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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.10745 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 22280 of 2011)

M/s. Paragon Rubber Industries            …Appellant  

VERSUS

M/s. Pragathi Rubber Mills & Ors.          

...Respondents

With

Civil Appeal No.10746 of 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C)  No. 33453 of 2011)

M/s.  Pragathi  Rubber  Mills  &  Ors.             …

Appellants  

VERSUS

M/s. Paragon Rubber Industries                

...Respondent

J U D G M E N T

SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.

1. Leave granted.

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2. This judgment shall dispose of C.A.No.10745 of 2013  

@ SLP (C)  No.22280 of 2011 and C.A.No. 10746 of  

2013 @ SLP (C) No.33453 of 2011. Both the appeals  

impugn the judgment of the High Court of Kerala at  

Ernakulam dated 15th March, 2011, rendered in Civil  

Revision Petition No.1417 of 2004.  

3. Since these are cross appeals,  the parties shall  be  

referred to as plaintiff and defendant. The facts at the  

centre of this controversy are as follows:

The  Plaintiff  is  engaged  in  the  business  of  

manufacturing and marketing of footwear since 1975,  

under  the  registered  trademark  for  which  it  also  

possesses  the  registered  copyright.  The  Plaintiff  is  

located in  Kerala.  The Defendant,  which is  located in  

Jalandhar,  Punjab,  also manufactures  and markets  its  

footwear under the registered trademark and copyright  

PRAGATI/PARAGATI with a device of lion.  

4.On 19th March, 2001,  the Plaintiff  filed a suit  being  

O.S. No. 2 of 2001 at District Courts in Kottayam, Kerala  

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against  the  defendants,  claiming  relief  under  the  

Copyright Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as “1957  

Act”) and the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958  

(hereinafter referred to as the “1958 Act”). The suit is  

pending in the trial court. The defendant filed I.A. No.  

322 of 2004, under order VII Rule XI CPC, with a prayer  

for rejection of plaint for want of territorial jurisdiction.  

The trial court dismissed the application on 22nd March,  

2004, with the observations that the issue of jurisdiction  

will  be  decided  at  the  final  stage  of  the  suit.  The  

defendant filed CRP No.363 of 2004 in the High Court  

against  the aforesaid  order.  The High Court  by order  

dated  16th June,  2004,  allowed  the  civil  revision  and  

directed  the  trial  court  to  determine  the  issue  of  

territorial jurisdiction afresh.              

5. In view of the aforesaid directions issued by the High  

Court, the trial court treated the issue with regard to  

the  jurisdiction  as  the  preliminary  issue.   Upon  

consideration  of  the  entire  matter  again  the  trial  

court in its order dated 6th October, 2004 held that it  

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has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit  in view of  

Section  62(2)  of  the  1957  Act.  The  petitioner  

challenged the aforesaid order in the High Court by  

filing C.R.P. No. 1417 of 2004.  The High Court, upon  

consideration  of  the  matter  has,  by  the  impugned  

order dated 15th March, 2011, held  as under:-

“The court  below held  in the order  impugned that  the suit as such is maintainable before the District  Court, Kottayam.  That finding is not correct in view  of  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme Court  referred  to  above.  Accordingly, the order passed by the court  below is set aside.  The plaintiff  is given liberty to  amend  the  plaint,  so  that  the  suit  will  be  maintainable before the District Court, Kottayam, in  the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme  Court  in  the  aforesaid  decisions.   When  an  application is filed for amendment of the plaint, the  court below shall consider the same on the merits,  after affording an opportunity of being heard to both  sides.

The Civil Revision Petition is allowed as above.”  

6.A perusal  of  the above shows that  the  High Court,  

having come to the correct conclusion that a composite  

suit would not be maintainable, has set aside the order  

passed by the trial  court. Thereafter, the Plaintiff has  

been given liberty to amend the plaint so that the suit  

will be maintainable before the District Court, Kottayam.  

The plaintiff aggrieved by the aforesaid order has filed  

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SLP (C) No.22280 of 2011 giving rise to C.A.No.10745 of  

2013.  

7.The defendant/petitioner in SLP (C) No. 33453 of 2011  

has challenged the impugned order on the ground that  

having  come to the  conclusion that  a  composite  suit  

under the 1957 Act and 1958 Act was not maintainable,  

the High Court erred in permitting the plaintiff to amend  

the plaint rather than rejecting the same on the ground  

of lack of jurisdiction.

8.We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.  

9.It is submitted by the learned counsel for the Plaintiff  

that the suit was maintainable before the District Judge,  

Kottayam  for  violation  of  the  copyright  in  view  of  

Section 62(2) of the 1957 Act, which permits the filing of  

the suit  at  the place where the plaintiff  resides.  It  is  

further submitted by the learned counsel that the High  

Court has wrongly held that a composite suit claiming  

relief under the 1957 Act and the 1958 Act would not be  

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maintainable.  Mr.  Siddhartha  Dave,  learned  counsel  

appearing  for  the  plaintiff  further  submitted  that  the  

relief claimed under the 1958 Act in the suit filed by the  

plaintiff under the 1957 Act was incidental to the relief  

claimed  under  the  1957  Act.  Such  a  composite  suit  

would  be  maintainable.  According  to  the  learned  

counsel, this Court in the case of  Dhodha House vs.  

S.K.Maingi  1     examined and  only partly answered the  

question as to whether a composite suit seeking relief of  

injunction under both the 1957 Act and the 1958 Act is  

maintainable when filed in the court where the plaintiff  

resides.  In  support  of  the  submissions made,  learned  

counsel relied on para 54 and 55 of the judgment.  

10. Learned  counsel  further  submitted  that  this  

Court  in  the  case  of  Dabur  India  Ltd.  Vs.  

K.R.Industries2 answered  the  question  as  to  what  

would be  meant  by a  composite  suit?  Answering  the  

aforesaid question, this Court has held that the ratio in  

the  case  of  Dhodha  House  (supra)  is  that  the  1  (2006) 9 SCC 41 2  (2008) 10 SCC 595

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provisions contained in Section 62(2) of the 1957 Act  

have been specially designed to confer an extra benefit  

upon the parties who were not in a position to initiate  

copyright proceedings in two different courts. In other  

words, it prescribes an additional ground for attracting  

the jurisdiction of the court over and above the normal  

grounds as laid down in Section 20 of the Code of Civil  

Procedure, 1908. Mr. Dave also pointed out that there is  

an  earlier  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Exphar  SA vs.  

Eupharma Laboratories Ltd.3  in which it has been  

held that a composite suit would be maintainable where  

the plaintiff resides in view of the provisions of the 1957  

Act.  In  Dabur  India’s  Case,  it  has  been  incorrectly  

observed that the case of  Exphar SA (supra) was not  

considered  in  Dhodha  House (supra).  Therefore,  

according  to  the  learned  counsel,  there  is  a  slight  

confusion and conflict between the decision in Exphar  

and Dhodha House on the one hand and Dabur case  

on  the  other.  It  is,  therefore,  submitted  that  the  

3  (2004) 3 SCC 688

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aforesaid  three  decisions  need  to  be  clarified  and  

referred to a larger bench.  

11. In the alternative, it is submitted that the relief  

claimed under the 1958 Act was only incidental to the  

relief claimed under the 1957 Act and such a composite  

suit would be maintainable in view of the ratio of law  

laid down in the case of Dhodha House Case as well as  

in  the  Dabur Case.  Additionally,  it  is  submitted  that  

under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, (hereinafter referred  

to as the ‘1999 Act’) the provisions similar to Section  

62(2) of the 1957 Act has been incorporated thereby  

conferring  the  jurisdiction  on  the  court  where  the  

plaintiff resides. In view of this provision, even though  

the Act was enforced with effect from 15th September,  

2003,  the  High  Court  ought  to  have  allowed  the  

proceedings  to  continue  in  Kottayam  rather  than  

truncating the suit, which would otherwise have to be  

partly tried in Kottayam and partly in Jalandhar.

12. On the other hand, the defendant submitted  

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that  the  suit  filed  by the  plaintiff  is  in  the  nature  of  

composite suit. It has been admitted by the plaintiff that  

the defendant’s goods are not available  in  Kottayam,  

nor do the defendant reside or carry on business within  

the jurisdiction of that Court. The plaintiffs have chosen  

to file the suit at Kottayam only on the ground that the  

jurisdiction  would  be  vested  in  the  District  Court  of  

Kottayam by virtue of Section 62(2) of the 1957 Act. It is  

further  submitted  that  the  reliance  placed  by  the  

plaintiff on the provisions contained in Section 134 of  

the 1999 Act is misplaced. The defendant also placed  

reliance  on  Section  159(4)  of  the  1999  Act  and  

submitted that the proceedings initiated under the 1958  

Act  would  be  governed  by  the  same  Act  

notwithstanding  the  provisions contained in  the  1999  

Act.           

13. We have considered the submissions made by  

the learned counsel for the parties. In our opinion, the  

issues raised in the present proceedings are no longer  

res integra  being covered by the ratio of judgments of  

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this Court in the case of  Dhodha House (supra) and  

Dabur India (supra).  

14.  It is not disputed before us that in the plaint  

itself it is pleaded as under :

“Though the defendants goods are not available in  Kottayam, nor do the defendants carry on business  and  reside  within  the  jurisdiction  of  this  Hon’ble  Court, yet this Hon’ble Court has the jurisdiction to  try and entertain this suit at Kottayam having regard  to the provisions of  Section 62(2) of  the Copyright  Act for the plaintiff carries on business and resides  within  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  this  Hon’ble  Court.”

15. The  aforesaid  averments  make  it  abundantly  

clear that even the plaintiff was aware that the court at  

Kottayam will  have no jurisdiction under the 1958 Act,  

but  tried to camouflage the  same by confusing it  and  

mixing it up or intermingling it with the relief contained  

under the 1957 Act.  From the averments made in the  

plaint,  it  is  apparent  that  the  plaintiff  had  filed  a  

composite suit.  Such a suit  would not be maintainable  

unless the court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit in  

relation to the entire cause of action and the entire relief.  

16. We  have  noticed  earlier  that  the  issue  is  no  

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longer res integra. The same issue has been examined in  

Dhodha House (supra).  In  paragraph  43,  this  Court  

formulated  the  question  for  consideration  which  is  as  

under:

“43. The  short  question  which  arises  for  consideration  is  as  to  whether  causes of  action  in  terms  of  both  the  1957  Act  and  the  1958  Act  although  may  be  different,  would  a  suit  be  maintainable  in  a  court  only  because  it  has  the  jurisdiction to entertain the same in terms of Section  62(2) of the 1957 Act?”

17. It was answered as follows :-

“44. A cause of action in a given case both under the  1957  Act  as  also  under  the  1958  Act  may  be  overlapping  to  some  extent.  The  territorial  jurisdiction conferred upon the court in terms of the  provisions  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  indisputably shall apply to a suit or proceeding under  the 1957 Act as also the 1958 Act. Sub-section (2) of  Section 62 of the 1957 Act provides for an additional  forum. Such additional forum was provided so as to  enable  the  author  to  file  a  suit  who  may  not  otherwise be in a position to file a suit at different  places where his copyright was violated. Parliament  while enacting the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act  in the year 1958 was aware of the provisions of the  1957 Act. It  still  did not  choose to make a similar  provision therein. Such an omission may be held to  be a conscious action on the part of Parliament. The  intention  of  Parliament  in  not  providing  for  an  additional  forum in  relation  to  the  violation  of  the  1958 Act is, therefore, clear and explicit. Parliament  while enacting the Trade Marks Act, 1999 provided  for such an additional forum by enacting sub-section  (2) of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act. The court  shall  not,  it  is  well  settled,  readily  presume  the  

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existence  of  jurisdiction  of  a  court  which  was  not  conferred  by  the  statute.  For  the  purpose  of  attracting the jurisdiction of a court in terms of sub- section  (2)  of  Section  62  of  the  1957  Act,  the  conditions  precedent  specified  therein  must  be  fulfilled,  the  requisites  wherefore  are  that  the  plaintiff must actually and voluntarily reside to carry  on business or personally work for gain.

For the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of a court  only because two causes of action joined in terms of  the  provisions  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  the  same would not mean that thereby the jurisdiction  can be conferred upon a court which had jurisdiction  to try only the suit in respect of one cause of action  and not the other. Recourse to the additional forum,  however, in a given case, may be taken if both the  causes of  action arise within the jurisdiction of the  court which otherwise had the necessary jurisdiction  to decide all the issues.”

18. This legal position has been reiterated in the  

case of Dabur India (supra) as under:-

“34. What then would be meant by a composite suit?  A  composite  suit  would  not  entitle  a  court  to  entertain  a  suit  in  respect  whereof  it  has  no  jurisdiction, territorial or otherwise. Order 2 Rule 3 of  the Code specifically states so and, thus, there is no  reason  as  to  why  the  same  should  be  ignored.  A  composite suit within the provisions of the 1957 Act  as considered in  Dhodha House1,  therefore,  would  mean the suit which is founded on infringement of a  copyright  and wherein  the  incidental  power  of  the  court is required to be invoked. A plaintiff may seek  a  remedy  which  can  otherwise  be  granted  by  the  court. It was that aspect of the matter which had not  been  considered  in  Dhodha  House  but  it  never  meant  that  two  suits  having  different  causes  of  action can be clubbed together as a composite suit.”

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19. We see no conflict in the ratio of law laid down  

in  the  aforesaid  two cases.  In  both the  cases,  it  has  

been  held  that  for  the  purpose  of  invoking  the  

jurisdiction of the court in a composite suit,  both the  

causes of action must arise within the jurisdiction of the  

court which otherwise had the necessary jurisdiction to  

decide all the issues. However, the jurisdiction cannot  

be conferred by joining two causes of action in the same  

suit when the court has jurisdiction to try the suit only in  

respect  of  one cause of action and not  the  other.  In  

Dabur India (supra) the ratio in  Dhodha House  has  

been explained. In Dhodha House, the law was stated  

in the following terms:

“54. For the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of a  court  only  because  two causes  of  action  joined  in  terms  of  the  provisions  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  the same would not mean that thereby  the jurisdiction can be conferred upon a court which  had jurisdiction to try only the suit in respect of one  cause of action and not the other. Recourse to the  additional forum, however, in a given case, may be  taken if  both the causes of  action arise within the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  which  otherwise  had  the  necessary jurisdiction to decide all the issues.

55. In this case we have not examined the question  as to whether if a cause of action arises under the  1957 Act and the violation of the provisions of the  

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Trade Marks Act is only incidental, a composite suit  will lie or not, as such a question does not arise in  this case.”

20. In our opinion, the aforesaid observation is self  

explanatory and need no further clarification. We also  

do not find any substance in the submission of Mr. Dave  

that there is any conflict between the law laid down in  

Dabur  (supra) and  Exphar SA (supra). In the case of  

Dabur  (supra),  this Court distinguished the judgment  

Exphar SA in the following terms :

“31. Exphar  SA cannot  be  said  to  have  any  application in the instant case. The question which  arose  for  consideration  therein  was  as  to  whether  the jurisdiction  of  a court  under  sub-section (2)  of  Section 62 of the 1957 Act is wider than that of the  court  specified  under  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  and thus a person instituting a suit having any claim  on the ownership of  the copyright  which has been  infringed, would not be a ground for holding that he  would not come within the purview of sub-section (2)  Section 62 of the 1957 Act, as he had been served  with  a  “cease and desist”  notice,  opining:  (SCC p.  693, para 13)

“13. It is, therefore, clear that the object  and reason for  the  introduction  of  sub- section  (2)  of  Section  62  was  not  to  restrict  the  owners  of  the  copyright  to  exercise their  rights but to remove any  impediment from their doing so. Section  62(2)  cannot  be  read  as  limiting  the  jurisdiction  of  the District  Court  only  to  cases  where  the  person  instituting  the  suit or other proceeding, or where there  

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are more than one such persons, any of  them actually and voluntarily resides or  carries  on  business  or  presently  works  for  gain.  It  prescribes  an  additional  ground for attracting the jurisdiction of a  court  over  and  above  the  ‘normal’  grounds as laid down in Section 20 of the  Code.”

32. There  cannot  be  any  doubt  whatsoever  that  Parliament having inserted sub-section (2) in Section  62  of  the  1957  Act,  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  thereunder  would  be  wider  than  the  one  under  Section 20 of the Code. The object and reasons for  enactment  of  sub-section  (2)  of  Section  62  would  also  appear  from the report  of  the  Committee,  as  has  been  noticed  by  this  Court  being  a  provision  which has been specially designed to confer an extra  benefit upon the authors who were not in a position  to instate copyright infringement proceeding before  the courts.  It  is in the aforementioned context  the  law laid down by this  Court  in para 13 of  Dhodha  House must be understood.

33. If  the impediment is sought  to be removed by  inserting  an  incidental  provision,  there  cannot  be  any  doubt  the  court  could  be  entitled  to  pass  an  interim  order,  but  the  same  by  no  stretch  of  imagination  can be extended to  a  cause of  action  which  is  founded  on  separate  set  of  facts  as  also  rights and liabilities of a party under a different Act.  In  Dhodha  House,  although  Exphar  Sa was  not  noticed, the distinction would be apparent from the  following: (Dhodha House case, SCC p. 56, paras 50- 51)

“50.  In  this  case,  the  Delhi  High  Court  could not have invoked its jurisdiction in  terms  of  the  1957  Act.  The  primary  ground upon which the jurisdiction of the  Original  Side  of  the  High  Court  was  invoked  was  the  violation  of  the  1958  Act,  but  in  relation  thereto,  the  provisions  of  sub-section  (2)  of  Section  62 of the 1957 Act could not be invoked.

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51. The plaintiff  was not a resident of Delhi. It has  not  been  able  to  establish  that  it  carries  on  any  business at Delhi. For our purpose, the question as  to  whether  the  defendant  had  been  selling  its  produce in Delhi or not is wholly irrelevant (sic). It is  possible that the goods manufactured by the plaintiff  are available in the market of Delhi or they are sold  in Delhi but that by itself would not mean that the  plaintiff carries on any business in Delhi.”

21.  We are, however, of the opinion that the High  

Court has correctly held that the provision contained in  

Section 134 of the 1999 Act, would not come to the aid  

of the plaintiff.  Although, the 1999 Act was enacted on  

30th December,  1999,  it  came  into  force  on  15th  

September,  2003  vide  S.O.  1048(E),  dated  15th  

September,  2003,  published  in  the  Gazette  of  India,  

Extra., Pt. II, Sec. 3(ii),                dated 15th September,  

2003.   Since  the  suit  in  this  case  was  filed  on  19th  

March, 2001, it  would be adjudicated under the 1958  

Act. The 1958 Act does not contain a provision similar to  

the provision contained in         Section 62(2) of the  

1957 Act. Parliament being aware of the provisions of  

the 1957 Act still did not incorporate the same in the  

1958 Act. Therefore, it can not be read into the 1958  

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Act  by  implication.  The  High  Court  had  correctly  

concluded that the suit of the plaintiff (appellant) was a  

composite one.

22. Having said this, we are still  not inclined to  

interfere with the order passed by the High Court  

permitting the plaintiff to amend the plaint.  The  

High Court was mindful of the fact that under the  

1999  Act,  a  composite  suit  could  be  filed  and  

would be maintainable by the Court at Kottayam.  

The Court was aware that the plaintiff has filed the  

suit on 19th March, 2001, but the 1999 Act was not  

enforced till 15th September, 2003. In our opinion,  

the High Court has passed the order in exercise of  

its discretionary powers taking into consideration  

the  entire  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case.  

The discretion exercised by the High Court can not  

be said to be either erroneous or perverse.  It has  

been  exercised  only  to  avoid  multiplicity  of  

litigation.  The defendant (respondent)  could not  

dispute  that  in  so  far  as  suit  predicated  on the  

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Copy Right is concerned, the Court at Kottayam is  

having  requisite  jurisdiction  in  view  of  the  

provisions of Section 62(2) of the Copy Right Act.  

Therefore, had the suit been filed for violation of  

copy  right  alone,  the  Court  at  Kottayam  could  

validly  entertain  the  same.   By  permitting  the  

plaintiff to amend the plaint so as that the suit will  

be  maintainable  before  the  District  Court,  

Kottayam,  no  error  was  committed  by  the  High  

Court.

23. In view of the observations made above, both  

the appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs.

 ...………………….….….J.  [Surinder Singh Nijjar]

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………………………….J. [A.K.Sikri]

New Delhi; November 29, 2013.

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ITEM NO.1A               COURT NO.9             SECTION XIA             S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A                          RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No.10745/2013 @  Petition(s)  for  Special  Leave  to  Appeal  (Civil)  No(s).22280/2011

M/S PARAGON RUBBER INDUSTRIES                  Petitioner(s)

                VERSUS

M/S PRAGATI RUBBER MILLS & ORS.                Respondent(s) WITH Civil Appeal No.10746/2013 @  SLP(C) NO. 33453 of 2011

Date: 29/11/2013  These matters were called on for      pronouncement of Judgment today.

For Petitioner(s)                      Mr. A. Raghunath,Adv.

Mr. Atul Jha, Adv. Ms. Divya Balasundaram, Adv. Mr. Sandeep Jha, Adv.

                    Mr. Dharmendra Kumar Sinha For Respondent(s)

Mr. Atul Jha, Adv. Ms. Divya Balasundaram, Adv. Mr. Sandeep Jha, Adv.

                    Mr. Dharmendra Kumar Sinha,Adv.

                    Mr. A. Raghunath

          UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following                                O R D E R  

Leave granted.

Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  Surinder  Singh  

Nijjar  pronounced  the  Judgment  of  the  Bench  

comprising  His  Lordship  and  Hon'ble  Mr.  

Justice A.K. Sikri.

For the reasons recorded in the signed  

Reportable  Judgment,  both  the  Appeals  are  

dismissed with no order as to costs.

(Vishal Anand) Court Master

(Indu Bala Kapur) Court Master

(Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)

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