MADAN Vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
Bench: P SATHASIVAM,RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI,RANJAN GOGOI
Case number: C.A. No.-010863-010863 / 2013
Diary number: 5545 / 2009
Advocates: SUDHANSHU S. CHOUDHARI Vs
ASHA GOPALAN NAIR
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10863 OF 2013 (Arising Out of SLP (C) No.9603 of 2009)
MADAN & ANR. ... APPELLANT (S)
VERSUS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ... RESPONDENT (S)
J U D G M E N T
RANJAN GOGOI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 09.O9.2008 passed by the High Court of Bombay at
Aurangabad holding the Reference made by the Collector
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under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) to be barred by
limitation. The High Court, accordingly, reversed the Award
dated 29.10.1993 passed by the Reference Court granting
enhanced compensation to the appellants. Aggrieved, this
appeal has been filed.
3. The brief facts of the case may be usefully recited as
hereunder:
Acquisition of a total area of 8 Hectares 40 Ares
covered by Survey No.49 situated at village Phule
Pimpalgaon in Taluka Majalgaon of Beed District was
initiated by a Notification under Section 4 of the Act which
was published in the gazette on 13.03.1980. No objection
under Section 5A of the Act was filed by any person
interested. Consequently, the Notification under Section 6 of
the Act was published on 18.04.1982 and an Award was
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passed on 16.08.1985 granting compensation at the rate of
Rs.50/-, Rs.65/- and Rs.75/- per Are respectively for different
categories of land classified as Grade I, II and III in the
Award. As there was a dispute with regard to the ownership
of the land, the Collector (Special Land Acquisition Officer)
referred the matter to the civil court for apportionment of
compensation under Section 30 of the Act. The Reference
under Section 30 made by the Collector which was
registered and numbered as L.A.R. No. 94/1985 came to be
disposed of by the learned Second Additional District Judge,
Beed on 4.9.1991 holding that the present appellants
(claimants 1 and 2) are entitled to compensation in respect
of 20 acres of the acquired land and the remaining parties
(claimants 3 to 7) for compensation in respect of remainder
of the acquired land.
4. It appears that after the order dated 4.9.1991 was
passed in the Reference under Section 30 of the Act, the
appellants received the compensation on 5.9.1991. Though
the precise date is not available, within six weeks from the
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date of the order dated 4.9.1991 the appellants sought a
Reference under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of
the compensation awarded. The aforesaid Reference which
was numbered as L.A.R. No. 75/1992 was decided by the
Second Additional District Judge, Beed by order dated
29.10.1993 enhancing the compensation amount by an
additional sum of Rs.2,10,000/- along with solatium, interest
etc. as due under different provisions of the Act.
5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Award dated 29.10.1993,
the State of Maharashtra filed an appeal before the High
Court questioning the enhancement of the compensation
awarded and also contending that the Reference made was
barred by limitation in view of the provisions of Section 18(2)
of the Act. The High Court by the impugned order dated
09.09.2008 decided the appeal only on the issue of limitation
by holding the same to be time barred. Accordingly, the
appeal filed by the State was allowed and the Award passed
by the Second Additional District Judge in L.A.R.No.75/1992
was reversed.
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6. We have heard Mr. Sudhanshu S. Choudhary, learned
counsel for the appellants and Mr. Anirudh P. Mayee, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-State.
7. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently
urged that from the materials placed on record it is evident
that the appellants did not participate in the enquiry leading
to the Award dated 16.08.1985 passed by the Land
Acquisition Collector. No notice of the Award under Section
12(2) of the Act was served on the appellants either. It is
pointed out that the appellants became entitled to receive
compensation under the Award only on 4.9.1991 i.e. the
date of the order of the court in the Reference made under
Section 30 of the Act. Such compensation was received by
the appellants on 5.9.1991. Thereafter, the application for
Reference under Section 18 of the Act was made within the
period of 6 weeks from the date of the order passed under
Section 30 of the Act. Relying on the decision of this Court
in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs. The Deputy Land
Acquisition Officer & Anr.1 learned counsel has urged that 1 AIR 1961 SC 1500
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the date of knowledge of the Award referred to in Section
18(2), in the present case, has to be understood to be
4.9.1991 i.e. the date of the order under Section 30 of the
Act. If that be so, according to the learned counsel for the
appellants, the High Court was clearly in error in holding the
Reference under Section 18 of the Act to be barred by
limitation. Another decision of this Court in Dr. G.H. Grant
Vs. The State of Bihar2 has been relied onto emphasize the
true purport of Sections 18 and 30 of the Act.
8. Controverting the submissions advanced on behalf of
the appellants, learned counsel for the State has contended
that the appellants having claimed to be the owners of the
land were at all times aware of the land acquisition
proceeding leading to the Award dated 16.08.1985 passed
by the Collector. According to the learned counsel for the
State, the appellants, therefore, should have sought a
Reference under Section 18 within the time prescribed by
Section 18(2). In this regard, learned counsel for the State
has pointed out that even under Section 18 of the Act it is 2 AIR 1966 SC 237
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open to an aggrieved party to seek a reference on the
question of apportionment of the Award. The Award in the
present case having been passed by the Land Acquisition
Collector on 16.08.1985, the Reference under Section 18 for
enhanced compensation made in the year 1991 is
inordinately delayed and the conclusion of the High Court to
the said effect is fully justified.
9. For ready reference it may be convenient to set out
hereinunder the provisions of Sections 18 and 30 of the Act:-
“18. Reference to Court.—(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken:
Provided that every such application shall be made,—
(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;
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(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire.”
“30. Dispute as to apportionment.—When the amount of compensation has been settled under section 11, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof, is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court.”
10. From the order dated 29.10.1993 passed in L.A.R. No.
75/1992, it is, inter alia, clear that there was a dispute
amongst the land owners (the appellants are one set of such
land owners) in respect of their respective shares in the
acquired land on account of which no apportionment of
compensation was made by the Collector who made a
Reference under Section 30 of the Act to the court. Further,
in the order dated 29.10.1993 it is recorded that the
appellants had no knowledge of the Award till the order
dated 4.9.1991 came to be passed in the Reference under
Section 30. In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra) this
Court has held that the expression “the date of the award”
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used in proviso (b) to Section 18(2) of the Act must be
understood to mean the date when the award is either
communicated to the party or is known by him either
actually or constructively. It was further held by this Court
that it will be unreasonable to construe the words “from the
date of the Collector’s award” used in the proviso to Section
18 in a literal or mechanical way. In the present case, it has
already been noticed that a finding has been recorded by
the Reference Court in its order dated 29.10.1993 that “the
petitioners had no knowledge about the passing of
the award till the date of payment of compensation
on 5.9.1991 because they were held entitled to
receive the compensation after the decision of
Reference under Section 30 dated 4.9.1991.”
11. What transpires from the above is that it is for the first
time on 4.9.1991 (date of the order under Section 30 of the
Act) that the appellants came to know that they were
entitled to compensation and the quantum thereof. It is not
in dispute that the Reference under Section 18 was made
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within 6 weeks from the said date i.e. 4.9.1991. In the
above facts, it is difficult to subscribe to the view taken by
the High Court to hold that the Reference under Section 18
was barred by limitation.
12. A cursory glance of the provisions of Sections 18 and 30
of the Act, extracted above, may suggest that there is some
overlapping between the provisions inasmuch as both
contemplate reference of the issue of apportionment of
compensation to the Court. But, a closer scrutiny would
indicate that the two Sections of the Act operate in entirely
different circumstances. While Section 18 applies to
situations where the apportionment made in the Award is
objected to by a beneficiary thereunder, Section 30 applies
when no apportionment whatsoever is made by the Collector
on account of conflicting claims. In such a situation one of
the options open to the Collector is to make a reference of
the question of apportionment to the Court under Section 30
of the Act. The other is to relegate the parties to the
remedy of a suit. In either situation, the right to receive
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compensation under the Award would crystallize after
apportionment is made in favour of a claimant. It is only
thereafter that a reference under Section 18 for enhanced
compensation can be legitimately sought by the claimant in
whose favour the order of apportionment is passed either by
the Court in the reference under Section 30 or in the civil
suit, as may be.
13. The decision of this Court in Dr. G.H. Grant Vs. The
State of Bihar (supra) would also support the above
conclusion. In the aforesaid case, an Award was made by
the Collector on 25.3.1952. On 5.5.1952, the owner applied
under Section 18 for a Reference to the court for
enhancement of the compensation payable to him. While
the matter was so situated, by notification dated 22.5.1952
issued under Section 3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 30 of
1950, the estate of the owner vested in the State. The
possession of the land was taken over on 21.08.1952 under
Section 16 of the Act. On 15.10.1952, a Reference under
Section 30 was sought on behalf of the State. After noticing
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the different situations in which the provisions of Sections 18
and 30 of the Act would apply, this Court proceeded to hold
the Reference sought by the State of Bihar under Section 30
of the Act to be competent in law on the ground that after
the award was passed by the Collector the land had vested
in the State by virtue of the notification dated 22.5.1952
under Section 3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. On a
logical extension of the principle laid down in Dr. G.H.
Grant Vs. The State of Bihar (supra) the State would have
been entitled in law to claim enhanced compensation under
Section 18 of the Act once its entitlement to
receive such compensation is to be decided in its favour
under Section 30. This is what has happened in the present
case.
14. For the reasons aforesaid, we hold that the High Court
had erred in allowing the appeal filed by the State and
reversing the order dated 29.10.1993 passed by the Second
Additional District Judge, Beed. The award of compensation
in the instant case having been made by the Collector as far
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back as in the year 1985 and the amount involved being
exceedingly small we have considered the basis on which
enhancement of compensation was made by the learned
Reference Court in its order dated 29.10.1993. On such
scrutiny, we do not find any error in the view taken by the
learned Reference Court. Therefore, in the peculiar facts of
the case, while allowing this appeal and setting aside the
order dated 09.09.2008 passed by the High Court we deem
it proper to restore the order dated 29.10.1993 passed by
the Second Additional District Judge in L.A.R. No.75 of 1995.
…………..….…………………CJI. [P. SATHASIVAM]
…….…….……..………………………J. [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI]
…….…….……..………………………J. [RANJAN GOGOI] NEW DELHI DECEMBER 06, 2013.
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