REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1507 OF 2007

M/s Sharma Transports               ………….. Appellant

Versus

The State of Maharashtra & Ors.   …………..Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1508 OF 2007

M/s Sangita Travel Agency & Ors.          …………..Appellants

Versus

The State of Maharashtra & Ors.          ……..Respondents

1

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1492 OF 2007

M/s N.T. Zameer Ahamed Khan Associates, Bangalore ……….. Appellant

Versus

The State of Maharashtra & Ors.   …………..Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1509 OF 2007

K. Srinivas       ………….. Appellant

Versus

The State of Maharashtra & Ors.   …………..Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1493 OF 2007

Southern Carriers, Bangalore       ………….. Appellant

Versus

The State of Maharashtra & Ors.   …………..Respondents

2

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1494 OF 2007

M/s. N.T. Zameer Ahamed Khan Associates, Bangalore & Anr.       ………….. Appellants

Versus

The State of Maharashtra & Ors.   …………..Respondents

WITH

WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 100 OF 2007

Ishwar Lal Sharma   ………….. Petitioner

Versus

State of Maharashtra & Ors.   …………..Respondents

WITH

WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 668 OF 2007

VRL Logistics Limited       ………….. Petitioner

Versus

State of Maharashtra & Ors.   …………..Respondents

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WITH

WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 566 OF 2009

Anand, Managing Director VRL Logistics Ltd.          ………….. Petitioner

Versus

State of Karnataka & Ors.   …………..Respondents

J U D G M E N T

H.L. Dattu, J.

1. These appeals and writ petitions are directed against the order  

of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.3 of  

1996  dated  21.07.2006,  whereby  the  High  Court  has  held  that  

transporters  (writ  petitioners  before  the  High  Court)  could  only  

provide luggage space at the rear or the sides of a tourist vehicle as  

mandated by Rule 128(9) of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989  

[hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  Rules”],  and no luggage  could  be  

carried on the roof of the vehicle. The prayer in the writ petitions is  

to direct the respondents therein not to check, levy and collect the  

compounding fee from the vehicles of the petitioners.

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2. The  transport  operators  [hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  

“transporters”] are in appeal by special leave before us, claiming that  

they have the right to carry luggage of the passengers on the roof of  

their vehicles.  In all, there are six appeals and three writ petitions  

before us, but for the sake of convenience, we will refer to the factual  

scenario in C.A. No. 1507 of 2007, as the same dicta will also be  

applicable to the rest of the matters.  

3. The transporters operate tourist vehicles between the States of  

Karnataka and Maharashtra and have been granted tourist permits by  

the State Transport Authority of Karnataka under Section 88 of the  

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 [hereinafter referred to as “the Act”].  The  

respondents, by their communication/circular dated 15.12.1995 had  

issued instructions to all the subordinate authorities under the Act to  

ensure that there was no luggage carried on the roof of the vehicles,  

as the same was not permissible under law. Due to this instruction,  

the checking authorities had started imposing and collecting fines to  

the tune of `1500/- for each entry and exit from the transporters for  

carrying goods on the roof of vehicles with tourist permits.  

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4. Aggrieved  by  this  imposition  and  collection  of  fine,  the  

transporters preferred a writ petition before the Bombay High Court  

inter-alia seeking the following relief/(s):

“i) Writ of  Mandamus or any other appropriate   Writ, Order or Direction and prohibit the 3rd and  4th Respondents  and  their  sub-ordinate  checking   officers from checking, levying and collecting the  compounding  fee  from  the  vehicles  of  the   Petitioners on the alleged offence of carriage of   goods on the top of the vehicle.

ii) A Writ in the nature of Certiorari or any other   appropriate  Writ,  Order,  Direction  and  quash  memo  receipts  issued  to  several  vehicles  of  the   Petitioners  vide  Annexure  ‘C’  produced  in  the   Writ Petition.

iii)  A  Writ  in  the  nature  of  Declaration  or  any  other  appropriate  Writ,  Order  or  Direction  and  direct  the  Respondent  not  to  levy  and  collect   illegal compounding fee for carriage of goods on  the top of the Petitioners vehicles as per the limits   prescribed.

iv) Direct the 3rd and 4th Respondents to refund the  compound  fee  already  collected  from  the   Petitioners.”

5. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissed the  

writ  petition holding that  by virtue  of  Rule  128 (9)  of  the Rules,  

luggage of the passengers could be stored only in the rear and side of  

the vehicle and not on the roof of the vehicle. The High Court held:

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“15…  The  specifications  are  aimed  at  securing   safety and security of the passengers so also the  luggage  and  thus  the  same  needs  to  be   meticulously adhered to. It has been stated in the   affidavit in reply that on account of the loading of   the  luggage  on  the  roof  of  the  vehicle  in  huge   quantities  or  weights,  unevenly  kept,  is  likely  to   result in exposing the vehicle to accidents and as   such the respondents insistence in not permitting  keeping of the luggage on the roof of the vehicles   is justified.

16. Having regard to the language used in sub   rule 9(i) which mandates that the luggage holds  shall be provided at the rear or at the sides or  both, what is intended is exclusion of the making   of  a  provision  for  luggage holds  at  any  other   place.  Sub  rule  9(i)  is  indicative  of  the   mandatory  nature  of  the  provisions  as  the  phraseology  used  is  “that  the  luggage  holds  shall be provided at the rear or at the sides or  both  of  the  tourist  vehicle…”.  ‘Shall’  is   ordinarily used to indicate the provisions to be   mandatory. It is also settled position of law that   if a provisions (sic.) requires a thing to be done   in a particular manner, it has to be so done, or   not at all. When the provision indicate place or   places where luggage holds are to be provided,   by  necessary  implication,  other  places  for   luggage holds stand excluded. In this view of the   matter we proceed to accept the interpretation  of  Rule  128(9)  as  contended  by  the  learned  counsel for respondents.  We are not accepting  the  submission  of  the  petitioner  that  in  the   absence  of  a  specific  restriction  in  regard  to  having luggage holds/carrier on the roof of the   vehicle the petitioners cannot be prevented from  carrying  the  goods/luggage on the  roof  of  the  vehicle. On the contrary we are of the clear view  that  luggage  has  to  be  stored  at  the  places   

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specifically permitted by sub rule 9(i) viz., at the   rear or at sides or both, but not the roof of the   vehicle.”  

6. The  transporters  are  represented  by  Shri.  Rakesh  Dwivedi,  

learned  senior  counsel,  and  Ms.  Madhavi  Divan,  learned  counsel  

appears for the respondent–State.  

7. The  learned  senior  counsel,  Shri.  Rakesh  Dwivedi,  submits  

that in Rule 128 (9), there is no express bar on carriage of luggage on  

the roof of the vehicles.   He states that the Rule requires that the  

transporters should provide space for the luggage of the passengers at  

the rear and the sides of the vehicle, but does not prohibit carrying  

the luggage on the roof of the vehicle. On the contrary, the learned  

senior  counsel  states  that  Rule  93,  which  regulates  the  overall  

dimensions  of  motor  vehicles,  by  virtue  of  Rule  128  (1),  gets  

incorporated  into  Rule  128.   Shri.  Dwivedi  pointed  out  to  the  

Explanations  to  sub-Rule  (3)  and  sub-Rule  (3A),  where  it  is  

expressly stated that any ladder provided for uploading luggage on  

the roof of a vehicle shall be excluded while calculating the “overall  

length” of the vehicle. He also refers to sub rule (4), (6A) and (8) of  

Rule 93.  In view of this, the learned senior counsel would contend  

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that in the absence of an express bar of carrying luggage on the roof  

of the vehicle, a vehicle could carry luggage on the roof of a vehicle.  

Shri.  Dwivedi  further  draws  our  attention  to  Rule  125C  and  the  

Automotive  Industry  Standards  Code  of  Practice  for  Bus  Body  

Design and Approval (“AIS specification” for short) to contend that  

there is no express prohibition from carrying luggage on the roof of  

the vehicle.  

8. Summing up the arguments, Shri Dwivedi would urge before  

us that on a conjoint reading of the Rules, it is clear that there was no  

prohibition for the transporters to carry luggage of the passengers on  

the roof of tourist vehicles.  It is also argued that such restriction of  

carrying the luggage on the roof of a vehicle unreasonably restricts  

the  right  of  the  transporters  to  carry  on  trade  or  business  which  

would be violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.  In aid of  

his  submissions,  Shri  Dwivedi,  learned  senior  counsel,  draws  our  

attention to a view taken by the Karnataka High Court.   

9. Per  contra,  Ms.  Madhavi  Divan,  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondent, states that Rule 128 (9) requires that sufficient space be  

provided at the rear and/or the sides of the vehicle. Ms. Divan lays  

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emphasis on the phrase “sufficient space and size” and contends that  

the transporter is required compulsorily to provide adequate space for  

the  luggage of  the  passengers  of  a  tourist  vehicle.  She states  that  

there is a limit on how much luggage a passenger can carry and such  

luggage must be stored only in the luggage compartment provided  

for in accordance with Rule 128 (9).  The learned counsel further  

submits that the incorporation of Rule 93 into Rule 128 is only for  

the purpose of complying with the dimensions of  the vehicle laid  

down in that Rule and the reference to the ladder for loading luggage  

on the roof is only for the purpose of excluding the length of the  

ladder, while calculating the overall dimensions of the vehicle, and  

does not, in any way, imply that a tourist vehicle may carry luggage  

on the roof of the vehicle.  She further states that Rule 128(9) is a  

special provision for tourist vehicles only and they would override  

any general provision like Rule 93, and that loading any luggage on  

the roof of a vehicle is detrimental to the balance of the vehicle and  

thereby the safety of the passengers inside the vehicle.  Ms. Divan  

also states  that  the transporters  are duty bound by Rule 128(9) to  

ensure  that  there  is  sufficient  space  to  house  the  luggage  of  the  

passengers and any plea of placing the extra luggage on the roof of  

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the vehicle due to insufficiency of space in the compartment at the  

rear and/or sides of the vehicle,  would itself  be a violation of the  

Rule.  By placing reliance on case laws, the learned counsel states  

that if something is provided for in a particular manner, then it must  

be done in that manner, or not at all. She further states that there is a  

clear distinction between luggage and goods as defined by Section  

2(13) of the Act, and that the real intention of the transporters by this  

appeal is to carry goods on the roof of the tourist vehicles, as is clear  

from their prayer in the writ petition before the High Court.  

Both the learned counsel have cited some case laws before us, which  

we will deal with, as and when required.  

10. The  issue  involved  is  whether  a  transporter  can  provide  

luggage carriers on the roof of his vehicle.

11. The transporters are the permit holders of the tourist vehicles.  

The vehicles  are registered as tourist  vehicles  and endorsement  is  

recorded on the Registration Certificate that tourist vehicle complies  

with all the requirements of Rule 128 of the Rules.  Section 2 of the  

Act  defines  the  meaning  of  the  expression  ‘contract  carriage’.  

Section 2(43) defines the meaning of the expression ‘tourist vehicle’  

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to mean a contract carriage, constructed or adapted and equipped and  

maintained  in  accordance  with  such  specifications  as  may  be  

prescribed  in  this  behalf.   Section  110  of  the  Act  authorizes  the  

Central  Government  to  make  rules  regulating  the  construction,  

equipment  and  maintenance  of  motor  vehicles  and  trailers  with  

respect to matters enumerated in Clause (a) to (p) of the Section.  In  

exercise  of  the  power  so  conferred,  the  Central  Government  has  

framed special provisions with respect to tourist vehicles other than  

motor cabs, etc.  Apart from others, it provides for specification for  

dimension and luggage holds for a tourist vehicle.  Rule 128(1), by  

way of incorporation, provides that the dimension of a tourist vehicle  

shall conform to the dimensions specified in Rule 93 of the Rules.  

Rule 128(9) provides that the luggage holds shall be provided at the  

rear or at the sides or both, of the tourist vehicle. The relevant portion  

of Rule 93 of the Rules is as under:

“Overall dimension 93. Overall dimension of motor vehicles.—(1) The  overall width of a motor vehicle, measured at right   angles  to  the  axis  of  the  motor  vehicle  between   perpendicular planes enclosing the extreme points,   134 shall not exceed 2.6 metres.  Explanation.—For purposes  of  this  rule,  a  rear- view mirror, or guard rail or a direction indicator   

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rub-rail  (rubber  beading)  having  maximum  thickness of 20 mm on each side of the body shall   not be taken into consideration in measuring the   overall width of a motor vehicle.  …… (3)  In  the  case  of  an  articulated  vehicle  or  a   tractor-trailer  combination  specially  constructed  and used for the conveyance of individual load of   exceptional length,—  (i) if all the wheels of the vehicle are fitted with   pneumatic tyres, or (ii)  if  all the wheels of the vehicle are not fitted   with pneumatic tyres, so long as the vehicle is not   driven at a speed exceeding twenty-five kilometers   per hour,  the  overall  length shall  not  exceed 18   metres. Explanation.—For  the  purposes  of  this  rule   "overall  length"  means  the  length  of  the  vehicle   measured between parallel planes passing through  the  extreme  projection  points  of  the  vehicle   exclusive of— (i) a starting handle; (ii) any hood when down; (iii) any fire-escape fixed to a vehicle; (iv)  any post office letter-box, the length of which   measured parallel to the axis of the vehicle, does not exceed 30 centimeters; (v) any ladder used for loading or unloading from  the roof of the vehicle or any tail or indicator lamp or number plate fixed to a   vehicle; (vi)  any  spare  wheel  or  spare  wheel  bracket  or   bumper fitted to a vehicle;

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(vii)  any towing hook or other fitment which does   not project beyond any fitment covered by clauses  (iii) to (vi). (3-A)The  overall  length  of  the  construction  equipment vehicle, in travel shall not exceed 12.75  metres: Provided  that  in  the  case  of  construction  equipment vehicle with more than two axles,  the  length shall not exceed 18 metres. Explanation.—For  the  purposes  of  this  sub-rule   "overall  length"  means  the  length  of  the  vehicle   measured  between  parallel  planes  through  the  extreme projection points of the vehicle, exclusive   of— (i) any fire-escape fixed to a vehicle; (ii)  any ladder used by the operator to board or   alight the vehicle; (iii)  any tail  or  indicator  lamp or  number plate   fixed to a vehicle; (iv)  any sphere wheel or sphere wheel bracket or   bumper fitted to a vehicle; (v) any towing hook or other fitments; (vi)  any operational attachment on front, rear or  carrier chassis of construction equipment vehicle   in travel mode. ……”

Rule 128(9) of the Rules is as under:

“…

(9) Luggage.—(i) Luggage holds shall be provided  at the rear or at the sides, or both, of the tourist   vehicle with sufficient space and size, and shall be  rattleproof,  dustproof and waterproof with safety   arrangements;

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(ii)  The  light  luggage  racks,  on  strong  brackets   shall  be  provided  inside  the  passenger   compartment running along the sides of the tourist   vehicle.  Except  where  nylon  netting  is  used,  the   under  side  of  the  rack  shall  have  padded  upholstery  to  protect  the  passengers  from  an  accidental hit. The general design and fitment of   the rack shall  be so designed as to avoid sharp   corners and edges.”

12. Chapter V of the Act relates to control of transport vehicles.  

Section 66 prescribes the necessity of a permit, without which, the  

vehicle cannot be used in any public place.  Section 84 deals with  

general  conditions  attaching  to  all  permits.   These  conditions  are  

deemed  to  be  incorporated  in  every  permit.  One  of  the  general  

conditions is that the vehicle is, at all times, to be so maintained as to  

comply  with  the  requirements  of  the  Act  and  the  Rules  made  

thereunder.  The authorities are empowered to cancel or suspend the  

permit on the breach of any of the general conditions specified in  

Section 84 or any other condition which is contained in the permit.  

Section  86  of  the  Act  lays  down  the  power  of  cancellation  and  

suspension of permit and Section 200 of the Act confers power on  

the  State  Government  that  it  may,  by  notification  in  the  official  

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gazette, specify the various compounding fees for the breach of the  

permit conditions.

13. Rule  128 (9)  is  a  special  provision  meant  for  laying  down  

specifications  for  a  tourist  vehicle.   The  sub-Rule  specifically  

provides  that  in  a  tourist  vehicle,  the  permit  holder  should  only  

provide luggage holds at the rear or at the sides or both, of the tourist  

vehicle with sufficient space and size.  When the Rules specifically  

make a provision in regard to the place where luggage holds shall be  

provided by necessary implication, it goes to exclude all the other  

places of the tourist vehicle for being used as luggage holds.  In our  

view, since the language of the Rule is clear and unambiguous, no  

other construction need be resorted to understand the plain language  

of the sub-Rule (a) of Rule 128 of the Rules.  Rule 128 is a special  

provision for tourist vehicles which excludes General Rule 93 to the  

extent of conflict between the former and the later.   

14. On a close examination of the argument on the incorporation  

of Rule 93 into Rule 128, we find that it is not the whole Rule 93 that  

is incorporated into Rule 128. On a plain reading of Rule 93 (3) and  

(3A), on which the transporters have heavily relied upon, it is clear  

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that these Sub-Rules are not applicable to tourist vehicles, as sub-

Rule (3) is applicable only to  “an articulated vehicle or a tractor-

trailer  combination  specially  constructed  and  used  for  the   

conveyance of individual load of exceptional length” and sub-Rule  

(3A) is applicable to  “construction equipment vehicle”.  Only sub-

Rule (1) of Rule 93, which is in reference to “a motor vehicle”, will  

be incorporated and read into Rule 128 by virtue of sub-Rule (1) of  

Rule 128.  In other words, the effect of Rule 128(1) with regard to  

the  conformation  to  the  dimensions  specified  in  Rule  93  are  

applicable to tourist vehicles and no other sub-Rule. Therefore, we  

are not inclined to agree with Shri Dwivedi that Rule 93 must be  

fully  incorporated  into  Rule  128,  thereby  implying  that  the  

transporters may load goods on the roof of a tourist vehicle due to the  

reference to a ladder to upload luggage found in sub-Rules (3) and  

(3A).  Both these sub rules specifically refer to vehicles that are for  

the purpose of carrying heavy loads and not for carrying tourists.  

15. The  cardinal  rule  of  interpretation  is  to  allow  the  general  

words to take their natural wide meaning unless the language of the  

Statute gives a different indication of such meaning and is likely to  

lead to absurd result, in which case their meaning can be restricted by  

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the application of this rule and they may be required to fall in line  

with the specific things designated by the preceding words.  When  

the language used in the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is the  

duty of the court to give effect to it.     

16. In  Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay,   

(2002) 4 SCC 297, this Court took the view:

“10. No words or expressions used in any statute   can  be  said  to  be  redundant  or  superfluous.  In   matters  of  interpretation  one  should  not   concentrate  too much on one word and pay too   little attention to other words. No provision in the   statute  and  no  word  in  any  section  can  be   construed in isolation. Every provision and every  word  must  be  looked  at  generally  and  in  the   context  in which it  is  used.  It  is  said that  every   statute  is  an  edict  of  the  legislature.  The  elementary  principle  of  interpreting  any  word   while considering a statute is to gather the mens  or  sententia  legis  of  the  legislature.  Where  the  words  are  clear  and  there  is  no  obscurity,  and  there  is  no  ambiguity  and  the  intention  of  the   legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope  for  the  court  to  take  upon  itself  the  task  of   amending or alternating the statutory provisions.   Wherever the language is clear the intention of the   legislature  is  to  be  gathered  from the  language  used. While doing so, what has been said in the   statute as also what has not been said has to be   noted.  The  construction  which  requires  for  its   support addition or substitution of words or which  results in rejection of words has to be avoided…”

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17. In  Bhavnagar  University  v.  Palitana  Sugar  Mill  (P)  Ltd.,  

(2003) 2 SCC 111, this Court held:

“24. True meaning of a provision of law has to be   determined on the basis of what it provides by its   clear language, with due regard to the scheme of   law.

25. Scope of the legislation on the intention of the   legislature cannot be enlarged when the language   of  the  provision  is  plain  and  unambiguous.  In  other words statutory enactments must ordinarily   be construed according to its plain meaning and  no  words  shall  be  added,  altered  or  modified  unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a   provision  from  being  unintelligible,  absurd,   unreasonable,  unworkable  or  totally   irreconcilable with the rest of the statute.”

18. In  the  case  of  Harshad  S.  Mehta  v.  State  of   

Maharashtra,(2001) 8 SCC 257, this Court opined:

“34. There is no doubt that if the words are plain   and simple and call for only one construction, that   construction  is  to  be  adopted  whatever  be  its   effect…”

19. In the case of Union of India v. Hansoli Devi,  (2002) 7 SCC  

273, this Court observed:

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“9…It is a cardinal principle of construction of a   statute  that  when  the  language  of  the  statute  is   plain and unambiguous, then the court must give   effect to the words used in the statute and it would   not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical   construction on the ground that such construction  is  more  consistent  with  the  alleged  object  and  policy of the Act…”

20. In the case of Patangrao Kadam v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Yadav  

Deshmukh,(2001) 3 SCC 594, this Court took the view:

“12. Thus when there is an ambiguity in terms of a   provision, one must look at well-settled principles   of construction but it is not open to first create an   ambiguity  which  does  not  exist  and  then  try  to   resolve  the  same  by  taking  recourse  to  some  general principle.”

21. In light of the above,  we are not inclined to agree with the  

submissions of the learned senior counsel for the appellants that Rule  

128 (9) does not place a prohibition on carrying of luggage on the  

roof  of  a  tourist  vehicle.   If  that  was  so,  it  would  have  to  be  

incorporated thus in the bare language of the provision. Since there is  

no ambiguity in the language of Rule 128 (9), there is no reason for  

us to read the same into the Rules.  

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22. In the case of Taylor v. Taylor, (1875-76) L.R. 1 Ch. D. 426,  

the Court took a view that if a particular method is prescribed for  

doing a certain thing by the Statute, it rules out any other method.  

This view has been adopted by the Privy Council in the case of Nazir  

Ahmed v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253. By this logic, we are  

inclined to accept the argument of Ms. Divan that the luggage of the  

passengers may only be stored in the compartments provided at the  

sides  and/or  at  the  rear  of  the  bus,  as  the  buses  are  mandated  to  

provide sufficient space for the storage of luggage.  

23. There  is  another  argument  advanced  on  behalf  of  the  

transporters  before  us,  who  claim  that  the  prohibition  to  carry  

luggage  of  the  passengers  on  the  roof  of  the  vehicle  is  an  

unreasonable restriction and, therefore, violative of Article 19(1)(g)  

of the Constitution.  In our view, the restriction imposed by the Rule  

is  a  reasonable  restriction  keeping  in  view  the  safety  of  the  

passengers in a tourist vehicle.  Therefore, the Rule cannot be said  

either arbitrary or unreasonable or violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the  

Constitution.  At the time of hearing of the appeals, reference was  

made to AIS specifications to contend that specification so provided  

support the interpretation given by the Karnataka High Court to Rule  

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128(a)  of  the  Rules.   In  our  view,  this  submission of  the  learned  

counsel for the appellants has no merit and is, therefore, rejected.

24. In the result,  the appeals  and writ  petitions fail.    They are  

dismissed.  Costs are made easy.

…………………………J.                                                                                       [ G. S. SINGHVI ]

             ……………………… …J.  

             [ H. L. DATTU ] New Delhi, August 02, 2011.

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