MAHESH DHANAJI SHINDE Vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
Bench: P SATHASIVAM,RANJAN GOGOI,SHIVA KIRTI SINGH
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001210-001213 / 2012
Diary number: 10613 / 2012
Advocates: APARNA JHA Vs
ASHA GOPALAN NAIR
Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 1210-1213 OF 2012
MAHESH DHANAJI SHINDE ... APPELLANT (S)
VERSUS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ... RESPONDENT (S)
With CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 2089-2091 OF 2012 CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 1238-1239 OF 2012 CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 1240-1241 OF 2012
J U D G M E N T
RANJAN GOGOI, J.
1. The appellants, Santosh Manohar Chavan, Amit Ashok
Shinde, Yogesh Madhukar Chavan and Mahesh Dhanaji
Shinde who were tried as accused Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6
(hereinafter referred to as A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-6) in Sessions
Case Nos. 3/2005, 4/2005 and 5/2005 have assailed the
1
Page 2
impugned common judgment and order of the High Court of
Bombay dated 17.10.2011 whereby their conviction in
Sessions Case Nos. 3/2005 and 5/2005, inter alia, under
Section 302/120B of the IPC and for offences under the Arms
Act have been upheld by the High Court. The death penalty
imposed on the appellants by the learned Trial Judge has
been confirmed by the High Court by the order under appeal
apart from the punishment imposed under different Sections
of the Penal Code as well as the Arms Act. Insofar as
Sessions Case No. 4/2005 is concerned, the learned Trial
Judge had acquitted accused 1, 2 and 3 of the offence under
Section 302/120B IPC. In the appeal by the State, the High
Court has reversed the acquittal and convicted the aforesaid
three accused of the aforesaid offence and has sentenced
them to undergo RI for life. The accused No. 6, i.e.,
appellant Mahesh Dhanaji Shinde is not an accused in
Sessions Case No. 4/2005. It is the common order of the
High Court rendered in the aforesaid cases convicting and
sentencing the accused-appellants, as aforementioned,
which has been challenged in the present appeals. It may
2
Page 3
also be mentioned at the outset that in all the cases the
accused-appellants have been exonerated of the charge
under Section 364A of the IPC by the order under appeal.
2. The case of the prosecution in short is that on
20.12.2003 the Superintendent of Police, Sindhudurg
received anonymous letters and phone calls to the effect
that some unidentified dead bodies were lying dumped on
the hillocks of village Nandos, Taluk Malvan, District
Sindhudurg. A search operation was organised on the very
day i.e. 20.12.2003 in the course of which 7 dead bodies
were recovered. Two more dead bodies were recovered on
the next day i.e. 21.12.2003 and one dead body was
recovered on 29.12.2003. Alongwith the dead bodies,
articles like clothes, trouser hooks, broken brief case etc.
alongwith two blood stained diaries were also recovered.
Though all the dead bodies were sent for post-mortem
examination the high level of decomposition rendered any
post-autopsy opinion impossible. The dead bodies were
therefore sent to Medical College, Miraj and a team of
doctors was constituted who performed forensic chemical
3
Page 4
tests on the dead bodies. Some of the organs from the dead
bodies were sent to the Centre for DNA Fingerprinting and
Diagnostics, Hyderabad (CDFD) for DNA test and the skulls
sent to the Forensic Laboratory, Kalina, Bombay for super-
imposition tests.
3. In the two diaries recovered by the police from the spot
some names and addresses were found. It is from these
persons that the names and particulars of the persons to
whom the diaries belonged could be ascertained. Having
traced the initial identity of some of the deceased in the
above manner, enquiries from such friends and relatives
revealed the names and identities of other persons who were
in the company of the deceased persons. Information
lodged in different police stations with regard to missing
persons around the relevant time were collected and co-
related. The opinion of handwriting experts were obtained
which showed that the diaries belonged to one Dada Saheb
Chavan and Kerubhai Mali. Blood samples of the relatives
were sent to the CDFD, Hyderabad for DNA test. Some of
the dead bodies were also identified by the relatives and
4
Page 5
friends of the deceased on the basis of articles recovered
from the spot which were seized in the course of the
investigation. The investigation which proceeded on the
aforesaid lines, prima facie indicated the involvement of the
accused-appellants. Accordingly, accused Santosh Manohar
Chavan (A-1) was arrested on 22.12.2003 and from the
information obtained during the course of his interrogation,
accused Nos. 2 to 7 were arrested. The disclosures made by
the accused led to recovery of gold articles, bank passbooks
etc. from the house of A-7 as well as incriminating weapons
like iron rods, cut bars of guns, one muzzle loader gun etc.
Test Identification Parade was held where A-1, A-2 and A-3
were identified by witnesses. The assets acquired by the
aforesaid persons around that time including motor bikes, a
Tata Sumo jeep etc. were seized alongwith bank statements
of the accused, their wives and relatives. The bank
statements revealed that cash deposits well beyond the
income of the accused were made around the time of the
incidents. The accounts also showed purchase of Tata Sumo
by A-1 at a cost of Rs. 2.6 lakhs on 24.08.2003 and purchase
5
Page 6
of motorcycles by A-2 and A-3 on 20.11.2003 and
25.11.2003 respectively.
4. According to the prosecution, investigation further
disclosed that A-1 Santosh Manohar Chavan who plied an
auto rickshaw in Mumbai claimed super natural powers to
bring about “money showers” i.e. to multiply cash money.
According to the prosecution while A-2 was a LIC agent, A-3
was employed in a private institution and A-6 was running a
ration shop. All the aforesaid accused used to spread and
circulate amongst innocent and unsuspecting persons the
magical powers claimed by A1 to multiply money by creating
“money showers”. They would ask the victims to come to
Malvan with currency notes of higher denominations
alongwith empty gunny sacks (ostensibly to collect the
proceeds of the money shower). In Malvan they were put up
in lodges and hotels. From those lodges and hotels the
victims would be ferried to the Nandos plateau by auto
rickshaw. The vehicle will halt near the village Panchayat
Office from where the victims were asked to travel by foot to
the plateau. The prosecution alleged that the accused
6
Page 7
ensured that the victims did not bring their own vehicles to
Malvan and that they did not leave any personal effects in
the hotel or lodge. All this was done to avoid any trace of
the victims. The registers of lodges and hotels where the
deceased persons and some of the accused had, according
to the prosecution, stayed on different dates during the
relevant period were also seized in the course of
investigation.
5. According to the prosecution, the investigations carried
out had also revealed that one Shankar Sarage and one
Hemant Thakre were done to death by the accused persons
on 24.9.2003. Dead bodies number 1 and 10 (DB-1 and DB-
10) were claimed to be of the aforesaid two persons who,
according to the prosecution, were killed on 24.9.2003. The
accused were charged of the offence of kidnapping and
murder of the aforesaid two persons and were put to trial in
the proceeding registered as Sessions Case No. 4/2005. On
the basis of the report of the forensic team of the Miraj
Medical College the prosecution alleged that the aforesaid
two persons were killed by gun shots, swords, rods and
7
Page 8
revolver and that they have been robbed of a sum of Rs.
1,55,000/-. While the Trial Court acquitted the accused A-1,
A-2 and A-3 on the ground that the dead bodies DB-1 and
DB-10 could not be identified to be that of deceased Shankar
Sarage and Hemant Thakre, the High Court reversed the said
finding insofar as deceased Shankar Sarage is concerned
and held accused 1, 2 and 3 to be guilty of murder of
Shankar Sarage. They have been accordingly sentenced to
undergo RI for life.
6. The prosecution had further alleged that the second
incident involved four persons i.e. Vijaysinha Dude,
Dadasaheb Chavan, Sanjay Garware and Vinayak Pisal and
that the same had occurred on 30.10.2003. It is the further
case of the prosecution that Dead Bodies i.e. DB-2, DB-3,
DB-4 and DB-5 were that of the four deceased persons
mentioned above who were killed and robbed of Rs.
3,10,000/-. Such identification was claimed on the basis of
super-imposition tests carried out at the Forensic Laboratory,
Kalina, Bombay. Sessions Case No. 5/2005 was registered in
respect of the said incident wherein the accused A-1, A-2, A-
8
Page 9
3 and A-6 were tried and convicted under Section 302/120B
IPC and other provisions of the Code as well as under
different provisions of the Arms Act. They have been
awarded the death sentence by the learned Trial Court which
has been confirmed by the High Court by the order under
challenge in the present appeals.
7. The prosecution has further alleged that the third
incident occurred on 14.11.2003 and involved four persons
of a family who were identified to be Kerubhai Mali, Anita
Mali, Sanjay Mali and Rajesh Mali. On the basis of the report
of DNA analysis, the prosecution alleged that dead bodies
DB-8, DB-7, DB-6 and DB-9, respectively, belonged to the
aforesaid persons in seriatim and that they had been killed
and robbed of Rs. 3,10,000/-. Sessions Case No. 3/2005 was
registered against accused A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-6 in respect
of the incident in question. All the four accused persons
have been convicted by the learned Trial Court inter alia
under Section 302/120B IPC and other provisions of the Code
as well as different provisions of the Arms Act and have been
9
Page 10
sentenced, inter alia, to death. The conviction and sentence
has been maintained by the High Court.
8. Though separate chargesheets in respect of the three
incidents of alleged murder on the three different dates were
filed in Court and separate sessions cases were registered
wherein separate charges had been framed against the
accused persons, evidence in all the cases was led in the
trial of Sessions Case No. 3/2005.
9. 128 witnesses including 38 panch witnesses; 22
persons acquainted with the accused and the victims; 9
relatives of the victims; 13 medical officers; 5 witnesses
connected with the mobile phone calls made by the accused;
29 police witnesses; two executive magistrates; 5 bank
officers and 5 DNA experts, super-imposition experts,
handwriting experts and ballistic experts were examined by
the prosecution. The accused persons denied their
involvement in any of the offences alleged against them but
did not adduce any evidence.
10
Page 11
10. A broad overview of the core evidence brought by the
prosecution to bring home the charges against the accused
may now be made.
On the basis of the report of the Forensic Expert
Committee (Exhibit 419) proved by PW-76, Dr. Anil Jinturkar,
the prosecution has tried to prove that the death of all the
10 deceased (DB-1 to DB-10) was homicidal in nature. The
findings of the forensic tests, as deposed to by PW-76, may
be set out below:-
• DB 1 was of a human male aged between 25 to 45 years. Time of death was 6 months prior to examination. Probable cause of death was opined as single hole firearm injury to the thorosic region, although the exit wound was not found. Other injuries to the mandible and verterbrae were caused by a hard, blunt object. Although the appearance of these injuries were similar to those caused by iron bars, PW-76 could not affirm that iron bars alone caused the injuries due to the non- availability of brain matter. Analysis of brain and brain matter would reflect the impact of blows from an iron bar, in the absence of which, PW-76 could not rule out the possibility of the injuries due to fall.
• DB 2 was of human male aged between 25 to 45 years and the person died 6 months before the examination. He stated that all injuries expect the gnawing marks were ante mortem & the probable cause of death was the head injuries resulting into the fracture of the skull & these injuries could have been caused by a sharp cutting object.
• DB 3 was of human male aged between 25 to 45 years and the person died 6 months before the examination. He stated that all injuries were found ante mortem & the probable cause of death was fire arm injury to chest & fracture of skull leading to head injury. Two injuries of circular holes on
11
Page 12
posterior parts were caused by fire arm & rest of the injuries by hard & blunt object.
• DB 4 was of human male aged between 25 to 45 years and the person died 6 months before the examination. He stated that all injuries expect the gnawing marks were found ante mortem & the probable cause of death was the head injury due to fracture of the skull bone with blunt thorosic trauma associated with multiple ante mortem fracture. It was stated that all ante mortem injuries could be caused by hard & blunt object.
• DB 5 was of human male aged between 25 to 45 years and the person died 6 months before the examination. He stated that all injuries could have been caused by hard & blunt object & the cause of death was head injury due to fracture of skull bone with blunt thorosic trauma associated with multiple ante mortem fracture.
• DB 6 was of human male aged between 12 to 18 years and the person died 6 months before the examination. An ante mortem injury of linear fracture over the left aspect of frontal bone was found & two post mortem injuries of broken styloid processes (points of attachment for muscles) & gnawing marks at left & right hands were found. The cause of death was stated to be head injury as a result of linear fracture of bone of left side.
• DB 7 was of human female aged between 25 to 45 years & could have died 6 months before the examination. All the injuries found were ante mortem & the probable cause of death was fire arm injuries to abdomen and pelvis with evidence of multiple fracture of skull leading to head injury.
• DB 8 was of human male aged between 25 to 45 years & could have died 6 months before the examination. All injuries of fracture of right frontal bone were found ante mortem caused probably by a hard & blunt object & some gnawing injuries were found post-mortem. The probable cause of death was stated to be head injury resulting into fracture of vault & anterior cranial fossa at the base of the skull.
• DB 9 was of human male aged between 18 to 20 years & could have died 6 months before the examination. All injuries were found ante mortem & were caused by hard & blunt object. The cause of injury was stated to be head injury resulting into depressed communicated fracture of skull bone.
12
Page 13
• DB 10 was of human male aged between 25 to 45 years & could have died 6 months before the examination. He opined that like DB 1 and 3, DB 10 had also suffered fire arm injuries, but he could not opine as to what type of fire arm was used in as much as it was a shot gun or rifle, but at the same time it was noticed that no exit wound was found on the skeleton.
11. The prosecution has laid evidence to show that blood
samples of the relatives of some of the deceased persons
were collected as per prescribed guidelines and alongwith
some parts of the organs of the deceased were sent to the
CDFD at Hyderabad for DNA analysis. The report of Dr. S.
Pandurang Prasad, Senior Technical Examiner in the
laboratory (PW-107) to the effect that dead bodies 1, 2, 6, 7,
8 and 9 were found to be that of deceased Shankar Sarage,
Vijaysinha Dudhe, Sanjay Mali, Anita Mali, Kerubha Mali and
Rajesh Mali was brought on record by the prosecution. In so
far as DB-2 to 5 are concerned, the identity thereof could not
be established by DNA analysis as the specimens sent were
found not to be fit for a conclusive determination of the
question. However, the skulls of the DB-2 to 5 were sent for
superimposition tests which were carried out by PW-108,
Ratna Prabha Gujarati. The aforesaid witness had testified
that the probability of her finding being correct is almost
13
Page 14
99% and the reliability of the superimposition test technique
is 91%. PW-108 had testified, on the basis of
superimposition tests, that DB-2 to 5 were of deceased,
Vijaysinha Dudhe, Dadasaheb Chavan, Sanjay Gavare, and
Bala Pisal respectively.
12. The prosecution has sought to establish the identity of
the dead bodies, additionally, on the basis of oral evidence.
In this regard, PW-66, Mohan Doke, brother of deceased
Anita Mali, (DB-7) had identified the mobile phones, pieces of
saree, hair clips, brief case, wrist watch, gold rings, earrings
along with mangal sutra belonging to members of the Mali
family which were either recovered from the spot/place of
occurrence or from other persons who had come into
possession of the same through the accused. In respect of
DB-2 to 5, the identification of the personal effects of the
deceased were made by close relations. Specifically, PW-97,
Pradip Pisal, brother of deceased Vinayak Pisal (DB-5) had
identified the clothes worn by the deceased whereas PW-98,
Vinayak Dinkar Chavan, brother of deceased Dadasaheb
Chavan (DB-3) had identified the clothes and chappals worn
14
Page 15
by the deceased as well as the diary belonging to him.
Similarly, PW-80, Smt. Jyoti Gavare, wife of deceased Sanjay
Gavare (DB-4) identified the clothes recovered from the
dead body as well as the rubber ring of the deceased worn
by him around the waist. Similarly, DB-2 was identified by
PW-63-Fatehsingh Dudhe to be the dead body of Vijaysinha
Dudhe on the basis of the gaps in the central teeth of the
dead body and the personal effects of the deceased like
clothes, shoes, wrist watch etc. Similarly, the DB-1 was
identified to be the dead body of Shankar Sarage by PW-119
Parvati Shankar, the widow of the deceased. Such
identification was made on the basis of the clothes that the
deceased was wearing at the time he had left his home.
13. On the basis of the above evidence brought by the
prosecution there can be no manner of doubt, whatsoever,
that the death of all the deceased persons except Hemant
Thakre (DB-10 - whose dead body could not be identified)
was homicidal and that DB-1 to 9 were of the deceased,
(excluding Hemant Thakre) as claimed by the prosecution.
15
Page 16
14. The evidence of the relevant witnesses examined by
the prosecution in all the three cases to establish a possible
link and show a live nexus between the crime(s) committed
and the persons responsible therefor may now be taken note
of.
(a) PW- 1, Ashok Nemalekar used to ply his auto-rickshaw
in Malvan. He has deposed that on 14.11.2003 he
ferried five passengers from Mayur Lodge to the Village
Panchayat Office at about 11.00-11.30 am. On the basis
of the photographs shown to him by the investigating
team he had identified four members of the Mali family
i.e. Sanjay Mali (DB-6), Anita Mali (DB-7), Kerubhai Mali
(DB-8), Rajesh Mali (DB-9) and the accused No.2 Amit
Ashok Shinde as his passengers.
(b) PW-4 Smita is the wife of A-7. She had testified that A-
1 had lived in her house since his childhood until he
moved to Mumbai to ply auto-rickshaw. Though he
would visit her only once in a year during Ganpati
Festival (usually held in the calendar month of August).
A-1 had visited her in May, 2003 and stayed with her for
16
Page 17
15 days. Thereafter, again in September, 2003 A-1, A-2
and A-3 stayed at her home for 10 days. According to
PW-4 during this visit she could notice that the three
accused would go to the plateau (Nandos) ostensibly
for hunting though they never returned with any prey.
This witness had further deposed that A-1 and A-3
unexpectedly arrived at her house on 24.9.2003 at
about 1.30 a.m. and when A-7 (husband of PW-4) had
asked them why they had come at such an odd hour A-
1 replied that they had some urgent work. According to
PW-4 at about 9.30 a.m. in the morning, A-1’s mobile
phone started ringing and A-3 answered the same by
saying “Bol Amit” (Amit speak). Thereafter within half
an hour A-1 and A-3 left for Katta in the Tata Sumo jeep
by which they had come. According to PW-4, her
daughter Deepika had informed her that she had seen
A-3, lurking around her school, which is near the
Nandos Village Panchayat. A-3, on being asked what he
was doing in the vicinity of the school had informed
Deepika that she must have seen somebody else as he
17
Page 18
had not gone near the school. PW-4 further deposed
that A-3 left her house at about 6.00 p.m. on 24.9.2003
followed by A-1 (around 7.00-7.15 pm) and they had
returned at about 9.00 -9.30 p.m. thoroughly
drenched though it was not raining. PW-4 had
further testified that the accused had asked her
to wash their clothes which she refused to do at night.
PW-4 in her deposition had further stated that on
22.10.2003, A-1, his second wife Sonali, A-3 and a
friend of A-1, one Jeetu, visited her and stayed for two
days. On both the dates A-1 and A-3 had visited Katta.
According to this witness about 5 to 6 days thereafter
and two days after Diwali day of Bhaubeej A-1, Sonali,
A-3 and A-6 came to her house where they were joined
by A-2. Next day, she saw A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-6
bathing near the well and in the rear side of her house.
She has further testified that A-6 was suffering from a
cut injury on his index finger for which he had to be
taken to a doctor who had put a bandage on the injured
index finger.
18
Page 19
PW-4 has further testified that on 12.11.2003 A-
1, A-3, A-6 and Sonali had come to her house.
On the next day the accused persons left her
house in the morning for Katta and returned in
the
evening. On 14.11.2003 A-1, A-3, A-6 left her house at
about 10.00-10.30 A.M. and returned around 3.00 P.M.
with A2. Before entering the house they had bathed
near the well. Thereafter the accused left her house on
different dates.
(c) PW-5 Sachin, who is the younger brother of A-1 had
testified that he had transported some of the victims in
his auto-rickshaw at the request of A-1. His testimony
was, however, rejected by the learned Trial Court on
the ground that the same appeared to be incredible.
(d) PW-8 Vinod Deorukhkar is an employee of Mayur Lodge,
Malvan. He had testified that on 14.11.2003, at about
7.00-7.30 am, one man, aged about 40-45 years, one
woman, aged about 30-35 years, two boys, aged
19
Page 20
between 8 to 10 years, and one man, aged about 28-30
years, reached Mayur Lodge. They were allotted room
no.6. When they were asked their names, the man
aged 28-30 years came forward and introduced
himself as Anil Jadhav; thus, the entry “Anil Jadhav
and family” was made in the register. They left their
room at 9.00 am that day for a walk and returned at
11.00 am. Shortly thereafter, they informed that they
would be leaving the hotel. At that time, PW-8 noticed
that the man, aged about 45 years, was carrying a
medium sized, grey suitcase/briefcase. He identified
Karubhai Mali’s briefcase as the one carried by the
man, before the Court. PW-8 also identified A2 as the
man who disclosed his name as Anil Jadhav. He
identified the Mali family from photographs shown to
him in Court.
(e) PW-9 Appa is the Manager of Pallavi Lodge at
Kankavli. The lodge register which was exhibited
(Exh.-89) showed that on 29.10.2003 five persons
including one Amit Shenoy occupied room No. 5 of the
20
Page 21
lodge. This witness recognized A-2 as the person
who called himself as Amit Shenoy. This witness
identified the other four persons from the
photographs shown to him and deposed that they
had left the room on the next day i.e. 30.10.2003 at
about 9.00 a.m. The persons identified by him from the
photographs are the deceased Vijaysinh Dudhe (DB-2),
Dadasaheb Chavan (DB-3), Sanjay Gavare (DB-4) and
Bala Pisal (DB-5).
(f) PW-10 Yogesh Dhake had testified that deceased
Dadasaheb Chavan, whose diary was found by the
police, and Vijaysinh Dudhe (DB-3 and DB-2) had
insisted on their being given a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/-
promising that they would return Rs. 6,00,000/-.
According to this witness on 28.10.2003 he gave a sum
of Rs. 3,10,000/- (which he had collected from another
customer for investment purpose) to the aforesaid two
persons and one Sanjay Gavare (DB-4) who was also
known to him. This witness has also testified that he
was introduced to Vinayak Pisal (DB-5) and Accused
21
Page 22
No. 2. All the aforesaid persons told him that they
would leave for Kankavli at 11.30 p.m. According
to this witness on the next day deceased
Dadasaheb Chavan called to inform him that they had
reached Pallavi Lodge and that he could be reached on
a different mobile number which turned out to be that
of A-2.
(g) PW-12 – Dipak Kumar who was working as a Booking
Clerk of Sarvottam Tours and Travels had deposed that
A-2 whom he knew by name had booked 5 tickets for
the journey on 13.11.2003 from Borovili to Malwan and
that at Varshi one male person, one female and two
children along with A-2 had boarded the bus.
(h) PW-14- Jagan Patil, was a friend of Bala @ Vinayak
Pisal (DB-5). PW-14’s evidence shows how, under the
guise of “money shower” he was duped Rs 3 lakhs. He
had gone with another sum of Rs.3 lakhs for ‘money
shower’ for the second time but he was sent back
by the accused. This was due to the fact that he
22
Page 23
had gone to Nandos in a private vehicle instead
of using public transport as advised by the accused.
(i) PW-15 Amit Patel is the son of the owner of the Konkan
Plaza Hotel at Kankavli. He testified that he used to
maintain the hotel register. The hotel register which
was exhibited (Exh-120) indicated that deceased
Shankar Sarage (DB-1) and Hemant Thakre (DB-10) and
one Samir Sonavane had arrived at the lodge on
25.09.2003 (1.00 A.M.) and stayed in room No. 5. The
evidence of PW-104 Dipak Wagle (handwriting expert)
is to the effect that the handwriting in the register was
in the hand of A-2. (From the above it is evident that A-
2 had used a fake name i.e. Samir Sonavane to sign the
register)
(j) PW-17 Subhash Chalke testified that he had
given Rs. 1,55,000/- to his friend deceased Shankar
Sarage (DB-1) on 22.09.2003 for the purpose of
money shower. He also testified that he had
met A-1, A-2 and A-3 in the presence of deceased
Shankar Sarage a couple of days before the money was
23
Page 24
handed over to the deceased. He further stated that
after he had handed over the money, the deceased had
contacted A-1 from a PCO and informed him that the
money had been arranged. Further PW-17 had stated
that on 23.09.2003 he received a phone call from the
deceased that he along with deceased Hemant Thakre
(DB-10) and A-1 & A-3 were proceeding to Malwan.
(k) PW-22 Anil Kisan Garate, a gold smith, testified that on
21.11.2003 a gold ring was sold to him by A-6 claiming
the same to be of his grandmother. The said ring has
been identified by PW-66, Mohan Dhoke, brother of
deceased Anita Mali, to be belonging to his sister.
(l) PW-18 – Aijaz had deposed as to how he had been
cheated by A-1 of Rs.1,20,000/- on two different
occasions (Rs.60,000/- on each occasion) by promise of
money shower.
(m) PW-30 Dr. Rajendra Rane had testified that on
30.10.2003 he treated A-6 for a cut injury on the right
24
Page 25
index finger. (knife was recovered at the instance of A-
6)
(n) PW-34 Satish is elder brother of A-7 and another uncle
of A-1. He has deposed with regard to purchase of Tata
Sumo vehicle by A-1 in the name of A-2 and payment of
Rs.10,000/- on 24.8.2003 and thereafter payment of
Rs.85,000/- in connection with the aforesaid. This
witness has also deposed with regard to the
nervousness and apprehension shown by A-1 after the
dead bodies were recovered.
(o) PW-47 Chetan Bhagwan Rawoot, a classmate of A-6,
testified that on 6.12.2003 A-6 had handed over a Rado
watch to him for safe keeping claiming that it belonged
to one of his customers who had not paid his dues. PW-
66 (brother of deceased Anita Mali) had identified the
said watch as belonging to deceased Kerubhai Mali.
(p) PW-49 Hariram Patil had testified that he had agreed to
sell his shop in Eksar, Borivali to the father of A-6, one
25
Page 26
Dhanaji Shinde. According to PW-49 he had received
part payments in cash on 15.6.2003 and 25.8.2003 and
on 1.12.2003 he had received a cheque for Rs. 50,000/-
drawn on Maratha Cooperative Bank from A-6. On
30.12.2003, the police accompanied by A-6, arrived at
his shop and he handed over Rs.50,000/- cash, which A-
6 had paid to him earlier.
(q) PW-65 Vimal was engaged in the business of sale and
purchase of second-hand vehicles. He had deposed
regarding the sale of a Tata Sumo vehicle to A-1, in the
name of A-2 and receipt of Rs.95,000/- in cash from A-1
in two instalments.
(r) PW-70 – Harjeet Singh Kochar, used to run a garage
and also used to deal with sale and purchase of
second-hand two wheelers. This witness has
deposed that on 20.11.2003, A-2 and A-3 (he
had identified them) had visited his garage for
purchase of second-hand motor bikes. PW-70 has also
deposed that while on 22.11.2003 he sold one
motorcycle to A-2 who paid to him Rs.17,500/-, on
26
Page 27
25.11.2003 A-2 and A-3 visited his garage again and A-
3 purchased another motorcycle for Rs.20,500/-. Both
these amounts were paid to him by the accused in
cash.
(s) PW-75 Santosh Yadav is another relative of A-1. This
witness has corroborated the evidence of PW-4 with
regard to the visit of A-1 to A-3 to the house of PW-4 on
5 occasions between October and December, 2003 and
that A-6 had accompanied the other accused persons
on 2 or 3 occasions. He had also testified that he had
seen the accused bringing guns and swords to the
house of PW-4 who was aware that the accused persons
were in possession of fire arms and other weapons.
(t) PW-76 Dr. Jinturkar was the head of the team of
Forensic Experts of Miraj Medical College, Mumbai
constituted for forensic examination of the
remains of the deceased persons. This witness had
testified that DB-1 to DB-7 were received in the Medical
College, Miraj on 23.12.2003 and DB-8 and DB-9 on
26.12.2003 and DB-10 on 5.1.2004. (The findings of
27
Page 28
the committee proved by this witness have already
been extracted above.)
(u) PW-107 Dr. S. Pandurang Prasad was, at the relevant
time, working as a Senior Technical Examiner in the
laboratory of DNA and Finger Printing Services, CDFD,
Hyderabad. This witness has testified that upon the
workable bone and blood samples, he found that DB-1
was the biological relative of Mr. D.B. Sarge, D-8 was
biological father of DB-6 & DB-7 was biological mother
of DB-6. DB-6 & DB-9 were also found biologically
related. DB-7 was found biological relative of Ratnakar
& Mohan Tukaram Doke. DB-8 was found biological
son of Mrs. Yamunabhai Nanaji Mali and biological
father of DB-9. DB-2 was found biological son
of Mr. Vinayak Anandrao Dudhe, aged 80 years and
biological relative of Mr. Ranjitsing Vinayak aged 40
years.
(v) PW-100, Babaji s/o Bhaskarrao Pavade, Branch Manager
of Mahanagar Cooperative Bank, Turbhe Branch, New
Mumbai, PW-109, Anand Vishnu Banodkar, Officer
28
Page 29
attached to Bank of Maharashtra, Dahisar Branch, PW-
110-Vijaykumar Sangodkar, Branch Manager, State
Bank of India, Dahisar Branch, PW-111, Krishna
Dattaram Parab, Branch Manager of the Greater
Bombay Cooperative Bank, Borivali Branch and PW-112,
Vidhyadhar Rawool, Branch Manager of Maratha
Sahakari Bank Ltd., Borivali Branch have proved the
deposit of several cash amounts in the bank accounts
of the accused, their wives or their immediate relatives.
All such deposits were made in and around the relevant
time.
15. Ms. Aparna Jha, learned counsel has very elaborately
argued the case of the appellants contending that in the
absence of any direct evidence the prosecution not only has
to prove that circumstances incriminating to the accused
had been laid before the Court but further that the sum total
of such evidence unerringly points to the commission of the
alleged offence by the accused leaving no room for any
other view. Learned counsel has taken us through the
relevant parts of the evidence of the material witnesses to
29
Page 30
contend that the same are not free from doubt and
ambiguity and are tainted on account of embellishments and
improvements. No circumstance that implicates the
accused-appellants, much less a chain of circumstances
which admits of no other possibility except the guilt of the
accused, has been established by the prosecution, in the
present case, contends the learned counsel. In particular,
learned counsel has pointed out that the identity of the dead
bodies recovered will always remain in doubt in view of the
extreme decomposition of the dead bodies when recovered.
It is urged that DNA matching and super-imposition tests
cannot lead to firm and conclusive results, beyond all
reasonable doubt, as regards the identity of dead bodies.
That apart, learned counsel has pointed out that some of the
registers of the lodges and hotels where the victims were
allegedly put up by the accused contain over-writings,
additions and deletions which would make the same highly
unreliable and unsafe in order to arrive at any conclusion
with regard to the involvement of the accused.
30
Page 31
16. Shri Sushil Karanjakar, learned State counsel, in reply,
has submitted that in a case of the present nature where
events had occurred as a result of a meticulous planning
made by the accused persons, absence of any eye witness
or direct evidence is, but, natural. Learned State counsel
has however pointed out that the prosecution has
systematically laid before the Court one
adverse/incriminating circumstance after the other, the
cumulative effect of which satisfies the test which
circumstantial evidence has to pass through before
acceptance by the Court. According to learned counsel, in
the present case, not only highly incriminating and material
circumstances have been established beyond doubt by the
prosecution, the cumulative effect of such circumstances
points to only one conclusion i.e. that the accused and no
one else who had committed the crime alleged. In this
regard learned State counsel has drawn the attention of the
Court to paragraph 96 of the judgment of the High Court
wherein the circumstances held to be proved and
established by the prosecution has been set out in seriatim.
31
Page 32
17. We may now proceed to analyse the substratum of the
evidence adduced by the prosecution as noted above. As
already held, the homicidal nature of death of the concerned
persons and their identities (except DB-10 Hemant Thakre)
has been conclusively established by the prosecution. In so
far as the alleged involvement of the accused in the crimes
alleged against them is concerned, the evidence and other
materials on record makes it clear that A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-6
were known to each other and they were residing in Mumbai.
It was deliberately circulated and spread by the accused that
A-1 was gifted with super-natural powers of causing money
showers i.e. multiplying money. The evidence on record also
establishes that the accused had been persuading people,
including the victims, to arrange for cash money and bring
the same to them at Malvan or Kankavli so that the same
can be multiplied. Accordingly, the victims, including the
deceased persons, after obtaining cash money from different
sources, had come to Malvan or Kankavli and they were put
up in different lodges/hotels by the accused. The
prosecution had also established that while staying in the
32
Page 33
hotels/lodges the victims and the accused did not use their
real names. Specifically, the prosecution evidence shows
that A-2 arranged for conveyance and stay of the victims
whereas A-3 had assisted A-2 in shifting the victims from the
lodges to the place where the crimes were committed. The
evidence adduced also shows that the victims had left in the
mornings of the days of incident for the Nandos plateau
alongwith some of the accused. A-1 was the money
spinner and A-6 was in the company of the other accused
with full knowledge of what was going on and with active
participation therein. The victims were missing for days and
their relatives had lodged complaints in different police
stations. From the place of occurrence articles like wearing
apparels, brief case, diaries etc. were recovered which have
been proved to be belonging to some of the deceased
persons whereas articles like wrist watch, jewellery items
etc. also belonging to the deceased had been recovered
from persons who were in such possession through the
accused. All such articles have been identified by the close
relatives of the deceased to be belonging to the respective
33
Page 34
deceased person(s). Around the time of the incidents, the
accused persons had made unaccounted cash deposits in
their Bank accounts or in the accounts of their close relatives
and A-1, A-2 and A-3 had purchased
automobiles/motorcycles on cash payment. The sources of
such receipts have not been explained. The above
conclusions which we have thought proper to draw on a
consideration of the evidence of the prosecution appears to
be more or less in conformity with what has been found by
the High Court to have been proved by the prosecution (para
96 of the impugned judgment). In the light of the above
facts, we do not entertain any doubt, whatsoever, that in
the present case the prosecution has succeeded in proving a
series of highly incriminating circumstances involving the
accused all of which, if pieced together, can point only to
one direction, namely, that it is the accused-appellants and
nobody else who had committed the crimes in question.
We, therefore, have no hesitation in affirming the impugned
common judgment and order of the High Court holding the
accused A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-6 in Sessions Case No. 3/2005
34
Page 35
and 5/2005 guilty of commission of the offences alleged
including the offence under Section 302 IPC read with
Section 120-B IPC. We also agree with the finding of the
High Court that the accused A-1, A-2 and A-3 in Sessions
Case No. 4/2005 are guilty of commission of the offence
under Section 302 IPC read with Section 120-B IPC, insofar
as the death of Shankar Sarage (DB-1) is concerned.
18. Having held that the accused-appellants are liable to be
convicted for the offences, inter alia, under Section
302/120B IPC, the next question, and perhaps a question of
equal if not greater significance, that would require
consideration is the measure of punishment that would be
just, adequate and complete. It has already been noted that
in two of the cases the accused-appellants have been
awarded death penalty whereas in the third case the
sentence of life imprisonment has been imposed in reversal
of the verdict of acquittal rendered by the learned Trial
Court.
19. Shri Colin Gonsalves, who has argued the case on
behalf of the appellants in so far as sentence is concerned,
35
Page 36
has submitted that all the accused persons are young and at
the time of commission of the offence they were between
23-29 years of age. None of the accused-appellants have
any previous criminal record; they have spent 10 years in jail
custody and the jail record amply demonstrates that while in
custody they have been educating themselves and have
passed or have partly completed the graduate course under
the Yashahantrao Chavan Maharashtra Open University. The
accused-appellants have reformed themselves and, if
rehabilitated in society, they can prove to be assets to
Society, it is submitted. The prospects of their committing
any further crime, according to the learned counsel, is
remote. It has also been submitted by Shri Colin Gonsalves
that the accused come from the lowest strata of society and
had committed the crime due to poverty. All these,
according to the learned counsel, are mitigating
circumstances which if balanced against the incriminating
circumstances of the case would tilt the scales in favour of
commutation of the sentences of death into that of life
imprisonment. Stressing the principle laid down in Bachan
36
Page 37
Singh Vs. State of Punjab1, Shri Colin Gonsalves has
submitted that the legislative policy under Section 354(3)
Cr.PC is that life imprisonment is the rule and death
sentence is an exception. It is submitted by Shri Gonsalves
that in the present case the option of life imprisonment does
not stand “unquestionably foreclosed” so as to justify the
death penalty imposed. Reliance has been placed on the
decision in Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar Vs.
State of Maharashtra2 to contend that the circumstances
set out above are all mitigating circumstances that ought to
be taken into account at the time of consideration of the
sentence to be imposed. Particular stress has been laid on
the observations in para 159 of the report that emphasis
that must be laid on the possibility of reform and
rehabilitation of the accused even to the extent of requiring
the State to prove that the same would not be possible. Shri
Gonsalves has also drawn attention of this Court to the
decision of this Court in Mulla & Anr. Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh3 (authored by the learned Chief Justice). In
1 (1980) 2 SCC 684 2 (2009) 6 SCC 498 3 (2010) 3 SCC 508
37
Page 38
particular, the observations in para 81 of the report has been
placed to show that the state of poverty of the accused is a
mitigating circumstance that should be taken into account
and that the initial shock of the circumstances in which the
crime is committed needs to be balanced with the possibility
of reform of the accused over a period of time. We were also
reminded that the long period of custody that a death
convict has endured has been held to be a mitigating
circumstance in Ramesh & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan4
(Para 76). The decision of this Court in Shankar Kisanrao
Khade Vs. State of Maharashtra5 (para 52) has been
relied upon to contend that “to award the death sentence,
the “crime test” has to be fully satisfied, that is, 100% and
“criminal test” 0%, that is, no mitigating circumstance
favouring the accused. If there is any circumstance
favouring the accused, like lack of intention to commit the
crime, possibility of reformation, young age of the accused,
not a menace to the society, no previous track record, etc.
the “criminal test” may favour the accused to avoid the
capital punishment ………”. 4 (2011) 3 SCC 685 5 (2013) 5 SCC 546
38
Page 39
20. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the
State has submitted that the accused-appellants have
committed not one but a series of heinous, depraved and
diabolical crimes resulting in the death of innocent and
unsuspecting victims. The crimes have been committed to
satisfy the greed for money. The criminal acts committed by
the accused are the result of a carefully planned and
meticulously executed conspiracy. Societal needs would
justify the upholding of the sentence of death awarded in the
present case to the accused-appellants. The cry for justice
by the families of the victims cannot fall on deaf ears, it is
contended.
21. Death penalty jurisprudence in India has been widely
debated and differently perceived. To us, the essential
principles in this sphere of jurisprudence has been laid down
by two Constitution Benches of this Court in Jagmohan
Singh Vs. The State of U.P.6 which dealt with the law after
deletion of Section 367(5) of the old Code but prior to the
enactment of Section 354(3) of the present Code and the
decision in Bachan Singh (supra). Subsequent opinions on 6 (1973) 1 SCC 20
39
Page 40
the subject indicate attempts to elaborate the principles of
law laid down in the aforesaid two decisions and to discern
an objective basis to guide sentencing decisions so as to
ensure that the same do not become judge centric.
22. The impossibility of laying down standards to
administer the sentencing law in India was noted in
Jagmohan Singh (supra) in the following terms:
“The impossibility of laying down standards is at the very core of the criminal law as administered in India which invests the judge with a very wide discretion in the manner of fixing the degree of punishment. … The exercise of judicial discretion on well-recognized principles is, in the final analysis, the safest possible safeguards for the accused.” (Para 26)
23. Bachan Singh (supra) contained a reiteration of the
aforesaid principle which is to be found in para 197 of the
report. The same was made in the context of the need,
expressed in the opinion of the Constitution Bench, to
balance the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in any
given case, an illustrative reference of which circumstances
are to be found in the report. Bachan Singh (supra), it may
be noted, saw a shift; from balancing the aggravating and
40
Page 41
mitigating circumstances of the crime as laid down in
Jagmohan Singh (supra) to consideration of all relevant
circumstances relating to the crime as well as the criminal.
The expanse of the death penalty jurisprudence was clearly
but firmly laid down in Bachan Singh (supra) which can be
summarized by culling out the following which appear to be
the core principles emerging therefrom.
(1) Life imprisonment is the rule and death penalty is the exception. (para 209)
(2) Death sentence must be imposed only in the gravest cases of extreme culpability, namely, in the “rarest of rare” where the alternative option of life imprisonment is “unquestionably foreclosed”. (para 209)
(3) The sentence is a matter of judicial discretion to be exercised by giving due consideration to the circumstances of the crime as well as the offender. (para 197)
24. A reference to several other pronouncements made by
this Court at different points of time with regard to what
could be considered as mitigating and aggravating
circumstances and how they are to be reconciled has
41
Page 42
already been detailed hereinabove. All that would be
necessary to say is that the Constitution Bench in Bachan
Singh (supra) had sounded a note of caution against
treating the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in
separate water-tight compartments as in many situations it
may be impossible to isolate them and both sets of
circumstances will have to be considered to cull out the
cumulative effect thereof. Viewed in the aforesaid context
the observations contained in para 52 of Shankar Kisanrao
Khade (supra) noted above, namely, 100% crime test and
0% criminal test may create situations which may well go
beyond what was laid down in Bachan Singh (supra).
25. We may also take note of the separate but concurring
judgment in Shankar Kisanrao Khade (supra)
enumerating the circumstances that had weighed in favour
of commutation (Para 106) as well as the principal reasons
for confirming the death penalty (Para 122).
In para 123 of the aforesaid concurring opinion the
cases/instances where the principles earlier applied to the
sentencing decision have been departed from are also
42
Page 43
noticed. Though such departures may appear to give the
sentencing jurisprudence in the country a subjective colour it
is necessary to note that standardisation of cases for the
purposes of imposition of sentence was disapproved in
Bachan Singh (supra) holding that “it is neither practicable
nor desirable to imprison the sentencing discretion of a
judge or jury in the strait-jacket of exhaustive and rigid
standards”.(Para 195) In this regard, the observations with
regard to the impossibility of laying down standards to
regulate the exercise of the very wide discretion in matters
of sentencing made in Jagmohan Singh (supra), (Para 22
hereinabove) may also be usefully recalled. In fact, the
absence of any discretion in the matter of sentencing has
been the prime reason for the indictment of Section 303 IPC
in Mithu Vs. State of Punjab7. The view of Justice
Chinnappa Reddy in para 25 of the report would be apt for
reproduction hereinbelow:-
“25. Judged in the light shed by Maneka Gandhi and Bachan Singh, it is impossible to uphold Section 303 as valid. Section 303 excludes judicial discretion. The scales of justice are removed from
7 AIR 1983 SC 473
43
Page 44
the hands of the Judge so soon as he pronounces the accused guilty of the offence. So final, so irrevocable and so irrestitutable is the sentence of death that no law which provides for it without involvement of the judicial mind can be said to be fair, just and reasonable. Such a law must necessarily be stigmatised as arbitrary and oppressive. Section 303 is such a law and it must go the way of all bad laws. I agree with my Lord Chief Justice that Section 303, Indian Penal Code, must be struck down as unconstitutional.”
26. In a recent pronouncement in Sunil Dutt Sharma vs.
State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)8 it has been observed by
this Court that the principles of sentencing in our country are
fairly well settled – the difficulty is not in identifying such
principles but lies in the application thereof. Such
application, we may respectfully add, is a matter of judicial
expertise and experience where judicial wisdom must search
for an answer to the vexed question —whether the option of
life sentence is unquestionably foreclosed? The unbiased
and trained judicial mind free from all prejudices and notions
is the only asset which would guide the judge to reach the
‘truth’.
8 2013 (12) SCALE 473
44
Page 45
27. Before proceeding to examine the relevant
circumstances for adjudging the sentence that would be
proper in the facts of the present case, we may take notice
of a recent pronouncement of this Court in Sushil Sharma
Vs. The State of NCT of Delhi9 wherein in paras 79, 80,
and 81 this Court, once again, had the occasion to take
notice of the circumstances which had weighed in
commutation of the death sentence as well as those which
have formed the basis for upholding such sentences.
Thereafter in para 81 of the report it has been held that the
core of a criminal case lies in its facts and facts differ from
case to case. The relevant paragraphs mentioned above
may now be recalled.
“79. We notice from the above judgments that mere brutality of the murder or the number of persons killed or the manner in which the body is disposed of has not always persuaded this Court to impose death penalty. Similarly, at times, in the peculiar factual matrix, this Court has not thought it fit to award death penalty in cases, which rested on circumstantial evidence or solely on approver’s evidence. Where murder, though brutal, is committed driven by extreme emotional disturbance and it does not have enormous proportion, the option of life imprisonment has been exercised in certain cases. Extreme poverty
9 2013 (12) SCALE 622
45
Page 46
and social status has also been taken into account amongst other circumstances for not awarding death sentence. In few cases, time spent by the accused in death cell has been taken into consideration along with other circumstances, to commute death sentence into life imprisonment. Where the accused had no criminal antecedents; where the State had not led any evidence to show that the accused is beyond reformation and rehabilitation or that he would revert to similar crimes in future, this Court has leaned in favour of life imprisonment. In such cases, doctrine of proportionality and the theory of deterrence have taken a back seat. The theory of reformation and rehabilitation has prevailed over the idea of retribution.
80. On the other hand, rape followed by a cold- blooded murder of a minor girl and further followed by disrespect to the body of the victim has been often held to be an offence attracting death penalty. At times, cases exhibiting premeditation and meticulous execution of the plan to murder by leveling a calculated attack on the victim to annihilate him, have been held to be fit cases for imposing death penalty. Where innocent minor children, unarmed persons, hapless women and old and infirm persons have been killed in a brutal manner by persons in dominating position, and where after ghastly murder displaying depraved mentality, the accused have shown no remorse, death penalty has been imposed. Where it is established that the accused is a confirmed criminal and has committed murder in a diabolic manner and where it is felt that reformation and rehabilitation of such a person is impossible and if let free, he would be a menace to the society, this Court has not hesitated to confirm death sentence. Many a time, in cases of brutal murder, exhibiting depravity and sick mind, this Court has
46
Page 47
acknowledged the need to send a deterrent message to those who may embark on such crimes in future. In some cases involving brutal murders, society’s cry for justice has been taken note of by this court, amongst other relevant factors. But, one thing is certain that while deciding whether death penalty should be awarded or not, this Court has in each case realizing the irreversible nature of the sentence, pondered over the issue many times over. This Court has always kept in mind the caution sounded by the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh that judges should never be bloodthirsty but has wherever necessary in the interest of society located the rarest of rare case and exercised the tougher option of death penalty.
81. In the nature of things, there can be no hard and fast rules which the court can follow while considering whether an accused should be awarded death sentence or not. The core of a criminal case is its facts and, the facts differ from case to case. Therefore, the various factors like the age of the criminal, his social status, his background, whether he is a confirmed criminal or not, whether he had any antecedents, whether there is any possibility of his reformation and rehabilitation or whether it is a case where the reformation is impossible and the accused is likely to revert to such crimes in future and become a threat to the society are factors which the criminal court will have to examine independently in each case. Decision whether to impose death penalty or not must be taken in light of guiding principles laid down in several authoritative pronouncements of this Court in the facts and attendant circumstances of each case.”
(Underlining is ours)
47
Page 48
28. In the present case, there is no manner of doubt that
the accused appellants have committed the murder of as
many as 9 innocent and unsuspecting victims who were led
to believe that A-1 had magical powers to multiply money.
The deceased, after being killed, were robbed of the cash
amounts that they had brought with them for the purpose of
“money shower”. The criminal acts of the accused were
actuated by greed for money and such acts were the result
of a carefully planned scheme. The crimes were committed
over a period of nearly two months in three different
episodes. The assaults on some of the victims were
merciless and gruesome. Some of the victims were young
and hapless children i.e. Sanjay Mali and Rajesh Mali.
29. At the same time, all the four accused were young in
age at the time of commission of the offence i.e. 23-29
years. They belong to the economically, socially and
educationally deprived section of the population. They were
living in acute poverty. It is possible that, being young, they
had a yearning for quick money and it is these
circumstances that had led to the commission of the crimes
48
Page 49
in question. Materials have been laid before this Court to
show that while in custody all the accused had enrolled
themselves in Yashahantrao Chavan Maharashtra Open
University and had either completed the B.A. Examination or
are on the verge of acquiring the degree. At least three of
the appellants (A-2, A-3 and A-6) have, at different points of
time, participated in different programmes of Gandhian
thoughts and have been awarded certificates of such
participation. In prison, A-2 has written a book titled
“Resheemganth” and A-3 has been associated with the said
work. There is no material or information to show any
condemnable or reprehensible conduct on the part of any of
the appellants during their period of custody. All the
circumstances point to the possibility of the accused-
appellants being reformed and living a meaningful and
constructive life if they are to be given a second chance. In
any case, it is not the stand of the State that the accused-
appellants, are beyond reformation or are not capable of
living a changed life if they are to be rehabilitated in society.
Each of the accused have spent over 10 years in
49
Page 50
incarceration. Though it must not be understood in any
other manner the entire case against the accused is built on
circumstantial evidence.
30. Balancing the two sets of circumstances i.e. one
favouring commutation and the other favouring upholding
the death penalty, we are of the view that in the present
case the option of life sentence is not “unquestionably
foreclosed”. Therefore, the sentence of death awarded to
the accused should be commuted to life imprisonment. We
order, accordingly, and direct that each of the accused-
appellants, namely, Santosh Manohar Chavan, Amit Ashok
Shinde, Yogesh Madhukar Chavan and Mahesh Dhanaji
Shinde shall undergo imprisonment for life for commission of
the offence under Section 302/120B IPC. The sentences
awarded to the accused-appellants by the High Court for
commission of all other offences under the IPC and the Arms
Act are affirmed to run concurrently. We also make it clear
that the custody of the appellants for the rest of their lives
will be subject to remissions if any, which will be strictly
50
Page 51
subject to the provisions of the Sections 432 and 433-A of
the Cr.PC.
31. We accordingly dispose of all the appeals with the
modification of the sentence as above.
.…………………………CJI. [P. SATHASIVAM]
.......………………………J. [RANJAN GOGOI]
..........……………………J. [SHIVA KIRTI SINGH]
NEW DELHI, FEBRUARY 27, 2014.
51