REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

REVIEW PETITION (C) NOS. 786-787 OF 2019  

IN  

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8442-8443 Of 2016

M/S SHANTI CONDUCTORS (P) LTD.       ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

ASSAM STATE ELECTRICITY  BOARD AND ORS.    ...RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 789 OF 2019  

IN  

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8450 Of 2016

M/S BRAHMAPUTRA CONCRETE  PIPE INDUSTRIES    ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE ASSAM STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD    ...RESPONDENT(S)

1

AND

REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 788 OF 2019  

IN  

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8445 Of 2016

M/S TRUSSES AND TOWERS (P) LTD.    ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

ASSAM STATE ELECTRICITY  BOARD AND ANR.                       ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

These review petitions have been filed against

the common judgment dated 23.01.2019 passed in Civil

Appeal Nos. 8442-8443 of 2016, Civil Appeal No.8450

of 2016 and Civil Appeal No.8445 of 2016, by which

all the Civil Appeals were dismissed, sought to be

reviewed  by  these  applications.  All  the  review

petitions filed have raised different grounds, which

need to be considered separately.

2

Review Petition (C) Nos. 786-787 of 2019    

2. To  consider  the  grounds  raised  in  the  review

petition, few facts need to be noticed.   

2.1 The  Assam  State  Electricity  Board,  the

respondent has issued two supply orders to

the  petitioner  dated  31.03.1992  and

13.05.1992 for supply of aluminium electrical

conductors.  Petitioner completed supply in

pursuance  of  the  above  supply  orders

beginning  from  June,  1992  till  04.10.1993.

The President of India to provide for and

regulate  payment  of  interest  on  delayed

payment to small scale industries issued an

Ordinance on 23.09.1992 namely “The interest

on  Delayed  Payments  to  Small  Scale  and

Ancillary Industrial Undertaking Ordinance”,

which subsequently became the Act namely “The

interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale

and  Ancillary  Industrial  Undertaking  Act,

1993  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “Act,

1993”)” w.e.f. 23.09.1992.   

3

2.2 A  Writ  Petition  (C)  No.  1351  of  1993  was

filed  by  Assam  Conductors  Manufacturers

Association on behalf of its five members,

which included M/s. Shanti Conductors Private

Limited also for realisation of its dues and

for seeking payment.  An interim order was

passed  by  the  Guwahati  High  Court  on

21.07.1993, in which the High Court observed

that  respondents  may  settle  with  the

outstanding bills of the petitioners.  The

respondent paid an amount of approx. Rs.2.15

Crores in instalments to the petitioner and

the last instalment of payment being made on

05.03.1994.  A Money Suit No.21 of 1997 was

filed by the petitioner in the Court of Civil

Judge  (Sr.  Division)  No.1  at  Guwahati  on

10.01.1997  for  a  decree  of  Rs.53,68,492.56

towards the interest only on the payment of

the principal amount, which had already been

received by the petitioner.

2.3 On 28.08.1997, Writ Petition (C) No.1351 of

1993  was  dismissed  observing  that  writ 4

petitioner  may  go  to  the  Civil  Court  for

realisation of its dues.   

2.4 The  trial  court  on  02.02.2000  decreed  the

money  suit  of  the  petitioner  for

Rs.51,60,507.42 with future interest @ 23.75%

on a monthly compounding basis.  RFA No.66 of

2000 was filed by the petitioner against the

judgment of the trial court.  The Division

Bench made a reference to the Full Bench for

answering  three  points  as  raised  by  the

counsel for the appellant.  Three-Judge Bench

answered the reference on 05.03.2002.  The

respondent filed Special Leave Petition (C)

No.  24577  of  2002,  which  was  subsequently

converted in Civil Appeal No.2351 of 2003.

This Court on 10.07.2012 dismissed the Civil

Appeal  No.2351  of  2003  [M/s.  Assam  State

Electricity Board Vs. M/s. Shanti Conductors

Pvt.  Ltd.]  alongwith  another  Civil  Appeal

No.2348 of 2003 [M/s. Purbanchal Cables and

Conductors  Pvt.  Ltd.  Vs.  Assam  State

Electricity Board].  After dismissal of the

5

above Civil Appeals, the Division Bench of

the High Court allowed the RFA No.66 of 2000

filed by the respondents and dismissed the

suit of the petitioner.   

2.5 Against the judgment of the Division Bench

dated 20.11.2012, Civil appeal Nos.8442-8443

of 2016 was filed by M/s. Shanti Conductors

(P) Ltd, the petitioner in the appeal.  Two

judgments  were  delivered  by  two  Hon’ble

Judges  with  two  divergent  opinion,  which

judgment is reported in (2016) 16 SCC Page

13.  The matter was referred to Three Judge

Bench, which heard all the appeals and vide

its judgment dated 23.01.2019 dismissed the

appeals.  

3. In the suit filed by the petitioners, one of the

questions,  which  was  framed  was  “Whether  the  suit

filed by the appellants is barred by limitation?”  In

paragraph 27 of the judgment dated 23.01.2019, Seven

question, which had arisen in these appeals have been

6

noticed.  Issue No.3 was “Whether money suit by M/s.

Shanti Conductors was barred by limitation?

4. Issue No.3 has been dealt from paragraphs 59 to

76 and we concluded in paragraph 76 that suit filed

by  M/s.  Shanti  Conductors  (P)  Ltd.  was  barred  by

time.    

5. Shri  Abhishek  Manu  Singhvi,  learned  senior

counsel appearing for petitioner submits that there

is an apparent error in the judgment dated 23.01.2019

in  holding  that  suit  was  barred  by  time.   He

submitted  that  according  to  admitted  facts  last

payment made by the respondent was on 05.03.1994 and

suit having been filed within three years, i.e., on

10.01.1997 was well within time.  It is submitted

that last supply having been completed on 04.10.1993

and even though three years period from 04.10.1993

had  lapsed,  but  the  payment  having  been  made  on

05.03.1994  by  the  respondents,  a  fresh  period  of

limitation shall be available to the petitioner as

per Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963.  It is

submitted that in the written submission, which was

7

submitted on behalf of the petitioner, reliance was

placed on Section 19 and further in earlier judgment

of  this  Court  reported  in  (2016)  15  SCC  13,  in

paragraph 53, Justice Gowda has answered the question

of limitation in favour of the appellant relying on

Section 13.  It is submitted that Section 19 escaped

the notice of this Court while answering the question

of limitation, which is an error apparent, need to be

corrected and it has to be held that suit was well

within  time.   Dr.  Singhvi  further  submits  that

petitioners were also entitled for benefit of Section

14 of the Limitation Act since Writ Petition No. 1351

of  1993  was  filed  in  the  High  Court  by  Assam

Conductors  manufacturers  Association,  of  which

petitioner  was  one  of  the  members,  which  writ

petition  came  to  be  dismissed  on  28.08.1997,  the

period  during  which  the  writ  petition  was  pending

consideration  ought  to  have  been  excluded  while

computing the limitation for money suit filed by the

petitioner. Dr. Singhvi submits that although in the

impugned judgment, this Court has considered claim of

petitioner of exclusion of time under Section 14 of

the Limitation Act but the benefit was erroneously 8

denied on the ground that writ petition was filed by

the Assam Conductors Manufacturers Association, which

is  a  different  entity  than  the  petitioner.   He

submits that the said view is apparently erroneous

and need to be corrected.  In the review petition,

apart from submissions of limitation, several other

grounds have been urged touching on the issues, which

have  been  considered  and  decided  in  the  judgment

dated 23.01.2019.   He sought to contend that Act,

1993  is  retroactive  and  further  any  outstanding

amount at the time of commencement of the Act ought

to attract interest under the Act, 1993.   

6. Shri  Vijay  Hansaria,  learned  senior  counsel

appearing for the respondents refuted the contentions

of  the  petitioner  and  submitted  that  there  is  no

error apparent on record.  The question on limitation

of  Suit  has  been  specifically  considered  and  this

court held that suit is barred by time. Arguments

made  on  the  strength  of  Section  14  has  been

specifically considered and rejected.  The petitioner

was not entitled for any benefit of Section 14 of the

Limitation  Act  since  Section  14  contemplates 9

exclusion  of  time  of  the  proceeding,  which  the

plaintiff  has  been  prosecuting  with  due  diligence.

He submits that plaintiff in the suit in question is

M/s. Shanti Conductors whereas petitioner in the writ

petition, which was filed in the Guwahati High Court

was association, which is a different entity and it

cannot be said that plaintiff of suit was the same

entity,  which  had  filed  the  writ  petition.   Shri

Hansaria further submits that against the dismissal

of the writ petition, a writ appeal was filed by the

Association, which writ appeal was also subsequently

dismissed by the Division Bench, which fact has been

concealed  by  the  petitioner.   When  against  the

judgment  of  learned  Single  Judge,  the  appeal  was

filed,  no  question  of  bonafide  prosecuting  the

earlier  proceedings  arises.   Shri  Hansaria  further

submits that for taking benefit under Section 19 of

the Limitation Act, there has to be specific pleading

and  proof  in  the  suit.   Plaintiffs  have  neither

pleaded any ground for claiming benefit under Section

19 nor proved the same in the suit, hence benefit of

Section 19 cannot be extended.  He further submits

that  for  taking  benefit  of  Section  19  of  the 10

Limitation Act, there has to be acknowledgment of the

payment, which is a question of fact required to be

pleaded and proved by the plaintiffs.   

7. Learned senior counsel for the parties have also

placed reliance on various judgments of this Court,

which  shall  be  referred  to  while  considering  the

submissions.  

8. We may first consider the grounds raised by the

petitioner  on  Section  19  of  the  Limitation  Act.

Although,  during  oral  submissions,  no  argument  was

raised on Section 19 of the Limitation Act, but the

question  being  of  limitation  of  the  suit,  we

permitted  the  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  to

advance their submissions.  

9. Section 19 of the Limitation Act is as follows:-

“19. Effect of payment on account of debt or of interest on legacy.—Where payment on account  of  a  debt  or  of  interest  on  a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy or by his agent duly authorised in this behalf, a fresh period  of  limitation  shall  be  computed from the time when the payment was made:  

11

Provided  that,  save  in  the  case  of payment of interest made before the 1st day of January, 1928, an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or  in  a  writing  signed  by,  the  person making the payment.  Explanation.—For  the  purposes  of  this section,—  

(a)  where  mortgaged  land  is  in  the possession  of  the  mortgagee,  the receipt  of  the  rent  or  produce  of such land shall be deemed to be a payment;  

(b) “debt” does not include money payable under a decree or order of a court.”

10. In  the  judgment  dated  23.01.2019,  it  has  been

held that the limitation of the suit filed by the

petitioner shall be governed by Article 113 of the

Limitation Act, 1963, which is three years from the

date when the right to sue accrues.  In paragraph 71

of the judgment, it has been held that last supply

was completed on 04.10.1993, thus, amount became due

on 04.11.1993 and the period of three years shall

start  running  from  04.11.1993  and  suit  filed  was

beyond three years.  The petitioners on the strength

of Section 19 contends that since the last payment

was made on 05.03.1994, a fresh period of limitation

12

shall begin from the fresh date, i.e., 05.03.1994 and

the suit filed on 10.01.1997 was well within time.

Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with bar

of limitation.  Section 3(1) is as follows:-

“3. Bar of limitation.—(1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed  period  shall  be  dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX”

11. The above provision makes it clear that in event,

a suit is instituted after the prescribed period, it

shall be dismissed although limitation has not been

set up as a defence. The Court by mandate of law, is

obliged to dismiss the suit, which is filed beyond

limitation even though no pleading or arguments are

raised to that effect.  The provisions of Sections 4

to 20 are exceptions when suit beyond the period of

limitation as prescribed in the Schedule shall not be

dismissed as required by Section 3.  In this context,

we need to refer to Order VII Rule 6 of the Civil

Procedure Code.  Order VII deals with plaint.  Order

VII Rule 6 contains a heading “Grounds of exemption

13

from  limitation  law”.   Order  VII  Rule  6  is  as

follows:-

“6. Grounds of exemption from limitation law. - Where the suit is instituted after the expiration of the period prescribed by the law of limitation, the plaint shall show the ground upon which exemption from such law is claimed:

Provided that the Court may permit the plaintiff to claim exemption from the law of limitation on any ground not set out in the  plaint,  if  such  ground  is  not inconsistent with the grounds set out in the plaint."

12. Order VII Rule 6 uses the words “the plaint shall

show the ground upon which exemption from such law is

claimed”.  The exemption provided under Sections 4 to

20 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are based on certain

facts  and  events.   Section  19,  with  which  we  are

concerned, provide for a fresh period of limitation,

which is founded on certain facts, i.e., (i) whether

payment on account of debt or of interest on legacy

is  made  before  the  expiration  of  the  prescribed

period  by  the  person  liable  to  pay  the  debt  or

legacy,  (ii)  an  acknowledgement  of  the  payment

appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed

14

by, the person making the payment.  We may notice the

judgment of this Court dealing with Section 20 of the

Limitation  Act,  1908,  which  was  akin  to  present

Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963.  In Sant Lal

Mahton Vs. Kamla Prasad and Others, AIR 1951 SC 477,

this Court held that for applicability of Section 20

of  the  Limitation  Act,  1908,  two  conditions  were

essential  that the payment must be made within the

prescribed  period  of  limitation  and  it  must  be

acknowledged by some form of writing either in the

handwriting of the payer himself or signed by him.

This Court further held that for claiming benefit of

exemption under Section 20, there has to be pleading

and proof.  In paragraphs 9 and 10, following has

been laid down:-

“9. It would be clear, we think, from the language of s. 20, Limitation Act, that to attract its operation two conditions are essential  :  first,  the  payment  must  be made  within  the  prescribed  period  of limitation  and  secondly,  it  must  be acknowledged  by  some  form  of  writing either  in  the  handwriting  of  the  payer himself or signed by him. We agree with the  Subordinate  Judge  that  it  is  the payment which really extends the period of limitation  under  s.  20,  Limitation  Act; but the payment has got to be proved in a particular way and for reason of policy the legislature insists on a written or

15

signed acknowledgment as the only proof of payment  and  excludes  oral  testimony. Unless, therefore, there is acknowledgment in  the  required  from,  the  payment  by itself  is  of  no  avail.  The  Subordinate Judge, however, is right in holding that while  the  section  requires  that  the payment should be made within the period of limitation, it does not require that the  acknowledgment  should  also  be  made within  that  period.  To  interpret  the proviso in that way would be to import into it certain words which do not occur there. This is the view taken by almost all the High Courts in India and to us it seems to be a proper view to take (See Md. Moizuddin v. Nalini Bala A.I.R. (24) 1937 Cal 284 : I.L.R. (1937) 2 Cal. 137; Lal Singh v. Gulab Rai 55 All 280, Venkata Subbhu v. Appu Sundaram 17 Mad. 92, Ram Prasad v. Mohan Lal A.I.R. (10) 1923 Nag 117 and Viswanath v. Mahadeo 57 Bom. 453.

10. …………………………………If the plaintiff's right of action is apparently barred under the Statute of limitation, O. 7, R. 6, Civil P.C.  makes  it  his  duty  to  state specifically in the plaint the grounds of exemption  allowed  by  the  Limitation  Act upon  which  he  relies  to  exclude  its operation; and if the plaintiff has got to allege  in  his  plaint  the  facts  which entitle him to exemption, obviously these facts must be in existence at or before the time when the plaint is filed; facts which come into existence after the filing of the plaint cannot be called in aid to revive a right of action which was dead at the date of the suit. To claim exemption under s. 20. Limitation Act the plaintiff must be in a position to allege and prove not  only  that  there  was  payment  of interest on a debt or part payment of the principal, but that such payment had been

16

acknowledged  in  writing  in  the  manner contemplated by that section…………………………”  

13. We need to notice as to whether the petitioners

in plaint have pleaded any exclusion of time under

Section 19 of the Act or not.  The plaint is filed as

Annexure P/2 in Civil Appeal Nos. 8442-8443 of 2016.

A perusal of the plaint indicates that there is no

pleading as to exception of limitation by running any

fresh period of limitation as per Section 19.  In

paragraph 10, the details of delivery challans have

been given, last challan being dated 04.10.1993 has

been  mentioned  by  which  supply  was  made.   In

paragraph 12, details of payments received have also

been  mentioned,  in  which  last  being  made  on

05.03.1994  has  been  mentioned,  but  for  the  last

payment made on 05.03.1994, there was no pleading of

an  acknowledgment  on  the  part  of  the  respondents,

which  could  result  in  start  of  fresh  period  of

limitation.  Further in paragraph 21, it has been

further  specifically  pleaded  that  provisions  of

Limitation Act do not apply in view of the provisions

contained in the Act, 1993 as because the Act, 1993

is having overriding effect over the Limitation Act 17

and all other Acts.  Paragraph 21 of the plaint is

referred to for ready reference:-

“21.  That  the  transaction  between  the plaintiffs  and  the  defendants  are  duly maintained by the plaintiffs in the Books of  Accounts  like  ledger,  Sale  Register etc., which are kept in the usual course of  the  business  of  the  plaintiffs  and those accounts between the plaintiffs and the defendants are in continuity and the interest payable by the defendants to the plaintiffs are carried over till date.  As such  the  suit  of  the  plaintiffs  is  in within  time.   Apart  from  that  the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply in view of the provisions contained in the Act, 1993 as because the Act of 1993 is having overriding effect over the Limitation Act and all other Acts.”  

14. There  being  no  specific  pleading  by  the

plaintiffs  claiming  any  start  of  fresh  period  of

limitation, there was no occasion for defendants to

raise any reply in reference to Section 19.  Shri

Abhishek  Manu  Singhvi,  learned  senior  counsel  has

relied on two judgments of this Court, which need to

be  noticed:  (i)  Jiwanlal  Achariya  Vs.  Rameshwarlal

Agarwalla, AIR 1967 SC 1118, and (ii) Kamla Devi and

Others Vs. Pt. Mani Lal Tewari and Others, (1976) 4

SCC 818.  In  Jiwanlal Achariya (supra), this Court

had occasion to consider Section 20 of the Limitation

18

Act, 1908, which was akin to present Section 19 of

the Limitation Act, 1963.  The Court was considering

the question as to what shall be the date of a post-

dated cheque, whether it shall be the date on which

cheque bears or the date the cheque is handed over to

compute the start of fresh period of limitation.  The

Court  held  that  the  date  which  post-dated  cheque

bears subject to payment by the bank shall be treated

as  a  date  for  start  of  the  fresh  period  of

limitation. In paragraph 8 of the judgment, it was

observed  that  the proviso  to  Section  20  shall  be

treated to be complied with for the cheque itself is

an acknowledgment of the payment in the handwriting

of the person giving the cheque. Paragraph 8 of the

judgment is as follows:-  

“8. This  brings  us  to  the  question  of limitation. The facts are not in dispute now. The promissory note was executed on February 4, 1954. On the same date a post- dated cheque bearing the date February 25, 1954 was given by the defendant-appellant to the plaintiff-respondent, the intention being that on being realised it would be credited  towards  part  payment.  It  was realised sometime after February 25, 1954 and was credited towards part payment, the appellant  himself  having  made  an endorsement admitting this part payment. But  it  is  contended  on  behalf  of  the appellant  that  as  the  post-dated  cheque

19

was given on February 4, 1954, that must be  held  to  be  the  date  on  which  part payment was made. It has been held by the High  Court  that  the  acceptance  of  the post-dated cheque on February 4, 1954 was not an unconditional acceptance. Where a bill or note, is given by way of payment, the  payment  may  be  absolute  or conditional, the strong presumption being in  favour  of  conditional  payment.  It followed  from  the  finding  of  the  High Court  that  the  payment  was  conditional i.e. that the payment will be credited to the person giving the cheque in case the cheque is honoured. In the present case the cheque was realised and the question is  what  is  the  date  of  payment  in  the circumstances of this case for the purpose of  Section  20  of  the  Limitation  Act. Section 20 inter alia lays down that where payment on account of debt is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt, a fresh period  of  limitation  shall  be  computed from the time when the payment was made. Where therefore the payment is by cheque and is conditional, the mere delivery of the cheque on a particular date does not mean that the payment was made on that date  unless  the  cheque  was  accepted  as unconditional payment. Where the cheque is not accepted as an unconditional payment, it can only be treated as a conditional payment. In such a case the payment for purposes of Section 20 would be the date on  which  the  cheque  would  be  actually payable at the earliest, assuming that it will be honoured. Thus if in the present case the cheque which was handed over on February 4, 1954 bore the date February 4, 1954 and was honoured when presented to the bank the payment must be held to have been made on February 4, 1954, namely, the date which the cheque bore. But if the cheque  is  post-dated  as  in  the  present

20

case it is obvious that it could not be paid till February 25, 1954 which was the date  it  bore.  As  the  payment  was conditional it would only be good when the cheque is presented on the date it bears, namely, February 25, 1954 and is honoured. The earliest date therefore on which the respondent could have realised the cheque which  he  had  received  as  conditional payment  on  February  4,  1954  was  25th February, 1954 if he had presented it on that date and it had been honoured. The fact that he presented it later and was then  paid  is  immaterial  for  it  is  the earliest date on which the payment could be made that would be the date where the conditional  acceptance  of  a  post-dated cheque  becomes  actual  payment  when honoured. We are therefore of opinion that as  a  post-dated  cheque  was  given  on February 4, 1954 and it was dated February 25, 1954 and as this was not a case of unconditional acceptance, the payment for the  purpose  of  Section  20  of  the Limitation Act could only be on February 25, 1954 when the cheque could have been presented at the earliest for payment. As in  the  present  case  the  cheque  was honoured it must be held that the payment was made on February 25, 1954. It is not in dispute that the proviso to Section 20 is complied with in this case, for the cheque itself is an acknowledgment of the payment in the handwriting of the person giving  the  cheque.  We  are  therefore  of opinion that a fresh period of limitation began on February 25, 1954 which was the date of the post-dated cheque which was eventually honoured.”

15. In the above case, in the plaint itself it was

noticed  that  although  the  promissory  note  was

21

executed  on  04.02.1954  and  the  suit  was  filed  on

22.04.1957 but the plaintiff had relied on payment of

a cheque on 25.02.1954 to bring the suit within time.

Paragraph  1  of  the  judgment  is  to  the  following

effect:-     

“Two questions of law arise in this appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Patna High Court. The facts which have been found by the High Court and which are necessary for our purposes may be briefly narrated. The appellant was the defendant in  a  suit  filed  by  the  plaintiff- respondent for recovery of money on the basis of a promissory note for Rs 10,000 executed  on  February  4,  1954  by  the defendant-appellant  in  favour  of  the plaintiff-respondent.  12  per  cent  per annum  interest  was  to  run  on  the promissory  note  which  was  payable  on demand or to the order of the plaintiff- respondent. The suit was filed on February 22,  1957  and  was  thus  obviously  beyond time from February 4, 1954. The plaintiff- respondent relied on a payment by cheque on February 25, 1954 to bring the suit within time.”

16. The judgment of this Court in  Jiwanlal Achariya

(supra) does not lay down that even without pleading

all  facts  for  claiming  start  of  fresh  period  of

limitation, the plaintiff is entitled for the benefit

of  Section  19.   The  next  judgment  relied  by  Shri

Singhvi is  Kamla Devi and Others (supra), in which

22

case, this Court was considering Section 19 of the

Limitation  Act,  1963.   This  Court  relied  on  an

acknowledgement of payment for holding that from the

date of acknowledgment of order period of limitation

shall  start.   In  paragraph  4  of  the  judgment

following has been laid down:-

“4. The last contention pressed was that the personal decree should not have been granted,  because  it  was  barred  by limitation. The basis for this contention is that the payment of Rs 25, which has been  acknowledged  on  the  registered mortgage  deed,  was  not  itself  by  a registered endorsement and, therefore, the plaintiff  was  entitled  to  a  period  of three years only, even if Section 19 may give an extension of limitation. We see no merit in this contention. The function of Section 19 is to provide a later date to count the period of limitation afresh, and that fresh period of limitation will be computed  from  the  time  when  the acknowledgement is signed. Nothing turns on whether the acknowledgement is itself registered or not. The office of Section 19 being to postpone the date of reckoning limitation and not to create a different substantive  period  of  limitation,  the latter  depends  upon  the  appropriate article  of  the  Limitation  Act  which applies to the suit. In this case, the mortgage document was registered and the personal  covenant  was  contained  in  the registered deed. Therefore, Article 116, which  gives  a  period  of  six  years, applies.  Thus,  the  fresh  period  of limitation will be six years and it has to be  counted  from  the  date  of acknowledgement, namely, August 31, 1940.

23

In this view, there in no merit in the plea  of  limitation  either.  This  is obviously  a  case  where  the  revisional court had missed a fact apparent upon the record and, therefore, thought it fit, in the exercise of its discretion to review its  judgment.  Justice  has  thereby  been furthered rather than frustrated. We are not here concerned with an endorsement on the  deed  as  constituting  a  cause  of action.”

17. The  above  judgment  noticed  the function  of

Section 19, which provides for a later date to count

the period of limitation afresh.   There cannot be

any dispute to the preposition as laid down by this

Court in above case.  

18. We may also notice the proviso of Order VII Rule

6, which has been added by Act 104 of 1976, which

provided that the Court may permit the plaintiff to

claim exemption from the law of limitation on any

ground not set out in the plaint, if such ground is

not  inconsistent  with  the  grounds  set  out  in  the

plaint.  The proviso of Order VII Rule 6 cannot come

to  the  rescue  of  the  plaintiff  since  as  noticed

above,  the  plaintiffs  have  specifically  pleaded  in

paragraph 21 that the provisions of the Limitation

24

Act are not applicable since Act, 1993 has overriding

effect.  The trial court in decreeing the suit of the

plaintiff has accepted the above submission and has

held that Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable.  

19. We may further notice that paragraph 24 of the

plaint, which is a paragraph of cause of action for

the  suit,  which  refers  to  date  beginning  from

31.03.1992 till 05.10.1993, i.e., the beginning from

the first supply order i.e., 31.03.1992 and date of

last  supply  order,  i.e.,  05.10.1993,  but  cause  of

action is not claimed from the date 05.03.1994, which

was the date when the last payment was received by

the petitioner.  The petitioner in the plaint has

clearly not pleaded for benefit of Section 19 nor has

brought  necessary  facts  to  enable  the  Court  to

consider the claim under Section 19.  We, thus, are

of  the  view  that  petitioner  is  not  entitled  for

benefit of Section 19 of the Limitation Act and there

is  no  error  in  the  judgment  of  this  Court  dated

23.01.2019 holding that the suit of the plaintiff was

barred by time.   

25

20. We may also notice few submissions of Dr. Singhvi

in  support  of  his  plea  that  the  petitioner  was

entitled for benefit of Section 14.  In our judgment

dated 23.01.2019, we have already taken the view that

benefit of Section 14 of Limitation Act cannot be

claimed by the plaintiff since writ petition, which

was filed by the Association was by different entity.

The question of benefit of Section 14 having been

specifically considered and rejected by this Court in

its judgment dated 23.01.2019, we do not find any

error apparent on the aforesaid ground.  Moreover,

present  is  a  case  where  writ  petition  filed  by

Association was dismissed on 28.08.1997 subsequent to

filing  of  the  suit  by  plaintiff  on  10.01.1997.

Furthermore, after the judgment of the learned Single

Judge  on  28.08.1997  Association  has  filed  a  writ

appeal  challenging  the  said  judgment,  which  facts

also  detracts  from  fulfilling  the  conditions  as

required for extending the benefit of Section 14 of

the Limitation Act.  

26

21. Insofar as other submissions of Dr. Singhvi that

Act, 1993 is retroactive in nature and further amount

due at the time of the commencement of the Act ought

to  attract  interest  of  the  Act,  1993,  all  these

submissions have been elaborately considered in the

judgment dated 23.01.2019, which have been considered

on merits.  The scope of review is limited and under

the guise of review, petitioner cannot be permitted

to reagitate and reargue the questions, which have

already  ben  addressed  and  decided.   The  scope  of

review has been reiterated by this Court from time to

time.  It is sufficient to refer the judgment of this

Court in Parsion Devi and Others Vs. Sumitri Devi and

Others,  (1997)  8  SCC  715,  wherein  in  paragraph  9

following has been laid down:-  

“9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record  justifying  the  court  to  exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and

27

cannot  be  allowed  to  be  “an  appeal  in disguise”.”

22. We,  thus,  do  not  find  any  merit  in  Review

Petition  (C)  Nos.  786-787  of  2019,  which  is

accordingly dismissed.  

Review Petition (C) No.789 of 2019

23. Shri Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned senior counsel in

support of the review petition contended that there

is  an  error  apparent  on  the  face  of  record  in

observation of the Court made in paragraph 85 of the

judgment. Some of the supplies have been made prior

to the commencement of the Act, 1993, i.e., prior to

23.09.1992.   It  is  submitted  that  some  of  the

supplies  were  made  after  23.09.1992,  hence  the

petitioner was entitled for the benefit of interest

under the Act, 1993.  He submits that in ground (b),

it  has  been  mentioned  that  details  of  supply  and

reason of corresponding details have been noticed by

the  trial  court  in  the  judgment  dated  30.09.2002

passed in Money Suit No.32 of 1996.  Reference has

been made to Annexure – P/3 at Page – 71 @ Page 88 of

28

Civil  Appeal  No.8450  of  2016.   We  have  perused

Annexure P/3, the judgment of the trial court dated

30.09.2002, our attention has been invited to page 88

of the judgment, where reference of 12 bills have

been made in the judgment, which is to the following

effect:-

“Stated  specifically,  it  is  the plaintiff’s  evidence  that  against  the supply  of  poles  to  the  defendants different divisions on receipt of orders from  the  defendants,  the  plaintiff submitted a number of twelve bills for the payment to the defendants to be reiterated as:

Sl. No.

Bill No. Date Gross Amount of Bill

1. BCPI/31/91/92 20.3.92 Rs.5,02,545.92 2. BCPI/32/91/92 20.3.92 Rs.2,99,541.65 3. BCPI/33/91/92 20.3.92 Rs.2,98,344.48  4. BCPI/3/92/93 7.4.92 Rs.4,67,928.48 5. BCPI/11/92-93 8.6.92 Rs.1,08,806.45 6. BCPI/12/92-93 8.6.92 Rs.2,48,459.90 7. BCPI/26/92-93 29.9.92 Rs.17,729.50 8. BCPI/27/92-93 - Rs.79,699.77 9. BCPI/28/92-93 - Rs.1,81,497.98 10. BCPI/29/92-93 - Rs.87,249.81 11. BCPI/30/92-93 - Rs.12,782.45 12. 5%  Security

Deposit Bill - Rs.23,738.00

Total Outstanding Amount

Rs.23,28,324.39

29

24. A  perusal  of  the  above  chart  given  in  the

judgment indicates that the date 29.09.1992 is a date

of bill for the payment for supply of the materials

by the plaintiffs.  In the judgment dated 23.01.2019,

we had observed that “there being nothing on record

to come to the conclusion that any supply was made

after the enforcement of the Act so as to enable the

appellant to claim interest under Section 3 read with

Section 4 of the Act, 1993, we are of the view that

judgment  of  the  High  Court  does  not  need  any

interference in this appeal”.                   

25. We, thus, do not find any merit in the submission

of the learned counsel for the appellant that there

is  error  apparent  on  the  face  of  record  in

observation of the Court made in paragraph 85 of the

judgment,  the  said  submission  is  rejected  and  the

Review Petition (C) No. 789 of 2019 is dismissed.   

Review Petition (C) No.788 of 2019

30

26. Shri  Basava  S.  prabhu  Patil,  learned  senior

counsel  appearing  for  the  petitioner  contends  that

this  Court  in  the  judgment  dated  23.01.2019  has

dismissed  the  appeal  of  the  petitioner  as  not

maintainable, which is an error apparent on record.

He submits that the appeal filed by the petitioner

being  Civil  Appeal  No.  8445  of  2016  against  the

review judgment of the High Court dated 19.03.2013

was maintainable.     

27. Shri  Patil  submits  that  in  the  judgment  dated

23.01.2019,  the  Issue  No.6  was  specifically  framed

regarding maintainability of the Civil Appeal No.8445

of  2016.   The  maintainability  of  the  appeal  was

specifically  considered  and  answered  in  paragraphs

80.  81  and  82  of  the  impugned  judgment.   The

submission  of  Shri  Patil  is  that  since  the  Civil

Appeal No.8445 of 2016 was against the judgment of

the  High  Court  dated  19.03.2013  by  which  review

petition was partly allowed by allowing interest @9%

p.a.,  against  which  judgment,  the  appeal  was

maintainable and withdrawal of earlier appeal by the

petitioner was not fatal.  The appellants were issued 31

two  supply  orders  dated  17.02.1992  and  17.03.1992.

The suit was filed on 16.05.1994 seeking decree with

interest,  which  trial  court  decreed.   Assam

Electricity  Board  filed  a  first  appeal,  which  was

allowed by the High Court holding that bills raised

by  the  appellants  were  cleared  by  the  Assam

Electricity Board prior to commencement of Act, 1993,

hence the appellant was not entitled for benefit of

Act, 1993.  Special leave petition filed against the

judgment  of  the  High  Court  dated  05.04.2001  was

permitted to be withdrawn by following order:-

“Learned counsel for the petitioner seeks leave  to  withdraw  the  special  leave petition.  He states that he will move the High Court in review stating that it has erred  in  recording  that  “all  the  bills were  paid  and  cleared  earlier  to  the commencement  of  the  Act.”   The  special leave petition is dismissed as withdrawn accordingly.”

28. After  the  aforesaid  judgment  of  this  Court

permitting  the  petitioner  to  withdraw  the  special

leave petition, a review petition was filed, which

was partly allowed on 19.03.2013.  A perusal of the

judgment dated 19.03.2013 indicates that the grounds

on which the petitioner prayed liberty to file review

32

was  not  proved  in  the  review  petition.   The  High

Court in the review judgment did not hold in favour

of  the  petitioner  that  he  was  entitled  for  the

benefit of Act, 1993 rather the High Court accepted

the submission of the petitioner that plaintiffs are

not debarred from claiming cost under Section 34 CPC,

Section 61 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 or Section

3 of the Interest Act, 1978 or in equity only on the

ground of principal amount.  The High Court granted

interest at the rate of 9% per annum.  The Civil

Appeal No. 8445 of 2016 has been filed against the

review  judgment  but  obviously  the  appeal  is  not

against the 9% interest granted to the petitioner.

Review judgment does not grant interest under Act,

1993 since the High Court in the review judgment did

not  interfere  with  the  earlier  finding  that

petitioner  is  not  entitled  for  benefit  under  Act,

1993.  The review on the ground on which liberty was

sought was in essence not accepted by the High Court

in its review judgment.  Moreover, in judgment dated

23.01.2019, the maintainability of appeal having been

considered and found against the petitioner, we do

not find any ground to review the petition. 33

29. In result, Review Petition (C) Nos. 786-787 of

2019, Review Petition (C) No. 789 of 2019 and Review

Petition (C) No. 788 of 2019 are dismissed.

......................J.                              ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )

......................J.                              ( S. ABDUL NAZEER )

......................J.                              ( NAVIN SINHA )

New Delhi,  December 18, 2019.        

34