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PETITIONER: MANAGEMENT OF ADVANCE INSURANCE CO.  LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI GURUDASMAL & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/03/1970

BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) SHELAT, J.M. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. GROVER, A.N. RAY, A.N.

CITATION:  1970 AIR 1126            1970 SCR  (3) 881  1969 SCC  (1) 633  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1976 SC1856  (7)

ACT: Constitution  of India, 1950, 7th Sch. List 1 Entry  80-Word ’State’ in Entry-Whether includes ’Union Territories’  after passing    of   Constitution   (Seventh   Amendment)    Act, 1956--Adaptation  of  Laws  (No.  1)  Order  1956  enlarging definition  of ’State’ in s. 3(58) of General  Clauses  Act, 1897  to include Union Territories-Effect of Order-Power  of President to pass Order after expiry of period specified  in Art.  372(2)  of Constitution-Power is sustained  under  new Art. 372-A. Special  Police Establishment Act 25 of 1946 as  amended  in 1952--Purporting to create Special Police Force "in  Delhi’- Such  force whether "belonging to" a ’State’ within  meaning of  Entry  80-Consent of State Government  to  extension  of powers   of  Special   Police   Establishment--Proof-Consent already given in respect of certain offences subsists  after new offences added by fresh notification.

HEADNOTE: Entry  80 in List 1 of the 7th Sch. to the  Constitution  of India 1950 corresponding to entry 39 in the Federal List  of the  Government  of India Act, 1935, empowered  the  Central Legislature inter alia to extend the powers and jurisdiction of  members of the police force ’belonging to’ any State  to any area outside that.  State with the consent of ’the State in  which such area was situate.  Under the Constitution  as originally  adopted  the  States in the  Indian  Union  were specified as Part A, B & C States and certain territories as part D territories.  By the Constitution (Seventh  Amendment Act),  1956  the distinction between Part A & B  States  was abolished  and Part C States and Part D territories came  to be described as Union Territories.  The Delhi Special Police Establishment  Act 25 of 1946 was passed under entry  39  of the  Federal List of the Government of India Act, 1935.   As adapted  in  1950,  the long title of the  Act  referred  to Special  Police Force ’for the State of Delhi’.   After  the

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Delhi  Special  Police Establishment (Amendment) Act  26  of 1952  the long title referred to a Special Police Force  ’in Delhi’.    The  Adaptation  of  Laws  (No.  3)  Order   1956 substituted  the words ’Union Territories’ in place of  Part ’C’  States in the Delhi Special Police  Establishment  Act. On  November 6, 1956 Notification No. 7/5/55-AVD was  issued by the Central Government under s. 3 of the Act enabling the Special  Police  Establishment  to  investigate  inter  alia offences  under ss. 409 and 477A of the Indian  Penal  Code. By  memorandum No. DPE/1260/6554-V, dated July 2, 1960,  the Government  of Maharashtra purported to express its  consent to  the extension to the State of Maharashtra of the  powers of  Delhi  Police  Establishment  to  investigate  into  the offences  mentioned in the Central  Government  Notification aforesaid   dated   November   6,   1956   and    subsequent notifications  dated  February 12, 1957, June 21,  1957  and August  27,  1957.  The appellant company was charged  in  a complaint  filed by Income-tax Officer (Section X  Central), Bombay with offences under ss. 409, 477A and 120B read  with s. 409 of the Indian Panel Code.  ’Me case was registered by the Superintendent of Police, Special Police  Establishment, Delhi and investigation thereof was ordered to be  conducted in  the  State  of Maharashtra by  an  Inspector  under  the Establishment.  The appellant filed a writ 882 petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging  the power of the Special Police Establishment to investigate the case  in  the  State of  Maharashtra.   The  petition  being dismissed,  an  appeal with certificate was  filed  in  this Court.   The contentions raised on behalf of  the  appellant which fell for consideration were : (i) that Act 25 of  1946 when it was made applicable to Union Territories as a result of  Adaptation  Order No. 3 of 1956 was thereby  cut  adrift from entry 80 which referred only to ’States’ (ii) that  the enlargement of the definition of ’State’ in s. 3(58) of  the General Clauses Act to include Union Territories as respects the  period after the Seventh Amendment of the  Constitution was  not effectively made by Adaptation Order (No.  1)  1956 because the power of the President under Art. 372(2) expired in  1953;  (iii)  that Act 25 of 1947  as  amended  in  1952 purposed to create a special police force in Delhi, and  the Act  was not thus not in accord with entry 80 in  which  the phrase  used  was ’belonging to any State,"; (iv)  that  the consent  of  the  Maharashtra  Government  to  the   Central Government Notification dated November 6, 1956 extending  to the  State  of Maharashtra, the power of  the  State  Police Establishment to investigate cases under s. 409 and s.  477A of  the  Indian  Penal  Code was not  proved  to  have  been obtained;  (v) that in, any case no fresh consent  ,for  the investigation  of  these  offences  was  obtained  when   by Notification  dated  February  18, 1963  the  Delhi  Special Police   establishment  was  empowered  to  investigate   in Maharashtra  certain  other offences in  addition  to  those mentioned in the earlier notifications. HELD  : (i) After the amendment of s. 3(58) of ’,he  General Clauses Act by the Adaptation Order (No. 1) of 1956 the word ’State’  in entry 80 of List I must be read as respects  any period  after the commencement of the Seventh  Amendment  of the  Constitution  so  as to  include  ’Union  Territories’. Therefore, members of a police ’force belonging to the Union Territory  of Delhi could have their power and  jurisdiction extended to another State with the consent of the Government of that State.  Adaptation Order No. 3 of 1956 did not  have the  effect of taking Act 25 of 1946 outside the  ambit  of, entry 80. [890 C]

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(ii) The  power of the President under Art. 372(2) to  adapt and modify laws no doubt expired in 1953.  But a fresh power equal and analogous to that under Art. 372(2) was  conferred on  President  by  Art. 372A which  was  introduced  by  the Constitution  Seventh Amendment Act, 1956.   Therefore,  the amendment  of the definition of ’State’ in s. 3(58)  of  the General Clauses Act by the Adaptation of Laws (No. 1) Order, was valid and had the effect of including Union  Territories in entry 80 of the Union List [890 H; 891 F-G; 892 D-E] Ramkishore  Sen  & Ors. v. Union of India &  Ors.  [1966]  1 S.C.R. 430 at 438 and T. M. Kanniyan V. Income-tax  Officer, Pondicherry & Anr. [1968] 2 S.C.R. 103 at 108, referred to. Ram Kishore Sen’s case to Art. 372 held per incuriam. (iii) Provisions of law must be read as far as possible with a  view  to their validity and not to render  them  invalid. The  expression ’belonging to’ in entry 80 only conveys  the meaning   that  it  is  a  police  force   constituted   and functioning in one area, which may be authorised to function in another area.  The change ’from "for" to "in" made in the long title of Act 25 of 1946 by the amendment of 1952  makes no difference because both expressions fit with the  meaning of the phrase ’belonging to’ in the entry.  In this way  the Delhi  Special  Police Establishment means  a  police  force constituted  and  functioning in the  Union  Territories  in Delhi  and  it  could not be said that Act  25  of  1946  as amended in 1952 was not in second with entry 80. [893 E-F]  883 (iV)There  is a presumption of regularity of  official  acts but even apart ’from it the memorandum of the Government  of Maharashtra  dated July 2, 1960 and the affidavit  filed  by the  Under Secretary to the Government  clearly  established that  the  consent of the Government of Maharashtra  to  the notifications of he Central Government mentioned therein was duly given. [888 F] (v)If  by the notification dated February 18, 1963  ss.  409 and 477A Indian Penal Code had been newly added, consent  of the Government of Maharashtra would have been necessary: But that  Government had on more than one occasion consented  to the  investigation in that State of those offences,  and  no fresh  consent in respect of them was  therefore  necessary. [889 A-B]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  2258  of 1968. Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 18, 1968 of the Delhi High Court,-Himachal Bench at Simla in Civil  Writ No. 365 of 1968.- A. K. Sen and B. Datta, for the appellant. Jagadish  Swarup, Solicitor-General, R. L. Mehta and  R.  N. Sachthey, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah,  C.J. On a complaint, January 30. 1968 by  the Income  Tax  Officer  (Section X  Central)  Bombay,  of  the Commission  of  Offences under ss. 409, 477A and  120B  read with  s. 409 of the Indian-Penal Code a case was  registered by   the   Superintendent   of   Police,   Special    Police Establishment, New Delhi.  Investigation was entrusted to an Inspector  under the Establishment.  It -was to be  made  in Maharashtra  State.   The  appellant,  which  is  a  limited company, called the Management of Advance Insurance  Company Limited,  thereupon filed a petition under Art. 226  of  the Constitution  in  the High Court at  Delhi  challenging  the

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right of the Special Police Establishment to investigate the case.  This petition was disposed of on October 18, 1968  by the  High Court ordering its dismissal.  The present  appeal is by certificate granted by the High Court. Before  the High Court many questions were mooted.   Shortly stated  the  argument  is  that  the  Delhi  Special  Police Establishment  is  not  constitutional and that  it  has  no jurisdiction to investigate the cases in other States.  This argument  has  many  facets  which  will  presently  appear. Before.  we consider them it is necessary to  say  something about  the  original  constitution of  this  Special  Police Establishment. We  are concerned today with the Delhi Special Police  Esta- blishment Act of 1946 (XXV of 1946).  This Act succeeded two 884 Ordinances  which  had been earlier passed by  the  Governor General and it had been amended from time to time by way  of adaptation  and  modification.   It  was  passed"  when  the Government  of India Act 1935 was in force.  Entry No. 3  of the  Provincial Legislative List in the 7th Schedule to  the Government of India Act, 1935 read "police including railway and  village police".  Entry 39 of the  Federal  Legislative List was as follows               "39.  Extension of the powers and jurisdiction               of members of a police force, belonging to any               part  of British India to any area in  another               Governor’s  Province or  Chief  Commissioner’s               Province,  but not so as to enable the  police               of   one   part   to   exercise   powers   and               jurisdiction elsewhere without the consent  of               the  Government of the Province or  the  Chief               Commissioner as the case may be; extension  of               the  powers and jurisdiction of members  of  a               police force belonging to any unit to  railway               areas outside that unit."               It  was substituted by the India  (Provisional               Constitution) Order 1947, as follows :               "39.  Extension of the powers and jurisdiction               of members of a police force belonging to  any               province to any area in another province,  but               not so as to enable the police of one province               exercise  powers and jurisdiction  in  another               province without the consent of the Government               of  that  Province; extension  of  powers  and               jurisdiction  of  members of  a  police  force               belonging to any unit to railway areas outside               that unit.               In  this  entry "province"  includes  a  Chief               Commissioner’s province." The explanation which was included in this last entry was to obviate  the implication of the definition of a Province  in s. 46(3) of the Act which read :               "In  this Act the expression "Province"  means               unless  the  context  otherwise  requires,   a               Governor’s Province, and "Provincial" shall be               construed accordingly." The implication of the explanation was to apply entry 39  to the Chief Commissioner’s Province in addition to  Governor’s Province.   In this way the jurisdiction  exercisable  under entry 39 was made co-extensive again with what was  formerly British  India, which, by s. 311 (1) of the Act, meant  both kinds  of  provinces.  The prior history of the Act  may  be shortly noted.  It ’has little bearing upon the questions in Hand.  8 8 5

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On  July 12, 1943 the Governor General enacted an  ordinance (XXII of 1943) in exercise of his powers conferred by S.  72 of  the Government of India Act which was continued  in  the Ninth  Schedule  to the Government of India Act,  1935.   An emergency  had been declared owing to World War II  and  the powers were exercisable by the Governor General.  The  ordi- nance  was  called  the Special  Police  Establishment  (War Department)  Ordinance, 1943.  It extended to the  whole  of British  India and came into force at once.  By s. 2(4)  the Special   Police   Establishment   (War   Department)    was constituted  to exercise throughout British India the  power and jurisdiction exercisable in a province by the members of the  police  force  of that province  possessing  all  their powers, duties, privileges and liabilities.  Under s. 4  the superintendence  of  the Special Police  Establishment  (War Department)  was vested in the Central Government.  It  was, however, provided by s. 3 as follows :               "Offences to be investigated by Special Police               Establishment :-               The  Central  Government  may  by  general  or               special order specify the offences or  classes               of  offences  committed  in  connection   with               Departments  of the Central  Government  which               are  to be investigated by the Special  Police               Establishment (War Department), or may  direct               any particular offence committed in connection               with a Department of the -Central Government." This  ordinance  ’would have lapsed on September  30,  1946. Before  that on September 25, 1946 another ordinance of  the same  name (No.  XXII of 1946) was promulgated.  This  cons- tituted a special police force for the Chief  Commissioner’s province  of  Delhi for investigation  of  certain  offences committed in connection with matters concerning  departments of the Central Government.  The scheme of this ordinance was slightly different.  Under s. 2 Special Police Establishment was  constituted  for the Chief Commissioner’s  Province  of Delhi  for  the investigation in that province  of  offences notified in s. 3. This was notwithstanding the provisions of the  Police  Act  of 1861.   The  Police  Establishment  had throughout  the  Chief Commissionees Province  of  Delhi  in relation  to those ’Offences the powers, duties,  privileges and  liabilities  of the regular  police  officers  subject, however,  to any orders which the Central  Government  might make  in  this behalf.  Section 3 of the new  ordinance  was almost the same as s. 3 of the previous ordinance.  The only changes  were that the offences had to be notified  and  the -power  to refer any particular case was not  reveated.   In the  ordinance  s.  5  provided  that  the  consent  of  the Government of the Governors pro- 886 vince  or of the Chief Commissioner should be,  obtained  to the extension before the powers would be exercised. Ordinance No. XXII of 1946 was repealed by the Delhi  Police Establishment  Act 1946 (XXV of 1946) which  re-enacted  the provisions  of  the  Ordinance.  This Act  was  adapted  and amended   on  more  than  one  occasion.   First  came   the Adaptation  of  Laws Order 1950, enacted under clause  2  of Art.  372 of the Constitution on January 26, 1950.  It  made two changes.  The first was throughout the Act for the words "Chief Commissioner’s Province of Delhi" the words "State of Delhi"  were  substituted and for the word  "Provinces"  the words  "Part  A and C States" were  substituted.   This  was merely  to give effect to the establishment of  "States"  in place of provinces under the scheme of our Constitution. Next  came  the changes introduced by Part B  States  (Laws)

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Act,  1951 (Act III of 1951). , They were indicated  in  the schedule  to that Act.  Those changes removed the words  ’in the States’ in the long title and the preamble.  The purpose of this was to remove reference to the States in the phrases "for the extension to other areas in the States".  The  more significant changes came in 1952 by the Delhi Special Police Establishment  (Amendment) Act 1952 (XXVI of 1952).  In  the long  title (after the "Adaptation of Laws Orders 1950)  the words were               "An Act to make provision for the constitution               of  a  special police force for the  State  of               Delhi   for  the  investigation   of   certain               offences committed in connection with  matters               concerning   Departments   of   the    Central               Government etc."               After the amendment the words read               "An Act to make provision for the constitution               of  a  special police force in Delhi  for  the               investigation  of certain offences in  Part  C               States." Similar  changes were also made in the preamble and in S.  3 the reference to Departments of Government was also deleted. The  change from ’for the State of Delhi to ’in  Delhi’  was the subject of comment in the High Court.  To that we’ shall refer later. In 1956 the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, -1956  was enacted.   Previously the Constitution specified the  States as  parts  A,B  and  C, States  and  some  territories  were specified in Part D in the First Schedule.  By the amendment the  distinction between Parts A and B was  abolished.   All States  (previously Part A and B States) were shown  in  the First Schedule under the 887 heading   ’The  States’  and  Part  C  States  and  Part   D territories   were  all  described  as  Union   Territories. Thereupon  an Adaptation of Laws Order, 1956 was passed  and in  the  Delhi  Special Police Establishment  Act  1946  all references  to  ’Part  C  States’  were  ’replaced  by   the expression  ’union territory’.  Another  significant  change made  by the Amending Act was to remove from s. 2 the  words ’for the State of Delhi’, and all references to offences  by the  words ’committed in connection with matters  concerning Departments  of the Central Government’ were  deleted.   The resulting position in 1956 may thus be stated by quoting the pertinent sections               "Section 2(1) Notwithstanding anything in  the               Police  Act, 1861, the Central Government  may               constitute a special police force to be called               the Delhi Special Police Establishment...  for               the investigation of offences notified   under               section 3.               (2)   Subject to any orders which the  Central               Gov-               ernment    may make in this behalf, members of               the said               police     establishment shall have throughout               in relation               to  the  investigation of  such  offences  and               arrest of persons concerned in such  offences,               all   the  powers,  duties,   privileges   and               liabilities  which  police  officers  have  in               connection with the investigation of  offences               committed therein.               (3)   Any   member   of   the   said    police               establishment  of  or above the rank  of  Sub-

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             Inspector may, subject to any orders which the               Central  Government may make in  this  behalf,               exercise  in any of the powers of the  officer               in  charge of a police station in the area  in               which  he  is for the time being and  when  so               exercising  such powers shall, subject to  any               such  orders as aforesaid, be deemed to be  an               officer   in  charge  of  a   police   station               discharging  the functions of such an  officer               within the limits of his station."               "Section  3.  The Central Government  may,  by               notification in the Official Gazette.  specify               the offences or class of offences which are to               be  investigated by the Delhi  Special  Police               Establishment.’,               "Section  5(1) The Central Government  may  by               order extended to any area (including  Railway               areas) the powers and jurisdiction of  members               of the Delhi Special Police Establishment  for               the  investigation of any offences or  classes               of offences specified in a notification  under               section 3."               888               "Section  16.  Nothing contained in section  5               shall  be deemed to enable any member  of  the               Delhi Special Police Establishment to exercise               powers  and  jurisdiction in any  area  in  (a               State  not being a Union territory or  railway               area) without the consent of the Government of               that State." The  remaining  sections  need not be quoted  here  as  they follow  the  scheme  of the earlier  ordinances  and  confer powers,  jurisdiction  etc. equal to those  of  the  regular police.  Those provisions are not in dispute. After the passing of the 1946 Act a number of  notifications succeeded  -which  notified the offences which  the  Special Police Establishment could investigate.  On November 6, 1956 (Notn.  No. 7/5/55-AVD) was issued under s. 3 of the Act  of 1946.   It  enabled  the  Special  Police  Establishment  to investigate inter alia offences under sections 409 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code.  A memorandum (No.  DPE/1260/6554- V)  dated  July  2,  1960  shows  that  the  Government   of Maharashtra   consented   to  the   Delhi   Special   Police Establishment  exercising  powers and  jurisdiction  in  the State  of  Maharashtra in respect of offences  mentioned  in notifications  of the Government of India dated November  6, 1956, February 12, 1957, June 21, 1957 and August 27,  1957. The  first notification has been referred to  already.   The remaining  three  notifications  were  not  brought  to  our notice. A  doubt  raised in the High Court and before  us  that  the Government  of Maharashtra had not considered the matter  or that  the  consent was not properly given,  is  sufficiently answered  by  the affidavit of the Under  Secretary  to  the Government of Maharashtra dated July 18, 1968 in which it is clearly  stated that the Chief Minister had  considered  the matter  and  given his consent and that under the  Rules  of Business  he was quite competent to do so.  No argument  has been  advanced before us which entitles the appellant to  go behind  the  memorandum  and  the  affidavit.   There  is  a presumption  of regularity of official acts and  even  apart from it, the memorandum and the Affidavit clearly  establish that the consent was given. It  is.  however,  urged that the  Government  of  India  on February 18, 1963 issued another notification (No  25/12/62-

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AVD-II)  which  superseded  the  earlier  notification   No. 25/7/60AVD  dated January 21, 1961.  From this it is  argued that the earlier notification to which consent was given  by the  Maharashtra’ Government bad all been revoked and  fresh consent  was therefore, necessary and has not  been  proved. In our judgment this is an argument of no avail.  It is true that if sections 409 and  8 8 9 477-A I.P.C. were newly added, consent of the Government  of Maharashtra would have been necessary.  But the  Maharashtra Government  had on more than one occasion consented  to  the investigation in the State of Maharashtra of these offences. The notifications mentioned those offences afresh with  some other  offences.  In so far as the newly added offences  are concerned, the argument would have some validity but not  in respect  of offences already assented to.  We find no  force in  the argument since we consider the new  notification  as merely  restating the old notification after including  some other offences in the new notification. This brings us to the two main arguments.  The first is that after   the  Constitution  (Seventh  Amendment)  Act   which removed.   the   description  ’Part  C  States’   from   the Constitution   and   introduced   the   expression    ’Union Territories’  the  present  entry  80  of  the  Union   List (corresponding  to entry 39 of the Federal Legislative  List of  the Government of India Act of 1935) cannot be  read  as enabling  the power to be exercised in respect of  a  police force  belonging  to the Union Territories  such  as  Delhi. Entry No. 80 may be read here :               "80.  Extension of the powers and jurisdiction               of members of a police force belonging to  any               State to any area outside that State, but  not               so  as  to enable the police of one  State  to               exercise  powers and jurisdiction in any  area               outside that State without the consent of  the               Government of the State in which such area  is               situated;   extension   of  the   powers   and               jurisdiction  of  members of  a  police  force               belonging  to  any  State  to  railway   areas               outside that State." This entry speaks of a ’police force belonging to any State’ and not of a police force belonging to the Union  Territory. Ther  adaptation of the Delhi Special  Police  Establishment Act  by  the  Adaptation  of Laws (No.  3)  Order,  1956  by substituting  ’Union  territories’  in  place  of  ’Part   C States’, it is said, cut the Act adrift from the entry under which  the  power could alone be exercised.  This  power  is limited  in extent, it is argued, and cannot be used  except as  specifically conferred and it applies to a police  force belonging to a State and not Union territory.  In reply  the provisions  of  the  General  Clauses  Act,  as  adapted  by Adaptation  Order  (No.  1)  were  brought  to  our  notice. Section 3(58) of the General Clauses Act was adapted to read               "State"--               (a) as respects any period before the commence               ment of the Constitution(Seventh Amendment)               SupCI(NP)/70-12               8 90               Act, 1956, shall mean a Part A State, a Part B               State or a Part C State; and               (b)   as   respects  any  period  after   such               commencement. shall mean a State specified  in               the  First Schedule to the  Constitution-  and               shall include a Union territory".               Previously the definition read

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             "State"  shall mean a Part A State., a Part  B               State or a Part C State". This   definition  furnishes  a  complete  answer   to   the difficulty which is raised since Entry 80 must be read so as to  include Union territory.  Therefore members of a  police force belonging to the Union territory can have their powers and  jurisdiction  extended to another  State  provided  the Government  of  that State consents.  The Bombay  State  has consented as shown, above. Faced with this complete answer the appellants raised  argu- ment  that  the  powers of adaptation of  the  President  in relation  to the General Clauses Act came to an end in  1953 and the adaptation of the General Clauses Act is ineffective to  give  the new meaning of the word ’State’ in  Entry  80. This argument needs some consideration. Article  367 which followed Art. 366 in which the  terms  of the Constitution were expressly defined applied in  addition the   provisions  of  the  General  Clauses  Act   for   the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the  Dominion of  India.   The  Article, however, said  that  the  General Clauses  Act might be adapted and modified under  Art.  372. Under  that article continuance of the laws in force in  the territory  of India immediately before the  commencement  of the Constitution was laid down by cl. (1).  Clause (2)  then empowered the President to bring the provisions of any  such law  into accord with the provisions of the Constitution  by making  such  adaptations  and modifications  of  such  laws whether  by way of repeal or amendment as were required  and by  providing  in  that order the date from  which  the  law subject to the....... adaptation or modification was to have effect.    The  clause  further  provided  that   any   such adaptation  or modification shall not be questioned  in  any court  of  law.   If  this  power  had  no  time  limit  the adaptation  of  the  General Clauses Act in  1956  would  be covered  by  Art.  372(2) but the learned  counsel  for  the appellants  pointed  out that there was a time  limit  of  2 years  (later  extended  to 3 years) in clause  (3)  of  the article  and that time limit expired in 1953.  They  contend that the definition prior to the amendment would only apply. 891 This  argument overlooks the provision of a fresh  power  of adaptation confered on the President of India by Art.  372-A which   was   introduced  by   the   Constitution   (Seventh Amendment). Act 1956. that article reads :               "372A.  Power of the President to adapt laws.               (1)   For   the  purposes  of   bringing   the               provisions of any law in force in India or  in               any  part  thereof,  immediately  before   the               commencement  of  the  Constitution   (Seventh               Amendment)  Act,  1956, into accord  with  the               provisions of this Constitution as amended  by               that  Act,  the President may  by  order  made               before  the  1st day of November,  1957,  make               such adaptations and modifications of the law,               whether by way of repeal or amendment, as  may               be  necessary or expedient, and  provide  that               the  law  shall, as from such date as  may  be               specified in the order, have effect subject to               the adaptations and modifications so made. and               any such adaptation or modification shall  not               be questioned in any court of law.,               (2)   Nothing in clause (1) shall be deemed to               prevent  a  competent  legislature  or   other               competent authority from repealing or amending               any  law adapted or modified by the  President

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             under the said clause." This  conferred a power on the President of India  to  adapt any  law  in force in India by making such  adaptations  and modifications, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary and provide that the law so adapted or modified shall   have   effect   subject  to   the   adaptations   or modifications  so made and the adaptations and  modification shall  not be questioned.  This was a fresh power equal  and analogous  to  Art. 372(2).  Therefore, when  the  President adapted. the General Clauses Act by giving a new  definition of  ’State’  the new definition appropriate to  the  purpose applied to the interpretation of the Constitution.  The word ’State’  in  entry 80 of Union List, therefore,  applied  to Union Territories also. Reference  is  made to Ramkishore Sen & others v.  Union  of India  and  others(1) where the reference was to  Art.  372. This was per incuriam as the proper reference ought to have- been  to Art. 372A.  It is also argued that  the  definition cannot  be  read at all the places where  the  word  ’State’ occurs  in the Constitution. A number of such articles  were brought to our notice. one such (11) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 430 at 438, 89 2 being  Art. 246(2).  It is contended that in that clause  at least  the  definition  cannot be read  as  including  Union Territories  and,  therefore, the General  Clauses  Act,  as amended, cannot be read in Entry 80 either.  The argument is correct that the definition cannot always be read. - But the answer.is  plain.   The definitions apply  unless  there  is anything  repugnant  in the subject or context.   After  the Seventh  Amendment India is a Union of States (Art.  1)  and the territories thereof are specified in the First Schedule. Then  there  are  Union  Territories  which  are   mentioned separately.   There is thus a distinction  between  ’States’ and ’Union territories’ which cannot be lost sight of.  When the  I  definition cannot be made applicable  owing  to  the context or the subject, the word ’State’ refers to States in the  First Schedule only.  Such an occasion arose in  T.  M. Kanniyan v. Income-Tax Officer Pondicherry and Anr.(1‘)  and Bachawat   J.  explained  Art.  246  by  holding  that   the definition  of ’State’ in two parts in the  adapted  section 3(58)  of  the  General Clauses Act  was  repugnant  to  the subject  and context of Art. 246.  There is nothing  in  the subject  or context of Entry 80 of the Union List which  can be  said to exclude the application of the definition in  s. 3(58).  Indeed the Part C States were expressly mentioned in Entry No. 39 of the Federal List of the Government of  India Act, 1935 (after its amendment in 1947) and thus before  the Seventh  Amendment the definition of State (subject  to  the subject or context) included Part C States.  Therefore,  the definition of ’State’ in s. 3(58) in the General Clauses Act after  the  adaptation in 1956 applies  and  includes  Union Territories in Entry 80 of the Union List. The  last  argument is that the Entry 80 of the  Union  List speaks  of a police force ’belonging to any State’ and  this phrase was also used in the Government of India Act, 1935 to Entry  39  of the Federal Legislative List both  before  and after its amendment in 1947.  It is argued that in Ordinance XXII  of 1946 the phrase was ’for the  Chief  Commissioner’s Province  of Delhi’ and it was repeated in Act XXV  of  1946 till  the phrase was changed to ’for Part C  States’.   Thus the word ’for’ took the place of the words ’belonging to’ in the  Entry.  Then came the change to the present  phrase  ’a special police force in Delhi.’ It is pointed out that the Special Police Establishment does

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not  belong  to  the Union territory  of  Delhi,  since  the superintendence  of it vests in the Central Government.   It is  said that the force of the words ’belonging to’  is  not the same as that of the word ’in’.  Therefore it is  claimed that the Act is not in accord with the Entry. (1)  [1968] 2 S.C.R. 103 at 108.  8 9 3 Various  meanings  of  the  expression  ’belonging  to’  are suggested  in  the arguments before us.  On  behalf  of  the appellants  it is said that it meant ’employed by’  and  not merely  ’located  in’.   In this sense, it  is  argued,  the Special Police Establishment did not belong to any State  or Union  territory.  On the other side it is argued  that  the words  ’belonging  to’  convey no more  than  a  territorial nexus.   The police force belong& to a part of India and  it does  not  have to belong to a Provincial  Government  or  a State  Government or Government of a Union  territory.   The extension  of the powers, jurisdiction etc. of such a  force is also in another part of India, placing again an  emphasis on  the territory.  This shows that the police force of  one area operates in another area. Now  the  scheme  of  the Constitution  is  that  the  Union territories  are  centrally administered and  if  the  words ’belonging  to’  mean  belonging to a  part  of  India,  the expression  is  equal  to  a  police  force  constituted  to function  in  an  area.   In  this  way  the  Delhi   Police Establishment   means   a  police  force   constituted   and functioning in the Union territory of Delhi.  Previously the same  force functioned in the Chief Commissioner’s  Province of Delhi, then in Part C State of Delhi and now it functions in the Union territory of Delhi. It  is no doubt true that the words are susceptible  of  the other  meaning also but so long as the words are-capable  of bearing  the  meaning we have given it is not  necessary  to discover another meaning under which the whole scheme  would become  void.  Provisions of law must be read as far  as  is possible  with  a view to their validity and not  to  render them invalid.  In our judgment the expression ’belonging to’ only  conveys  the  meaning  that  it  is  a  police   force constituted  and  functioning  in  one  area  which  may  be authorised  to  function in another area.  The  change  from ’for’  to ’in’ makes no difference because both  expressions fit in with the meaning of the phrase ’belonging to’ in  the Entry.  We see no force in this argument also. The result is that the appeal is devoid of force-.  It fails and will be dismissed.  There will be no order about costs. G.C.                                                  Appeal dismissed, 8 9 4