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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1731   OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.5451 OF

2017)

M/S. METERS AND INSTRUMENTS PRIVATE LIMITED  & ANR.        …APPELLANTS

VERSUS KANCHAN MEHTA           ...RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1732   OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.5441 OF

2017)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1733   OF 2017  (ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.5449 OF

2017)

J U D G M E N T   

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1. Leave granted.   These appeals have been preferred against

the order dated 21st April, 2017 of the High Court of Punjab and

Haryana at Chandigarh in CRLM Nos.13631, 13628 and 13630 of

2017.  The High Court rejected the prayer of the appellants for

compounding  the  offence  under  Section  138  of  the  Negotiable

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Instruments Act, 1881 (the Act) on payment of the cheque amount

and in the alternative for exemption from personal appearance.   

2. When  the  matters  came  up  for  hearing  before  this  Court

earlier,  notice  was  issued  to  consider  the  question  “as  to  how

proceedings for an offence under Section 138 of the Act can be

regulated  where  the  accused  is  willing  to  deposit  the  cheque

amount.  Whether in such a case, the proceedings can be closed or

exemption granted from personal appearance or any other order

can be passed.”  The Court also appointed Mr. K.V. Viswanathan,

learned senior counsel to assist the Court as amicus and Mr. Rishi

Malhotra,  learned  counsel  to  assist  the  amicus.   Accordingly,

learned amicus has made his submissions and also filed written

submissions  duly  assisted  by  S/Shri  Rishi  Malhotra,  Ravi

Raghunath,  Dhananjay  Ray  and  Sidhant  Buxy,  advocates.   We

place  on  record  our  appreciation  for  the  services  rendered  by

learned amicus and his team.

3. Few Facts:   The  Respondent  Kanchan Mehta  filed  complaint

dated 15th July, 2016 alleging that the appellants were to pay a

monthly amount to her under an agreement.  Cheque dated 31st

March, 2016 was given for Rs.29,319/- in discharge of legal liability

but the same was returned unpaid for want of sufficient funds.   In

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spite of service of legal notice, the amount having not been paid,

the appellants committed the offence under Section 138 of the Act.

The  Magistrate  vide  order  dated  24th August,  2016,  after

considering  the  complaint  and  the  preliminary  evidence,

summoned the appellants.   The Magistrate in the order dated 9th

November,  2016  observed  that  the  case  could  not  be  tried

summarily as sentence of  more than one year may have to be

passed and be tried as summons case.  Notice of accusation dated

9th November, 2016 was served under Section 251 Cr.P.C.  

4. Appellant No.2, who is the Director of appellant No.1, made a

statement that he was ready to make the payment of the cheque

amount. However, the complainant declined to accept the demand

draft.  The case was adjourned for evidence.  The appellants filed

an application under Section 147 of the Act on 12th January, 2017

relying upon the judgment of this Court in  Damodar S. Prabhu

versus Sayed Babalal H.1 The application was dismissed in view

of  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  JIK  Industries  Ltd.  versus

Amarlal  versus  Jumani2 which  required  consent  of  the

complainant for compounding.  The High Court did not find any

ground to interfere with the order of the Magistrate.  Facts of other

two cases are identical.  Hence these appeals.   1  (2010) 5 SCC 663 2  (2012) 3 SCC 255

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5. We have heard  learned counsel  for  the parties  and learned

amicus  who  has  been  duly  and  ably  assisted  by  S/Shri  Rishi

Malhotra,  Ravi  Raghunath,  Dhananjay  Ray  and  Sidhant  Buxy,

advocates.  We proceed to consider the question.

6. The object of introducing Section 138 and other provisions of

Chapter  XVII  in  the  Act  in  the  year  19883 was  to  enhance  the

acceptability of cheques in the settlement of liabilities.  The drawer

of cheque is made liable to prosecution on dishonour of cheque

with safeguards to prevent harassment of honest drawers.   The

Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions)

Act, 2002 to amend the Act was brought in, inter-alia, to simplify

the procedure to deal with such matters.  The amendment includes

provision for service of summons by Speed Post/Courier, summary

trial and making the offence compoundable.   

7. This  Court  has  noted that  the object  of  the  statute  was  to

facilitate  smooth  functioning  of  business  transactions.   The

provision  is  necessary  as  in  many  transactions  cheques  were

issued merely as a device to defraud the creditors.  Dishonour of

cheque causes incalculable loss, injury and inconvenience to the

3  Vide the Banking, Public Financial  Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988

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payee and credibility of business transactions suffers a setback4.

At the same time, it was also noted that nature of offence under

Section  138  primarily  related  to  a  civil  wrong  and  the  2002

amendment specifically made it compoundable5.  The offence was

also described as ‘regulatory offence’.  The burden of proof was on

the accused in view of  presumption under Section 139 and the

standard of proof was of “preponderance of probabilities”6 .  The

object of the provision was described as both punitive as well as

compensatory.  The intention of the provision was to ensure that

the  complainant  received  the  amount  of  cheque  by  way  of

compensation.  Though proceedings under Section 138 could not

be treated as civil suits for recovery, the scheme of the provision,

providing  for  punishment  with  imprisonment  or  with  fine  which

could extend to twice the amount of the cheque or to the both,

made the intention of law clear.  The complainant could be given

not only the cheque amount but double the amount so as to cover

interest and costs.  Section 357(1)(b) of the Cr. P.C. provides for

payment of compensation for the loss caused by the offence out of

the  fine7.   Where  fine  is  not  imposed,  compensation  can  be

4  Goa Plast (P) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula  D’Souza (2004) 2 SCC 235 5  Vinay Devanna Nayak v. Ryot Sewa  Sahakari Bank Ltd.(2008) 2 SCC 305 6  Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441 7  R. Vijayan v. Baby (2012)  1 SCC 260

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awarded under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. to the person who suffered

loss.  Sentence in default can also be imposed.  The object of the

provision is not merely penal but to make the accused honour the

negotiable instruments8.

8.  In view of the above scheme, this Court held that the accused

could make an application for compounding at the first or second

hearing in which case the Court ought to allow the same.  If such

application is made later, the accused was required to pay higher

amount towards cost etc9.  This Court has also laid down that even if

the  payment  of  the  cheque  amount,  in  terms  of  proviso  (b)  to

Section 138 of the Act was not made, the Court could permit such

payment being made immediately after receiving notice/summons

of the court10.   The guidelines in Damodar (Supra) have been held

to be flexible as may be necessary in a given situation11.  Since the

concept of compounding involves consent of the complainant, this

Court  held  that  compounding  could  not  be  permitted  merely  by

unilateral payment, without the consent of both the parties.12

8  Lafarge Aggregates & Concrete India  (P) Ltd. v. Sukarsh Azad (2014) 13 SCC 779 9  Damodar S. Prabhu (supra) 10  (2006) 6 SCC 456, (2007) 6 SCC 555 11  Para 23 in Madhya Pradesh State Legal Services Authority  versus Prateek Jain and Anr.  (2014) 10 SCC 690 12  Rajneesh Aggarwal v. Amit J. Bhalla  (2001) 1 SCC 631

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9. While  the  object  of  the  provision  was  to  lend  credibility  to

cheque transactions, the effect was that it put enormous burden on

the  courts’  dockets.   The  Law  Commission  in  its  213th Report,

submitted on 24th November, 2008 noted that out of total pendency

of  1.8  crores  cases  in  the  country  (at  that  time),  38  lakh  cases

(about 20% of total pendency) related to Section 138 of the Act.

This Court dealt with the issue of interpretation of 2002 amendment

which was incorporated for simplified and speedy trials. It was held

that the said provision laid down a special code to do away with all

stages and processes in regular criminal trial13.  This Court held that

once  evidence  was  given  on  affidavit,  the  extent  and  nature  of

examination of such witness was to be determined by the Court.

The object of Section 145(2) was simpler and swifter trial procedure.

Only  requirement  is  that  the  evidence  must  be  admissible  and

relevant.  The affidavit could also prove documents14.  The scheme

of Sections 143 to 147 of the Act was a departure from provisions of

Cr.P.C.  and  the  Evidence  Act  and  complaints  could  be  tried  in  a

summary manner except where the Magistrate feels that sentence

of more than one year may have to be passed.  Even in such cases,

the procedure to be followed may not be exactly the same as in

Cr.P.C.   The expression “as far as possible” in Section 143 leaves 13  Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. v.  Nimesh B. Thakore(2010) 3 SCC 83, paras 25, 26 14  Para 41, ibid

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sufficient flexibility for the Magistrate so as not to affect the quick

flow of the trial process.  The trial has to proceed on day to day

basis  with  endeavour  to  conclude  the  same  within  six  months.

Affidavit of the complainant can be read as evidence.  Bank’s slip or

memo of  cheque  dishonour  can  give  rise  to  the  presumption  of

dishonour of the cheque, unless and until that fact was disproved.  

10. Again, this Court considered the matter in J.V. Baharuni and

Anr. etc.   versus  State of Gujarat and Anr etc.15 and observed

that the procedure prescribed for cases under Section 138 of the Act

was flexible and applicability of Section 326(3) of the Cr.P.C.  in not

acting on the evidence already recorded in a summary trial did not

strictly apply to the scheme of Section 143 of the Act16.  This Court

observed that the procedure being followed by the Magistrates was

not  commensurate  with  the  summary  trial  provisions  and  a

successor Magistrate ought not to mechanically order de novo trial.

This  Court  observed  that  the  Court  should  make  endeavour  to

expedite hearing of cases in a time bound manner.  The Magistrate

should make attempts to encourage compounding of offence at an

15  (2014) 10 SCC 494 16  Para 43 of J.V. Baharuni  (2014) 10  SCC 494

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early stage of litigation.  The compensatory aspect of remedy should

be given priority over the punitive aspect17.

11. While it is true that in Subramanium Sethuraman  versus

State of Maharashtra18 this Court observed that once the plea of

the  accused  is  recorded  under  Section  252  of  the  Cr.P.C.,  the

procedure contemplated under Chapter XX of the Cr.P.C. has to be

followed to take the trial to its logical conclusion, the said judgment

was rendered as per statutory provisions prior to 2002 amendment.

The  statutory  scheme  post  2002  amendment  as  considered  in

Mandvi Cooperative Bank and J.V. Baharuni (supra) has brought

about a change in law and it needs to be recognised.  After 2002

amendment, Section 143 of the Act confers implied power on the

Magistrate  to  discharge  the  accused  if  the  complainant  is

compensated to the satisfaction of the Court,  where the accused

tenders  the cheque amount  with  interest  and reasonable  cost  of

litigation  as  assessed  by  the  Court.  Such  an  interpretation  was

consistent with the intention of legislature.  The court has to balance

the rights of the complainant and the accused and also to enhance

access to justice.  Basic object of the law is to enhance credibility of

the  cheque  transactions  by  providing  speedy  remedy  to  the

17  Para 60 of J.V. Baharuni (2014) 10  SCC 494 18  (2004)13 SCC 324

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complainant without intending to punish the drawer of the cheque

whose  conduct  is  reasonable  or  where  compensation  to  the

complainant meets the ends of justice.  Appropriate order can be

passed by the Court in exercise of its inherent power under Section

143 of the Act which is different from compounding by consent of

parties.  Thus, Section 258 Cr.P.C. which enables proceedings to be

stopped in a summons case, even though strictly speaking is not

applicable to complaint cases, since the provisions of the Cr.P.C. are

applicable “so far as may be”, the principle of the said provision is

applicable to a complaint case covered by Section 143 of the Act

which contemplates applicability of summary trial provisions, as far

as possible, i.e. with such deviation as may be necessary for speedy

trial in the context.  

12. The sentence prescribed under Section 138 of the Act is upto

two years or with fine which may extend to twice the amount or with

both.  What needs to be noted is the fact that power under Section

357(3) Cr.P.C. to direct payment of compensation is in addition to

the said prescribed sentence, if sentence of fine is not imposed.  The

amount of compensation can be fixed having regard to the extent of

loss suffered by the action of the accused as assessed by the Court.

The  direction  to  pay  compensation  can  be  enforced  by  default

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sentence  under  Section  64  IPC  and  by  recovery  procedure

prescribed under Section 431 Cr.P.C.19

13.  This Court in  Indian Bank Association and Ors.  versus

Union of India and Ors.20 approved the directions of the Bombay

High Court, Calcutta High Court and Delhi High Court in  KSL and

Industries Ltd.  v.  Mannalal Khandelwal21, Indo International

Ltd.   versus State of  Maharashtra22, Harishchandra Biyani

versus  Stock  Holding  Corporation  of  India  Ltd.23,  Magma

Leasing  Ltd.   versus  State  of  W.B.24 and  Rajesh  Agarwal

versus State25 laying down simpler procedure for disposal of cases

under Section 138 of the Act.  This Court directed as follows:

“23. Many  of  the  directions  given  by  the  various  High Courts, in our view, are worthy of emulation by the criminal courts  all  over  the  country  dealing  with  cases  under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, for which the following directions are being given: 23.1. The  Metropolitan  Magistrate/Judicial  Magistrate (MM/JM), on the day when the complaint under Section 138 of the Act is presented, shall scrutinise the complaint and, if the complaint is accompanied by the affidavit, and the affidavit  and  the  documents,  if  any,  are  found to  be  in order, take cognizance and direct issuance of summons.

19  Hari Kishan v. Sukhbir Singh (1988) 4  SCC 551; Suganthi Suresh Kumar v. Jagdeeshan (2002) 2 SCC 420; K.A. Abbas H.S.A. v. Sabu Joseph (2010) 6 SCC  230; R. Mohan v. A.K. Vijaya Kumar (2012) 8 SCC 721; and Kumaran v. State of Kerala (2017) 7 SCC 471 20  (2014) 5 SCC 590 21  2005 Cri LJ 1201 (Bom) 22  2006 Cri LJ 208:  (2005) 44 Civil CC  (Bom) 23  (2006) 4 Mah LJ 381 24  (2007) 3 CHN 574 25  ILR (2010) 6 Del 610

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23.2. The MM/JM should adopt a pragmatic and realistic approach  while  issuing  summons.  Summons  must  be properly addressed and sent by post as well as by e-mail address  got  from  the  complainant.  The  court,  in appropriate cases, may take the assistance of the police or the nearby court to serve notice on the accused. For notice of appearance, a short date be fixed. If  the summons is received  back  unserved,  immediate  follow-up  action  be taken.

23.3. The court may indicate in the summons that if the accused  makes  an  application  for  compounding  of offences at the first hearing of the case and, if such an application  is  made,  the  court  may  pass  appropriate orders at the earliest.

23.4. The  court  should  direct  the  accused,  when  he appears to furnish a bail bond, to ensure his appearance during trial and ask him to take notice under Section 251 CrPC to enable him to enter his plea of defence and fix the case for defence evidence, unless an application is made by  the  accused  under  Section  145(2)  for  recalling  a witness for cross-examination.

23.5. The  court  concerned  must  ensure  that examination-in-chief,  cross-examination  and re-examination  of  the  complainant  must  be  conducted within three months of assigning the case. The court has option of accepting affidavits of the witnesses instead of examining  them  in  the  court.  The  witnesses  to  the complaint  and  the  accused  must  be  available  for cross-examination as and when there is direction to this effect by the court.

24. We,  therefore,  direct  all  the  criminal  courts  in  the country  dealing  with  Section  138  cases  to  follow  the abovementioned procedures for  speedy and expeditious disposal  of  cases  falling  under  Section  138  of  the Negotiable  Instruments  Act.  The  writ  petition  is, accordingly, disposed of, as above.”

14. We  may,  however,  note  that  this  Court  held  that  general

directions ought not to be issued which may deprive the Magistrate

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to exercise power under Section 205 Cr.P.C.26   We need to clarify

that the judgment of this Court is not a bar to issue directions which

do not affect the exercise of power under Section 205, to require

personal attendance wherever necessary.  Needless to say that the

judgment cannot be read as affecting the power of the High Court

under Article 225 of the Constitution read with Articles 227 and 235

to  issue  directions  to  subordinate  courts  without  affecting  the

prevailing statutory scheme.  

15. In  Bhaskar  Industries  Ltd.  versus  Bhiwani  Denim  &

Apparels Ltd.27, this Court considered the issue of hardship caused

in personal attendance by an accused particularly where accused is

located  far  away  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  where  the

complaint is filed.  This Court held that even in absence of accused,

evidence can be recorded in presence of counsel under Section 273

Cr.P.C. and Section 317 Cr.P.C. permitted trial to be held in absence

of accused.  Section 205 Cr.P.C. specifically enabled the Magistrate

to dispense with the personal appearance.    Having regard to the

nature  of  offence  under  Section  138,  this  Court  held  that  the

Magistrates  ought  to  consider  exercise  of  the  jurisdiction  under

26  TGN Kumar v. State of Kerala (2011) 2 SCC 772 27  (2001) 7 SCC 401

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Section  205  Cr.P.C.  to  relieve  accused  of  the  hardship  without

prejudice to the prosecution proceedings.  It was observed :

“15. These are days when prosecutions for the offence under Section 138 are galloping up in criminal  courts. Due to the increase of inter-State transactions through the facilities of the banks it is not uncommon that when prosecutions  are  instituted  in  one  State  the  accused might  belong  to  a  different  State,  sometimes  a  far distant  State.  Not  very  rarely  such accused  would  be ladies also. For prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act the trial should be that of summons case. When a magistrate feels that insistence of personal attendance of  the  accused  in  a  summons  case,  in  a  particular situation, would inflict enormous hardship and cost to a particular  accused,  it  is  open  to  the  magistrate  to consider  how  he  can  relieve  such  an  accused  of  the great  hardships,  without  causing  prejudice  to  the prosecution proceedings.”

16. It is, thus, clear that the trials under Chapter XVII of the Act are

expected normally to be summary trial.  Once the complaint is filed

which is accompanied by the dishonored cheque and the bank’s slip

and the affidavit, the Court ought to issue summons.  The service of

summons can be by post/e-mail/courier and ought to be properly

monitored.  The summons ought to indicate that the accused could

make specified payment by deposit in a particular account before

the  specified date and  inform the  court  and the  complainant  by

e-mail.  In such a situation, he may not be required to appear if the

court is satisfied that the payment has not been duly made and if

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the complainant has no valid objection.  If the accused is required to

appear, his statement ought to be recorded forthwith and the case

fixed  for  defence  evidence,  unless  complaintant’s  witnesses  are

recalled for examination.

17. Having regard to magnitude of challenge posed by cases filed

under Section 138 of the Act, which constitute about 20% of the

total number of cases filed in the Courts (as per 213th Report of the

Law Commission) and earlier directions of this Court in this regard, it

appears to be necessary that the situation is reviewed by the High

Courts and updated directions are issued.  Interactions, action plans

and monitoring are continuing steps mandated by Articles 39A and

21 of the Constitution to achieve the goal of access to justice28.  Use

of modern technology needs to be considered not only for paperless

courts but also to reduce overcrowding of courts.  There appears to

be  need to  consider categories  of  cases which can be partly or

entirely concluded “online” without physical presence of the parties

by simplifying  procedures  where seriously  disputed questions are

not required to  be adjudicated.  Traffic challans may perhaps be one

such category.  Atleast some number of Section 138 cases can be

decided online.  If complaint with affidavits and documents can be

filed online, process issued online and accused pays the specified 28  Hussain vs.  Union of India (2017)5  SCC 702

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amount online, it may obviate the need for personal appearance of

the complainant or the accused.  Only if the accused contests, need

for appearance of parties may arise which may be through counsel

and wherever viable,  video conferencing can be used.   Personal

appearances  can  be  dispensed  with  on  suitable  self  operating

conditions. This is a matter to be considered by the High Courts and

wherever viable, appropriate directions can be issued.  

18. From the above discussion following aspects emerge:

i) Offence under Section 138 of the Act is primarily

a civil wrong.  Burden of proof is on accused in

view  presumption  under  Section  139  but  the

standard  of  such  proof  is  “preponderance  of

probabilities”.  The same has to be normally tried

summarily  as  per  provisions  of  summary  trial

under the Cr.P.C. but with such variation as may

be  appropriate  to  proceedings  under  Chapter

XVII of the Act.  Thus read, principle of Section

258 Cr.P.C. will apply and the Court can close the

proceedings  and  discharge  the  accused  on

satisfaction  that  the  cheque  amount  with

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assessed costs and interest is paid and if there is

no reason to proceed with the punitive aspect.  

ii) The  object  of  the  provision  being  primarily

compensatory,  punitive  element  being  mainly

with  the  object  of  enforcing  the  compensatory

element, compounding at the initial stage has to

be encouraged but is not debarred at later stage

subject to appropriate compensation as may be

found acceptable to the parties or the Court.  

iii) Though  compounding  requires  consent  of  both

parties,  even  in  absence  of  such  consent,  the

Court,  in  the  interests  of  justice,  on  being

satisfied  that  the  complainant  has  been  duly

compensated,  can  in  its  discretion  close  the

proceedings and discharge the accused.

iv) Procedure for trial of cases under Chapter XVII of

the  Act  has  normally  to  be  summary.  The

discretion of the Magistrate under second proviso

to Section 143, to hold that it was undesirable to

try the case summarily as sentence of more than

one  year  may  have  to  be  passed,  is  to  be

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exercised after considering the further fact that

apart  from the  sentence  of  imprisonment,  the

Court  has  jurisdiction  under  Section  357(3)

Cr.P.C.  to  award  suitable  compensation  with

default sentence under Section 64 IPC and with

further  powers  of  recovery  under  Section  431

Cr.P.C.   With  this  approach,  prison sentence of

more than one year may not be required in all

cases.

v) Since evidence of the complaint can be given on

affidavit,  subject  to  the  Court  summoning  the

person giving  affidavit  and examining him and

the bank’s slip being prima facie evidence of the

dishonor  of  cheque,  it  is  unnecessary  for  the

Magistrate  to  record  any  further  preliminary

evidence.  Such affidavit evidence can be read as

evidence  at  all  stages  of  trial  or  other

proceedings.   The manner of examination of the

person giving affidavit can be as per Section 264

Cr.P.C.  The  scheme  is  to  follow  summary

procedure except where exercise of power under

second  proviso  to  Section  143  becomes

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necessary,  where  sentence  of  one  year  may

have  to  be  awarded  and  compensation  under

Section 357(3) is considered inadequate, having

regard to the amount of the cheque, the financial

capacity and the conduct of the accused or any

other circumstances.

19. In view of the above, we hold that where the cheque amount

with  interest  and  cost  as  assessed  by  the  Court  is  paid  by  a

specified  date,  the  Court  is  entitled  to  close  the  proceedings  in

exercise of its powers under Section 143 of the Act read with Section

258 Cr.P.C. As already observed, normal rule for trial  of cases under

Chapter  XVII  of  the Act  is  to  follow the summary procedure  and

summons trial procedure can be followed where sentence exceeding

one  year  may  be  necessary  taking  into  account  the  fact  that

compensation  under  Section  357(3)  Cr.P.C.  with  sentence  of  less

than one year will not be adequate, having regard to the amount of

cheque, conduct of the accused and other circumstances.  

20. In every complaint under Section 138 of the Act, it  may be

desirable that the complainant gives his bank account number and if

possible e-mail ID of the accused.  If e-mail ID is available with the

Bank  where  the  accused  has  an  account,  such  Bank,  on  being

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required, should furnish such e-mail ID to the payee of the cheque.

In every summons, issued to the accused, it may be indicated that if

the  accused  deposits  the  specified  amount,  which  should  be

assessed by the Court  having regard to  the cheque amount  and

interest/cost,  by  a  specified  date,  the  accused  need  not  appear

unless required and proceedings may be closed subject to any valid

objection of the complainant .  If the accused complies with such

summons and informs the Court and the complainant by e-mail, the

Court can ascertain the objection, if  any, of the complainant and

close the proceedings unless it becomes necessary to proceed with

the  case.   In  such  a  situation,  the  accused’s  presence  can  be

required, unless the presence is otherwise exempted subject to such

conditions  as  may  be  considered  appropriate.  The  accused,  who

wants  to  contest  the  case,  must  be  required  to  disclose specific

defence for such contest.  It  is  open to the Court to ask specific

questions  to  the  accused  at  that  stage.   In  case  the  trial  is  to

proceed, it  will  be open to the Court to explore the possibility of

settlement.   It  will  also  be  open  to  the  Court  to  consider  the

provisions of plea bargaining.  Subject to this, the trial can be on day

to  day  basis  and  endeavour  must  be  to  conclude  it  within  six

months.  The guilty must be punished at the earliest as per law and

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the one who obeys the law need not be held up in proceedings for

long unnecessarily.

21. It  will  be open to the High Courts to consider and lay down

category  of  cases  where  proceedings  or  part  thereof  can  be

conducted  online  by  designated  courts  or  otherwise.    The  High

Courts may also consider issuing any further updated directions for

dealing  with  Section  138  cases  in  the  light  of  judgments  of  this

Court.

The appeals are disposed of.  

It will be open to the appellants to move the Trial Court afresh

for any further order in the light of this judgment.

…………………………………..J.                           [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL]

…………………………………..J.        [UDAY UMESH LALIT]

NEW DELHI; OCTOBER 5, 2017.