REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5166 OF 2003

M/S GAMMON INDIA LTD. — APPELLANT

VERSUS

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,  MUMBAI

— RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

D.K. JAIN, J.:

1. This Civil Appeal, under Section 130-E(b) of the Customs Act, 1962  

(for short “the Act”), is directed  against order dated 4th April, 2003  

passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal,  

as it then existed,  (for short “the Tribunal”), in Appeal No. C/298/02-

Mum.  By the impugned order, the Tribunal has allowed the appeal  

preferred by the Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai, holding that the  

appellant is not entitled to claim the benefit of Exemption Notification  

No. 17/2001/Cus (General Exemption No. 121), issued by the Min-

istry of Finance, Government of India on 1st March, 2001.

2. Briefly stated, the facts, material for adjudication of the issue arising  

in this appeal, are as follows:

The appellant namely, M/s Gammon India Ltd. (for short “Gam-

mon”) and one M/s Atlanta Infrastructure Ltd., Mumbai, (for short “At-

lanta”) both incorporated as Public Limited Companies, entered  into a  

joint venture agreement on 18th September, 2000. The joint venture was  

named and styled as “Gammon Atlanta JV”.  The agreement was entered  

into for the purpose of submitting a bid to the National Highways Author-

ity of India (for short “NHAI”) for award of a contract for construction of  

31.40  Kilometers  of  road  on  National  Highway-5.   The  terms  of  the  

agreement, inter-alia, provided that: each of the said parties would share  

financial responsibilities in the form of guarantees, securities etc. to the  

extent of 50% of the project value; the venture would be managed by set-

ting up of a management board consisting of a Chairman and one Direc-

tor to be nominated by Gammon and a Joint Chairman and another Direc-

tor to be nominated  by  Atlanta. Although Gammon was to be designated  

as the lead partner to the venture but both the  companies were to be  

jointly and severally  liable to NHAI for due execution of the contract.  

3. The bid tendered by the said joint venture was accepted by NHAI and  

an  agreement  dated  20th December,  2000  was  executed  between  

NHAI, referred to as the “Employer” on the one part and M/s Gam-

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mon-Atlanta JV, referred to as the “contractor”, on the other part.  On  

behalf of Gammon-Atlanta JV, the agreement was signed by the repre-

sentatives of both the companies, i.e. Gammon and Atlanta.  

4. On 1st March, 2001, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section  

(1) of Section 25 of the Act,  the Central  Government,    issued the  

afore-noted Exemption Notification,  inter alia,  exempting the goods  

of the description specified in Column  (3) of the Table given thereun-

der, read with the relevant List appended thereto and falling within the  

Chapter, Heading no. or sub-heading no. of the First Schedule to the  

Customs Tariff Act, 1975, as specified in the corresponding entry in  

Column (2) of the said Table. Serial No. 217 of the said Table granted  

full exemption from basic Customs duty and additional Customs duty,  

on the goods falling under Chapter 84 specified in List 11, required for  

construction of  roads.  However,  the  said  exemption was subject  to  

certain conditions, enumerated in the said notification.  Condition No.  

38, relevant for this case, reads as follows:

“38.  If,- (a)     the goods are imported by-

(i) the ministry of Surface Transport, or  (ii) a person who has been awarded a contract  

for the construction of roads in India by or  on behalf of the Ministry of Surface Trans- port, by the National Highway Authority of  India, by the Public Works Department of a  State Government or by a road construction  

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corporation under the control of the Govern- ment of a State or Union Territory; or  

(iii) a person who has been named as a sub-con- tractor  in  the  contract  referred  to  in  (ii)  above for the construction of roads in India  by or on behalf of the Ministry of Surface  Transport, by the National Highway Author- ity of India, by Public Works Department of  a State Government or by a road construc- tion  corporation  under  the  control  of  the  Government of a State or Union Territory;

(b) the importer, at the time of importation, furnishes an  undertaking to the Deputy Commissioner of Customs  or  the  Assistant  Commissioner  of  Customs,  as  the  case may be, to the effect that he shall use the im- ported  goods  exclusively  for  the  construction  of  roads and that  he shall not sell or otherwise dispose  of the said goods, in any manner, for a period of five  years from the date of their importation; and  

(c) in case of goods of serial nos. 12 and 13 of List 11,  the  importer,  at  the  time  of  importation  of  such  goods, also produces to the Deputy Commissioner of  Customs or the Assistant Commissioner of Customs,  as the case may be, a certificate from an officer not  below the rank of a Deputy Secretary to the Govern- ment of India in the Ministry of Surface Transport  (Roads Wing), to the effect that the imported goods  are required for construction of roads in India.”  

5. It appears that the appellant approached NHAI for issue of the certifi-

cate, as contemplated in para (c) of Condition no.38, for import of one  

‘Concrete batching plant 56 cum/hr’ covered under Item No. 13 of  

List 11, referred to at Serial No. 217 in the said Exemption Notifica-

tion. Vide letter dated 3rd August, 2001 NHAI forwarded a Certificate,  

issued  by  the  Deputy  Secretary,  Government  of  India,  Ministry  of  

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Road Transport and Highways, addressed to  the Assistant Commis-

sioner of Customs, Mumbai, certifying that the said equipment was re-

quired for construction of roads and recommending its duty free im-

port.

6. Equipped with the said certificate, Gammon, the appellant  herein, im-

ported the specified Concrete Batching Plant from Germany and filed  

Bill of Entry (for home consumption) for its clearance at ‘nil’ rate of  

duty under Notification No.17/2001-cus, dated 1st March, 2001.  The  

Deputy  Commissioner  of  Customs,  by  his  order  dated  5th October,  

2001 rejected the claim of the appellant for exemption from payment  

of Customs duty on the ground that the appellant had failed to comply  

with the conditions stipulated at Serial No. 38 appended to the exemp-

tion notification.  According to the Adjudicating Authority, as per the  

said condition, the exemption is available only if the goods are import-

ed by “a person who has been awarded the contract” by NHAI for  

construction of roads in India by or on behalf of Ministry of Surface  

Transport, but in the present case the goods have been imported by  

Gammon to whom no contract had been awarded by the authorities  

specified in the notification. Admittedly, the contract had been award-

ed in the name of joint venture - M/s Gammon-Atlanta JV.  Thus, the  

adjudicating authority came to the conclusion that the appellant was  

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not entitled to the benefit of exemption notification in their capacity as  

a partner in the joint venture, to whom the contract had been awarded.

7. Aggrieved thereby the appellant preferred an appeal to the Commis-

sioner of Customs (Appeals).  The Commissioner (Appeals) was of  

the view that Gammon having been nominated as the lead partner in  

the  joint  venture  for  due  performance  of  the  contract  awarded  by  

NHAI, with authority to incur liabilities and to receive instructions for  

and on behalf of the joint venture, and the machine having been im-

ported on behalf of the joint venture for the purpose of road construc-

tion, the benefit of the said exemption notification could not be denied  

to the appellant.  Inter-alia,  observing that the appellant was not an  

outsider and perhaps due to some technical reasons the machine had  

been imported in the name of the appellant, the Commissioner held  

that outright denial of the benefit of the said notification was not war-

ranted.   Accordingly, he allowed the appeal.

8. Being dissatisfied with the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals),  

the revenue carried the matter in further appeal to the Tribunal.  As  

aforestated, by the impugned order the Tribunal has allowed the said  

appeal.  Distinguishing the case of New Horizons Limited & Anr. Vs.   

Union of India & Ors.1, relied on behalf of the importer, the Tribunal  1 (1995) 1 SCC 478

6

has come to the conclusion that the benefit of Exemption Notification  

cannot be availed of by a joint venture because it is nothing more than  

an association of two persons, having no identity in law. The Tribunal  

has gone on to observe that had such a bill of entry been filed even by  

a joint venture, the department would have  been justified in rejecting  

it on the ground that the identity of the real importer was not known.  

Aggrieved, Gammon is before us in this appeal.

9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

10. Mr. J.S. Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant,  

strenuously urged that in light of the decision of this Court in the case  

of  New Horizons  (supra), wherein the concept of a joint venture has  

been explained and the same has been subsequently followed in Gan-

pati RV-Talleres Alegria Track Private Limited  Vs.  Union of India  

& Anr.2, the view taken by the Tribunal is clearly erroneous.  It was  

contended that since a joint venture is a legal entity with all the trap-

pings of a partnership under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, the gen-

eral principles of the said Act were applicable to the joint venture and,  

therefore, any one of the two partners of the joint venture, viz. Gam-

mon and Atlanta was competent to import the subject machinery for  

and on behalf of the contractor viz. the joint venture for execution of  

2 (2009) 1 SCC 589

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the road project under contract between the joint venture and NHAI. It  

was argued that the eligibility certificate dated 3rd August 2001, issued  

by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, stating that the sub-

ject machine would be imported by the appellant herein, will sustain  

the eligibility of the joint venture in view of the law laid down by this  

Court in New Horizons (supra).  It was submitted that in view of an  

inclusive definition of the word “person” in the Export  and Import  

policy for the years 1997-2002, which includes a “legal person”, the  

import of machinery by the appellant for and on behalf of the joint  

venture is as good as an import by the joint venture who has been  

awarded the contract for construction of roads, thus fulfilling condi-

tion No.38 of the Exemption Notification.  Learned counsel asserted  

that since in identical fact situations in the cases of  IVRCL Infras-

tructures  &  Projects  Ltd.  Vs.  C.C.,  Chennai  (Sea)3 and  Techni   

Bharathi Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai-II4, when ma-

chinery for a road project was imported by one of the constituents’ of  

the joint venture, the benefit of the same Exemption Notification had  

been granted by the Tribunal.  It was argued that the said orders of the  

Tribunal having been accepted by the revenue, it cannot be permitted  

to take a different stand on the same point in the case of the appellant.  

Lastly, relying on the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Cus- 3 2004 (166) E.L.T. 447 (Tri.-Del.) 4 2006 (198) E.L.T. 33 (Tri.-Bang.)

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toms (Preventive), Mumbai Vs. M. Ambalal & Co.5, learned counsel  

submitted that a beneficial and promotional exemption notification has  

to be construed liberally.

11. Per contra, Mr. Harish Chander, learned senior counsel appearing on  

behalf  of  the  revenue,  supporting  the  decision  of  the  Tribunal,  

submitted that the joint venture and Gammon being two independent  

entities,  the  eligibility  certificate  dated  3rd August,  2001  issued  in  

favour of the latter was of no consequence in so far as the Exemption  

Notification was concerned  because the contract for construction of  

roads  had  not  been  awarded  to  Gammon,  who  had  imported  the  

machine but to the joint venture.   It was stressed that Gammon, on  

their own, were not entitled to import any goods for the execution of  

road works under the contract awarded to the joint venture by NHAI.  

Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Novopan India Ltd.,   

Hyderabad Vs. Collector of Central Excise & Customs, Hyderabad6,  

learned counsel contended that the Exemption Notification has to be  

construed strictly.  Responding to the  allegation of pick and choose  

policy adopted by the revenue, learned counsel urged that non-filing  

of an appeal in a similar case does not operate as a bar for the revenue  

to  prefer  an  appeal  in  another  case.   In  support,  learned  counsel  

5 (2011) 2 SCC 74: 2010 (260) E.L.T. 487 (S.C.) 6 1994 Supp (3) SCC 606

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commended us to the decision of this Court in C.K. Gangadharan &  

Anr. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Cochin7.  It was thus, assert-

ed that the decision of the Tribunal did not warrant any interference  

and the appeal deserved to be dismissed.

12. The short question for determination is whether import of the speci-

fied machine by Gammon can be considered  to be  an import “by a  

person who has been awarded a contract for construction of the roads  

in India”, so as to fulfill Condition No.38, laid down in Exemption  

Notification No.17/2001/Cus dated 1st March, 2001?

13. In order to appreciate the contentions advanced on behalf of the par-

ties on the question in issue, it would be expedient and useful to once  

again notice the salient features of agreement dated 18th September,  

2000 entered between Gammon and Atlanta.

14. Agreement  dated  18th September,  2000  provided  that:  financial  re-

sponsibilities of each of the parties to be shared equally in the form of  

guarantees, securities, etc. of the joint venture would be 50% of the  

project value; the Management of the joint venture would be subject to  

the overall control of the Management Board, consisting of a Chair-

man, to be nominated by Gammon, a Joint Chairman to be nominated  

by Atlanta and one Director each to be appointed by both of them;  

7 (2008) 8 SCC 739 : (2008) 228 ELT 497

1

joint venture bank account would be operated under joint signatures of  

the  authorized  representatives  of  Gammon  and Atlanta  and  neither  

party would be entitled to borrow for or on behalf of the joint venture  

or to acknowledge any liability without express prior consent in writ-

ing of the other party except to the extent of its share of work; Gam-

mon being most experienced party would  be the lead partner of the  

joint venture for the performance of the contract; the partner-incharge  

would be authorized to incur liabilities and to receive instructions for  

and on behalf of the partners of the joint venture, whether jointly or  

severally, and entire execution of the contract including receiving pay-

ment would  be carried out exclusively through the partner-incharge  

but any financial commitment required by the lead partner, on behalf  

of the joint venture, would always be previously discussed and agreed  

upon by the parties.  As stated above, though under agreement dated  

18th September, 2000, Gammon was notified as the lead partner but  

agreement dated 20th December, 2000 executed between NHAI as the  

“employer” and Gammon-Atlanta JV as “contractor” was signed by  

the representatives of both the companies viz. Gammon and Atlanta,  

meaning thereby that so far as NHAI was concerned, for them the con-

tractor was Gammon-Atlanta JV and not Gammon or Atlanta individ-

ually.

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15. According to the adjudicating authority, it was clear from both of the  

said agreements that the contract of construction of roads in India was  

awarded to the joint venture and, therefore, Gammon was not entitled  

to avail of the benefit of the Exemption Notification as an independent  

entity.  On the contrary, the Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the ben-

efit of the Exemption Notification to the appellant on the ground that  

the Exemption Notification should be given a liberal interpretation and  

that the revenue should not try to take advantage of ignorance of law  

and procedure on the part of Gammon.  It is the Tribunal which has  

dealt with the issue in detail by taking into consideration certain factu-

al aspects pertaining to the import of machine like placement of the  

supply orders by Gammon and not by the joint venture and its pay-

ment by Gammon from its own account and not from the joint venture  

account provided for in the joint venture agreement.   Rejecting the  

plea of the appellant that in light of the decision of this Court in New  

Horizons (supra) wherein it has been held that a joint venture is a le-

gal entity in the nature of a partnership, the import of the machinery  

by Gammon is to be considered as having been done on behalf of the  

joint venture, the Tribunal has allowed revenue’s appeal.

16. Since the stand of the appellant is that the issue arising in the present  

appeal stands concluded in their favour by the decision of this Court in  

1

New Horizons (supra) and a subsequent decision of this Court as also  

of the Tribunal,  in which the said decision has been relied upon, it  

would be necessary to discern the ratio of the decision in New Hori-

zons (supra).

17. In New Horizons (supra), a joint venture company, consisting of a few  

Indian  companies  (with  60% share  capital)  and  a  Singapore  based  

company (with 40% share capital), had participated in tender proceed-

ings floated by the Department of  Telecommunications for printing  

and binding of telephone directories of Delhi and Bombay.  The ten-

der submitted by  New Horizons Ltd; (for short “NHL”) was not ac-

cepted by the tender evaluation committee, apparently, on the basis of  

the fact that the successful party had more technical experience than  

any one of the constituent companies of NHL.  Aggrieved by the said  

decision, NHL filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court against the  

decision of the Department of Tele-communications.  The said writ  

petition was dismissed rejecting the plea of the NHL that the technical  

experience of the constituents  of  the joint  venture  was liable to be  

treated as that of the joint venture.  NHL brought the matter  to this  

Court.  Explaining the concept of joint venture in detail, it was held  

that a joint venture is a legal entity in the nature of a partnership en-

gaged in the joint undertaking of a particular transaction for mutual  

1

profit or an association of persons or companies jointly undertaking  

some commercial enterprise wherein all contributed assets and shared  

risks.  It was observed that a joint venture could take the form of a  

Corporation wherein two or more persons or companies might join to-

gether.  Accordingly, the appeal of NHL was allowed and it was held  

that it was a joint venture company in the nature of a partnership be-

tween the Indian group of companies and Singapore based company  

which had jointly undertaken the commercial venture by contributing  

assets and sharing risks.  Applying the principle of “lifting the corpo-

rate veil”, it was held that the joint venture companies’ technical expe-

rience could only be the experience of the partnering companies and  

the technical experience of all constituents of NHL was liable to be  

cumulatively reckoned in the tender proceedings and any one of the  

constituents was competent to act on behalf of the joint venture com-

pany.  Highlighting the concept of joint venture, the Court observed  

thus:

“24. The expression “joint venture” is more frequently used in  the United States. It connotes a legal entity in the nature of a  partnership  engaged  in  the  joint  undertaking  of  a  particular  transaction  for  mutual  profit  or  an  association  of  persons  or  companies  jointly  undertaking  some  commercial  enterprise  wherein  all  contribute  assets  and  share  risks.  It  requires  a  community of interest in the performance of the subject-matter,  a right to direct and govern the policy in connection therewith,  and duty, which may be altered by agreement, to share both in  profit  and losses.  (Black's  Law Dictionary,  6th Edn.,  p.  839)  

1

According  to  Words  and  Phrases,  Permanent  Edn.,  a  joint  venture is an association of two or more persons to carry out a  single business enterprise  for profit  (p.117,  Vol.  23).  A joint  venture can take the form of a corporation wherein two or more  persons  or  companies  may  join  together.  A  joint  venture  corporation has been defined as a corporation which has joined  with  other  individuals  or  corporations  within  the  corporate  framework in  some specific  undertaking commonly  found in  oil,  chemicals,  electronic,  atomic  fields.  (Black's  Law  Dictionary, 6th Edn., p. 342)………………..”  

18. In short, New Horizons (supra) recognises a joint venture to be a legal  

entity  in  the  nature  of  a  partnership  of  the  constituent  companies.  

Thus, the necessary corollary flowing from the decision in New Hori-

zons  (supra), wherein the partnership  concept in relation to a joint  

venture has been accepted, would be that  M/s Gammon-Atlanta JV,  

the joint venture could be treated as a ‘legal entity’, with the character  

of a partnership in which Gammon was one of the constituents.  In  

that view of the matter, the next question for consideration is whether  

being a legal entity i.e. a juridical person, the joint venture is also a  

“person” for the purpose of Condition No.38 of the Exemption Notifi-

cation, stipulating that the goods should be imported by “a person”  

who had been awarded a contract for construction of goods in India by  

NHAI?

19.In support of his submission that the joint venture is a “person” as  

contemplated in the Exemption notification, learned counsel for Gam-

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mon had relied on the definition of the word “person” as given in para  

3.37 of the Export and Import policy for the year 1997-2002.  It reads  

thus:

“3.37-“Person” includes an individual, firm, society,  company, corporation or any other legal person”.

20. The argument was that since a joint venture has been declared to be a  

legal entity in New Horizons (supra), it squarely   falls within the am-

bit of the said definition of the word “person”.  We are of the opinion  

that even if the stated stand on behalf of the appellant is  accepted,  

mercifully, on stark facts at hand, it does not carry their case any fur-

ther. Neither was it the case of the appellant either before the Adjudi-

cating Authority or before the Appellate Authority or before us, nor is  

it suggested by the documents viz. the supply order or the bill of entry,  

that the import of the machine was by or on behalf of the joint venture.  

On the contrary, the Tribunal has recorded in its order that when ques-

tioned, learned counsel for the appellant clarified that correspondence  

with the supplier of goods and placement of order had been done by  

Gammon and not by the joint venture or on their behalf. He also ad-

mitted that payment for the machine had not been made from the joint  

venture account, which had been provided for the contract but from  

the funds of Gammon.  

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21. Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that import of “Concrete batching  

plant 56 cum/hr” by Gammon cannot be considered as an import by  

M/s Gammon-Atlanta JV, “a person” who had been awarded contract  

for construction of the roads in India and therefore, neither Gammon  

Atlanta JV nor Gammon fulfill the requisite requirement stipulated in  

Condition No.38 of the Exemption Notification No. 17/2001/Cus dat-

ed 1st March, 2001.  

22. As regards the plea of the appellant that the Exemption Notification  

should receive a liberal construction to further the object underlying it,  

it is well settled that a provision providing for an exemption has to be  

construed strictly.  In  Novopan India Ltd.  (supra), dealing with the  

same  issue  in  relation  to  an  exemption  notification,  a  three-Judge  

Bench of this Court, stated the principle as follows:

“16. We are, however, of the opinion that, on principle, the  decision of this Court in Mangalore Chemicals— and in Union  of India v.  Wood Papers referred to therein — represents the  correct view of law. The principle that in case of ambiguity, a  taxing statute should be construed in favour of the assessee —  assuming that the said principle is good and sound — does not  apply  to  the  construction  of  an  exception  or  an  exempting  provision; they have to be construed strictly. A person invoking  an exception or an exemption provision to relieve him of the tax  liability must  establish clearly that  he is  covered by the said  provision. In case of doubt or ambiguity, benefit of it must go  to  the  State.  This  is  for  the  reason  explained  in  Mangalore  Chemicals and  other  decisions,  viz.,  each  such  exception/exemption  increases  the  tax  burden  on  other  members of the community correspondingly. Once, of course,  

1

the  provision is  found applicable  to  him, full  effect  must  be  given to it. As observed by a Constitution Bench of this Court  in  Hansraj Gordhandas v.  H.H. Dave that such a notification  has to be interpreted in the light of the words employed by it  and not on any other basis. This was so held in the context of  the principle that in a taxing statute, there is no room for any  intendment, that regard must be had to the clear meaning of the  words and that the matter should be governed wholly by the  language  of  the  notification,  i.e.,  by  the  plain  terms  of  the  exemption.”

23.Applying the above principles, we are of the opinion that since in the  

instant case the language of condition No.38 in the Exemption Notifi-

cation is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to the inter-

pretative process in order to determine whether the said condition is to  

be imparted strict or liberal construction.

24. Before parting, we wish to place on record our deep concern on the  

conduct of the two Benches of the Tribunal deciding appeals in the  

cases of  IVRCL Infrastructures & Projects  Ltd. (supra) &  Techni   

Bharathi Ltd.  (supra).   After noticing the decision of a co-ordinate  

Bench in the present case, they still thought it fit to proceed to take a  

view totally contrary to the view taken in the earlier judgment, thereby  

creating a judicial uncertainty with regard to the declaration of law in-

volved on an identical issue in respect of the same Exemption Notifi-

cation.  It needs to be emphasised that if a Bench of a Tribunal, in  

identical fact-situation, is permitted  to come to a conclusion directly  

1

opposed to the conclusion reached by another Bench of the Tribunal  

on earlier occasion, that will be destructive  of the institutional integri-

ty itself.  What is important is the Tribunal as an institution and not the  

personality of the members constituting it. If a Bench of the Tribunal  

wishes  to  take  a  view different  from the  one  taken  by  the  earlier  

Bench, the propriety demands that it should place the matter before  

the President of the Tribunal so that the case is referred to a larger  

Bench, for which provision exists in the Act itself.  In this behalf, the  

following observations by a three Judge Bench of this Court in Sub-

Inspector Rooplal & Anr. Vs. Lt. Governor & Ors.8  are quite appo-

site :

“At the outset, we must express our serious dissatisfaction in  regard to the manner in which a Coordinate Bench of the  Tribunal has overruled, in effect, an earlier judgment of an- other Coordinate Bench of the same Tribunal.  This is op- posed to all principles of judicial discipline.  If at all,  the  subsequent Bench of the Tribunal was of the opinion that the  earlier view taken by the Coordinate Bench of the same Tri- bunal was incorrect, it ought to have referred the matter to a  larger Bench so that the difference of opinion between the  two Coordinate Benches on the same point could have been  avoided.  It is not as if the latter Bench was unaware of the  judgment of the earlier Bench but knowingly it proceeded to  disagree with the said judgment against all known rules of  precedents.  Precedents which enunciate rules of law form  the foundation of administration of justice under our system.  This is a fundamental principle which every presiding offi- cer of a judicial forum ought to know, for consistency in in- terpretation of law alone can lead to public confidence in our  judicial system.  This Court has laid down time and again  

8 (2000) 1 SCC 644

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that precedent law must be followed by all concerned; devia- tion from the same should be only on a procedure known to  law.  A subordinate court is bound by the enunciation of law  made by the superior courts.  A Coordinate Bench of a Court  cannot pronounce judgment contrary to declaration of law  made  by  another  Bench.   It  can  only  refer  it  to  a  larger  Bench if it disagrees with the earlier pronouncement.”

We respectfully concur with these observations and are confident that all  

the Courts and various Tribunals in the country shall follow these salutary  

observations in letter and spirit.

25. In view of the foregoing discussion, the decision of the Tribunal, hold-

ing that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of Exemption no-

tification No. 17/2001-Cus dated 1st March, 2001, cannot be flawed.  

The appeal being bereft of any merit is dismissed accordingly, with  

costs, quantified at `50,000/-.

.……………………………………               (D.K. JAIN, J.)  

                              …………………………………….               (H.L. DATTU, J.)

NEW DELHI; JULY 6, 2011.

RS

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