Page 1

1

  Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4494 OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.34115 OF 2013)

Maharaji Educational Trust ... APPELLANT VERSUS

SGS Construction & Dev. P. Ltd. & Ors.    ...RESPONDENTS WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4495 OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.36569 OF 2013)

U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad ...APPELLANT

VERSUS

SGS Construction & Dev. P. Ltd. & Ors.    ...RESPONDENTS

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.4496  OF 2015

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.1510 OF 2014)

Housing & Urban Development Corpn. Ltd.    ... APPELLANT

VERSUS SGS Construction & Dev. P. Ltd. & Ors.    ...RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T Arun Mishra, J.

1. Leave granted in all the special leave petitions.

2. In the appeals the judgment and order dated 25.9.2013 passed by the

High Court of Allahabad, Bench at Lucknow, has been questioned by Maharaji

Educational Trust (for short ‘the Trust’), U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (for

short  ‘Avas  Evam  Vikas  Parishad’)  and  Housing  and  Urban  Development

Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘HUDCO’) whereby the High Court has

Page 2

2

directed  the  Avas  Evam  Vikas  Parishad  to  demarcate  42.45  acres  of  the

mortgaged land and 21 acres as unencumbered land out of total area of 63.45

acres in writ petition filed by SGS Construction & Development (P) Ltd. (for

short ‘Builder’).

3. The  factual  matrix  indicate  that  the  Trust  has  taken  a  loan  from

HUDCO.  The  outstanding  figure  at  present  is  stated  to  be  approximately

Rs.433  crores.  There  was  default  in  making  the  payment.  The  Trust  had

mortgaged the immovable properties mentioned from serial Nos.1 to 5 and also

the property at serial No.6 which is in question in the present matter in an area

of 63.45 acres of vacant land situated at village Akbarpur, village Behrampur

and village Mirzapur, Pargana-Loni, Tehsil and District Ghaziabad. Out of the

property mentioned at  serial  No.6 which was mortgaged with HUDCO, the

Trust had exchanged the land in area 21 acres from Avas Evam Vikas Parishad

vide Exchange Deed dated 4.5.2007. Thereafter, the Trust had also deposited

the deed of exchange of the said land with HUDCO on 27.7.2011.

4. As  the  loan  was  not  repaid  by  the  Trust,  HUDCO  had  started

proceedings  before  the  Debt  Recovery  Tribunal  at  Delhi.  The  recovery

proceedings are pending before the Recovery Officer, in which the builder has

filed objections which are stated to be pending. The objections have been filed

by  the  Builder  in  respect  of  property  No.6  against  the  action  initiated  by

HUDCO  for  sale  of  mortgaged  property  under  Securitisation  and

Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act,

Page 3

3

2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the SARFAESI Act’).

5. The Builder has filed objections on the strength of an agreement to sell

dated  26.8.2010  entered  with  Trust  which  was  initially  unregistered  for

purchase of 63.45 acres of land comprised in property No.6, which includes the

21 acres of land which was exchanged by the Trust with the Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad. The agreement was executed between the Builder and the Trust for

consideration of Rs.154 crores. Out of the same, it is submitted that sum of

Rs.9 crores has been paid by the Builder to the Trust. The agreement had been

registered  subsequently,  which  has  been  questioned  by  the  Trust  and  writ

petition is pending in High Court at Allahabad.  A civil suit is also stated to be

pending.  

6. Notwithstanding the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings, the Builder

preferred writ petition in question before the High Court of Allahabad, Bench

at Lucknow claiming following reliefs :  

“i)  Issue  a  writ  in  the  nature  of  mandamus  commanding  the Respondent/Opposite  Party  No.1  i.e.  U.P.  Awas  Evam  Vikas Parishad to demarcate lands measuring 42.45 acres out of 63.45 acres, which are mortgaged so that if at a later date the properties at Sl. No.6 as mentioned in Annexure P/1 were to be sold by the Respondent No.3, there would be no ambiguity in identifying the mortgaged property. ii)  Issue a writ,  order or  direction commanding the Respondent No.2 to implement its order dated 6th September, 2011 in a time bound manner preferably with a period of 3 months in order to sell properties  at  Sl.  No.1  to  5  as  mentioned  in  Annexure  P/1  and further  restrain  the  Respondent  No.2  to  proceed  with  the application  filed  by  the  Respondent  No.3  dated  20.10.2011 (Annexure P/7) till the properties at Sl. No.1 to 5 are not sold. iii) Issue any writ, direction or orders as may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

Page 4

4

Second prayer had been abandoned at  the time of final  hearing of the writ

petition.

7. On behalf of the appellants, it was submitted that it is not the function

of Avas Evam Vikas Parishad to demarcate the land on the basis of an agreement

entered  into  inter  se between the  Trust  and the  Builder. Uttar  Pradesh Avas

Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 (in short referred to as Adhiniyam of

1965) has been enacted so as to further various kinds of housing schemes and

development projects. The powers under Section 15 of the Adhiniyam of 1965

cannot  be  exercised  out  of  context  of  the  Act.   It  was  also  submitted  that

Lucknow Bench had no jurisdiction  to  entertain  the  writ  petition.  The High

Court  could  not  have  treated  the  property  exchanged  by  Avas  Evam  Vikas

Parishad with the Trust as unencumbered one.  It was further submitted that on

the strength of unregistered agreement to sell, no right, title or interest passes to

the  Builder.  The  registration  of  agreement  to  sale  which  had  been  obtained

subsequently, has been stayed by the High Court in the pending writ application.

The writ petition was a misconceived venture. By virtue of section 70 of the

Transfer of Property Act (for short ‘the TP Act’), HUDCO was having a right

over the property of Trust obtained in exchange with mortgaged property. The

Deed of Exchange has also been deposited by the Trust  with HUDCO.  No

application was ever filed by the Builder with the Avas Evam Vikas Parishad for

demarcation of land. There was no housing scheme framed by Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad with respect to the land which had been given in exchange to the Trust.

Page 5

5

Thus, provision of section 15 of the Adhiniyam of 1965 is not attracted. It was

also submitted on behalf of the appellants that the Builder is dilly dallying the

recovery proceedings by filing frivolous litigation.

8. Per contra, on behalf of the Builder, it was submitted that the agreement

to sell has been executed in favour of the Builder by the Trust with respect to

63.45 acres of land which includes 21 acres of the land given by Avas Evam

Vikas Parishad to the Trust in exchange. Recovery proceedings against the Trust

are pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, New Delhi, in which objections

have  been  preferred  by  the  Builder  which  are  pending  consideration.  The

Builder having entered into an agreement, had the right to apply to Avas Evam

Vikas  Parishad  to  demarcate  the  land it  had exchanged  with  the  Trust.  The

direction for demarcation is beneficial to all concerned. No case for interference

is made out. The Builder has submitted a proposal under section 56 of the T.P.

Act  to  the  Chairman of  HUDCO. The land given by the  Avas  Evam Vikas

Parishad  to  the  Trust  was  unencumbered.  The  21  acres  of  land  obtained  in

exchange was not mortgaged with HUDCO. Indubitably, Lucknow Bench had

the jurisdiction as the Head Office of Avas Evam Vikas Parishad is situated at

Lucknow. The Avas Evam Vikas Parishad had the onus to demarcate the land as

provided under section 15(1) (e), (k) (m) and (o). The Builder had the right to

know/identify the property i.e. 21 acres of land which was unencumbered. The

land received by the Avas Evam Vikas Parishad from the Trust has been utilised

for a housing scheme. Thus, the impugned order calls for no interference.

Page 6

6

9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length, we are of the

considered opinion that it was a misadventure on the part of the Builder to file a

writ petition for the kind of reliefs prayed for and that too could not have been

entertained by the Bench at Lucknow.

10. It is not in dispute that property Nos.1 to 6 had been mortgaged with

HUDCO by the Trust. Property No.6 which is in dispute comprised of 63.45

acres  of  land  which  was  initially  mortgaged  by  the  Trust  with  HUDCO.

Proceedings for  recovery of  debt  which seems to have presently amassed to

more than Rs. 433 crores under the SARFAESI Act,  are stated to be pending

before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Delhi. The property is admittedly situated in

the district of Ghaziabad, State of U.P. and Ghaziabad falls within the territorial

limits of the main seat of the High Court of Allahabad. Undisputedly, objections

had been preferred by the Builder before the Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery

Tribunal, Delhi.  Admittedly, 21 acres of land, out of the total of 63.45 acres

which was mortgaged to HUDCO as item No.6, had been exchanged by the

Trust  with  Avas  Evam  Vikas  Parishad.  Thus,  the  exchange  was  with  the

property which was under mortgage with HUDCO and the exchange deed had

been  deposited  by  the  Trust  with  HUDCO on  11.7.2011.   Before  the  Debt

Recovery  Officer,  New Delhi,  prayer  has  been  made  by  the  Builder  to  sell

property Nos.1 to 5 and not to sell property No.6 with respect to which he has

entered into an agreement with the Trust.

11. The  writ  petition  filed  for  the  aforesaid  twin  reliefs,  was  not

Page 7

7

maintainable before the writ court; firstly, it is not within ken of the High Court

in writ jurisdiction to declare any property as unencumbered one. Such rights

between private parties cannot be made subject-matter of writ jurisdiction  as

has been ordered in the impugned judgment and order that out of a total of 63.45

acres  of  land,  21  acres  be  demarcated  as  an  unencumbered property  and to

maintain status quo. Following is the operative portion of the order passed by

the Division Bench at Lucknow :

“In the premises discussed hereinabove, we are of the considered view  that  the  relief  as  sought  in  prayer  no.1  can  be  granted  by directing  respondent  no.1  to  demarcate  42.45  acres,  said  to  be mortgaged, and 21 acres as unencumbered, out of the total area of 63.45 acres, as mentioned at serial no.6, in the list of properties as detailed in the foregoing paragraphs. Thus, we allow this petition and direct  respondent  no.  1  to  carry  out  the  aforesaid  exercise  of demarcation either itself or being an instrumentality of the State, and having  statutory  duties  as  extracted  and  reproduced  hereinabove, with the help of revenue authorities concerned. Moreover, in view of the  chequered  background  of  the  litigation  in  respect  of   the lands/properties in question, and the conduct of respondent no.3, as noticed above, we also deem it expedient in the interest of justice to direct and thus it is ordered that the parties shall maintain status quo qua the lands, namely, 21 acres out of the total area of 63.45 acres as mentioned at serial no.6. We also direct that the said area of 21 acres of the land at serial no. 6 shall not be alienated and/or transferred in any manner till the exercise of demarcation is fully carried out in accordance with law. Additionally, it is further directed that the area of  42.45  acres,  said  to  be  encumbered  and  21  acres,  as unencumbered  shall  be  clearly  identified  and  segregated  in  the presence of the parties.”   

12. Though, there is serious dispute between the parties to the lis whether

the said land is unencumbered, finding has been given by the High Court that 21

acres of land is unencumbered. The High Court could not have treated 21 acres

of land as unencumbered one out of 63.45 acres. It was not open to the High

Page 8

8

Court to enter into the aforesaid arena, which of the property is encumbered and

to be sold in realization of debt is the outlook of the Recovery Officer, DRT,

Delhi,  where the recovery proceedings  are  pending,  including the  objections

preferred by the Builder.

13. In our opinion, it was not open to the Builder to file a writ application

for the aforesaid reliefs. Though the second relief had been abandoned at the

time of final arguments but the first relief could not have been granted without

going into the said question. The High Court in writ jurisdiction has made a

declaration that the property 21 acres of land is unencumbered. The High Court

could not have adjudicated on the property rights under the guise of directing

Avas Evam Vikas Parishad to demarcate the land and give finding that it was

unencumbered land. The High Court has erred in law in giving a finding on

merits on effect of exchange and that section 70 of TP Act is not applicable. It

was not the function of the High Court to decide these questions under writ

jurisdiction. Section 70 of the TP Act is extracted hereunder :

“70. Accession to mortgaged property.—If, after the date of a mortgage, any accession is made to the mortgaged property, the mortgagee, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, shall, for the purposes of the security, be entitled to such accession.”

14. We could  have  decided the  aforesaid  question  finally. However,  we

refrain from doing so as, in our opinion, it was not open to the High Court to

take up these questions under writ jurisdiction and to declare the properties as

unencumbered. It was for the parties to agitate the questions before the DRT

where the recovery proceedings are pending at the instance of HUDCO with

Page 9

9

whom the property had been mortgaged by the Trust.

15. Prima facie, we are of the view that on the strength of the agreement to

sell, particularly when possession had not been handed over to the Builder, it

was not open to him to file a writ application for demarcation of the property as

unencumbered property or otherwise. What was sought to be achieved by filing

a writ petition, was to get rid of the proceedings pending before the Recovery

Officer, DRT at Delhi, and to save land at serial No.6 from being sold which

includes 21 acres of land, and an attempt was made to get the 21 acres of land

declared as unencumbered one. As a matter of fact, such disputed questions with

respect  to  the  properties  inter  se between  the  Builder  and  the  Trust  as  to

demarcation,  writ  petition  could  not  be  said  to  be  appropriate  remedy,

particularly when the order passed by the Recovery Officer, DRT, was not in

question  and  the  order  passed  by  the  DRT,  Delhi,  could  not  have  been

questioned before the Lucknow Bench of High Court of Allahabad.

16. It was submitted on behalf of the Builder that the writ petition was filed

before the Lucknow Bench of the High Court of Allahabad  as the Head Office

of Avas Evam Vikas Parishad is located at Lucknow and part of the cause of

action has arisen at  Lucknow. In view of the fact that the Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad had exchanged the 21 acres of land with the Trust and it had a statutory

duty  enjoined under  section  15 of  the  Adhiniyam of  1965 so  as  to  conduct

survey and demarcate the land. In our considered opinion, no part of the cause

of action to the Builder has arisen at Lucknow where the Head Office of Avas

Page 10

10

Evam Vikas  Parishad  is  situated.  Avas  Evam Vikas  Parishad  was  not  at  all

answerable  to  the  Builder.  As  way-back  in  the  year  2007,  much  before

agreement to sell was entered into, it had exchanged its 21 acres of land with the

Trust.  Moreover, no application was ever filed by the Builder to Avas Evam

Vikas Parishad for seeking demarcation of the land. Thus, in case of dispute

inter se between the Builder and the Trust based upon subsequent agreement to

sale entered into in 2010, there was no right available to the Builder to ask Avas

Evam Vikas Parishad to demarcate the land which it had already given to the

Trust. After the 21 acres of land had been given to the Trust,  Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad had nothing to do with that land. This, it was a wholly misconceived

venture on the part of the Builder to ask Avas Evam Vikas Parishad to demarcate

the land given to the Trust, particularly when the Parishad was not having any

housing scheme with respect to the land which had been given to the Trust.  

  Thus, filing of the writ petition at Lucknow Bench was totally uncalled for

and the propriety required that it should not have been entertained at Lucknow

Bench. Merely because the transfer petition filed in this court for transfer of case

was withdrawn and the direction was issued by the Chief Justice of High Court

to decide  at an early date, would not confer jurisdiction on Bench at Lucknow,

all the questions had been left open to be agitated at the time of hearing. In our

opinion,   Bench at  Lucknow ought not  to have entertained the petition as it

lacked the jurisdiction.  

17. With respect to the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench, the Builder has

Page 11

11

relied upon the decision of this Court in Sri Nasiruddin etc. v. State Transport

Appellate Tribunal  etc.  [1975 (2)  SCC 671].  Reliance has been placed upon

paras 37 and 38 and the same are reproduced hereunder:

“37. The conclusion as well as the reasoning of the High Court is incorrect. It is unsound because the expression "cause of action" in an  application  under  Article 226 would  be  as  the  expression  is understood and if the cause of action arose because of the appellate order or the revisional order which came to be passed at Lucknow then Lucknow would have jurisdiction though the original order was passed  at  a  place  outside  the  areas  in  Oudh.  It  may  be  that  the original order was in favour of the person applying for a writ. In such case an adverse appellate order might be the cause of action. The expression "cause of action" is well- known. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the  Lucknow Bench will  have  jurisdiction.  If  the  cause  of  action arises wholly within the specified Oudh areas, it is indisputable that the  Lucknow  Bench  would  have  exclusive  jurisdiction  in  such  a matter. If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum conveniens. The litigant has the right to go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises. In such cases, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular Court. The choice is by reason  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  being attracted  by part  of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court. Similarly, if  the  cause  of  action  can  be  said  to  have  arisen  partly  within specified areas in Oudh and partly outside the specified Oudh areas, the  litigant  will  have  the  choice  to  institute  proceedings  either  at Allahabad or Lucknow. The Court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the Court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action.

   38.   To sum up, our conclusions are as follows. First, there is no permanent  seat  of  the  High  Court  at  Allahabad.  The  seats  at Allahabad and at Lucknow may be changed in accordance with the provisions of the Order. Second, the Chief Justice of the High Court has no power to increase or decrease the areas in Oudh from time to time. The areas in Oudh have been determined once by the Chief Justice and, therefore, there is no scope for changing the areas. Third, the Chief Justice has power under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the Order to direct in his discretion that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be heard at Allahabad. Any case or class

Page 12

12

of cases are those which are instituted at Lucknow. The interpretation given by the High Court that the word "heard" confers powers on the Chief Justice to order that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be instituted or filed at Allahabad instead of Lucknow is wrong. The word "heard" means that cases which have already been instituted  or  filed at  Lucknow may in the  discretion of  the Chief Justice under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the Order be directed to be heard at Allahabad. Fourth, the expression "cause of action" with regard to a civil matter means that it should be left to the litigant to institute cases at Lucknow Bench or at Allahabad Bench according to  the  cause  of  action  arising  wholly  or  in  part  within either of the areas. If the cause of action arises wholly within Oudh areas then the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. Similarly, if the cause of action arises wholly outside the specified areas in Oudh then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action in part arises in the specified Oudh areas and part of the cause of action arises outside the specified areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame  the  case  appropriately  to  attract  the  jurisdiction  either  at Lucknow or  at  Allahabad.  Fifth,  a  criminal  case  arises where  the offence has been committed or otherwise as provided in the Criminal Procedure  Code.  That  will  attract  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  at Allahabad or Lucknow. In some cases depending on the facts and the provision regarding jurisdiction, it may arise in either place.”

18. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  has  strongly  relied  upon  the

decision of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar

Basu & Ors. [1994 (4) SCC 711} as follows :  

“12. Pointing out that after the issuance of the notification by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act, the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances and  hence  it  was  not  necessary  for  the  respondents  to  plead  the service of notice under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate direction  or  order  under  Article 226  for  quashing  the  notification acquiring the land.  This Court,  therefore,  held that  no part  of  the cause of  action arose within the jurisdiction of  the Calcutta  High Court.  This  Court  deeply  regretted  and  deprecated  the  practice prevalent  in the High Court  of exercising jurisdiction and passing interlocutory orders in matters where it lacked territorial jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the strong observations made by this Court in the aforesaid decision and in the earlier decisions referred to therein, we

Page 13

13

are distressed that the High Court of Calcutta persists in exercising jurisdiction even in cases where no part of the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction. It is indeed a great pity that one of the  premier  High  Courts  of  the  country  should  appear  to  have developed a tendency to assume jurisdiction on the sole ground that the  petitioner  before  it  resides  in  or  carries  on  business  from  a registered office in the State of West Bengal. We feel all the more pained that notwithstanding the observations of this Court made time and  again,  some  of  the  learned  Judges  continue  to  betray  that tendency. Only recently while  disposing of  appeals  arising out  of SLP Nos. 10065-66 of 1993, Aligarh Muslim University and Anr. v. Vinay  Engineering  Enterprises  (P)  Ltd.  and Anr.,  [1994  (4)  SCC 710] this Court observed:

“We are  surprised,  not  a  little,  that  the  High  Court  of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction.”

In that case, the contract in question was executed at Aligarh, the construction  work was  to  be  carried  out  at  Aligarh,  the  contracts provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction, the Arbitrator was appointed at Aligarh and was to function at  Aligarh and yet  merely because  the  respondent  was  a Calcutta based firm, it  instituted proceedings in the Calcutta High Court and the High Court exercised jurisdiction where it had none whatsoever. It must be remembered that the image and prestige of a Court  depends  on  how  the  members  of  that  institution  conduct themselves. If an impression gains ground that even in cases which fall outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, certain members of the Court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on the plea that some  event,  however  trivial  and  unconnected  with  the  cause  of action had occurred within the jurisdiction of the said Court, litigants would seek to abuse the process by carrying the cause before such members giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That would lower the dignity of the institution and put the entire system to ridicule. We are greatly  pained to  say  so  but  if  we  do  not  strongly  deprecate  the growing tendency we will, we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution and the system of administration of justice. We do hope that we will not have another occasion to deal with such a situation.”

19. Reliance has also been placed on National Textile Corporation Ltd.

& Ors. v. Haribox Swalram & Ors. [2004 (9) SCC 786] as follows :

Page 14

14

“10. Under clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court  is  empowered  to  issue  writs,  orders  or  directions  to  any Government, authority or person exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.  Cause of action as understood in the civil proceedings  means  every  fact  which,  if  traversed,  would  be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. To put it in a different way, it is the bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. In  Union of India v.  Adani Exports  Ltd.  [2002 (1)  SCC 567]  in  the  context  of  clause  (2)  of Article 226 of the Constitution, it has been explained that each and every fact pleaded in the writ petition does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the court’s  territorial  jurisdiction  unless  those  facts  pleaded  are  such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or dispute involved in the  case,  do  not  give  rise  to  a  cause  of  action  so  as  to  confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. A similar question was examined in State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties [1985 (3) SCC 217]. Here certain properties belonging to a company which had its registered office in Calcutta were sought to be acquired in Jaipur and a notice under Section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act was served upon the company at Calcutta. The question which arose for consideration was whether the service of notice at the head office of the company at Calcutta could give rise to a cause of action within the  State  of  West  Bengal  to  enable  the  Calcutta  High  Court  to exercise  jurisdiction  in  a  matter  where  challenge  to  acquisition proceedings conducted in Jaipur was made. It was held that the entire cause  of  action  culminating  in  the  acquisition  of  the  land  under Section  152  of  the  Rajasthan  Act  arose  within  the  territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court and it was not necessary for the company to plead the service of notice upon them at Calcutta for grant of appropriate writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution  for  quashing  the  notice  issued  by  the  Rajasthan Government under Section 52 of the Act. It was thus held that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.

x x x x x

12.1. As discussed earlier, the mere fact that the writ petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or that the reply to the correspondence made by it  was received at Calcutta is not an integral part of the

Page 15

15

cause  of  action  and,  therefore,  the  Calcutta  High  Court  had  no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and the view to the contrary taken by the  Division Bench cannot  be sustained.  In  view of  the above finding, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. However, in order to avoid any further harassment to the parties and to put an end to the litigation, we would examine the matter on merits as well.”

20. Reliance has also been placed with respect to jurisdiction of the High  

Court in the decision of this Court in Alchemist Ltd. & Anr. v. State Bank of  

Sikkim & Ors. [2007 (11) SCC 335] as follows :  

“20. It  may  be  stated  that  the  expression  “cause  of  action”  has neither  been  defined  in  the  Constitution  nor  in  the  Code  of  Civil Procedure, 1908. It may, however, be described as a bundle of essential facts necessary for the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed. Failure to prove such facts would give the defendant a right to judgment in his favour.  Cause  of  action  thus  gives  occasion  for  and  forms  the foundation of the suit.

x x x x x

22. For every action, there has to be a cause of action. If there is no cause of action, the plaint or petition has to be dismissed.

x x x x x

25. The  learned  counsel  for  the  respondents  referred  to  several decisions  of  this  Court  and submitted  that  whether  a  particular  fact constitutes a cause of action or not must be decided on the basis of the facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case.  In  our  judgment,  the  test  is whether a particular fact(s) is (are) of substance and can be said to be material, integral or essential part of the lis between the parties. If it is, it forms a part of cause of action. If it is not, it does not form a part of cause of action. It is also well settled that in determining the question, the  substance  of  the  matter  and  not  the  form  thereof  has  to  be considered.

x x x x x

38. In the present case, the facts which have been pleaded by the

Page 16

16

appellant  Company, in our judgment,  cannot be said to be essential, integral or material facts so as to constitute a part of “cause of action” within  the  meaning of  Article  226(2)  of  the Constitution.  The High Court,  in  our  opinion,  therefore,  was  not  wrong  in  dismissing  the petition.”

21. Reliance  was  also  placed  on  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Eastern

Coalfields Ltd. & Ors. v. Kalyan Banerjee [2008 (3) SCC 456] to the following

effect :

“13. In  view  of  the  decision  of  the  Division  Bench  of  the Calcutta High Court that the entire cause of action arose in Mugma area within the State of Jharkhand, we are of the opinion that only because the head office of the appellant Company was situated in the State of West  Bengal,  the same by itself will  not confer any jurisdiction  upon the  Calcutta  High Court,  particularly  when the head office had nothing to do with the order of punishment passed against the respondent.”

22. We have held that no part of the cause of action has arisen at Lucknow,

and it  was  not  the  function  of  Avas  Evam Vikas  Parishad to  demarcate  the

property  in  case  of  dispute  between  private  party  or  for  the  purpose  of

proceeding before the DRT and that the property was situated in the district of

Ghaziabad which is not under territorial jurisdiction of Bench at Lucknow. Thus,

the writ petition was not maintainable at Lucknow Bench.  

23. Apart from that, we find that there is no merit in the submission that the

Housing Board could have demarcated the land in exercise of powers within the

purview of section 15 of the Act of 1965. The objective of the Act of 1965 is to

tackle the housing and development problems of urban areas. The objective of

the Act is extracted hereunder :

Page 17

17

“Migration of people from rural to urban area, influx of displaced persons, increasing impact of the development activity generated by the Five Year Plans and several other factors have resulted in rapid increase of population in towns of this State. Construction of new houses and the planned development of towns has, however, not kept pace with this rapid increase of urban population. The efforts  in  this  direction  made  by  the  State  Government,  Nagar Mahapalikas,  Nagar  Palikas,  Improvement  Trusts,  Development Board and other Smaller Local Bodies have, for want of effective co-ordination and control, not met with the desired success. The said local bodies with their limited resources and know-how and due  to  other  factors  have  not  been  able  to  relieve  the  housing shortage and to undertake the requisite development of land. There are areas in this State with immense potentialities of development, but they still remain as they were a decade or so back. It is now considered  absolutely  essential  for  tackling  the  housing  and development  problems of  practically  all  the fast  growing urban areas,  and  areas  with  potentialities  of  development,  that  an autonomous  central  body  to  be  known  as  Housing  and Development  Board  be  created  for  the  whole  State.  A Comprehensive Bill,  called the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vidheyak has accordingly been prepared to provide for the establishment, incorporation and functioning of a Housing and Development  Board  in  this  State.  This  bill  is  being introduced accordingly.”  

24. The provisions of section 15 of Adhiniyam of 1965 have been relied

upon. Same are extracted below :

“15. Functions of the Board.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules and regulations,  the functions of the Board shall be—

(a) To frame  and  execute  housing  and  improvement  schemes  and  other projects;

(b)To plan and co-ordinate various housing activities  in the State and to ensure  expeditious  and  efficient  implementation  of  housing  and improvement schemes in the State;

(c) To provide  technical  advice  for  and  scrutinise  various  projects  under housing  and  improvement  schemes  sponsored  or  assisted  by  Central Government or the State Government;

(d)To assume management of such immovable properties belonging to the State  Government  as  may  be  transferred  or  entrusted  to  it  for  this purpose;

Page 18

18

(e) To maintain, use, allot, lease, or otherwise transfer plots, buildings and other properties of the Board or of the State Government placed under the control and management of the Board;

(f)           To organise and run workshops and stores for the manufacture and stockpiling of building materials;

(g)On such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between the Board and  the  State  Government,  to  declare  houses  constructed  by  it  in execution  of  any  scheme  to  be  houses  subject  to  the  U.P. Industrial Housing Act, 1955 (U.P. Act XXIII of 1955);

(h)To regulate building operations; (i)           To improve and clear slums; (j)          To provide roads, electricity, sanitation, water supply and other

civic amenities and essential services in areas developed by it; (k)To acquire movable and immovable properties for any of the purposes

before mentioned; (l)           To raise loans from the market, to obtain grants and loans from the

State Government, the Central Government, local authorities and other public  corporations,  and to  give  grants  and  loans  to  local  authorities, other  public  corporations,  housing  co-operative  societies  and  other persons for any of the purposes before mentioned;

(m)To  make  investigation,  examination  or  survey  of  any  property  or contribute  towards  the  cost  of  any  such investigation,  examination  or survey made by any local authority or the State Government;

(n)To levy betterment fees; (o)To fulfil any other obligation imposed by or under this Act or any other

law for the time being in force; and  (p)To do all such other acts and things as may be necessary for the discharge

of the functions before mentioned.

(2)  Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules and regulations, the  Board  may  undertake,  where  it  deems  necessary,  any  of  the following functions, namely –

(a) To promote research for the purpose of expediting the construction of and reducing the cost of buildings;

(b)To execute  works  in  the  State  on  behalf  of  public  institutions,  local authorities and other public corporations, and departments of the Central Government and the State Government;

(c) To supply and sell building materials; (d)To  co-ordinate,  simplify  and  standardise  the  production  of  building

materials  and to  encourage  and organise  the  prefabrication  and mass production of structural components;

(e) With a view to facilitating the movement of the population in and around any city, municipality, town area or notified area, to establish, maintain

Page 19

19

and  operate  any  transport  service,  to  construct  widen,  strengthen  or otherwise improve roads and bridges and to give financial help to others for such purposes;

(f)        To do all such other acts and things as may be necessary for the discharge of the functions before mentioned.”  

25. Chapter III of Adhiniyam of 1965 deals with the powers and functions

of the Board constituted under section 3. Section 15 deals with the functioning

of  the  Board  and  the  provisions  of  the  Act.  It  is  crystal  clear  from  the

provisions of section 15 that the power to make investigation, examination or

survey of any property is to be exercised by the Board in connection with its

functions enjoined in the Act. The power is not general in nature. Section 18

deals with types of housing schemes. Sections 19 to 27 deal in details with the

schemes provided in section 18(1)(a) to (i). Other sections 28 to 49 deal with

acquisitions, framing of schemes, its execution, transfer of property to Board,

streets, square etc.  

26. It  is  apparent  from the  scheme  of  the  Adhiniyam of  1965  that  the

provisions contained in section 15(1)(m) are not to be read in isolation but with

reference to the objectives of the Adhiniyam of 1965 and its functions relating

to housing and development issues.  

27. The  principle  of  noscitur  a  socii will  be  applicable  in  construing

Section 15 of the Act and the words “to make investigation, examination or

survey of any property” in section 15(1)(m) will take their meaning and colour

Page 20

20

from the other phrases employed in section 15(1). As held by this Court in

Rohit Pulp & Paper Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Baroda  [1990

(3) SCC 447] :

“12. The principle of statutory interpretation by which a generic word receives a limited interpretation by reason of its context is well established. In the context with which we are concerned, we can legitimately draw upon the “noscitur a sociis” principle. This expression simply means that  “the meaning of  a  word is  to  be judged by the company it keeps.” Gajendragadkar, J. explained the scope of the rule in  State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha [1960 (2) SCR 866] in the following words : (SCR pp. 873-74)

“This rule, according to Maxwell, means that, when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take as it were their colour  from  each  other,  that  is,  the  more  general  is restricted  to  a  sense  analogous to  a  less  general.  The same rule  is  thus  interpreted  in  “Words  and  Phrases” (Vol.  XIV,  p.  207).  “Associated  words  take  their meaning  from  one  another  under  the  doctrine  of noscitur  a sociis,  the philosophy of  which is  that  the meaning  of  a  doubtful  word  may  be  ascertained  by reference to the meaning of  words associated with it; such  doctrine  is  broader  than  the  maxim  ejusdem generis” In fact the latter maxim “is only an illustration or specific application of the broader maxim noscitur a sociis”. The argument is that certain essential features of attributes  are  invariably  associated  with  the  words “business and trade” as understood in the popular and conventional  sense,  and  it  is  the  colour  of  these attributes which is taken by the other words used in the definition  though  their  normal  import  may  be  much wider. We are not impressed by this argument. It must be borne in mind that noscitur a sociis is merely a rule of construction and it cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately used in  order  to  make  the  scope  of  the  defined  word correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of the legislature in associating wider words with words of

Page 21

21

narrower significance is doubtful, or otherwise not clear that  the  present  rule  of  construction  can  be  usefully applied. It can also be applied where the meaning of the words of wider import is doubtful, but, where the object of the legislature in using wider words is clear and free of ambiguity, the rule of construction in question cannot be pressed into service.”

This principle has been applied in a number of contexts in judicial decisions  where  the  court  is  clear  in  its  mind  that  the  larger meaning of the word in question could not have been intended in the context in which it has been used.”

28. The Trust has submitted an application for limited purpose of approval

of site plan of  housing society to Avas Evam Vikas Parishad which was not

pressed by it. The said application was not for the purpose of demarcation and

would not enure to the benefit of the Builder. The objective of builder in writ

petition was to get land demarcated as unencumbered.

29. For  the  purpose  of  demarcation  the  remedy  is  available  before  the

concerned authority under section 24 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006.

Section 24 of the Code is extracted below :

“24. Disputes regarding boundaries.- (1)  The Sub-Divisional Officer may, on his own motion or on an application made in this behalf  by  a  person  interested,  decide,  by  summary  inquiry,  any dispute regarding boundaries on the basis of existing survey map or, where the same is not possible, in accordance with the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, on the basis of such map.  

(2) If in the course of an inquiry into a dispute under sub-section (1),  the  Sub-Divisional  Officer  is  unable  to  satisfy  himself  as  to which party is in possession or if it is shown that possession has been obtained by wrongful dispossession of the lawful occupant, within a period of three months preceding the commencement of the inquiry, the Sub-Divisional Officer shall-  

(a)  in the first  case,  ascertain by summary inquiry who is  the

Page 22

22

person best  entitled  to  the  property, and shall  put  such person in possession.  

(b)  in  the  second  case,  put  the  person  so  dispossessed  in possession, and for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary an shall then fix the boundary accordingly.  

(3) Every proceeding under this section shall, as far as possible, be concluded by the Sub-Divisional Officer within six months from the date of the application.  

(4)  Any  person  aggrieved  by  the  order  of  the  Sub-Divisional Officer  may prefer  an appeal  before  the Commissioner  within 30 days of the date of such order. The order of the Commissioner shall be final.”

The  corresponding  provision  in  the  U.P.  Land  Revenue  Act,  1901  was

section 41.  The recourse to provision of the Adhiniyam of 1965 in such cases

was not available.

30. It was also submitted on behalf of the appellants that the agreement

which was entered into between the Trust and the Builder was required to be

registered under the provisions of the Registration Act as per Section 17 read

with section 49 of the Registration Act as applicable in U.P. and section 3 read

with  section  54  of  the  TP  Act.  We  decline  to  entertain  and  examine  the

submissions as it would not be proper to do so in the present proceedings and as

effect  of  non-registration  and  validity  of  registration  made  subsequently  has

been  questioned  in  Writ  Petition  [C]  No.38596/2013  pending  consideration

before the High Court of Allahabad. Thus, it is for the High Court to adjudicate

upon the aforesaid questions.

31. In view of the afore discussion,  we allow the appeals,  set  aside the

judgment  and  order  passed  by  the  Lucknow  Bench  of  the  High  Court  of

Allahabad, and dismiss the writ petition filed by the Builder – respondent No.1

Page 23

23

– with costs quantified at Rs.5 lakhs to be paid to the Supreme Court Legal

Services Committee, within a period of six weeks from today.

....................................CJI (H.L. Dattu)

....................................J. (S.A. Bobde)

New Delhi; ....................................J. May 15, 2015. (Arun Mishra)