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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CRIMINAL   APPEAL No.1557 OF 2015   

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.7850 of 2011)

M/S BRIDGESTONE INDIA PVT. LTD.                    .......APPELLANT

VERSUS

INDERPAL SINGH                                    .......RESPONDENT  WITH

CRIMINAL   APPEAL No.1562 OF 2015       (Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.9758 of 2011)

    CRIMINAL   APPEAL No.1563 OF 2015       (Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.10019 of 2011)

    CRIMINAL   APPEAL No.1564 OF 2015       (Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.10020 of 2011)

                                               J U D G M E N T

JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.

Criminal Appeal No.1557 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.7850 of  2011)

1. Leave granted. 2. Despite service, no one has entered appearance on behalf  of the respondent. 3. A  cheuqe  No.1950,  drawn  on  the  Union  Bank  of  India,  Chandigarh, was issued by Inderpal Singh (the respondent herein) to  the appellant - M/s Bridgestone India Pvt.Ltd.  The cheque was in  the  sum  of  Rs.26,958/-.  The  appellant  -  M/s  Bridgestone  India

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Pvt.Ltd. presented the above cheque at the IDBI Bank in Indore.  The  appellant  received  intimation  of  its  being  dishonoured  on  account of “…exceeds arrangement…” on 04.08.2006 at Indore.   4. The appellant issued a legal notice on 26.08.2006, which  was  served  on  the  respondent  –  Inderpal  Singh  on  06.09.2006,  demanding the amount depicted in the cheque. The appellant informed  the respondent, that he would be compelled to initiate proceedings  under  Section  138  of  the  Negotiable  Instruments  Act,  1881,  if  payment was not made by the respondent within 15 days from the date  of receipt of the legal notice. 5. Consequent upon the issuance of the aforementioned legal  notice wherein the respondent was required to reimburse the cheuqe  amount  to  the  appellant,  and  the  respondent  having  failed  to  discharge  his  obligation,  proceedings  were  initiated  by  the  appellant on 13.10.2006 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate,  First  Class,  Indore,  under  Section  138  of  the  Negotiable  Instruments Act, 1881. 6. The  accused-respondent  -  Inderpal  Singh,  preferred  an  application before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore,  Madhya Pradesh, under Section 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code,  contesting the territorial jurisdiction with respect to the above  cheque drawn on the Union Bank of India, Chandigarh. The prayer  made by the respondent, that the Judicial Magistrate, First Class,  Indore, did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings  initiated by the appellant – M/s Bridgestone Indian Pvt.Ltd. was  declined  on  02.06.2009.   The  Judicial  Magistrate,  First  Class,  Indore,  relied  on  the  judgment  rendered  by  this  Court  in

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K.Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another, AIR 1999 SC  3762, to record a finding in favour of the appellant.  Dissatisfied  with  the  order  passed  by  the  Judicial  Magistrate,  First  Class,  Indore, dated 02.06.2009, the respondent-Inderpal Singh preferred a  petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in the  High  Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh  before  its  Indore  Bench.   Having  examined the controversy in hand and keeping in mind the fact, that  a number of documents were presented by the respondent – Inderpal  Singh during the course of hearing before the High Court, by an  order  dated  03.12.2009,  the  petition  filed  by  the  accused- respondent was disposed of, by remitting the case to the Judicial  Magistrate, First Class, Indore,  requiring him to pass a fresh  order  after  taking  into  consideration  the  additional  documents  relied upon, and the judgments cited before the High Court. 7. The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, yet again,  by an order dated 11.01.2010 held, that he had the territorial  jurisdiction  to  adjudicate  upon  the  controversy  raised  by  the  appellant – M/s Bridgestone India Pvt.Ltd. under Section 138 of the  Negotiable  Instruments  Act,  1881.  The  decision  rendered  by  the  Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, was again assailed by the  accused-respondent  in  yet  another  petition  filed  by  him  under  Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in the High Court of  Madhya Pradesh before its Indore Bench. The High Court accepted the  prayer made by the accused-respondent - Inderpal Singh by holding,  that  the  jurisdiction  lay  only  before  the  Court  wherein  the  original drawee bank was located, namely, at Chandigarh, where-from  the  accused-respondent  had  issued  the  concerned  cheque  bearing

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No.1950, drawn on the Union Bank of India, Chandigarh. 8. Dissatisfied with the order passed by the High Court of  Madhya Pradesh, dated 05.05.2011, the appellant has approached this  Court through the instant appeal.  9. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the  appellant cited the decision rendered by a three-Judge Bench of  this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra and  another, (2014) 9 SCC 129, and pointedly invited our attention to  the  conclusions  drawn  by  this  Court  in  paragraph  58,  which  is  extracted hereunder:

“58.   To sum up: 58.1  An  offence  under  Section  138  of  the  Negotiable  Instruments  Act,  1881  is  committed  no  sooner  a  cheque  drawn by the accused on an account being maintained by him  in  a  bank  for  discharge  of  debt/liability  is  returned  unpaid for insufficiency of funds or for the reason that  the amount exceeds the arrangement made with the bank. 58.2 Cognizance  of  any  such   offence  is  however  forbidden  under  Section  142  of  the  Act except upon a  complaint  in  writing  made by the payee or holder of the  cheque in due course within a period of one month from the  date  the  cause of action accrues to such payee or holder  under clause (c) of proviso to Section 138. 58.3 The cause of action to file a complaint accrues  to a complainant/payee/holder of a cheque in due course if

(a) the dishonoured cheque is presented to  the  drawee  bank  within  a  period  of  six  months from the date of its issue. (b)  If  the   complainant   has   demanded  payment of cheque amount  within  thirty  days of receipt of information by him  from  the  bank  regarding  the  dishonour  of  the cheque, and (c) If the drawer has failed to pay the  cheque  amount  within  fifteen  days  of  receipt of such notice.

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58.4 The facts constituting cause of action do not  constitute the ingredients of the offence under Section  138 of the Act. 58.5 The  proviso  to  Section  138  simply  postpones/defers institution of criminal proceedings and  taking of cognizance by the court till such time cause of  action in terms of clause (c) of proviso accrues to the  complainant. 58.6 Once  the  cause  of  action  accrues  to  the  complainant, the jurisdiction of the Court to try the case  will be determined by reference to the place where the  cheque is dishonoured. 58.7 The general rule stipulated under Section 177  CrPC  applies   to   cases   under   Section  138  of  the  Negotiable  Instruments Act. Prosecution in such cases  can, therefore,  be  launched  against  the drawer of the  cheque only before the court within whose jurisdiction  the   dishonour   takes   place  except  in situations  where  the  offence of dishonour of the cheque punishable  under Section 138 is committed along with other offences  in  a  single  transaction within the meaning of Section  220(1)  read  with  Section  184  of  the Code of Criminal  Procedure  or  is covered by the provisions of Section  182(1) read with Sections 184 and 220 thereof.”

In view of the decision rendered by this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh  Rathod’s  case,  it  is  apparent,  that  the  impugned  order  dated  05.05.2011, passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at  Indore, was wholly justified. 10. In order to overcome the legal position declared by this  Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod’s case, learned counsel for the  appellant has drawn our attention to the Negotiable Instruments  (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as `the  Ordinance'). A perusal of Section 1(2) thereof reveals, that the  Ordinance would be deemed to have come into force with effect from  15.06.2015. It is therefore pointed out to us, that the Negotiable  Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015 is in force. Our

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attention  was  then  invited  to  Section  3  thereof,  whereby,  the  original Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, came  to be amended, and also, Section 4 thereof, whereby, Section 142A  was inserted into the Negotiable Instruments Act. Sections 3 and 4  of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015  are being extracted hereunder:

“3.  In  the  principal  Act,  section  142  shall  be  numbered as sub-section (1) thereof and after sub-section  (1)  as  so  numbered,  the  following  sub-section  shall  be  inserted, namely:-

   (2)   The  offence  under  section  138  shall  be  inquired into and tried only by a court within  whose local jurisdiction,--

(a)  if  the  cheque  is  delivered  for  collection through an account, the branch  of the bank where the payee or holder in  due course, as the case may be, maintains  the account, is situated; or  (b)  if the cheque is presented for payment  by  the  payee  or  holder  in  due  course  otherwise through an account, the branch of  the drawee bank where the drawer maintains  the account, is situated. Explanation –  For  the  purposes  of  clause  (a),  where  a  cheque  is  delivered  for  collection at any branch of the bank of the  payee or holder in due course, then, the  cheque  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  delivered  to  the  branch  of  the  bank  in  which the payee or holder in due course, as  the case may be, maintains the account.”

4. In the principal Act, after section 142, the following  section shall be inserted, namely:-

142A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any judgment,  decree, order or directions of any court, all cases  transferred to the court having jurisdiction under  sub-section (2) of section 142, as amended by the  Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015,  shall be deemed to have been transferred under this  Ordinance, as if that sub-section had been in force

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at all material times. (2)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  sub- section  (2)  of  section  142  or  sub-section  (1),  where the payee or the holder in due course, as the  case  may  be,  has  filed  a  complaint  against  the  drawer of a cheque in the court having jurisdiction  under sub-section (2) of section 142 or the case  has  been  transferred  to  that  court  under  sub- section (1), and such complaint is pending in that  court,  all  subsequent  complaints  arising  out  of  section 138 against the same drawer shall be filed  before the same court irrespective of whether those  cheques were delivered for collection or presented  for payment within the territorial jurisdiction of  that court. (3) If, on the date of the commencement of this  Ordinance, more than one prosecution filed by the  same payee or holder in due course, as the case may  be, against the same drawer of cheques is pending  before different courts, upon the said fact having  been brought to the notice of the court, such court  shall  transfer  the  case  to  the  court  having  jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142,  as  amended  by  the  Negotiable  Instruments  (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, before which the first  case  was  filed  and  is  pending,  as  if  that  sub- section had been in force at all material times.”

  (Emphasis is ours)    A perusal of the amended Section 142(2), extracted above, leaves  no  room  for  any  doubt,  specially  in  view  of the  explanation  thereunder, that with reference to an offence under Section 138 of  the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the place where a cheque is  delivered for collection i.e. the branch of the bank of the payee  or holder in due course, where the drawee maintains an account,  would be determinative of the place of territorial jurisdiction.  11. It is, however, imperative for the present controversy,  that the appellant overcomes the legal position declared by this  Court,  as  well  as,  the  provisions  of  the  Code  of  Criminal

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Procedure.  Insofar  as  the  instant  aspect  of  the  matter  is  concerned, a reference may be made to Section 4 of the Negotiable  Instruments  (Amendment)  Second  Ordinance,  2015,  whereby  Section  142A was inserted into the Negotiable Instruments Act.  A perusal  of Sub-section (1) thereof leaves no room for any doubt, that  insofar  as  the  offence  under  Section  138  of  the  Negotiable  Instruments Act is concerned, on the issue of jurisdiction, the  provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, would have to  give way to the provisions of the instant enactment on account of  the  non-obstante clause  in  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  142A.  Likewise, any judgment, decree, order or direction issued by a  Court would have no effect insofar as the territorial jurisdiction  for  initiating proceedings  under Section  138 of  the Negotiable  Instruments Act is concerned.  In the above view of the matter, we  are  satisfied,  that  the  judgment  rendered  by  this  Court  in  Dashrath  Rupsingh  Rathod’s  case  would  also  not  non-suit  the  appellant for the relief claimed.   12. We are in complete agreement with the contention advanced  at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant. We are  satisfied, that Section 142(2)(a), amended through the Negotiable  Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015, vests jurisdiction  for initiating proceedings for the offence under Section 138 of the  Negotiable  Instruments  Act,  inter  alia in  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  where  the  cheque  is  delivered  for  collection (through an account of the branch of the bank where the  payee or holder in due course maintains an account). We are also  satisfied,  based  on  Section  142A(1)  to  the  effect,  that  the

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judgment rendered by this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod’s case,  would  not  stand  in  the  way  of  the  appellant,  insofar  as  the  territorial jurisdiction for initiating proceedings emerging from  the dishonor of the cheque in the present case arises. 13. Since cheque No.1950, in the sum of Rs.26,958/-, drawn on  the  Union  Bank  of  India,  Chandigarh,  dated  02.05.2006,  was  presented for encashment at the IDBI Bank, Indore, which intimated  its dishonor to the appellant on 04.08.2006, we are of the view  that the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, would have the  territorial  jurisdiction  to  take  cognizance  of  the  proceedings  initiated by the appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable  Instruments Act, 1881, after the promulgation of the Negotiable  Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015.  The words “...as  if that sub-section had been in force at all material times...”  used with reference to Section 142(2), in Section 142A(1) gives  retrospectivity to the provision. 14. In the above view of the matter, the instant appeal is  allowed, and the impugned order passed by the High Court of Madhya  Pradesh, by its Indore Bench, dated 05.05.2011, is set aside. The  parties  are  directed  to  appear  before  the  Judicial  Magistrate,  First Class, Indore, on 15.01.2016. In case the complaint filed by  the appellant has been returned, it shall be re-presented before  the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, Madhya Pradesh, on  the date of appearance indicated hereinabove.

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Criminal Appeal No.1562 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.9758 of  2011), Criminal Appeal  No.1563 of 2015 (Arising  out  of SLP(Crl.)  No. 10019  of  2011)  and  Criminal Appeal No.1564 of 2015 (Arising  out of SLP(Crl.)No.10020 of 2011)

1. Leave granted. 2. Despite service, no one has entered appearance on behalf  of the respondent. 3. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  states,  that  the  controversy raised in the instant appeals is identical to the one  adjudicated upon by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.1557  of  2015 (Arising  out  of  SLP(Crl.)No.7850  of  2011)[M/s  Bridgestone  India  Pvt.Ltd. vs. Inderpal Singh] on 24.11.2015. The instant appeals are  accordingly allowed in terms of the order passed by this Court in  in Criminal Appeal No.1557 of 2015 [M/s Bridgestone India Pvt.Ltd.  vs. Inderpal Singh] on 24.11.2015.                        

                       ..........................J.                 (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)  

                       ..........................J.  

         (R. BANUMATHI)

NEW DELHI; NOVEMBER 24, 2015.