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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 141 OF 2015

[Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.6449 of 2014)

MANIK TANEJA & ANR.                                 ... Appellants

vs.

STATE OF KARNATKA & ANR.                            ...Respondents  

J U D G M E N T

R. BANUMATHI, J.

Leave granted.

2.     This appeal by Special Leave arises out of the judgment  

dated 24.04.2014 passed by the Karnataka High Court in Criminal  

Petition No.252 of 2014,  in and by which, the High Court, while  

dismissing the petition, held that the petition is premature and  

the same is filed even before the completion of the investigation.

3. Brief facts which led to the filing of this appeal are as  

under:-  The appellant No.1 and his wife Sakshi Jawa met with an  

accident with an auto rickshaw on 13.06.2013 at about 10.30 in  

the morning, while Sakshi Jawa was driving Maruti SX4 KA-03-MM-

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8646.  One of the passengers,  who was travelling by the auto,  

namely Mrs. Laxmi Ganapati, sustained injuries and she was duly  

admitted in the Santosh Hospital for treatment.  Sakshi Jawa, the  

appellant No.2, is said to have paid all the hospital expenses of the  

injured  and the  matter  is  said  to  have been amicably   settled  

between the injured and the appellants and no FIR was lodged.  

The Constable, who was present at the time of incident,  directed  

the  appellants  to  meet  Mr.  Kasim,  Police  Inspector,  Pulakeshi  

Nagar Traffic Police Station, Bangalore City.  The appellants allege  

that as soon as they entered the office of Mr. Kasim, he behaved in  

a rude manner.  Further, Mr. Kasim summoned the appellant No.2  

to produce her driving licence and other documents.  As at that  

time no FIR was lodged, the appellant No. 2 questioned the Police  

Inspector  as  to  why  she  was  being  asked  to  produce  those  

documents.   Mr.  Kasim, in reply,   is alleged to have threatened  

appellant No.2 by saying that he would drag her to court if she  

continued to argue and she was also thrown out of his office.  On  

the orders of      Mr. Kasim, his deputy told the appellants that they  

are booking them on the charge of rash and negligent driving.      

4.        Being aggrieved with the manner with which they were  

treated, the appellants posted comments on the Bangalore Traffic  

Police Facebook page,  accusing Mr. Kasim of his misbehaviour

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and also forwarded an  email  complaining about the harassment  

meted  out  to  them  at  the  hands  of  the  Respondent  Police  

Inspector.  The Respondent No.2-Police Inspector filed a complaint  

regarding the posting of the comment on the Facebook by the  

appellants  and  subsequently  FIR  was  registered  against  the  

appellants for offences punishable under Sections 353 and 506  

IPC on 14.06.2013.   

5.   The appellants filed Criminal Petition No. 252 of 2014  

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court seeking to quash  

the FIR and the criminal proceedings initiated against them on  

the ground that the complaint is an afterthought. The High court  

vide  its  Order  dated 24.04.2014 dismissed the petition stating  

that the petition was filed at a premature stage.  The appellants  

by this special leave are seeking to assail the correctness of the  

above Order.

6.           Learned Counsel for the appellants contended that  

posting of a comment on the Facebook page of the traffic police  

does not amount to an offence under Sections 353 and 506 IPC  

and the FIR was not sustainable in law.  It  was submitted that  

Facebook page of  the Bengaluru traffic  police itself  is  a  public  

forum meant for citizens to discuss and post their grievances and  

therefore, the comment of the appellants posted on the Facebook

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would not prima facie constitute the offence and the High Court  

erred in not appreciating the matter in proper perspective.   

7.         Per  Contra,  learned  counsel  for  the  Respondents  

contended that by posting a comment on the Facebook of the  

traffic  police,  the  appellants  obstructed  the  public  duty  of  the  

complainant and his staff by publicly making baseless allegations.  

It was submitted that such posting of derogatory comments on  

the  Facebook  page  amounts  to  'threatening'  and  ‘criminal  

intimidation’ within the meaning of Section 506 IPC affecting the  

complainant's reputation and integrity and the High Court rightly  

declined to quash  the FIR  and the impugned order warrants no  

interference.

8.            We have considered the rival contentions and perused  

the impugned order and materials on record.

9.    The  legal  position  is  well-settled  that  when  a  

prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to  

be  applied  by  the  Court  is  as  to  whether  the  uncontroverted  

allegations as made, prima facie, establish the offence.  It is also  

for the Court to take into consideration any special features which  

appear in a particular case to consider whether it  is expedient  

and  in  the  interest  of  justice  to  permit  the  prosecution  to  

continue.  Where,  in the opinion of the Court,  the chances of

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ultimate conviction is bleak and no useful purpose is likely to be  

served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court  

may  quash  the  proceeding  even  though  it  may  be  at  a  

preliminary stage.

10.   In State of T.N. v. Thirukkural Perumal [(1995) 2 SCC 449]  

considering  the  scope  of  Section  482  Cr.  P.C.  to  quash  the  

FIR/criminal proceedings, this Court has held as under:-

“….The power of  quashing an FIR and criminal  proceeding  should be exercised sparingly by the courts.  Indeed, the High  Court has the extraordinary or inherent power to reach out  injustice and quash the first information report and criminal  proceedings, keeping in view the guidelines laid down by this  Court in various judgments (reference in this connection may  be made with advantage to  State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal   [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) but the same has to be done with  circumspection.   The  normal  process  of  the  criminal  trial  cannot be cut short in a rather casual manner….”

11.  So  far  as  the  issue  regarding  the  registration  of  FIR  

under Section 353 IPC is concerned, it has to be seen whether by  

posting  a  comment  on  the  Facebook  of  the  traffic  police,  the  

conviction  under  that  Section  could  be  maintainable.   Before  

considering  the  materials  on  record,  we  may  usefully  refer  to  

Section 353 IPC which reads as follows:-    

"353.  Assault or criminal force to deter public servant  from discharge  of  his  duty.-  Whoever  assaults  or  uses  criminal  force to any person being a  public  servant  in  the  execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to  prevent  or  deter  that  person  from discharging  his  duty  as  such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or

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attempted to be done by such person in the lawful discharge  of  his  duty  as  such public  servant,  shall  be punished with  imprisonment  of  either  description  for  a  term  which  may  extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."

12.       A reading of the above provision shows that the essential  

ingredients  of  the  offence under  Section  353  IPC  are  that  the  

person accused of the offence should have assaulted the public  

servant or used criminal force with the intention to prevent or  

deter the public servant from discharging his duty as such public  

servant.  By perusing the materials available on record, it appears  

that  no  force  was  used  by  the  appellants  to  commit  such  an  

offence. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the  

appellants  either  assaulted  the  respondents  or  used  criminal  

force  to  prevent  the  second  respondent  from  discharging  his  

official duty.  Taking the uncontroverted allegations,  in our view,  

that the ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are not  

made out.

13.      Section 506 IPC prescribes punishment for the offence of  

criminal intimidation. "Criminal intimidation" as defined in Section  

503 IPC is as under:-

“503. Criminal Intimidation.-  Whoever threatens another  with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the  person  or  reputation  of  any  one  in  whom  that  person  is  interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to  cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound  to do, or to omit to do any act   which  that person is legally

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entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such  threat, commits criminal  intimidation. Explanation.-  A  threat  to  injure  the  reputation  of  any  deceased  person  in  whom  the  person  threatened  is  interested, is within this section.”  

14.         A reading of the definition of “Criminal intimidation”  

would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another  

person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property  

of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened  

person is  interested  and the  threat  must  be  with  the  intent  to  

cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act  

which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is  

legally entitled to do.  

15.     In the instant case, the allegation is that the appellants  

have  abused  the  complainant  and  obstructed  the  second  

respondent  from discharging  his  public  duties  and  spoiled  the  

integrity  of  the  second  respondent.   It  is  the  intention  of  the  

accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what  

he  has  stated  comes  within  the  meaning  of  “Criminal  

intimidation”.  The threat must be with intention to cause alarm  

to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any  

work.   Mere  expression  of  any words without  any intention  to  

cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of  

this section.  But material has to be placed on record to show that

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the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant.  From the facts  

and  circumstances  of  the  case,  it  appears  that  there  was  no  

intention  on  the  part  of  the  appellants  to  cause  alarm in  the  

minds of the second respondent causing obstruction in discharge  

of his duty.  As far as the comments posted on the Facebook are  

concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping  

the public and the act of appellants posting a comment on the  

Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in  

Section 503 IPC.   

16.       Of course, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section  

482 Cr.P.C., the court should be extremely cautious to interfere  

with the investigation or trial of a criminal case and should not  

stall the investigation, save except when it is convinced beyond  

any manner of doubt that the FIR does not disclose commission of  

offence and that continuance of the criminal prosecution would  

amount to abuse of process of the court.   As noted earlier, the  

page created by the traffic police on the Facebook was a forum  

for the public to put forth their  grievances.   In our considered  

view,  the  appellants  might  have  posted  the  comment  online  

under the bona fide belief that it was within the permissible limits.  

As  discussed  earlier,  even  going  by  the  uncontroverted  

allegations in the FIR, in our view, none of the ingredients of the

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alleged offences are satisfied.  We are of the view that in the facts  

and circumstances of the case, it would be unjust to allow the  

process of the court to be continued against the appellants and  

consequently the order of the High Court is liable to be set aside.  

17.        In the result, the impugned order of the High Court in  

Criminal Petition No.252 of 2014 dated 24.4.2014 is set aside and  

this appeal is allowed and the FIR in Crime No.174/2013 registered  

against the appellants is quashed.   

.................................J.                                                 (V. Gopala Gowda)

................................J.                                                       (R. Banumathi)

New Delhi,   January  20, 2015.

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ITEM NO.1B-For Judgment    COURT NO.12               SECTION IIB                S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Crl.A. No. …..../2015 arising from SLP (Crl.)  No(s).  6449/2014 MANIK TANEJA & ANR.                                Petitioner(s)                                 VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR.                          Respondent(s) Date : 20/01/2015 This petition was called on for pronouncement  of JUDGMENT today. For Petitioner(s)  Mr. Bharadwaj S. Iyengar, Adv.                      Mr. Vikas Upadhyay,Adv.                       For Respondent(s)                      Mr. Joseph Aristotle S.,Adv.                       

Hon'ble  Mrs.  Justice  R.  Banumathi  pronounced  the  judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.  Gopala Gowda and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi.

Leave granted. The  appeal  is  allowed  in  terms  of  the  signed  

Reportable Judgment.  

   (VINOD KR. JHA)    (MALA KUMARI SHARMA) COURT MASTER COURT MASTER

(Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)