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REPORTABLE        

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.              OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 1674 of 2009)

M/s Atlas Cycle (Haryana) Ltd.                  .... Appellant (s)

Versus

Kitab Singh                          .... Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T  

P. Sathasivam, J.

1) Leave granted.

2) This appeal is directed against the final judgment and  

order dated 04.10.2008 passed by the High Court of Punjab  

& Haryana at Chandigarh in Letters Patent Appeal No. 48 of  

2008  whereby  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  

dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant-Company herein  

and confirmed the order of the learned Single Judge in Civil  

Writ Petition No.11450 of 1995.

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3) Brief facts:

(a) In the year 1977, Kitab Singh – respondent herein was  

employed by the appellant-Company on piece rate basis in  

the Packing Department.   On 28.11.1988, respondent was  

charge- sheeted for committing theft of goods belonging to  

the appellant-Company for which a written explanation dated  

12.10.1989 was submitted by the respondent seeking pardon  

and  assuring  that  he  would  not  indulge  in  any  such  

misconduct in future.  This was accepted by the appellant-

Company.  

(b) On  01.10.1992,  respondent  submitted  his  resignation  

citing  domestic  circumstances  and the  appellant-Company  

accepted the resignation on the same day.

(c) On 07.10.1992, respondent wrote a letter to the Chief  

Minister of Haryana, leveling certain allegations against the  

management  of  the  appellant-Company.  In  that  letter,  he  

alleged that on 30.09.1992, in the evening after finishing his  

duty, when he went to the puncture shop outside the factory  

to collect his scooter, which he had left in the morning, the  

security guard accused him of taking stolen goods in a bag.  

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He  further  alleged  that  he  was  beaten  up,  given  electric  

shock  and  forced  to  write  the  resignation  letter  and  

thereafter, left him in his home in an unconscious condition.  

It was further stated in that letter that when the respondent  

had gone to the factory in the morning of 01.10.1992, he was  

not allowed to enter.   

(d) Respondent  sent  a  notice  dated  13.10.1992  to  the  

appellant-Company stating that when he went to attend duty  

on 01.10.1992, the security officer refused to enter him and  

he had not been given compensation under Section 25-F of  

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as  

“the Act”) and that he should be reinstated with continuity of  

service.     

(e) The State  Government,  vide  letter  dated  11.01.1993,  

rejected his request for a Reference on the ground that he  

himself  had  resigned  from  the  job  after  submitting  

resignation.

(f) Aggrieved  by  the  said  reply,  respondent  filed  a  Writ  

Petition being CWP No. 10642 of 1993 before the High Court  

praying for referring the dispute to the Labour Court.  The  

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High Court allowed the same with a direction to the State  

Government  to  refer  the  matter  to  the  Labour  Court  for  

adjudication.     

(g) On  21.04.1994,  respondent  filed  a  Claim  Statement  

before the Labour Court alleging that he had not resigned  

and that he should be ordered to be reinstated on duty with  

continuity of service and back wages.   

(h) Appellant-Company  filed  a  written  statement  stating,  

inter alia, that respondent is not entitled to any relief by way  

of re-instatement  or by way of back  wages as  he himself  

resigned from the service.   

(i) The Labour Court, by order dated 02.02.2005, dismissed  

the Reference and the Claim Statement of the respondent.

(j) Aggrieved by the said order, on 07.08.1995, respondent  

filed a Petition being Civil  Writ Petition No. 11450 of 1995  

before the High Court. Learned single Judge, by order dated  

09.01.2008  set  aside  the  Award  of  the  Labour  Court  and  

directed the appellant-Company to reinstate the respondent  

in service with 25% back wages.  

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(k) Not satisfied with the order of learned single Judge, on  

07.02.2008,  the  appellant-Company  filed  a  Letters  Patent  

Appeal No. 48 of 2008 before the Division Bench of the High  

Court.  By judgment dated 04.10.2008, the Division Bench  

dismissed the said Appeal.  

(l) Being aggrieved, the appellant-Company preferred this  

appeal by way of special leave.  

4) We heard Mr. Raj Kumar Mehta, learned counsel for the  

appellant-Company and Mr.  S.N. Bhat,  learned counsel  for  

the respondent-workman.

5) The only question that was posed and discussed before  

the learned single Judge of the High Court was as to whether  

the  workman  had  voluntarily  resigned  on  01.10.1992,  as  

claimed by the Management or was he forced to resign on  

30.09.1992 as alleged by the workman?  After  finding  that  

had  the  workman  resigned  voluntarily  on  01.10.1992,  he  

would not have complained to the Management on that very  

day and run from pillar to post, by making various complaints  

to higher authorities, including the Chief Minister of the State  

and if the workman had committed any misconduct like theft  

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etc.,  the Management  could have held  a  domestic  inquiry  

and taken a  suitable  action as  per  law,  the  single  Judge  

ultimately concluded that the workman was retrenched from  

employment without complying with Section 25-F of the Act.

6) Before  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court,  the  

Management  raised  a  question  relating  to  the  scope  of  

interference by a writ Court in a finding of fact rendered by a  

Tribunal/Labour Court.  It was urged by the Management that  

the Labour Court, having arrived at a firm finding that the  

workman  was  never  tortured  or  that  the  story  of  forcible  

resignation claimed by him was unreliable, the learned single  

Judge ought not to have interfered with the same in exercise  

of his extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the  

Constitution of India.  Learned counsel for the Management  

further  contended that  in  no circumstance,  a  direction for  

reinstatement  of  the  workman  in  service  is  warranted,  

particularly  when  having  regard  to  his  misconduct,  the  

Management  had  completely  lost  confidence  in  the  

workman.   On  the  other  hand,  learned  counsel  for  the  

workman contended that when the findings rendered by the  

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Labour  Court  are  contrary  to  the  material  evidence  on  

record, it shall amount to perversity and the writ Court is fully  

justified in interfering with the same.  On going through the  

entire materials, the Division Bench accepted the stand of  

the workman and confirmed the order passed by the learned  

single Judge.   

7) Similar  contentions  as  raised  before  the  single  Judge  

and the Division Bench of the High Court were raised before  

us by both the parties.  

8) Before considering the merits of the claim of both the  

parties, it is useful to refer the jurisdiction of the High Court  

under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.  After  

adverting to earlier decisions, this Court in  Surya Dev Rai  

vs.  Ram  Chander  Rai  &  Ors., (2003)  6  SCC  675  

summarized  various  circumstances  under  which  the  High  

Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227  

of the Constitution which are as under:

“38. Such like matters frequently arise before the High  Courts. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at  the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder:

(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7- 2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot  

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and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the  High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

(2)  Interlocutory  orders,  passed  by  the  courts  subordinate  to the High Court,  against  which remedy of  revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of  1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue  to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of  the High Court.

(3) Certiorari,  under Article 226 of the Constitution,  is  issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a  subordinate  court  is  found  to  have  acted  (i)  without  jurisdiction — by assuming jurisdiction where there exists  none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction — by overstepping  or  crossing  the  limits  of  jurisdiction,  or  (iii)  acting  in  flagrant  disregard  of  law  or  the  rules  of  procedure  or  acting  in  violation  of  principles  of  natural  justice  where  there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning  failure of justice.

(4)  Supervisory  jurisdiction  under  Article  227  of  the  Constitution  is  exercised  for  keeping  the  subordinate  courts  within  the  bounds  of  their  jurisdiction.  When  a  subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does  not have or  has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it  does  have  or  the  jurisdiction  though  available  is  being  exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law  and  failure  of  justice  or  grave  injustice  has  occasioned  thereby,  the  High  Court  may  step  in  to  exercise  its  supervisory jurisdiction.

(5)  Be  it  a  writ  of  certiorari  or  the  exercise  of  supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere  errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements  are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the  face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear  ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and  (ii)  a  grave  injustice  or  gross  failure  of  justice  has  occasioned thereby.

(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e.  which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving  into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn  process  of  reasoning.  Where  two  inferences  are  

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reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen  to  take  one  view,  the  error  cannot  be  called  gross  or  patent.

(7)  The  power  to  issue  a  writ  of  certiorari  and  the  supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and  only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of  the  High  Court  dictates  it  to  act  lest  a  gross  failure  of  justice  or  grave  injustice  should  occasion.  Care,  caution  and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the  abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during  the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate  court  and  the  error  though  calling  for  correction  is  yet  capable  of  being  corrected  at  the  conclusion  of  the  proceedings  in  an  appeal  or  revision  preferred  thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari  or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct  the  smooth  flow  and/or  early  disposal  of  the  suit  or  proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene  where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very  moment,  may become incapable of  correction at a later  stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of  justice  or  where  such  refusal  itself  would  result  in  prolonging of the lis.

(8)  The  High  Court  in  exercise  of  certiorari  or  supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court  of  appeal and indulge  in reappreciation  or  evaluation  of  evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct  errors of mere formal or technical character.

(9)  In  practice,  the  parameters  for  exercising  jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for  exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and  the width of  jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts  in  India  unlike  English  courts  has  almost  obliterated  the  distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising  jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may  annul  or  set  aside  the  act,  order  or  proceedings  of  the  subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision  in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the  High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to  guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it  would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court  may  in  appropriate  cases  itself  make  an  order  in  supersession  or  substitution  of  the  order  of  the  

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subordinate court  as the court  should have made in the  facts and circumstances of the case.”

In  the  light  of  the  above  principles,  while  reiterating  the  

same,  we  have  to  consider  whether  the  High  Court  has  

exceeded its power as claimed by the learned counsel for the  

appellant?

9) It  is  relevant  to  note  that  in  order  to  find  out  the  

correctness of the order passed by the learned single Judge,  

the Division Bench summoned all the records of the Labour  

Court and perused the same.  In the written claim before the  

Labour Court, the workman has specifically alleged that on  

01.10.1992,  he  sent  a  notice-cum-application  to  the  

Management  and  a  news  item  to  this  effect  was  duly  

published in a vernacular local daily.  This factual aspect and  

version,  particularly  the  receipt  of  notice-cum-application  

dated 01.10.1992 from the workman, has not been denied in  

the written statement filed by the Management.  The main  

emphasis in the written statement of the Management was  

that the workman had voluntarily tendered his resignation on  

01.10.1992.  It is brought to our notice that the Labour-cum-

Conciliation Officer has not disputed the important fact that  

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the workman protested in writing on the very next day of the  

incident.   Whether the complaint sent by the workman on  

07.10.1992  and  the  resignation  tendered  by  him  on  

01.10.1992 was voluntary or not have not been adverted to  

by the Labour Court.   According to us,  these are the real  

issues  in  this  case.   As  rightly  observed  by  the  Division  

Bench, we also noticed contradictory findings by the Labour  

Court with regard to the claim of the workman that he was  

tortured by the Management on 30.09.1992 and was made  

to write the resignation letter on 01.10.1992.  Again, it was  

rightly observed by the Division Bench that certain relevant  

facts such as workman had been in service since 1977 and in  

such  circumstance  whether  there  is  any  need  to  resign  

without  any  acceptable  reason  that  too  without  any  

monetary incentive and complaint on the same day to the  

Management  and  higher  authorities  including  the  Chief  

Minister, were not at all considered by the Labour Court and  

merely accepted that the workman tendered the resignation  

in his own writing.      

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10) Even  the  claim  of  theft  in  the  year  1988  by  the  

workman  has  not  been  specifically  raised  in  the  written  

statement before the Labour Court and raised for the first  

time only before the writ Court.

11) We  are  satisfied  that  the  learned  single  Judge  

thoroughly analysed all the aspects and arrived at a correct  

conclusion.   It  is  settled  law  that  when  the  Labour  Court  

arrived at a finding overlooking the materials on record, it  

would amount to perversity and the writ Court would be fully  

justified  in  interfering  with  the  said  conclusion.   We  are  

conscious of the fact that the High Court exercising  writ of  

certiorari would  not  permit  to  assume  the  role  of  the  

appellate Court, however, the Court is well within its power to  

interfere if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the  

Tribunal/Labour Court had erroneously refused to admit the  

admissible  and  material  evidence,  or  had  erroneously  

admitted any inadmissible evidence which has influenced the  

impugned  finding,  the  writ  Court  would  be  justified  in  

exercising its remedy.  In other words, if a finding of fact is  

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based on no evidence that would be regarded as an error of  

law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari.   

12) On going through the  entire  reasoning of the Labour  

Court, materials placed and stand taken by the workman and  

the  Management,  we are  satisfied that  the  learned single  

Judge  was  fully  justified  in  interfering  with  the  conclusion  

arrived  at  by  the  Labour  Court  which  has  been  rightly  

affirmed by the Division Bench.  Consequently, the appeal of  

the Management fails and the same is dismissed with costs  

quantified at Rs.10,000/-.

...…………….…………………………J.               (P. SATHASIVAM)                                  

 .….....…………………………………J.       (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)         

NEW DELHI; JANUARY 24, 2013.  

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