country, including any

mandatory  provisions  of  its  law  on  arbitration.  To  say  that  the

parties have “chosen” that particular law to govern the arbitration

is rather like saying that an English woman who takes her car to

France has “chosen” French traffic law, which will  oblige her to

drive on the right-hand side of the road, to give priority to vehicles

approaching from the right, and generally to obey traffic laws to

which she may not be accustomed. But it would be an odd use of

language to say this notional motorist had opted for “French traffic

law”.  What  she  has  done  is  to  choose  to  go  to  France.  The

applicability of French law then follows automatically. It is not a

matter of choice.

Parties may well choose a particular place of arbitration precisely

because  its  lex  arbitri  is  one  which  they  find  attractive.

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Nevertheless,  once  a  place  of  arbitration  has  been  chosen,  it

brings with it its own law. If that law contains provisions that are

mandatory so far as arbitration are concerned, those provisions

must be obeyed. It is not a matter of choice any more than the

notional motorist is free to choose which local traffic laws to obey

and which to disregard.”” [Underlining added]

24. In the context of domestic arbitration, holding that once the

“Seat”  is  determined,  only  that  jurisdictional  court  would  have

exclusive  jurisdiction,  in  Indus  Mobile  Distribution  (P)  Ltd.  v.

Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd. and others (2017) 7 SCC 678, it was

held as under:-  

“19. A conspectus  of  all  the  aforesaid  provisions  shows  that  the

moment the seat is designated, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction

clause. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that the seat of

arbitration  is  Mumbai  and  Clause  19  further  makes  it  clear  that

jurisdiction exclusively vests in the Mumbai courts. Under the Law of

Arbitration, unlike the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to suits

filed in courts, a reference to “seat” is a concept by which a neutral

venue can be chosen by the parties to  an arbitration clause.  The

neutral venue may not in the classical sense have jurisdiction — that

is,  no part  of  the cause of  action may have arisen at  the neutral

venue and neither would any of the provisions of Sections 16 to 21 of

CPC  be  attracted.  In  arbitration  law  however,  as  has  been  held

above, the moment “seat” is determined, the fact that the seat is at

Mumbai  would  vest  Mumbai  courts  with  exclusive  jurisdiction  for

purposes  of  regulating  arbitral  proceedings  arising  out  of  the

agreement between the parties.” [Underlining added]

25. Clause 17.1 of the MoU stipulates that the MoU is governed

by  the  laws  of  India  and  the  courts  at  New  Delhi  shall  have

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jurisdiction.   The  interpretation  to  Clause  17.1  shows  that  the

substantive law governing the substantive contract are the laws of

India.  The words in Clause 17.1  “without regard to its conflicts of

laws provisions and courts at New Delhi shall have the jurisdiction”

has to be read along with Clause 17.3 of the agreement.  As per

Clause  17.3,  the  parties  have  agreed  that  the  party  may  seek

provisional,  injunctive  or  equitable  remedies  from a  court  having

jurisdiction  before,  during  or  after  the  pendency  of  any  arbitral

proceedings. In para (161) in BALCO (2012) 9 SCC 552, this Court

held that “…..on a logical and schematic construction of Arbitration

Act, 1996, the Indian Courts do not have the power to grant interim

measures when the seat of arbitration is outside India….”.   If  the

arbitration agreement is found to have seat  of  arbitration outside

India,  then  the  Indian  Courts  cannot  exercise  supervisory

jurisdiction over  the award or  pass interim orders.  It  would have

therefore been necessary for the parties to incorporate Clause 17.3

that  parties have agreed that  a  party  may seek interim relief  for

which Delhi Courts would have jurisdiction. In this regard, we may

usefully  refer  to  the  insertion  of  proviso  to  Section  2(2)  of  the

Arbitration Act, 1996 by Amendment Act, 2015. By the Amendment

Act, 2015 (w.e.f. 23.10.2015), a proviso has been added to Section

2(2) of the Act as per which, certain provisions of Part-I of the Act

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i.e. Sections 9 – interim relief, 27 – court’s assistance for evidence,

37(1)(a) – appeal against the orders and Section 37(3) have been

made applicable to “International Commercial Arbitrations” even if

the place of arbitration is outside India.  Proviso to Section 2(2) of

the Act reads as under:-

“2. Definitions.-

……..

(2) This Part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India:

Provided that subject to an agreement to the contrary, the provisions

of  sections  9,  27  and  clause (a) of  sub-section (1) and  sub-

section (3) of section 37 shall also apply to international commercial

arbitration, even if  the place of arbitration is outside India, and an

arbitral award made or to be made in such place is enforceable and

recognised under the provisions of Part II of this Act.”

It is pertinent to note that Section 11 is not included in the proviso

and  accordingly,  Section  11  has  no  application  to  “International

Commercial Arbitrations” seated outside India.   

26. The words in Clause 17.1  “without regard to its conflicts of

laws provisions and courts at New Delhi shall have the jurisdiction”

do not take away or dilute the intention of the parties in Clause 17.2

that the arbitration be administered in Hong Kong.  The words in

Clause 17.1 do not suggest that the seat of arbitration is in New

Delhi.   Since Part-I  is not applicable to “International Commercial

Arbitrations”, in order to enable the parties to avail the interim relief,

Clause  17.3  appears  to  have  been added.   The  words  “without

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regard to its conflicts of laws provisions and courts at New Delhi

shall  have  the  jurisdiction”  in  Clause  17.1  is  to  be  read  in

conjunction  with  Clause 17.3.   Since  the arbitration is  seated at

Hong Kong, the petition filed by the petitioner under Section 11(6) of

the Act is not maintainable and the petition is liable to be dismissed.

27. In the result,  Arbitration Petition No.32 of  2018 filed by the

petitioner seeking appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6)

of  the Act  is  dismissed.   It  is  however  open to  the  petitioner  to

approach  Hong  Kong  International  Arbitration  Centre  for

appointment of the arbitrator, if they so desire.

………………………..J.                                                                         [R. BANUMATHI]

………………………..J.                                                                 [A.S. BOPANNA]

.………………………..J.                                                                  [HRISHIKESH ROY]

New Delhi; March 05, 2020.

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