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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4890/2014 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 34133 of 2011)

      M/S Bharat Coking Coal Ltd and Ors.                        …  Appellants

vs.

Chhota Birsa Uranw                                                 … Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeal arises against the order of the  High Court  

of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Letters Patent Appeal No.90 of 2010  

dated  September 20, 2010, which was filed against the order  

dated December 11, 2009 passed by the learned Single Judge  

in a writ being W.P. (S) No. 496 of 2007 filed by the respondent

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in  the present  matter,  wherein  the  court  quashed the order  

dated  August 2, 2006 passed by the Project Officer, Jamunia  

Open Cast Project (hereinafter referred to as ‘Project Officer’)  

Area of the Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (being appellant No. 1 in  

the  present  matter),  which  stated  that  the  respondent  will  

superannuate   on  February 28, 2007.

3. The brief facts leading to the same are as under :

3.1. The  respondent   joined   appellant  No.  1,  

Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (‘BCCL’), a ‘Government Company’ as  

under Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956,  his  date of  

joining as per the impugned order is stated to be  March 31,  

1973.   At the time of joining, his date of birth was recorded  

as February 15, 1947,  in Form ‘B’, a statutory form stipulated  

under the Mines Rules, 1955, the basis of recording the same  

is  not  clear.  The respondent  obtained  a  Secondary  School  

Leaving  Certificate  issued  on  October  12,  1979,  which  

indicated  that  he  attended  Rajya  Samposhit  Uchcha  

Vidyalaya, Baghmara, a Government school in Dhanbad  from  

January,  1964 to  August,  1964.  In  the  said  certificate,  the  

date of birth of the respondent is  recorded as February 6,  

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1950, which is in conflict with his date of birth as entered by  

him in the service records being the aforementioned Form  

‘B’.  

3.2. Subsequently, in 1983, he was transferred to  

the Jamunia Open Cast Project and as stated, he once again  

signed the Form ‘B’ wherein his date of birth was recorded as  

February  15,  1947  and  he  allegedly  did  not  raise  any  

objections then.

3.3. In  1986,  the  respondent  passed the  Mining  

Sardarship and in the certificate acknowledging the same his  

date  of  birth  was  recorded  as  February  6,  1950,  

corresponding  to  the  date  recorded in  the  aforementioned  

School Leaving Certificate.  Therefore, there existed two sets  

of records of the respondent’s details; first being the Form ‘B’  

register on one hand in which the date of birth was recorded  

to be February 15, 1947 and second being the Mining Sardar  

Certificate  and  the  School  Leaving  Certificate  wherein  the  

date of birth was recorded as February 6, 1950.

3.4. In 1987, the National Coal Wage Agreement  

III (hereinafter referred as ‘NCWA III’) being Implementation  

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Instructions  were  put  into  operation  for  stabilizing  service  

records of employees. Pursuant to Implementation Instruction  

No. 76, appellant No. 1 provided its employees with Nominee  

Forms  as  prescribed  by  the  Implementation  Instructions  

which contained relevant extracts from the service records in  

the  Form  ‘B’  register,  thereby  enabling  the  employees  to  

identify any discrepancy or error in the records and get the  

same rectified as per the prescribed procedure. In wake of  

the same the respondent became aware of inconsistencies in  

the records regarding his date of birth, date of appointment,  

father’s  name  and  permanent  address;  therein  the  

respondent  made  representations  to  the  Project  Officer,  

Jamunia  Open  Cast  Project  for  rectification  of  the  

abovementioned  errors  and  he  specifically  sought  the  

incorrect  date  of  birth  to  be  corrected  as  per  the  date  

mentioned in  the Mining Sardar  Certificate and the School  

Leaving Certificate. It appears that the concerned authorities  

rectified the discrepancies regarding the name of the father  

and the permanent address; however the date of birth and  

date  of  appointment  remained  unchanged.  Thereafter,  as  

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stated  by  the  respondent,  he  made  a  subsequent  

representation to the concerned Project  Officer  on July  16,  

2006  for  correction  of  the  date  of  birth  in  the  Form  ‘B’  

register in accordance with the Mining Sardar Certificate and  

the same was rejected by the appellant company vide letter  

dated July 19, 2006.  

3.5. The Project Officer vide order dated August 2,  

2006 intimated the respondent that  he is  to  superannuate  

from  February  28,  2007.  Aggrieved  by  the  same,  the  

respondent filed a writ bearing W.P. (S) No. 496 of 2007 for  

quashing of the order of superannuation by the Project Officer  

on the  grounds that  the  date  of  superannuation has been  

incorrectly  calculated  by  relying  on  the  erroneous  date  of  

birth which should have been rectified in terms of the NCWA  

III, which provided that the Mining Sardar Certificate and the  

School  Leaving  Certificate  must  be  treated  as  authentic  

documents by the employer as proof of the date of birth of  

the  employee.  The  appellant  company  without  challenging  

the genuineness of the same countered the respondent on  

the grounds that the Form ‘B’ register was a conclusive proof  

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of  date of  birth  as  it  was verified by the signature  of  the  

employee  being  the  respondent;  and  having  accepted  the  

entry then, the respondent is not entitled to raise any dispute  

after twenty years and at the fag end of his service. The High  

Court while allowing the writ determined that the respondent  

did not raise such a claim at the fag end of his career, rather  

such  a  claim  was  made  in  1987  itself  and  the  appellant  

company had failed to respond suitably to the dispute raised  

by the respondent. Thereby, the Court directed  the appellant  

company   to  conduct  an  enquiry  on  the  basis  of  the  

certificates  produced  by  the  respondent  and  to  effectively  

communicate to the respondent the decision taken together  

with the reasons assigned within three months of the passing  

of the order.  

3.6. Aggrieved, the appellant company preferred  

a  Letters  Patent  Appeal,  the  order  in  which  is  impugned  

herein. The High Court dismissed the appeal having found no  

merit in the same in light of the clauses in Implementation  

Instruction No. 76.   

3.7. Thereafter, the matter lies before us.  

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4. The  appellant  in  the  present  appeal  has  come  before  us  

seeking that the impugned judgment be set aside. The case of  

the appellant is, firstly, when a school leaving certificate is not  

a document mentioned in Implementation Instruction No. 76,  

the High Court was incorrect in substituting the same with the  

documents  given  in  the  said  Instruction,  thereby  creating  a  

situation which supersedes all other statutory documents like  

Form  ‘B’  register.  Secondly,  the  High  Court  should  have  

considered that the date of birth recorded in Form ‘B’ register  

being a  statutory  document  under  Mines Act  is  binding  and  

cannot  be  preceded  by  a  non-statutory  document  and  

therefore, the  inter alia holding of the High Court that School  

Leaving  Certificate  and Mining  Sardar  Certificate  would  take  

precedence  over  company  records  and  other  statutory  

documents is contrary to the judgment of this Court in  G.M.  

Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., West Bengal  vs. Shib Kumar Dushad   

and Ors.1. Thirdly, the appellant has challenged the exercise of  

jurisdiction  by  the  High  Court  under  Article  226  considering  

that the respondent as workman could avail efficacious remedy  

1 (2000) 8 SCC 696

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from  the  forum  under  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act  and  the  

respondent could raise such a dispute at the fag end of  his  

career  de hors  the judgment  in  Bharat  Coking Coal  Ltd.  vs.   

Presiding  Officer  and  Anr2.  Fourthly,  that  the  documents  on  

which  the  respondent  has  relied  being  School  Leaving  

Certificate  and  Mining  Sardar  Certificate  are  not  those  

mentioned in Implementation Instruction No. 76 for review of  

determination  of  date  of  birth  with  respect  to  existing  

employees and that the implementation of the impugned order  

would give way to many unscrupulous employees to procure  

such documents and take advantage of the same. Fifthly, the  

respondent while signing the Form ‘B’ register at the time of  

appointment had verified his date of birth as February 15, 1947  

on his joining on January 1, 1973 and later on his transfer in  

1983; since he is a supervisory staff capable of reading and  

writing and understanding English his verification amounts to  

acceptance and his raising of dispute in 1987, fourteen years  

after  is  incorrect.  Sixthly,  the  appellant  has  challenged  the  

reliance  placed  on  the  School  Leaving  Certificate  by  the  

2 (1995) Suppl. 2 SCC 598

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respondent  on  the  grounds  that  the  same  was  issued  on  

October 12, 1979 six years after his appointment and as the  

Mining Sardar Certificate was based on the same reliance on it  

is also  doubtful; furthermore, since both the documents were  

issued after the date of employment they cannot form basis  of  

correction  of  date  of  birth;  furthermore,  the  appellant  has  

challenged the correctness  of the School Leaving Certificate on  

the grounds that the alleged Certificate was not verified by the  

District Education Commissioner; that the attendance register  

for  relevant  period  when  the  respondent  allegedly  attended  

school was not available and the verification was with respect  

to one Sri Birsa Prasad Uranw; it is further submitted that these  

discrepancies  which  were  covered  by  legal  inspector  of  

company (who was duly charge-sheeted) in collusion with the  

respondent make the school leaving certificate dubious. Finally,  

it was submitted that the respondent has raised the issue at  

the fag end by means of a belated writ i.e. thirty years after  

appointment and after twenty years (as claimed by him) of his  

knowledge.

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5. Per contra, the respondent has denied the averments of the  

appellant and has submitted that he has not disputed his date  

of birth at the fag end of his service as found by the learned  

Single Judge. It has been submitted that the respondent  joined  

service on March 31, 1973, when his date of birth was recorded  

as  February  15,  1947  basis  of  which  is  not  clear;  that  

subsequently in 1986 he cleared his Mining Sardarship and was  

given a Mining Sardar Certificate where his date of birth was  

recorded as February 6, 1950 same as in his School Leaving  

Certificate; that subsequently in 1987, on noticing the incorrect  

date  of  birth  and  other  details  in  his  service  records,  the  

respondent  immediately  submitted  an  application  for  the  

correction of his date of birth as February 6, 1950 and other  

minor  corrections  in  his  service  records.  On  receiving  no  

information regarding the same on inquiry from his superiors,  

he  was  given  the  impression  that  the  necessary  corrections  

were  made  in  the  service  records  and  the  respondent  was  

surprised to receive his superannuation order in 2006 on the  

basis of the incorrect date of birth being February 15, 1947.  

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6. In these circumstances, the respondent has contended, firstly,  

that it  is  not  the case that the respondent disputed date of  

birth at the end of service, instead he had disputed the same  

way back in the year 1987, it is the employer who disputed the  

same at the fag end by creating the impression that claim of  

respondent for correction of date of birth was accepted when,  

in reality,  it  was not and even the learned Single Judge has  

concurred that the rectification was not sought at the fag end.  

Secondly, it was contended that the respondent has relied on  

two documents for correction of his date of birth as February 6,  

1950, namely the statutory Mining Sardar Certificate and the  

School Leaving Certificate. Thirdly, it has been contended that  

in light of the policy contained in part  (B) of Implementation  

Instruction No. 76, the appellant as per clause (i)(a) accepted  

the School Leaving Certificate but it was contended before the  

High Court that as the same was issued in 1979 and as the  

workman joined service in 1979, the certificate was thus, ‘not  

issued’ prior to the date of employment and therefore cannot  

form the  basis  of  correction  of  date  of  birth.  However,  this  

contention was rejected by the High Court, which held that the  

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school records were created prior to joining and a copy issued  

on a subsequent date does not create a difference as the date  

of  issue  of  certificate  refers  to  the  date  when  the  relevant  

record was created on the basis of which the certificate has  

been  issued.  In  addition  to  the  same,  it  has  also  been  

submitted  that  the  appellate  court  had granted time to  the  

appellant  to  verify  the  genuineness  of  the  School  Leaving  

Certificate and in response through a supplementary affidavit,  

the appellants have admitted the school leaving certificate to  

be  genuine,  thus  contended  by  the  respondent  that  as  the  

School Leaving Certificate was found to be genuine, it warrants  

no  interference.  Fourthly,  it  has  been  contended  by  the  

respondent that his claim for correction was not considered on  

the basis of the Mining Sardar Certificate which as claimed has  

been given by the Central Government and was submitted by  

him, which is also mentioned as a basis for correction of date of  

birth in Clause (i)(b) in Part B of Implementation Instruction No.  

76. It is further submitted that the appellant did not give any  

reason as to why the Mining Sardar Certificate was rejected by  

them. Finally, the respondent has submitted that he was made  

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to  retire  prematurely  and  not  allowed  to  work  inspite  of  

favourable  orders  from  the  High  Court;  furthermore,  the  

respondent filed a contempt petition but was not allowed to  

work by the petitioners on the pretext of pendency of matter  

before higher courts. It is also the case of the respondent that  

he  was  not  gainfully  employed  anywhere  else  during  that  

period.

7. It  is  pertinent  to  note  at  this  point  that  during  the  oral  

proceedings, this Court vide order dated July 4, 2013 directed  

the appellants as under:

“List  after  four  weeks  to  enable  the  counsel  for  the   petitioners to produce the original and also photocopy  of  the  Form ‘B’  register  where  it  is  alleged that  the   respondent  had  affixed  his  signature  on  the  date  of   birth which was recorded as 15.02.1947.”

However,  as  found  by  us  and  pointed  out  by  the  respondent  

instead of filing the original  Form ‘B’  prepared in 1973,  at the  

time of joining of the respondent with designation as Explosive  

Carrier (which as claimed admittedly did not bear the signature of  

the respondent), filed a photocopy of the alleged Form ‘B’ dated  

January 27, 1987 which showed the designation of the respondent  

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to  be  that  of  Mining  Sardar.  It  has  been  submitted  by  the  

respondent that his signature was taken on the alleged form on  

January 27, 1987 while handing over the photocopy of the same  

for necessary correction of the record.

8. On the basis of the above, we find that within the given set of  

facts the dispute is regarding the manner in which the date of  

birth  should  be  determined;  whether  the  reliance  should  be  

placed on the set of records being the Mining Sardar Certificate  

and the School Leaving Certificate which state the date of birth  

to be February 6,  1950 or reliance should be placed on the  

extracts of the Form ‘B’ register which state the date of birth to  

be February 15, 1947. The position which emerges on the basis  

of the above is that after having joined service in 1973 when  

the Form ‘B’ register was filled and when it was  filled once  

again  in  1983  when  the  respondent  was  transferred,  there  

were  certain  discrepancies  regarding  permanent  address,  

father’s name and date of joining. In 1987, when the appellant  

made available the details of all employees for verification of  

service records,  the respondent raised the dispute regarding  

his  incorrect  particulars  being  the  date  of  joining,  father’s  

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name, permanent address and date of birth.  Apparently,  the  

abovementioned  corrections  other  than  date  of  birth  were  

made.  Thus,  it  is  evident  and  correctly  determined  by  the  

learned Single Judge that the dispute was not raised at the fag  

end  of  service  or  on  the  eve  of  superannuation  but  it  was  

raised at the earliest  possible opportunity in  1987 when the  

respondent became aware of the discrepancy. As the factum of  

when  the  dispute  was  raised  is  settled  what  remains  to  be  

determined is the issue of date of birth.

9. In the corpus of service law over a period of time, a certain  

approach towards date of birth disputes has emerged in wake  

of  the  decisions  of  this  Court  as  an  impact  created  by  the  

change  in  date  of  birth  of  an  employee  is  akin  to  the  far  

reaching  ripples  created  when  a  single  piece  of  stone  is  

dropped into the water. This Court  has succinctly  laid down  

the same in  Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department   

vs. R. Kirubakaran (supra), which is as under:-  

“7. An application for  correction of  the date of birth   should not  be dealt  with by the tribunal  or  the High   Court  keeping  in  view  only  the  public  servant   concerned. It  need not be pointed out that any such   direction for correction of the date of birth of the public   

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servant concerned has a chain reaction, inasmuch as   others waiting for years, below him for their respective   promotions are affected in this process. Some are likely   to suffer irreparable injury, inasmuch as, because of the   correction of the date of birth,  the officer concerned,   continues  in  office,  in  some  cases  for  years,  within   which  time  many  officers  who  are  below  him  in   seniority  waiting  for  their  promotion,  may  lose  their   promotions for  ever.  Cases are not unknown when a   person accepts appointment keeping in view the date   of retirement of his immediate senior. According to us,   this is an important aspect, which cannot be lost sight   of  by  the  court  or  the  tribunal  while  examining  the   grievance of a public servant in respect of correction of   his date of birth. As such, unless a clear case, on the   basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in   nature, is made out by the respondent, the court or the   tribunal  should not issue a direction,  on the basis  of   materials which make such claim only plausible. Before   any such direction is issued, the court or the tribunal   must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice   to the person concerned and his claim for correction of   date of  birth has been made in accordance with the   procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any   rule or order.  If  no rule or order has been framed or   made,  prescribing  the  period  within  which  such  application has to be filed, then such application must   be  filed  within  the  time,  which  can  be  held  to  be   reasonable. The applicant has to produce the evidence   in  support  of  such  claim,  which  may  amount  to   irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth. Whenever   any such question arises, the onus is on the applicant,   to prove the wrong recording of his date of birth, in his   service book. In many cases it is a part of the strategy   on the  part  of  such  public  servants  to  approach the   court  or  the  tribunal  on  the  eve  of  their  retirement,   questioning the correctness of the entries in respect of   their  dates  of  birth  in  the  service  books.  By  this   process, it has come to the notice of this Court that in   many cases,  even if  ultimately  their  applications  are   

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dismissed, by virtue of interim orders, they continue for   months, after the date of superannuation. The court or   the  tribunal  must,  therefore,  be  slow  in  granting  an   interim relief for continuation in service, unless prima   facie evidence of unimpeachable character is produced   because if the public servant succeeds, he can always   be compensated, but if he fails, he would have enjoyed   undeserved  benefit  of  extended  service  and  merely   caused injustice to his immediate junior.”

The  same  approach  had  been  followed  by  this  Court  while  

deciding on date of birth disputes irrespective of the relief being  

in favour of the workman or the employer. (See: State of Punjab  

vs. S.C. Chadha3, State of U.P. & Anr. v. Shiv Narain Upadhyay4,  

State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Vali Mohd. Dosabhai Sindhi5,  State of  

Maharashtra & Anr. vs. Goraknath Sitaram Kamble6)  

10. Another  practice  followed  by  the  

courts  regarding  such  disputes  is  that  date  of  birth  of  an  

employee is determined as per the prescribed applicable rules  

or  framework  existing  in  the  organization.  Even  this  Court  

inspite of the extraordinary powers conferred under Article 136  

has  decided  date  of  birth  disputes  in  accordance  with  the  

3 (2004) 3 SCC 394 4 (2005) 6 SCC 49 5 (2006) 6 SCC 537 6 (2010) 14 SCC 423

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applicable rules and seldom has the Court determined the date  

of birth as it is a question of fact fit to be determined by the  

appropriate  forum.  (See:  State  of  Maharashtra  &  Anr.  vs.   

Goraknath  Sitaram  Kamble  &  Ors.7 Registrar  General,  High  

Court of Madras vs. M. Manickam & Ors.8 High Court of Andhra  

Pradesh vs. N. Sanyasi Rao9 )

11.  As stated earlier, this Court needs to  

decide  the  manner  in  which  date  of  birth  has  to  be  

determined.  It  is  the  case  of  the  appellant  that  as  the  

respondent raised the dispute at the fag end of his career  

and  as  there  exists  a  set  of  records  being  the  Form ‘B’  

register which is a statutory document in which the date of  

birth  has  been  verified  by  the  respondent  himself  twice,  

other  non  statutory  documents  should  not  be  given  

precedence and the orders of the High Court must be set  

aside.  This  claim  of  the  appellant  does  not  stand  in  the  

present matter. As determined, the dispute was not raised at  

the fag end of the career; on the contrary,  it was raised in  

7 (2010) 14 SCC 423 8 (2011) 9 SCC 425 9 (2012) 1 SCC 674

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1987 almost two decades prior to his superannuation when  

he first came to know of the discrepancy. It has been held in  

Mohd. Yunus Khan v. U.P. Power Corporation Ltd.10,  that, “an  

employee may take action as is permissible in law only after   

coming to know that a mistake has been committed by the   

employer.” Thus, the case of the respondent should not be  

barred on account  of  unreasonable  delay.  Admittedly,  the  

appellant  as  the  employer  in  view  of  its  own  regulations  

being  Implementation  Instruction  No.  76  contained  in  the  

National Coal Wage Agreement III, gave all its employees a  

chance  to  identify  and  rectify  the  discrepancies  in  the  

service  records  by  providing  them  a  nominee  form  

containing details of their service records. This initiative of  

the  appellants  clearly  indicated  the  existence  of  errors  in  

service  records  of  which  the  appellants  were  aware   and  

were taking steps to rectify the same. Against this backdrop,  

the stance of the appellant that the records in the Form ‘B’  

register  must  be  relied  upon does  not  hold  good  as  it  is  

admitted by the appellant that errors existed in the same.  

10 (2009) 1 SCC 80

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Even a perusal of the nominee form exhibits the ambiguity  

regarding the date of birth and date of joining. It was due to  

the discrepancies which subsisted that the appellants gave  

all  its  employees  a  chance  to  rectify  the  same.  In  such  

circumstances, the appellants are bound by their actions and  

their  attempt  to  deny  the  claims  of  the  respondent  is  

incorrect.  The  respondent  in  this  case  duly  followed  the  

procedure available and the attempt of the appellant to deny  

the claim of the respondent on the basis of technicality is  

incorrect. We, therefore, feel that the learned Single Judge  

has correctly held that:

“11. Having given the petitioner, like all employees, the   benefit of seeking correction of the entries contained in   their service records including their date of birth, the   petitioner’s claim cannot be denied, merely because he   had signed upon the Form ‘B’ Register at the time of its   opening  and  containing  the  entry  of  date  of  birth  a   recorded therein.”

12. The appellant in the present case should have followed the  

procedure as laid down by Implementation Instruction No. 76 to  

determine  the  date  of  birth  of  an  existing  employee.  The  

provisions of which  read as follows:

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“(B)   Review determination of  date of  birth  in  respect of existing employees.

  (i)(a)  In  the  case  of  the  existing  employees  Matriculation Certificate  of  (sic:  or)  Higher  Secondary  Certificate  issued  by  the  recognized  Universities  of  Board or Middle Pass Certificate issued by the Board of  Education and/or Department of Public Instruction and  admit cards issued by the aforesaid Bodies should be  treated as  correct  provided they  were  issued by  the  said Universities/Boards Institutions prior to the date of  employment.

  (i)(b)    Similarly, Mining Sardarship, winding engine  or similar other statutory certificate where the Manager  had  to  certify  the  date  of  birth  will  be  treated  as  authentic.

     Provided that where both documents mentioned in  (i)(a) and  (i)(b) above are available, the date of birth  recorded in (i)(a) will be treated as authentic

   (ii)       Wherever there is no variation in records,  such cases will not be reopened unless there is a very  glaring and apparent wrong entry brought to the notice  of  the  Management.  The  Management  after  being  satisfied on the merits of the case will take appropriate  action  for  correction  through  determination  committee/medical board.

       (C) Age Determination Committee/medical Board  for the above will be constituted by the Management. In  the case of employees whose date of birth cannot be  determined  in  accordance  with  the  procedure  mentioned in (B) (i) (a) or (B) (i) (b) above, the date of  birth recorded in the records of the company, namely,  Form  ‘B’  register,  CMP  Records  and  Identity  Cards  (untampered)  will  be  treated  as  final.  Provided  that  where there is a variation, in the age recorded in the  records mentioned above, the matter will be referred to  the  Age  Determination  Committee/Medical  Board  

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constituted by the Management for the determination  of age.

      (D) Age determination: by the Age Determination  Committee/Medical  Board  referred  to  above  may  consider  their  evidence  available  with  the  colliery  management; and/or

    (E) Medical Board constituted for determination of  age will be required to manage (sic assess) the age in  accordance  with  the  requirement  of  medical  jurisprudence  and  the  Medical  Board  will  as  far  as  possible  indicate  the  accurate  age  assessed  and  not  approximately.”

       In another case, being G.M. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. vs. Shib  

Kumar Dushad (supra) where the date of birth of an employee of  

the  Bharat  Coking  Coal  was  in  dispute  and  the  same  set  of  

instructions  were  applicable,  this  court  referring  to  the  

Implementation Instruction held that:

“20. From the provisions in the instructions referred to   above, it is clear that in case of dispute over the date of   birth  of  an  existing  employee  who  has  neither  a   Matriculation  Certificate/Secondary  School  Certificate   nor  a  statutory  certificate  in  which the  Manager  has   certified  the  entry  regarding  the  date  of  birth  to  be   authentic  the  employer  is  to  refer  the matter  to  the   Medical Board.”

13. We give due regard to the sensitive nature of date of birth  

disputes and fully agree with the approach laid down in  R.  

Kirubakaran Case (supra). However, with an aim to prevent the  

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cascading inconveniences caused by a change of date of birth,  

a  wronged  employee  should  not  be  denied  of  his  rights  

especially when he has adhered to the procedure laid down  

and  attempted  to  avoid  litigation  by  resorting  to  in-house  

mechanisms.  Public  Corporations/Departments,  should  not  

benefit from their own omission of duty. In the present case,  

the appellant-company failed to follow the procedure as laid  

down in  the  Implementation Instruction.  It  is  the appellant’s  

omission and not the inaction of the respondent which led to  

the dispute being raised in the courts at such a delayed stage.  

The  attitude  of  such  corporations  wherein  to  avoid  the  

rectification  of  a  date  of  birth,  litigation  is  unnecessarily  

prolonged just because they have number of resources at their  

command, goes against the grain of equity and duty towards  

society at large.

14.   As noted by us, the respondent in 1987 on coming to know  

of the wrong recording of his date of birth in his service records  

from the nomination form sought rectification. Therefore, such  

rectification was not sought at the fag end of his service. We  

have  further  noticed  that  the  High  Court  duly  verified  the  

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genuineness of the school leaving certificate on the basis of a  

supplementary affidavit filed by Shri Dilip Kumar Mishra, legal  

inspector  of  the  appellant  company on   September  6,  2010  

before  the  High  Court.  It  has  been  admitted  in  the  said  

supplementary affidavit that the school leaving certificate has  

been  verified  and  has  been  found  to  be  genuine.  We  have  

further noticed that Implementation Instruction No.76 clause (i)

(a) permits rectification of the date of birth by treating the date  

of birth mentioned in the school leaving certificate to be correct  

provided  such  certificates  were  issued  by  the  educational  

institution prior  to  the date of  employment.  The question of  

interpreting the words ‘were issued’ was correctly interpreted,  

in our opinion, by the High Court which interpreted the said  

words for the purpose of safeguarding against misuse of the  

certificates  for  the  purpose  of  increasing  the  period  of  

employment.  The High Court correctly interpreted and meant  

that  these  words  will  not  apply  where  the  school  records  

containing  the  date  of  birth  were  available  long  before  the  

starting  of  the  employment.  The date  of  issue of  certificate  

actually intends to refer to the date with the relevant record in  

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the  school  on  the  basis  of  which  the  certificate  has  been  

issued. A school leaving certificate is usually issued at the time  

of  leaving  the  school  by  the  student,  subsequently  a  copy  

thereof  also can be obtained where a student misplaces his  

said  school  leaving  certificate  and  applies  for  a  fresh  copy  

thereof. The issuance of fresh copy cannot change the relevant  

record which is prevailing in the records of the school from the  

date  of  the  admission  and  birth  date  of  the  student,  duly  

entered in the records of the school  

15. Therefore, the order of the High Court does not call for any  

interference.  We  endorse  the  reasoning  given  by  the  High  

Court and affirm the same.

16. In  these  circumstances,  we  do  not  find  any  merit  in  the  

appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.  

…....……………………..J. (Gyan Sudha Misra)

New Delhi;                                         ......... …………………….J.

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March 25, 2014.                                (Pinaki Chandra   Ghose)

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