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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL     APPEAL     NO.     1332     OF     2012   [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.3786 of 2012]

M.C. GUPTA … Appellant

Versus

CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,  DEHRADUN     … Respondent

WITH

CRIMINAL     APPEAL     NO.     1333     OF     2012   [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.5908 of 2012]

MOHAN LAL GUPTA         … Appellant

Versus

CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,  DEHRADUN     … Respondent

JUDGMENT

(SMT.)     RANJANA     PRAKASH     DESAI,     J.   

1. Leave granted.

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2. These appeals, by special leave, are directed against the  

judgment and order dated 27/03/2012 delivered by the  

Uttarakhand High Court confirming the judgment and order of  

conviction and sentence dated 08/10/1999 / 25/10/1999  

passed by the Special Judge, Anti  Corruption, U.P. (East),  

Dehradun in C.B.I. Case No.3/90, whereby the Special Judge  

convicted the appellants, inter alia, under the provisions of the  

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short, “Act of 1947”).

3. It is necessary to narrate the facts of the case.  Appellant  

M.C. Gupta was posted as Assistant Divisional Manager, New  

India Assurance Company Limited (for short, “the Company”).  

He was authorized by the Company to operate its Account  

No.314 held with the Punjab National Bank, Civil Lines,  

Moradabad.  Appellant Mohan Lal Gupta was the proprietor of  

M/s. Mohan Dal Mill. Account No.SSI/53 was held in the  

name of M/s. Mohan Dal Mill with State Bank of India, Orai,  

District Jalaun, Uttar Pradesh.

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4. On 09/07/1988, appellant M.C. Gupta issued cheque  

No.QDE-800186 in the sum of Rs.1,00,200/- from the account  

of the Company and asked the bank to prepare a draft of  

Rs.1,00,000/- in favour of M/s. Mohan Dal Mill.  Appellant  

M.C. Gupta himself prepared the draft application dated  

09/07/1988.  The bank, accordingly, prepared a draft of  

Rs.1,00,000/- on the same date and debited the amount of  

cheque from the account of the Company.  Appellant M.C.  

Gupta himself collected the said draft from the bank and sent  

it to his relative appellant - Mohan Lal Gupta at Orai, who  

deposited the same on 14/07/1988 in the aforementioned  

account of M/s. Mohan Dal Mill vide pay-in-slip dated  

14/07/1988.  Thus, appellant M.C. Gupta, in collusion with  

appellant Mohan Lal Gupta, dishonestly and fraudulently  

misappropriated the Company’s money, which is public  

money, for wrongful gain to appellant Mohan Lal Gupta,  

thereby causing corresponding losses to the Company.  

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5. When the siphoning off of money came to light, a FIR was  

lodged on 19/02/1990 under Section 5(2) read with Section  

5(1)(c) of the Act of 1947.  After investigation, C.B.I. submitted  

charge-sheet against both the appellants before the Special  

Judge.  After perusing the evidence, the Special Judge  

convicted and sentenced appellant M.C. Gupta to RI for one  

year and a fine of Rs.1,000/- for offence under Section 120-B  

of the IPC.  He was also sentenced to RI for two years and a  

fine of Rs.2,000/- for offence under Section 409 of the IPC.  In  

addition, he was sentenced to RI for one year and a fine of  

Rs.1,000/- under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(c) of the  

Act of 1947.  Appellant Mohan Lal Gupta was sentenced to RI  

for one year and a fine of Rs.1,000/- for offence under Section  

120-B of the IPC.  He was also sentenced to RI for one year  

and a fine of Rs.1,000/- for offence under Section 409 of the  

IPC.  He was also sentenced to RI for one year and a fine of  

Rs.1,000/- for offence under Section 5(2) read with Section  

5(1)(c) of the Act of 1947 read with Section 120-B of the IPC.  

All sentences were to run concurrently.  In default of payment  

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of fine, the appellants were to undergo imprisonment for six  

months.  

6. Being aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence,  

both the appellants filed separate appeals to the High Court.  

As we have already noted, by the impugned order, the appeals  

were dismissed by the High Court and, hence, the present  

appeals.   

7. The basic submission of Mr. Amarendra Sharan and Mr.  

S.K. Dubey, learned senior counsel for the appellants is based  

on the fact that the Act of 1947 stood repealed by the  

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, “the New Act”).  

The alleged crime took place between 9/7/1988 and  

14/07/1988 and FIR was lodged in respect of the same on  

19/02/1990 alleging offences under the Act of 1947.  Counsel  

submitted that FIR could not have been lodged for the offences  

punishable under the Act of 1947, which stood repealed by the  

New Act.  It was urged that in fact, by reason of repeal,  

proceedings  under   the  Act  of 1947   stand  obliterated.  

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In this connection, our attention was drawn to Section 30 of  

the New Act.  Sub-section 1 of Section 2 thereof provides for  

repeal and saving.  It states that the Act of 1947 stands  

repealed.  It was pointed out that Sub-section 2 of Section 30  

of the New Act states that notwithstanding such repeal, but  

without prejudice to the application of Section 6 of the General  

Clauses Act, 1897 (for short, “the GC Act”), anything done or  

any action taken or purported to have been done or taken  

under or in pursuance of the Acts so repealed shall, in so far  

as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the New Act be  

deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of  

the corresponding provisions of the New Act.  

8. Counsel pointed out that nothing was done or no action  

was taken in pursuance of the Act of 1947 and, therefore,  

there was no question of coming to a conclusion that any  

action taken could be deemed to have been taken under the  

provisions of the New Act.  Since no action was taken under  

the Act of 1947, there was no question of saving it.  Counsel  

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also drew our attention to Section 6 of the GC Act which  

speaks about the effect of repeal.  Counsel submitted that the  

instant case is not covered by any of the sub-clauses of  

Section 6 of the GC Act so as to come to a conclusion that any  

investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted,  

continued or enforced or any penalty or punishment may be  

imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed.  Counsel  

submitted that, in the circumstances, the entire prosecution is  

vitiated and, hence, it is necessary for this Court to quash the  

proceedings and set the appellants free.  Alternatively, counsel  

submitted that since the amount of Rs.1,00,000/- was repaid  

by the appellants before 19/02/1990 i.e. even before the FIR  

was lodged, this Court should reduce the sentence of the  

appellants to the sentence already undergone by them.  In  

support of this submission, counsel relied on Satpal     Kapoor    

etc.       v.      State     of     Punjab     etc.  1   and Shiv     Nandan     Dixit       v.    

State     of     U.P.  2  .  Mr. Chandhiok, learned Additional Solicitor  

General, for the C.B.I. supported the impugned judgment.  

1 (1996) 11 SCC 769 2 (2003) 12 SCC 636

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9. We are unable to accept the submissions of learned  

counsel for the appellants.  It is true that according to the  

prosecution, the alleged offence took place between 9/7/1988  

and 14/7/1988.  The New Act came into force on 9/9/1988.  

The FIR was registered against the appellants, inter alia, for  

offences punishable under the Act of 1947.  Charges were  

framed against the appellants, inter alia, under the provisions  

of the Act of 1947 and the appellants were tried and convicted  

as aforesaid.  Since the repeal of Act of 1947 is the major  

plank of the appellants’  submissions, it is necessary to quote  

Section 30 of the New Act which repealed the Act of 1947. It  

reads thus:

“30.Repeal and saving:- (1) The Prevention of  Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947) and the Criminal  Law Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952) are hereby  repealed.

(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, but without  prejudice to the application of section 6 of  the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of  1897), anything done or any action taken  or purported to have been done or taken  under or in pursuance of the Acts so  repealed shall, in so far as it is not  inconsistent with the provisions of this  

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Act, be deemed to have been done or  taken under or in pursuance of the  corresponding provision of this Act.”

Sub-section 1 of Section 30 makes it clear that the Act of  

1947 has been repealed.  Sub-section 2 of Section 30 of the  

New Act says that anything done or any action taken or  

purported to have been done or taken under or in pursuance  

of the repealed Acts in so far as it is not inconsistent with the  

New Act, shall be deemed to have been done or taken in  

pursuance of the New Act.  Thus, a deeming fiction is  

introduced so far as action taken under the repealed Act is  

concerned.    

10. Sub-section 2 of Section 30 keeps the application of  

Section 6 of the GC Act intact and if a situation is not covered  

by Section 30, resort to Section 6 of the GC Act is open.  

Section 6 of the GC Act reads thus:

“6. Effect of repeal:- Where this Act, or any  Central Act or Regulation made after the  commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment  hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a  different intention appears, the repeal shall not –

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(a) revive anything not in force or existing  at the time at which the repeal takes  effect; or

(b) affect the previous operation of any  enactment so repealed or anything  duly done or suffered thereunder; or

(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or  liability acquired, accrued or incurred  under any enactment so repealed; or

(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or  punishment incurred in respect of any  offence committed against any  enactment so repealed; or

(e) affect any investigation, legal  proceeding or remedy in respect of  any such right, privilege, obligation,  liability, penalty, forfeiture or  punishment as aforesaid,

and any such investigation, legal proceeding or  remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced,  and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may  be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had  not been passed.”

11. In this connection, we may usefully refer to the decision  

of this court in Bansidhar     &     Ors.      V.      State     of     Rajasthan     &    

Ors.  3   where this court was dealing with the question whether  

3 (1989) 2 SCC 557

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the proceedings for fixation of ceiling area with reference to the  

appointed date i.e. 1/4/1966 under Chapter III-B of the  

Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 could be initiated and continued  

after coming into force of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling  

on Agricultural Holdings Act which with effect from 1/1/1973  

repealed Section 5(6-A) and Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan  

Tenancy Act, 1955.  While dealing with this question, this  

court observed that when there is a repeal of a statute  

accompanied by re-enactment of a law on the same subject,  

the provisions of the new enactment would have to be looked  

into not for the purpose of ascertaining whether the  

consequences envisaged by Section 6 of the GC Act ensued or  

not - but only for the purpose of determining whether the  

provisions in the new statute indicate a different intention.  

This court further observed that a saving provision in a  

repealing statute is not exhaustive of the rights and  

obligations so saved or the rights that survive the repeal.  This  

court quoted a paragraph from its judgment in I.T.  

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Commissioner      v.      Shah     Sadiq     &     Sons     4 : (SCC p.524, para  

15).  It reads thus:

“…  In other words whatever rights are expressly  saved by the ‘savings’  provision stand saved.  But,  that does not mean that rights which are not saved  by the ‘savings’  provision are extinguished or stand  ipso facto terminated by the mere fact that a new  statute repealing the old statute is enacted.  Rights  which have accrued are saved unless they are taken  away expressly.  This is the principle behind Section  6(c), General Clauses Act, 1897. …”

12. Thus assuming the proceedings under the Act of 1947  

initiated against the appellants cannot be saved by Section  

30(2) of the New Act because no action was taken pursuant to  

the Act of 1947, prior to coming into force of the New Act,  

saving clause contained in Section 30 is not exhaustive.  

Section 6 of the GC Act can still save the proceedings.  

13. Viewed from this angle, clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of  

the GC Act become relevant for the present case.  Sub-clause  

(c) says that if any Central Act repeals any enactment, the  

repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability  

4 (1987) 3 SCC 516

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acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so  

repealed. In this case, the right which had accrued to the  

investigating agency to investigate the crime which took place  

prior to the coming into force of the New Act and which was  

covered by the Act of 1947 remained, unaffected by reason of  

clause (c) of Section 6.  Clause (e) says that the repeal shall  

not affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in  

respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability,  

penalty, forfeiture or punishment and Section 6 further states  

that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may  

be instituted, continued or enforced and such penalty,  

forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing  

Act had not been passed.  Therefore, the right of C.B.I. to  

investigate the crime, institute proceedings and prosecute the  

appellants is saved and not affected by the repeal of Act of  

1947.  That is to say, the right to investigate and the  

corresponding  liability  incurred are saved.  Section 6 of the  

GC Act qualifies  the  effect  of  repeal  stated in sub-clauses  

(a)  to  (e)  by the  words  ‘unless a  different intention  

appears’.  Different  intention  must   appear  in  the  repealing  

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Act (See  Bansidhar).  If the repealing Act  discloses a  

different intention, the repeal shall not result in situations  

stated in sub-clauses (a) to (e).  No different intention is  

disclosed in the provisions of the New Act to hold that repeal  

of the Act of 1947 affects the right of the investigating agency  

to investigate offences which are covered by the Act of 1947 or  

that it prevents the investigating agency from proceeding with  

the investigation and prosecuting the accused for offences  

under the Act of 1947.  In our opinion, therefore, the repeal of  

the Act of 1947 does not vitiate or invalidate the criminal case  

instituted against the appellants and the consequent  

conviction of the appellants for offences under the provisions  

of the Act of 1947.

14.  There is no substance in the contention that the  

appellants could not have been charged under the provisions  

of the Act of 1947 after its repeal.  As we have already noted,  

the offence is alleged to have been committed prior to the  

coming into force of the New Act.  When the offence was  

committed, the Act of 1947 was in force.  It is elementary that  

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no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation  

of a law in force at the time of commission of the act charged  

as an offence nor can he be subjected to a penalty greater  

than that which might have been inflicted under the law in  

force at the time of the commission of the offence.  Article  

20(1) of the Constitution of India is clear on this point.  The  

appellants were, therefore, rightly charged, tried and convicted  

under the provisions of the Act of 1947.  We may also note  

that the provisions of the New Act are more stringent than the  

provisions of the Act of 1947.  The appellants cannot,  

therefore, be said to have been prejudiced.  

15. So far as the merits of the case are concerned, in our  

opinion, the guilt of the appellants is clearly established and,  

hence, no interference is necessary with the impugned  

judgment of the High Court which has confirmed the  

conviction and sentence of the appellants.   

16. That takes us to the arguments on quantum of sentence.  

In Satpal     Kapoor  , the appellant therein was charged, inter  

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alia, under Section 5(2) of the Act of 1947.  He was an angina  

patient, suffering from coronary diseases requiring medical  

attention.  He was 60 years of age.  Considering these facts,  

his sentence was reduced to four months’  simple  

imprisonment.  

17. In Shiv     Nandan     Dixit  , the appellants therein were  

charged, inter alia, under Section 5(1)(c) read with Section 5(2)  

of the Act of 1947.  While considering the quantum of  

sentence, this court took into account the fact that the  

incident had taken place nearly 23 years ago.  Considering the  

fact that the appellants therein had lost their jobs and retiral  

benefits; that the prolonged litigation had caused considerable  

loss to them and that they had crossed 60 years of age, this  

court reduced the sentence of one year RI to a period of six  

months’ RI.   

18. In this case, so far as appellant M.C. Gupta is concerned,  

he is about 70 years’  old and is stated to be suffering from  

various ailments.  The crime in question took place about 24  

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years ago.  In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that his  

sentence of two years’ RI for offence under Section 409 of the  

IPC should be reduced to one year’s RI and is accordingly  

reduced.  Rest of the sentences awarded to him shall remain  

intact.  So far as appellant Mohan Lal Gupta is concerned, he  

has been sentenced to one year’s RI for offence under Section  

5(2) read with Section 5(1)(c) of the Act of 1947.  Considering  

the fact that he was the beneficiary of the dishonest and  

fraudulent misappropriation of the Company’s money, we are  

not inclined to reduce his sentence.  We clarify that the  

sentence of fine imposed on both the appellants is confirmed.  

The appeals are disposed of in the aforestated terms.  

……………………………………………..J.     (AFTAB ALAM)

……………………………………………..J. (RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)

NEW DELHI, AUGUST 31, 2012.

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