13 October 2011
Supreme Court
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MANINDERJIT SINGH BITTA Vs UNION OF INDIA .

Bench: S.H. KAPADIA,K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN,SWATANTER KUMAR
Case number: W.P.(C) No.-000510-000510 / 2005
Diary number: 21064 / 2005
Advocates: CHARU MATHUR Vs B. KRISHNA PRASAD


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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

IA NO.10 of 2010

IN  

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.510 OF 2005

Maninderjit Singh Bitta           …  Petitioner

Versus

Union of India & Ors.      …  Respondents

O R D E R  

1. Government  of  India,  on  28th March,  2001,  issued  a  

notification  under  the  provisions  of  Section  41(6)  of  the  

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the Act’) read with Rule  

50 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (for short, ‘the Rules’)  

for  implementation  of  the  provisions  of  the  Act.   This  

notification  sought  to  introduce  a  new scheme  regulating  

issuance and fixation of High Security Number Plates.  In  

terms  of  sub-section  (3)  of  Section  109  of  the  Act,  the  

Central  Government  issued  an  order  dated  22nd August,  

2001 which dealt with various facets of manufacture, supply  

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and fixation of new High Security Registration Plates (HSRP).  

The Central Government also issued a notification dated 16th  

October, 2001 for further implementation of the said order  

and the HSRP Scheme. Various States had invited tenders  

in order to implement this Scheme.

2. A writ petition being Writ Petition (C) No.41 of 2003 was  

filed  in  this  Court  challenging  the  Central  Government’s  

power to issue such notification as well as the terms and  

conditions of the tender process.  In addition to the above  

writ petition before this Court, various other writ petitions  

were  filed  in  different  High  Courts  raising  the  same  

challenge.   These writ  petitions came to be transferred to  

this Court.  All the transferred cases along with Writ Petition  

(C) No. 41 of 2003 were referred to a larger Bench of three  

Judges of this Court by order of reference dated 26th May,  

2005  in  the  case  of  Association  of  Registration  Plates  v.  

Union of India [(2004) 5 SCC 364], as there was a difference  

of  opinion  between  the  learned  Members  of  the  Bench  

dealing  with  the  case.   The  three  Judge  Bench  finally  

disposed  of  the  writ  petitions  vide  its  order  dated  30th  

November,  2004  reported  in  Association  of  Registration  

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Plates v. Union of India Association of Registration Plates v.   

Union of India [(2005) 1 SCC 679].  While dismissing the writ  

petition and the connected matters, the Bench rejected the  

challenge  made  to  the  provisions  of  the  Rules,  statutory  

order  issued  by  the  Central  Government  and  the  tender  

conditions and also issued certain directions for appropriate  

implementation of the Scheme.   

3. The matter did not rest there.  Different States did not  

comply  with  the  Rules,  scheme  and/or  statutory  order  

which resulted in filing of  the present writ petition,  being  

Writ Petition (C) No.510 of 2005. This writ petition also came  

to be disposed of by a three Judge Bench of this Court vide  

its  judgment  titled  as  Maninderjit  Singh  Bitta v.  Union  of   

India [(2008) 7 SCC 328].  It will be appropriate to refer to  

the operative part of the said judgment:

“5. Grievance of the petitioner and the intervener i.e.   All  India Motor  Vehicles Security Association is that   subsequent to the judgment the scheme of HSRP is yet   not  implemented  in  any  State  except  the  State  of   Meghalaya  and  other  States  are  still  repeating  the   processing of the tender.  The prayer therefore is that   the  purpose  of  introducing  the  scheme  should  be   fulfilled (sic- in) letter and spirit.  The objective being   public  safety  and  security  there  should not  be  any   lethargy.   It  is  pointed  out  that  most  of  the  States   floated the tenders and thereafter without any reason   the process has been slowed down…

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9. Needless to say the scheme appears to have been   introduced  keeping  in  view  the  public  safety  and   security of the citizens.  Let  

necessary decisions be taken,  if  not  already taken,   within  a  period  of  six  months  from  today.   While   taking  the  decision  the  aspects  highlighted  by  this   Court in the earlier decision needless to say shall be   kept in view.”

4. Despite  the above judgment of  this  Court,  most  of  the  

States  have  failed  to  implement  the  scheme  and  the  

directions contained in the judgments of  this Court.   The  

matter  remained  pending  before  this  Court  for  a  

considerable time and various orders passed by this Court  

directing implementation of the scheme, were not complied  

with.  On 7th April, 2011, by a detailed order, we had taken  

note  of  the  intervening  events  and  the  fact  that  a  large  

number of States had not even implemented the scheme and  

the  directions  contained  in  the  judgments  of  this  Court.  

Before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court  

for initiation of contempt proceedings against the concerned  

authorities  of  the  respective  defaulting  States,  this  Court  

considered it necessary to require only presence of officers in  

Court  and  provided  them  with  another  opportunity  to  

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ensure compliance of  the directions issued by this  Court.  

Despite  assurance  of  an  effective  implementation  of  the  

Court’s orders, nothing substantial was done within the time  

of six weeks granted by this Court vide its Order dated 7th  

April, 2011.  Certain Interim Applications (I.A.s) were filed  

by some of the States for extension of time and in view of the  

assurance given in court, this Court had also dispensed with  

the personal appearance of the senior officers of those State  

Governments.  However,  with some regret,  we noticed that  

still a few states had not complied with the directions of this  

Court and the casual attitude of  the State Government of  

these States was obvious from their very conduct, inside and  

outside the court.  This attitude compelled us to pass a very  

detailed Order on 30th August, 2011 classifying the States  

into different categories.   The first category of the states had  

taken steps and even awarded the  contract  for  supplying  

‘High  Security  Registration  Plates’  (HSRP).   The  second  

category was of the States/U.T.s which had not followed the  

correct procedure for selection and had approved all private  

vendors  with  ‘Type  Approval  Certificate’  (TAC)  from  the  

Central  Government  to  affix  the  ‘HSRP’  at  their  own  

premises or at the Office of the RTO.  The third category was  

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of the defaulting States who had filed affidavits, assuring the  

Court  of  taking  steps  and  finalising  the  tender  allotment  

within the specified dates. On the basis of the affidavits filed  

by them, they were granted further time and were required  

to file affidavits of compliance.  The last category was of the  

States which had been persisting with the default and had  

not taken any effective steps to comply with the directions of  

this Court.  Thus, vide Order dated 30th August 2011 we had  

passed the following directions in relation to this category :  

“9. From the record before us, it is clear that there is   apparent  and  intentional  default  on  the  part  of  the   concerned  officers  of  these  defaulting  States.   Consequently,  we  issue  notice  to  show cause  why   proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971   be  not  initiated,  if  found  guilty,  why  they  be  not   punished in accordance with law and why exemplary   costs,  personally  recoverable  from  the  erring   officers/officials,  be  not  imposed.   Notice  shall  be  issued to:

a. Secretary (Transport) of the defaulting States.

       b. Commissioner,  State  Transport  Authority of  

          the respective States.”

5. The State of Haryana is one such state which has hardly  

taken any step to implement the scheme.  For their intentional  

violation  of  the  Court’s  Order,  we  were  compelled  to  issue  

notice as to why proceedings under the Contempt of Courts  

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Act  of  1971  (for  short  ‘the  1971  Act’)  as  well  as  costs,  

exemplary or otherwise, be not imposed upon the States or its  

officers,  responsible  for  such  inordinate  delay  in  complying  

with the orders of the Court.   

6. In the affidavits filed on behalf of the State of Haryana, it  

was stated that a notice for inviting tender was published on  

29th October 2002 which was challenged before the court and  

finally, this Court vide its Order dated 13th November 2004,  

had  dismissed  the  petition  raising  challenge  to  the  tender  

process.   Thereafter,  draft  ‘Request  for  Proposals’  was  

prepared  only  on  28th April,  2011  and  the  notice  inviting  

tender was published on 12th May, 2011.  Pre-bid meeting was  

held and amendments to the terms of the tender were made on  

30th June, 2011.  The constituted committee held a meeting  

thereafter and apprised the concerned of the pre-qualification  

bids.   On  30th August,  2011,  the  bids  were  received  and  

evaluated.  The technical bids were opened on 5th September,  

2011 and financial bids were to be opened thereafter in the  

month of September 2011 itself which, unfortunately, have not  

been opened till date and the tender has not been awarded to  

any bidder.   

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7. Let  us  now  examine  the  conduct  of  the  State  and  its  

officers, responsible for not carrying out the directions of this  

Court.  It is undisputable from the record produced before us  

that initially the steps were taken by the State of Haryana in  

the year 2002 which could not be finalised because of court’s  

intervention and the said challenge was finally dismissed and  

all controversies came to an end by the Order of this Court  

dated 30th November, 2004.  Admittedly, from the year 2004  

till 2011, for a long period of seven years, no steps were taken  

by the State of Haryana in compliance with the directions of  

this Court and the statutory scheme under the provisions of  

Rule 50 of the Rules.  It was only with the pronouncement of  

the Order dated 7th April, 2011 by this Court that the State of  

Haryana appears to have woken up from slumber and made a  

feeble  attempt,  which  completely  lacked  both  will  and  

sincerity,  to  comply  with  the  orders  of  this  Court.   The  

authorities were expected to comply with the directions and  

implement the scheme effectively and expeditiously.  Despite  

the lapse of more than 5 months, tenders have still not been  

awarded to any party.  It is evident from the record that the  

matters  of  public  safety  and  urgent  nature  were  taken  as  

routine  files  of  the  Department.   This  conduct  of  the  

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Department and its officers demonstrates a complete callous  

attitude  on  their  part,  as  they  failed  to  take  note  of  the  

mandatory and self-contained directions of this Court in the  

Order  dated  7th April,  2011.   Besides  noticing  that  such  

functioning of the departments was reprehensible, this Court  

while recording a note of caution, required the authorities to  

comply with such orders in future.  Despite specific orders, it  

has taken months for the State hierarchy to open the financial  

bids and award the contract.  In the Order dated 30th August,  

2011,  the  State  of  Haryana was named amongst  the  states  

which had taken no action or had merely initiated the process  

without any effective steps and/or final  results.   They were  

issued notice  because  the  conduct  of  these  States  reflected  

callousness and lack of will to obey the orders of this Court.  

Their attitude was found to be one of disobedience and the  

situation has hardly changed, not for the better in any case.  

Not taking any steps, whatsoever, to implement the Scheme  

and  the  orders  of  this  Court  for  years  together  and  now  

inaction for months together in not opening the financial bids  

and awarding the contract, is a glaring and flagrant violation  

of the orders of  this Court by the State and its responsible  

officers.     

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8. Now,  we  would  examine  certain  principles  of  law  which  

would normally guide the exercise of judicial discretion in the  

realm of contempt jurisdiction.  ‘Contempt’ is an extraordinary  

jurisdiction of the Courts.  Normally, the courts are reluctant  

to initiate contempt proceedings under the provisions of the  

1971 Act.  This jurisdiction, at least  suo moto, is invoked by  

the courts sparingly and in compelling circumstances, as it is  

one of the foremost duty of the courts to ensure compliance of  

its orders.  The law relating to contempt is primarily dissected  

into two main heads of jurisdiction under the Indian Law:  (a)  

Criminal  Contempt,  and (b)  Civil  Contempt.   It  is  now well  

settled  and  explained  principle  under  the  Indian  contempt  

jurisdiction  that  features,  ingredients,  procedure,  attendant  

circumstances of the case and the quantum of punishment are  

the relevant and deciphering factors.  Section 12 of the 1971  

Act deals with the contempt of court and its punishment while  

Section 15 deals with cognizance of criminal contempt.  Civil  

contempt would be wilful breach of an undertaking given to  

the court or wilful disobedience of any judgment or order of  

the court, while criminal contempt would deal with the cases  

where  by  words,  spoken or  written,  signs  or  any matter  or  

doing of any act which scandalises, prejudices or interferes,  

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obstructs  or  even tends  to  obstruct  the  due  course  of  any  

judicial  proceedings,  any  court  and  the  administration  of  

justice  in  any  other  manner.   Under  the  English  Law,  the  

distinction between criminal and civil contempt is stated to be  

very  little  and that  too  of  academic  significance.   However,  

under both the English and Indian Law these are proceedings  

sui generis.  While referring to Justice J.D. Kapoor’s Law of  

Contempt  of  Court,  Second Edition,  2010 which mentioned  

the Phillimore Committee Report – Report of the Committee on  

Contempt of Court, of which importantly the following passage  

can be noticed:

“4.  In England and Wales most forms of contempt   have been regarded as of criminal character, and as   such, are called “criminal contempts”.  In Scotland   contempt of court is not a crime nor is a distinction   between “criminal” and “civil” contempts recognised.   Scots law regards contempt of court as a chapter of   a law sui generis.  This difference of approach is of   little  more  than  academic  significance  in  modern   practice,  but  the  Scottish  explain  certain  peculiar   elements in its operation and procedure.  What is of   particular importance is that it is branch of the law  in which breaches are investigated by a special and   summary procedure  and  where,  once  established,   they may be severely punished.”

9. Under the Indian Law the conduct of the parties, the act  

of  disobedience  and  the  attendant  circumstances  are  

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relevant to consider whether a case would fall  under civil  

contempt  or  a  criminal  contempt.   For  example,  

disobedience of an order of a court simplicitor would be civil  

contempt but when it is coupled with conduct of the parties  

which  is  contemptuous,  prejudicial  and  is  in  flagrant  

violation  of  the  law  of  the  land,  it  may  be  treated  as  a  

criminal contempt.  Even under the English Law, the courts  

have the power to enforce its judgment and orders against  

the recalcitrant parties.

10. In exercise of its contempt jurisdiction, the courts  

are  primarily  concerned  with  enquiring  whether  the  

contemnor is guilty of intentional and wilful violation of the  

orders  of  the  court,  even  to  constitute  a  civil  contempt.  

Every party to  lis before the court, and even otherwise, is  

expected to obey the orders of the court in its true spirit and  

substance.  Every person is required to respect and obey the  

orders of the court with due dignity for the institution.  The  

Government  Departments  are  no  exception  to  it.   The  

departments  or  instrumentalities  of  the  State  must  act  

expeditiously as per orders of the court and if such orders  

postulate  any  schedule,  then  it  must  be  adhered  to.  

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Whenever  there  are  obstructions  or  difficulties  in  

compliance  with  the  orders  of  the  court,  least  that  is  

expected of the Government Department or its functionaries  

is  to  approach  the  court  for  extension  of  time  or  

clarifications,  if  called  for.   But,  where  the  party  neither  

obeys  the  orders  of  the  court  nor  approaches  the  court  

making  appropriate  prayers  for  extension  of  time  or  

variation of order, the only possible inference in law is that  

such party disobeys the orders of the court.  In other words,  

it is intentionally not carrying out the orders of the court.  

Flagrant  violation  of  the  court’s  orders  would  reflect  the  

attitude of the concerned party to undermine the authority  

of the courts, its dignity and the administration of justice.  

In the case of Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra [(1995) 2 SCC 584],  

this Court held that ‘judiciary has a special and additional  

duty  to  perform,  viz.,  to  oversee  that  all  individuals  and  

institutions including the executive and the legislature act  

within  the  framework  of  not  only  the  law  but  also  the  

fundamental law of the land.  This duty is apart from the  

function of  adjudicating  the  disputes  between the  parties  

which is  essential  to peaceful  and orderly development of  

the society.  Dignity and authority of the Courts have to be  

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respected and protected at all costs’.

11. Another very important aspect even of the Civil  

Contempt  is,  ‘what  is  the  attribution  of  the  contemnor?’  

There may be cases of disobedience where the respondent  

commits acts and deeds leading to actual disobedience of  

the  orders  of  the  court.   Such  contemnor  may  flout  the  

orders of the court openly, intentionally and with no respect  

for  the  rule  of  law.   While  in  some  other  cases  of  civil  

contempt, disobedience is the consequence or inference of a  

dormant or passive behaviour on the part of the contemnor.  

Such would be the cases where the contemnor does not take  

steps and just  remains unmoved by the directions of  the  

court.   As such, even in cases where no positive/active role  

is  directly  attributable  to  a  person,  still,  his  passive  and  

dormant attitude of inaction may result in violation of the  

orders of the court and may render him liable for an action  

of contempt.  

12. It  is  not  the  offence  of  contempt  which  gets  

altered  by  a  passive/negative  or  an  active/positive  

behaviour of a contemnor but at best, it can be a relevant  

consideration  for  imposition  of  punishment,  wherever  the  

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contemnor  is  found  guilty  of  contempt  of  court.   With  

reference to Government officers, this Court in the case of  

E.T. Sunup v. Canss Employees Assoc.. [(2004) 8 SCC 683]  

took  the  view  that  it  has  become  a  tendency  with  the  

Government officers to somehow or the other circumvent the  

orders of the Court by taking recourse to one justification or  

the  other  even  if  ex-facie they  are  unsustainable.   The  

tendency  of  undermining  the  court  orders  cannot  be  

countenanced.    Deprecating  practice  of  undue  delay  in  

compliance with the orders of the court, this Court again in  

the case of  M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors. [(2001) 5   

SCC 309] observed :  

“.....clear  lapse  on the  part  of  NCT and Municipal   Corporation.   Even  if  there  was  not  deliberate  or   wilful  disregard  for  the  court  orders,  there  has   clearly been a lackadaisical attitude and approach   towards  them.   Though  no  further  action  in  this   matter  need be taken for  now,  but such lethargic   attitude  if  continues  may  soon  become  contumacious.”   

13. It  is  also  of  some  relevancy  to  note  that  

disobedience  of  court  orders  by  positive  or  active  

contribution  or  non-obedience  by  a  passive  and dormant  

conduct leads to the same result.  Disobedience of orders of  

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the court strikes at the very root of rule of law on which the  

judicial system rests.  The rule of law is the foundation of a  

democratic society.  Judiciary is the guardian of the rule of  

law.  If the Judiciary is to perform its duties and functions  

effectively and remain true to the spirit with which they are  

sacredly entrusted, the dignity and authority of the courts  

have to be respected and protected at all costs (refer  T.N.  

Godavarman  Thirumulpad’s  case  [(2006)  5  SCC  1].  The  

proceedings before the highest court of the land in a public  

interest litigation, attain even more significance.  These are  

the cases which come up for hearing before the court on a  

grievance  raised  by  the  public  at  large  or  public  spirited  

persons.  The State itself places matters before the Court for  

determination which would fall, statutorily or otherwise, in  

the domain of the executive authority.  It is where the State  

and  its  instrumentalities  have  failed  to  discharge  its  

statutory  functions  or  have  acted  adversely  to  the  larger  

public interest that the courts are called upon to interfere in  

exercise  of  their  extraordinary  jurisdiction,  to  ensure  

maintenance of the rule of law.  These are the cases which  

have impact in  rem or on larger section of the society and  

not  in  personam  simplicitor.  Courts  are  called  upon  to  

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exercise jurisdiction with twin objects in mind.  Firstly, to  

punish the persons who have disobeyed or not carried out  

orders of the court i.e. for their past conduct.  Secondly, to  

pass  such  orders,  including  imprisonment  and  use  the  

contempt jurisdiction as a tool for compliance of its orders  

in  future.  This  principle  has  been  applied  in  the  United  

States and Australia as well.  For execution of the orders of  

the court even committal  for  an indefinite  term has been  

accepted under Australian law  [Australasian Meat Industry  

Employees Union v. Mudginberri Station Pty. Ltd. (1986) 161   

CLR 98 (Australian High Court)] and American law, though  

this  is  no  longer  permissible  under  English  Law.   While  

referring to detention of a person for a long period to ensure  

execution of the orders in Re Nevitt [117 F. 448, 461 (1902)]   

Judge Sanborn observed that the person subjected to such  

a term ‘carries the keys of  his prison in his own pocket.’  

Lethargy,  ignorance,  official  delays  and  absence  of  

motivation can hardly be offered as any defence in an action  

for contempt.  Inordinate delay in complying with the orders  

of  the  courts  has  also  received  judicial  criticism.   It  is  

inappropriate  for  the  parties  concerned  to  keep  the  

execution of the court’s orders in abeyance for an inordinate  

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period.  Inaction or even dormant behaviour by the officers  

in highest echelons in the hierarchy of the Government in  

complying with the directions/orders of this Court certainly  

amounts  to  disobedience.   Inordinate  delay  of  years  in  

complying with the orders of the court or in complying with  

the  directed  stipulations  within  the  prescribed  time,  has  

been  viewed  by  this  Court  seriously  and  held  to  be  the  

contempt of court, as it undermines the dignity of the court.  

Reference in this regard can be made to Maniyeri Madhavan  

v. Inspector of Police, Cannanore [AIR 1993 SC 356] and Anil   

Ratan Sarkar  and Ors.  v.  Hirak Ghosh and Ors.  [(2002) 4  

SCC 21].  Even a lackadaisical attitude, which itself may not  

be deliberate or wilful, have not been held to be a sufficient  

ground of defence in a contempt proceeding.  Obviously, the  

purpose is to ensure compliance of the orders of the court at  

the earliest and within stipulated period.   

14. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, it  

is undisputed that for years together the State of Haryana  

has failed to comply with the directions of this Court and  

implement the scheme.  It has not only caused prejudice to  

the public at large but has even undermined the dignity of  

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this  Court.  The attitude of  the  State  of  Haryana and the  

respective  officers  has  been  lackadaisical  and  of  wilful  

disregard.  Despite repeated orders they have failed to take  

effective steps and whatever steps were taken the same are  

not  in  conformity  with law.   The  repeated Orders  of  this  

Court have failed to bring any results from the recalcitrant  

State.  The repeated opportunities and extension of time did  

not  help  in  expeditious  progress  in  the  matter.   On  the  

contrary,  there  is  apparent  disobedience  of  the  Orders  of  

this Court and no compliance with the Orders of this court,  

by their completely passive and dormant behaviour.  This  

behaviour, besides causing serious problems in the effective  

implementation of statutory scheme, has even undermined  

the dignity of this Court and impinged upon the basic rule  

of law.  At the cost of repetition, we may notice that there is  

not  even a word of  explanation as  to  why no steps  were  

taken by the State  of  Haryana for  a long period of  seven  

years and why tender has not been awarded till date.  The  

vague  averments made in the  affidavit  are  nothing  but a  

lame  excuse  to  somehow  avoid  the  present  proceedings.  

The State of Haryana and the concerned officers,  namely,  

the  Secretary,  Transport  and  the  Commissioner,  State  

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Transport Authority have violated the Orders of this Court  

and are liable for the consequences of such disobedience.   

15. It  was  expected  of  the  officers  in-charge  and  

particularly  the  Secretary,  Transport  and  Commissioner,  

State Transport Authority of the State of Haryana to at least  

carefully  read  the  orders  of  this  Court  and  ensure  their  

implementation in their correct perspective.  We would have  

expected  such  high  officers  of  the  State  to  act  fairly,  

expeditiously  and  in  accordance  with  the  orders  of  this  

Court.   If the concerned State would have taken timely and  

appropriate steps in accordance with the law and the orders  

of this Court, it would have not only saved the time of the  

Court, which it had spent on repeated hearings, but would  

have also saved the public money that it had spent so far.

16. We  have  no  hesitation  in  coming  to  the  

conclusion  that  the  Secretary,  Transport  and  the  

Commissioner,  State  Transport  Authority  of  the  State  of  

Haryana is guilty of wilful disobedience/non-compliance of  

the orders of this Court, particularly the orders dated 30th  

November  2004,  7th April  2011  and  30th August  2011.  

Having found them guilty under the provisions of the 1971  

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Act and under Article 129 of the Constitution of India, we  

punish the Secretary,  Transport and Commissioner,  State  

Road Transport Authority of the State of Haryana as under :

i) They are punished to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- each and  

in  default,  they  shall  be  liable  to  undergo  simple  

imprisonment for a period of fifteen days;

ii) We impose exemplary cost of Rs.50,000/- on the State  

of Haryana, which amount, at the first instance, shall  

be paid by the State but would be recovered from the  

salaries of  the erring officers/officials of  the State in  

accordance with law and such recovery proceedings be  

concluded  within  six  months.   The  costs  would  be  

payable  to  the  Supreme  Court  Legal  Services  

Committee.    

iii) In  view  of  the  principle  that  the  courts  also  invoke  

contempt  jurisdiction  as  a  tool  for  compliance  of  its  

orders  in  future,  we  hereby  direct  the  State  

Government  and  the  respondent/contemner  herein  

now  to  positively  comply  with  the  orders  and  

implement the scheme within eight weeks from today.

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Copy  of  this  order  be  circulated  to  the  Chief  

Secretary/Competent Authority of all the States/U.T.s.

It is ordered accordingly.

….………….............................CJI.                             (S.H. Kapadia)

…….………….............................J.                                     (K.S. Radhakrishnan)

...….………….............................J.                                     (Swatanter Kumar) New Delhi October 13, 2011

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