MANINDERJIT SINGH BITTA Vs UNION OF INDIA .
Bench: S.H. KAPADIA,K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN,SWATANTER KUMAR
Case number: W.P.(C) No.-000510-000510 / 2005
Diary number: 21064 / 2005
Advocates: CHARU MATHUR Vs
B. KRISHNA PRASAD
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
IA NO.10 of 2010
IN
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.510 OF 2005
Maninderjit Singh Bitta … Petitioner
Versus
Union of India & Ors. … Respondents
O R D E R
1. Government of India, on 28th March, 2001, issued a
notification under the provisions of Section 41(6) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the Act’) read with Rule
50 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (for short, ‘the Rules’)
for implementation of the provisions of the Act. This
notification sought to introduce a new scheme regulating
issuance and fixation of High Security Number Plates. In
terms of sub-section (3) of Section 109 of the Act, the
Central Government issued an order dated 22nd August,
2001 which dealt with various facets of manufacture, supply
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and fixation of new High Security Registration Plates (HSRP).
The Central Government also issued a notification dated 16th
October, 2001 for further implementation of the said order
and the HSRP Scheme. Various States had invited tenders
in order to implement this Scheme.
2. A writ petition being Writ Petition (C) No.41 of 2003 was
filed in this Court challenging the Central Government’s
power to issue such notification as well as the terms and
conditions of the tender process. In addition to the above
writ petition before this Court, various other writ petitions
were filed in different High Courts raising the same
challenge. These writ petitions came to be transferred to
this Court. All the transferred cases along with Writ Petition
(C) No. 41 of 2003 were referred to a larger Bench of three
Judges of this Court by order of reference dated 26th May,
2005 in the case of Association of Registration Plates v.
Union of India [(2004) 5 SCC 364], as there was a difference
of opinion between the learned Members of the Bench
dealing with the case. The three Judge Bench finally
disposed of the writ petitions vide its order dated 30th
November, 2004 reported in Association of Registration
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Plates v. Union of India Association of Registration Plates v.
Union of India [(2005) 1 SCC 679]. While dismissing the writ
petition and the connected matters, the Bench rejected the
challenge made to the provisions of the Rules, statutory
order issued by the Central Government and the tender
conditions and also issued certain directions for appropriate
implementation of the Scheme.
3. The matter did not rest there. Different States did not
comply with the Rules, scheme and/or statutory order
which resulted in filing of the present writ petition, being
Writ Petition (C) No.510 of 2005. This writ petition also came
to be disposed of by a three Judge Bench of this Court vide
its judgment titled as Maninderjit Singh Bitta v. Union of
India [(2008) 7 SCC 328]. It will be appropriate to refer to
the operative part of the said judgment:
“5. Grievance of the petitioner and the intervener i.e. All India Motor Vehicles Security Association is that subsequent to the judgment the scheme of HSRP is yet not implemented in any State except the State of Meghalaya and other States are still repeating the processing of the tender. The prayer therefore is that the purpose of introducing the scheme should be fulfilled (sic- in) letter and spirit. The objective being public safety and security there should not be any lethargy. It is pointed out that most of the States floated the tenders and thereafter without any reason the process has been slowed down…
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XXX XXX XXX
9. Needless to say the scheme appears to have been introduced keeping in view the public safety and security of the citizens. Let
necessary decisions be taken, if not already taken, within a period of six months from today. While taking the decision the aspects highlighted by this Court in the earlier decision needless to say shall be kept in view.”
4. Despite the above judgment of this Court, most of the
States have failed to implement the scheme and the
directions contained in the judgments of this Court. The
matter remained pending before this Court for a
considerable time and various orders passed by this Court
directing implementation of the scheme, were not complied
with. On 7th April, 2011, by a detailed order, we had taken
note of the intervening events and the fact that a large
number of States had not even implemented the scheme and
the directions contained in the judgments of this Court.
Before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court
for initiation of contempt proceedings against the concerned
authorities of the respective defaulting States, this Court
considered it necessary to require only presence of officers in
Court and provided them with another opportunity to
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ensure compliance of the directions issued by this Court.
Despite assurance of an effective implementation of the
Court’s orders, nothing substantial was done within the time
of six weeks granted by this Court vide its Order dated 7th
April, 2011. Certain Interim Applications (I.A.s) were filed
by some of the States for extension of time and in view of the
assurance given in court, this Court had also dispensed with
the personal appearance of the senior officers of those State
Governments. However, with some regret, we noticed that
still a few states had not complied with the directions of this
Court and the casual attitude of the State Government of
these States was obvious from their very conduct, inside and
outside the court. This attitude compelled us to pass a very
detailed Order on 30th August, 2011 classifying the States
into different categories. The first category of the states had
taken steps and even awarded the contract for supplying
‘High Security Registration Plates’ (HSRP). The second
category was of the States/U.T.s which had not followed the
correct procedure for selection and had approved all private
vendors with ‘Type Approval Certificate’ (TAC) from the
Central Government to affix the ‘HSRP’ at their own
premises or at the Office of the RTO. The third category was
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of the defaulting States who had filed affidavits, assuring the
Court of taking steps and finalising the tender allotment
within the specified dates. On the basis of the affidavits filed
by them, they were granted further time and were required
to file affidavits of compliance. The last category was of the
States which had been persisting with the default and had
not taken any effective steps to comply with the directions of
this Court. Thus, vide Order dated 30th August 2011 we had
passed the following directions in relation to this category :
“9. From the record before us, it is clear that there is apparent and intentional default on the part of the concerned officers of these defaulting States. Consequently, we issue notice to show cause why proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 be not initiated, if found guilty, why they be not punished in accordance with law and why exemplary costs, personally recoverable from the erring officers/officials, be not imposed. Notice shall be issued to:
a. Secretary (Transport) of the defaulting States.
b. Commissioner, State Transport Authority of
the respective States.”
5. The State of Haryana is one such state which has hardly
taken any step to implement the scheme. For their intentional
violation of the Court’s Order, we were compelled to issue
notice as to why proceedings under the Contempt of Courts
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Act of 1971 (for short ‘the 1971 Act’) as well as costs,
exemplary or otherwise, be not imposed upon the States or its
officers, responsible for such inordinate delay in complying
with the orders of the Court.
6. In the affidavits filed on behalf of the State of Haryana, it
was stated that a notice for inviting tender was published on
29th October 2002 which was challenged before the court and
finally, this Court vide its Order dated 13th November 2004,
had dismissed the petition raising challenge to the tender
process. Thereafter, draft ‘Request for Proposals’ was
prepared only on 28th April, 2011 and the notice inviting
tender was published on 12th May, 2011. Pre-bid meeting was
held and amendments to the terms of the tender were made on
30th June, 2011. The constituted committee held a meeting
thereafter and apprised the concerned of the pre-qualification
bids. On 30th August, 2011, the bids were received and
evaluated. The technical bids were opened on 5th September,
2011 and financial bids were to be opened thereafter in the
month of September 2011 itself which, unfortunately, have not
been opened till date and the tender has not been awarded to
any bidder.
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7. Let us now examine the conduct of the State and its
officers, responsible for not carrying out the directions of this
Court. It is undisputable from the record produced before us
that initially the steps were taken by the State of Haryana in
the year 2002 which could not be finalised because of court’s
intervention and the said challenge was finally dismissed and
all controversies came to an end by the Order of this Court
dated 30th November, 2004. Admittedly, from the year 2004
till 2011, for a long period of seven years, no steps were taken
by the State of Haryana in compliance with the directions of
this Court and the statutory scheme under the provisions of
Rule 50 of the Rules. It was only with the pronouncement of
the Order dated 7th April, 2011 by this Court that the State of
Haryana appears to have woken up from slumber and made a
feeble attempt, which completely lacked both will and
sincerity, to comply with the orders of this Court. The
authorities were expected to comply with the directions and
implement the scheme effectively and expeditiously. Despite
the lapse of more than 5 months, tenders have still not been
awarded to any party. It is evident from the record that the
matters of public safety and urgent nature were taken as
routine files of the Department. This conduct of the
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Department and its officers demonstrates a complete callous
attitude on their part, as they failed to take note of the
mandatory and self-contained directions of this Court in the
Order dated 7th April, 2011. Besides noticing that such
functioning of the departments was reprehensible, this Court
while recording a note of caution, required the authorities to
comply with such orders in future. Despite specific orders, it
has taken months for the State hierarchy to open the financial
bids and award the contract. In the Order dated 30th August,
2011, the State of Haryana was named amongst the states
which had taken no action or had merely initiated the process
without any effective steps and/or final results. They were
issued notice because the conduct of these States reflected
callousness and lack of will to obey the orders of this Court.
Their attitude was found to be one of disobedience and the
situation has hardly changed, not for the better in any case.
Not taking any steps, whatsoever, to implement the Scheme
and the orders of this Court for years together and now
inaction for months together in not opening the financial bids
and awarding the contract, is a glaring and flagrant violation
of the orders of this Court by the State and its responsible
officers.
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8. Now, we would examine certain principles of law which
would normally guide the exercise of judicial discretion in the
realm of contempt jurisdiction. ‘Contempt’ is an extraordinary
jurisdiction of the Courts. Normally, the courts are reluctant
to initiate contempt proceedings under the provisions of the
1971 Act. This jurisdiction, at least suo moto, is invoked by
the courts sparingly and in compelling circumstances, as it is
one of the foremost duty of the courts to ensure compliance of
its orders. The law relating to contempt is primarily dissected
into two main heads of jurisdiction under the Indian Law: (a)
Criminal Contempt, and (b) Civil Contempt. It is now well
settled and explained principle under the Indian contempt
jurisdiction that features, ingredients, procedure, attendant
circumstances of the case and the quantum of punishment are
the relevant and deciphering factors. Section 12 of the 1971
Act deals with the contempt of court and its punishment while
Section 15 deals with cognizance of criminal contempt. Civil
contempt would be wilful breach of an undertaking given to
the court or wilful disobedience of any judgment or order of
the court, while criminal contempt would deal with the cases
where by words, spoken or written, signs or any matter or
doing of any act which scandalises, prejudices or interferes,
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obstructs or even tends to obstruct the due course of any
judicial proceedings, any court and the administration of
justice in any other manner. Under the English Law, the
distinction between criminal and civil contempt is stated to be
very little and that too of academic significance. However,
under both the English and Indian Law these are proceedings
sui generis. While referring to Justice J.D. Kapoor’s Law of
Contempt of Court, Second Edition, 2010 which mentioned
the Phillimore Committee Report – Report of the Committee on
Contempt of Court, of which importantly the following passage
can be noticed:
“4. In England and Wales most forms of contempt have been regarded as of criminal character, and as such, are called “criminal contempts”. In Scotland contempt of court is not a crime nor is a distinction between “criminal” and “civil” contempts recognised. Scots law regards contempt of court as a chapter of a law sui generis. This difference of approach is of little more than academic significance in modern practice, but the Scottish explain certain peculiar elements in its operation and procedure. What is of particular importance is that it is branch of the law in which breaches are investigated by a special and summary procedure and where, once established, they may be severely punished.”
9. Under the Indian Law the conduct of the parties, the act
of disobedience and the attendant circumstances are
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relevant to consider whether a case would fall under civil
contempt or a criminal contempt. For example,
disobedience of an order of a court simplicitor would be civil
contempt but when it is coupled with conduct of the parties
which is contemptuous, prejudicial and is in flagrant
violation of the law of the land, it may be treated as a
criminal contempt. Even under the English Law, the courts
have the power to enforce its judgment and orders against
the recalcitrant parties.
10. In exercise of its contempt jurisdiction, the courts
are primarily concerned with enquiring whether the
contemnor is guilty of intentional and wilful violation of the
orders of the court, even to constitute a civil contempt.
Every party to lis before the court, and even otherwise, is
expected to obey the orders of the court in its true spirit and
substance. Every person is required to respect and obey the
orders of the court with due dignity for the institution. The
Government Departments are no exception to it. The
departments or instrumentalities of the State must act
expeditiously as per orders of the court and if such orders
postulate any schedule, then it must be adhered to.
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Whenever there are obstructions or difficulties in
compliance with the orders of the court, least that is
expected of the Government Department or its functionaries
is to approach the court for extension of time or
clarifications, if called for. But, where the party neither
obeys the orders of the court nor approaches the court
making appropriate prayers for extension of time or
variation of order, the only possible inference in law is that
such party disobeys the orders of the court. In other words,
it is intentionally not carrying out the orders of the court.
Flagrant violation of the court’s orders would reflect the
attitude of the concerned party to undermine the authority
of the courts, its dignity and the administration of justice.
In the case of Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra [(1995) 2 SCC 584],
this Court held that ‘judiciary has a special and additional
duty to perform, viz., to oversee that all individuals and
institutions including the executive and the legislature act
within the framework of not only the law but also the
fundamental law of the land. This duty is apart from the
function of adjudicating the disputes between the parties
which is essential to peaceful and orderly development of
the society. Dignity and authority of the Courts have to be
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respected and protected at all costs’.
11. Another very important aspect even of the Civil
Contempt is, ‘what is the attribution of the contemnor?’
There may be cases of disobedience where the respondent
commits acts and deeds leading to actual disobedience of
the orders of the court. Such contemnor may flout the
orders of the court openly, intentionally and with no respect
for the rule of law. While in some other cases of civil
contempt, disobedience is the consequence or inference of a
dormant or passive behaviour on the part of the contemnor.
Such would be the cases where the contemnor does not take
steps and just remains unmoved by the directions of the
court. As such, even in cases where no positive/active role
is directly attributable to a person, still, his passive and
dormant attitude of inaction may result in violation of the
orders of the court and may render him liable for an action
of contempt.
12. It is not the offence of contempt which gets
altered by a passive/negative or an active/positive
behaviour of a contemnor but at best, it can be a relevant
consideration for imposition of punishment, wherever the
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contemnor is found guilty of contempt of court. With
reference to Government officers, this Court in the case of
E.T. Sunup v. Canss Employees Assoc.. [(2004) 8 SCC 683]
took the view that it has become a tendency with the
Government officers to somehow or the other circumvent the
orders of the Court by taking recourse to one justification or
the other even if ex-facie they are unsustainable. The
tendency of undermining the court orders cannot be
countenanced. Deprecating practice of undue delay in
compliance with the orders of the court, this Court again in
the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors. [(2001) 5
SCC 309] observed :
“.....clear lapse on the part of NCT and Municipal Corporation. Even if there was not deliberate or wilful disregard for the court orders, there has clearly been a lackadaisical attitude and approach towards them. Though no further action in this matter need be taken for now, but such lethargic attitude if continues may soon become contumacious.”
13. It is also of some relevancy to note that
disobedience of court orders by positive or active
contribution or non-obedience by a passive and dormant
conduct leads to the same result. Disobedience of orders of
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the court strikes at the very root of rule of law on which the
judicial system rests. The rule of law is the foundation of a
democratic society. Judiciary is the guardian of the rule of
law. If the Judiciary is to perform its duties and functions
effectively and remain true to the spirit with which they are
sacredly entrusted, the dignity and authority of the courts
have to be respected and protected at all costs (refer T.N.
Godavarman Thirumulpad’s case [(2006) 5 SCC 1]. The
proceedings before the highest court of the land in a public
interest litigation, attain even more significance. These are
the cases which come up for hearing before the court on a
grievance raised by the public at large or public spirited
persons. The State itself places matters before the Court for
determination which would fall, statutorily or otherwise, in
the domain of the executive authority. It is where the State
and its instrumentalities have failed to discharge its
statutory functions or have acted adversely to the larger
public interest that the courts are called upon to interfere in
exercise of their extraordinary jurisdiction, to ensure
maintenance of the rule of law. These are the cases which
have impact in rem or on larger section of the society and
not in personam simplicitor. Courts are called upon to
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exercise jurisdiction with twin objects in mind. Firstly, to
punish the persons who have disobeyed or not carried out
orders of the court i.e. for their past conduct. Secondly, to
pass such orders, including imprisonment and use the
contempt jurisdiction as a tool for compliance of its orders
in future. This principle has been applied in the United
States and Australia as well. For execution of the orders of
the court even committal for an indefinite term has been
accepted under Australian law [Australasian Meat Industry
Employees Union v. Mudginberri Station Pty. Ltd. (1986) 161
CLR 98 (Australian High Court)] and American law, though
this is no longer permissible under English Law. While
referring to detention of a person for a long period to ensure
execution of the orders in Re Nevitt [117 F. 448, 461 (1902)]
Judge Sanborn observed that the person subjected to such
a term ‘carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket.’
Lethargy, ignorance, official delays and absence of
motivation can hardly be offered as any defence in an action
for contempt. Inordinate delay in complying with the orders
of the courts has also received judicial criticism. It is
inappropriate for the parties concerned to keep the
execution of the court’s orders in abeyance for an inordinate
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period. Inaction or even dormant behaviour by the officers
in highest echelons in the hierarchy of the Government in
complying with the directions/orders of this Court certainly
amounts to disobedience. Inordinate delay of years in
complying with the orders of the court or in complying with
the directed stipulations within the prescribed time, has
been viewed by this Court seriously and held to be the
contempt of court, as it undermines the dignity of the court.
Reference in this regard can be made to Maniyeri Madhavan
v. Inspector of Police, Cannanore [AIR 1993 SC 356] and Anil
Ratan Sarkar and Ors. v. Hirak Ghosh and Ors. [(2002) 4
SCC 21]. Even a lackadaisical attitude, which itself may not
be deliberate or wilful, have not been held to be a sufficient
ground of defence in a contempt proceeding. Obviously, the
purpose is to ensure compliance of the orders of the court at
the earliest and within stipulated period.
14. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, it
is undisputed that for years together the State of Haryana
has failed to comply with the directions of this Court and
implement the scheme. It has not only caused prejudice to
the public at large but has even undermined the dignity of
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this Court. The attitude of the State of Haryana and the
respective officers has been lackadaisical and of wilful
disregard. Despite repeated orders they have failed to take
effective steps and whatever steps were taken the same are
not in conformity with law. The repeated Orders of this
Court have failed to bring any results from the recalcitrant
State. The repeated opportunities and extension of time did
not help in expeditious progress in the matter. On the
contrary, there is apparent disobedience of the Orders of
this Court and no compliance with the Orders of this court,
by their completely passive and dormant behaviour. This
behaviour, besides causing serious problems in the effective
implementation of statutory scheme, has even undermined
the dignity of this Court and impinged upon the basic rule
of law. At the cost of repetition, we may notice that there is
not even a word of explanation as to why no steps were
taken by the State of Haryana for a long period of seven
years and why tender has not been awarded till date. The
vague averments made in the affidavit are nothing but a
lame excuse to somehow avoid the present proceedings.
The State of Haryana and the concerned officers, namely,
the Secretary, Transport and the Commissioner, State
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Transport Authority have violated the Orders of this Court
and are liable for the consequences of such disobedience.
15. It was expected of the officers in-charge and
particularly the Secretary, Transport and Commissioner,
State Transport Authority of the State of Haryana to at least
carefully read the orders of this Court and ensure their
implementation in their correct perspective. We would have
expected such high officers of the State to act fairly,
expeditiously and in accordance with the orders of this
Court. If the concerned State would have taken timely and
appropriate steps in accordance with the law and the orders
of this Court, it would have not only saved the time of the
Court, which it had spent on repeated hearings, but would
have also saved the public money that it had spent so far.
16. We have no hesitation in coming to the
conclusion that the Secretary, Transport and the
Commissioner, State Transport Authority of the State of
Haryana is guilty of wilful disobedience/non-compliance of
the orders of this Court, particularly the orders dated 30th
November 2004, 7th April 2011 and 30th August 2011.
Having found them guilty under the provisions of the 1971
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Act and under Article 129 of the Constitution of India, we
punish the Secretary, Transport and Commissioner, State
Road Transport Authority of the State of Haryana as under :
i) They are punished to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- each and
in default, they shall be liable to undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of fifteen days;
ii) We impose exemplary cost of Rs.50,000/- on the State
of Haryana, which amount, at the first instance, shall
be paid by the State but would be recovered from the
salaries of the erring officers/officials of the State in
accordance with law and such recovery proceedings be
concluded within six months. The costs would be
payable to the Supreme Court Legal Services
Committee.
iii) In view of the principle that the courts also invoke
contempt jurisdiction as a tool for compliance of its
orders in future, we hereby direct the State
Government and the respondent/contemner herein
now to positively comply with the orders and
implement the scheme within eight weeks from today.
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Copy of this order be circulated to the Chief
Secretary/Competent Authority of all the States/U.T.s.
It is ordered accordingly.
….………….............................CJI. (S.H. Kapadia)
…….………….............................J. (K.S. Radhakrishnan)
...….………….............................J. (Swatanter Kumar) New Delhi October 13, 2011
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