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REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2020 OF 2013

LT. COL. VIJAYNATH JHA      … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.          … RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

We have heard the appellant appearing in-person

and Shri Sandeep Sethi, learned Additional Solicitor

General for India.

2. This  appeal  has  been  filed  by  the  appellant

questioning the judgment and order dated 23.08.2012

passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench,

Lucknow  by  which  O.A.No.104  of  2011  filed  by  the

appellant has been rejected as not maintainable and

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returned to the appellant with liberty to file the

same before the concerned authority.

3. Brief facts of the case necessary to be noted for

deciding the issues raised in the appeal are:

The appellant was commissioned in the Indian Army

on  11.03.1989  in  the  Engineering  Discipline.  The

appellant was subsequently selected and inducted in

the Directorate General of Quality Assurance (DGQA)

from  31.05.2004.  On  completion  of  two  years  the

appellant  was  transferred  to  the  Directorate  of

Indigenization  under  DGEME.  Quality  Assurance

Selection Board (QASB) was held at DGQA organisation

for selection of the officers of the rank of Lt. Col.

and Major for permanent secondment. The appellant was

not found fit for permanent secondment by the QASB.

The  appellant  filed  a  statutory  complaint  seeking

permanent secondment in the DGQA. The complaint was

submitted at the time when the appellant was working

in  the  Army.  The  complaint  was  forwarded  to  the

Ministry of Defence. Since, the complaint pertained

to  DGQA  organisation,  the  Government  of  India,

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Ministry of Defence, Department of Defence Production

by order dated   17.12.2007 rejected the statutory

complaint of the appellant. O.A. No.104 of 2011 was

filed  by  the  appellant   before  the  Armed  Forces

Tribunal,  Regional  Bench,  Lucknow  praying  for

quashing  the  order  dated  17.12.2007  and  issuing  a

direction  to  the  respondent  to  grant  permanent

secondment  to  the  DGQA  organisation  with  all

consequential benefits retrospectively.  

4. A counter-affidavit  was filed in O.A. by the

respondent. When the O.A. was taken for hearing by

the Armed Forces Tribunal on 23.08.2012 a preliminary

objection  was  raised  by  the  respondent  that  the

relief claimed by the applicant in the O.A. is not

maintainable in the Armed Forces Tribunal. The Armed

Forces  Tribunal  heard  the  parties  on  the  above

preliminary objection and vide order dated 23.08.2012

held that O.A. is not maintainable. It is useful to

extract paragraph 16 of the judgment which is to the

following effect:

"16.The applicant's main grievance is

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that  he  was  not  considered  for permanent seconded, DGQA organisation and we find no breach in the Army Act and  the  Army  Rules  and  it  is  a separate  organisation  with  the guideline  for  induction,  appointment and promotion and Service HQ has no role  in  grant  of  second  tenure  of (sic)  permanent  secondment  of  any officer under the Army Act. The terms and condition of the service officers in DGQA is not creation of the Army Act or the Army Rules and the Armed Forces Tribunal is not the right forum for  adjudication  of  DGQA  matters. Hence the Original Application is not maintainable  and  is  returned  to  the applicant with the liberty to file the same before the concerned authority.”

5. A  miscellaneous  application  was  filed  by  the

applicant before the Tribunal seeking leave to appeal

to  this  Court  which  application  was  rejected  on

11.09.2012.  This  appeal  has  been  filed  challenging

the  order  dated  23.08.2012  and  order  dated

11.09.2012.

6. A counter-affidavit has been filed in this appeal

by  the  respondent  reiterating  their  objection  that

the relief which was claimed by the appellant in O.A.

was  not  maintainable  before  the  Armed  Forces

Tribunal.

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7. The appellant appearing in-person submits that in

DGQA Officers are drawn from Armed Forces on tenure

posting and thereafter their cases are considered for

permanent secondment as per the  Office Memorandum

dated  28.10.1978  and  Office  Memorandum  dated

22.12.1993. The DGQA is an organisation within the

control of Ministry of Defence and is composed of

persons subject to Army Act, 1950 including civilian

persons thus the Armed Forces Tribunal will have the

jurisdiction to decide the matter relating to DGQA.

Relying  on  Section  3(o)(iv)  of  the  Armed  Forces

Tribunal Act, 2007, the appellant submits that his

case is squarely covered by the said provision. The

appellant who is subject to Army Act, 1950 being a

commissioned  officer  of  Indian  Army  can  very  well

approach  the  Armed  Forces  Tribunal.  Reliance  on

judgment of Chandigarh Bench of Armed Forces Tribunal

in the case of Brig.A.K. Bhutani vs. Union of India

decided on 19.04.2011 has been placed. The appellant

has also relied on the provisions of Sections 27 and

33 of the Army Act, 1950 to support his submission.

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8. Shri Sandeep Sethi, learned Additional Solicitor

General  submits  that  the  claim  raised  by  the

appellant  before  the  Armed  Forces  Tribunal  is  not

covered by the definition of the service matter as

defined in Section 3(o) of the Armed Forces Tribunal

Act,  2007.  He  submits  that  denial  of  permanent

secondment was made by DGQA Selection Board. No order

was passed against the appellant under the Army Act

or the Army Rules against which the appellant could

have  made  a  complaint  before  the  Armed  Forces

Tribunal.   Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  has

placed  reliance  on  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in

Union of India and others vs. Colonel G.S. Grewal,

2014  (7)  SCC  303  and  on  another  judgment  of  this

Court  in  Mohammed  Ansari  vs.  Union  of  India  and

others, 2017 (3) SCC 740.  He submits that service

matters with regard to which Armed Forces Tribunal

has  jurisdiction  are  service  matters  of  Army

personnel which have been dealt under the Army Act,

Army  Rules  and  Regulations  framed  therein.   The

action which was impugned before the Tribunal by the

appellant  was  not  any  action  of  the  Army  which

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could have been complained before the Armed Forces

Tribunal. He has further submitted that Armed Forces

Tribunal  has  rightly  rejected  the  O.A.  of  the

appellant as not maintainable.

9. We have considered the submissions of the parties

and perused the records.

10. The only question which needs to be answered is

as to whether the Original Application filed by the

appellant  was  maintainable  before  the  Armed  Forces

Tribunal?

11. The main relief, which was asked by the appellant

before the Armed Forces Tribunal was to quash and set

aside  the  order  dated  17.12.2007  by  which  the

complaint of the appellant was rejected by Central

Government.   The  appellant  had  prayed  for  a

direction  to  the  respondents  to  grant  permanent

secondment  in  the  DGQA  Organization  with  all  the

consequential  benefits  retrospectively.   The  Armed

Forces Tribunal (AFT) has rejected the application of

the appellant holding that it has no jurisdiction to

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entertain the application. The Tribunal in Para 16 of

the judgment has held that there is no breach of Army

Act and the Army Rules and the Service HQ had no role

in grant of second tenure of permanent secondment of

any Army Officer in the DGQA Organisation.  Further,

the terms and conditions of the Service Officers in

DGQA is not creation of the Army Act or the Army

Rules.

12. The provisions of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act,

2007 have to be looked into to find out as to whether

the Tribunal has committed any error in refusing to

entertain  the  application  of  the  appellant.   The

Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 has been enacted to

provide for the adjudication or trial by Armed Forces

Tribunal of disputes and complaints with respect to

commission, appointments, enrolment and conditions of

service in respect of persons subject to the Army

Act, 1950, the Navy Act, 1957 and the Air Force Act,

1950.  Section 2 deals with the applicability of the

Act, which is to the following Act:-

“2.  Applicability  of  the  Act :  (1)  The provisions of this Act shall apply to all

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persons subject to the Army Act, 1950, the Navy  Act,  1957  and  the  Air  Force  Act, 1950.

 (2) This Act shall also apply to retired personnel subject to the Army Act, 1950 or the Navy Act, 1957 or the Air Force Act, 1950,  including  their  dependants,  heirs and successors, in so far as it relates to their service matters.”

13. Section 3 is a definition section.  Section 3(o)

defines “service matters”, which is to the following

effect:-

“3(o)“service matters”, in relation to the persons subject to the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950) the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) and the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950) mean  all  matters  relating  to  the conditions  of  their  service  and  shall include—

(i).remuneration (including allowances),  pension and other retirement benefits;

(ii)tenure,  including  commission, appointment,  enrolment,  probation, confirmation,  seniority,  training, promotion,  reversion,  premature retirement, superannuation, termination of service and penal deductions;

(iii)summary disposal and trials where the punishment of dismissal is awarded;

(iv)any  other  matter,  whatsoever,  but shall not include matters relating to—

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(i)orders issued under section 18 of the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950) sub- section (1) of section 15 of the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) and section 18 of  the  Air  Force  Act,  1950;  (45  of 1950) and

(ii)transfers  and  postings  including the change of place or unit on posting whether individually or as a part of unit, formation or ship in relation to the persons subject to the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950) the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) and the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950);

(iii)leave of any kind;

(iv)summary court martial except where the  punishment  is  of  dismissal  or imprisonment  for  more  than  three months;”

14. The  provision  excludes  certain  matters.   The

present case is not covered by excluded categories,

hence that part of the provision is not relevant for

the present case.  The definition of service matters

is  an  inclusive  definition.  A  look  into  the

enumerations as contained in Section 3(o) indicates

that  they  all  relate  to  matters  relating  to  the

conditions of the service of persons subject to the

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Army Act, 1950, the Navy Act, 1957 and the Air Force

Act, 1950.  Last enumeration, i.e.,  (iv) is “any

other matter whatsoever”, at first blush; it appears

that  the  said  enumeration  is  very  wide  which  may

cover all other residual categories.  But, the phrase

“any other matter whatsoever” is to take colour from

the other three enumerations and the main provision

of Section 3(o).  The pre-condition of a matter to be

a service mater has to be relating to the conditions

of their service.  Thus, for a matter to be treated

as a service matter, it must relate to the conditions

of their service.  

15. From the facts as noted above, it is clear that

the appellant was given a tenure of two years in DGQA

in  accordance  with  the  guidelines  issued  by  the

Ministry  of  Defence,  Department  of  Defence

Production, as noticed above.  After completion of

tenure of two years, the appellant returned back to

the Army.  On 06.06.2007, the appellant’s claim for

permanent secondment in the DGQA was considered by

the  QASB,  wherein  he  was  not  found  fit  for  the

permanent  secondment  by  the  QASB,  with  regard  to

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which a complaint was filed, which was rejected by

the Ministry.  DGQA is an Organisation functioning

under the Ministry of Defence, Department of Defence

Production and the question of permanent secondment

of an Army Officer was considered by the Selection

Board of DGQA.  The decision not to grant permanent

secondment to the appellant in DGQA does not in any

manner affect the service conditions of the appellant

as  Commissioned  Officer.   The  Tribunal  has  placed

reliance on a judgment of the Principal Bench of the

Armed Forces Tribunal in T.A. No. 125 of 2010, Maj.

General S.B. Akali Etc. Etc. Vs. Union of India &

Ors. In the above case, the question of selection of

the  applicant  in  Defence  Research  and  Development

Organisation was under consideration.  The objection

was  raised  that  the  AFT  has  no  jurisdiction  to

entertain  the  claim.   The  Principal  Bench  of  the

Armed Forces Tribunal, speaking through Justice A.K.

Mathur, Chairperson (as he then was), in Paragraphs

12, 13, 14 and 15 has held:-

“12.  We  have  bestowed  our  best  of consideration and we are of the opinion that as per Section 2 read with Section

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3(o) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007,  this  Tribunal  has  limited jurisdiction  to  deal  with  the  service conditions of the Army Act and Rules, but, the present case, which relates to non-selection of the petitioner by the DRDO for the rank of Lt. General and it is not supersession under the Army Act or Rules, it is under the DRDO Rules of the  Office  Memorandum  dated  23rd November, 1989. As such, this Tribunal cannot sit over the selection by DRDO to decide the issue whether petitioner has been correctly superseded or not, since the service conditions of the seconded officers under the DRDO is regulated by Office Memorandum dated 23rd November, 1979 and it is not under the Army Act and Rules. Therefore, this Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to decide this case of  supersession  of  petitioner  for promotion to the rank of Lt. General.

13.  In  this  view  of  the  matter,  we uphold the preliminary objection of the learned Counsel for the respondent and direct the Principal Registrar to remit this  case  back  to  Hon'ble  Delhi  High Court to decide the matter in accordance with law.

14. On the same lines is the case of Brig PJS Rangar & Brig Anand Solanki (TA No.  221  of  2010).  In  this  case  the incumbents were permanently seconded to Director General of Quality Assurance. It  is  also  governed  by  OM  dated  28th October, 1978, as amended from time to time. In this case also the petitioners prayer  is  to  quash  the  OM  dated  18th February, 2008, letter dated 15th May, 2008  and  empanelment  order  dated  16th June, 2008 and direct the respondents to

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give  effect  to  the  empanelment  order dated  31st  January,  2008  and  promote them  to  the  rank  of  Major  General  in accordance with their seniority in the panel.

15. The service conditions are governed by the OM dated 28th October, 1978 and the non-selection of the petitioners are by Director General Quality Assurance of Ministry of Defence. There is no breach of any service conditions under the Army Act and Rules. The non-selection of the petitioner is on account of the service conditions as mentioned in OM dated 28th October, 1978, as amended from time to time. Therefore, the objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent, in  this  case  is  also  upheld  and consequently  it  is  held  that  this Tribunal  has  no  jurisdiction  to interfere in this matter and direct the Principal Registrar to remit this case back  to  Hon'ble  Delhi  High  Court  to decide  the  matter  in  accordance  with law.”

16. The  above  judgment  has  been  referred  to  and

relied by the Tribunal.   

17. In the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Colonel

G.S.  Grewal,  (2014)  7  SCC  303, the  same  question

relating  lack  of  jurisdiction  of  AFT  came  for

consideration.   The  facts  have  been  noticed  in

Paragraph  3  of  the  judgment,  which  are  quoted  as

below:-

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“3.  The  respondent  joined  the  Indian Army as a Major. Indubitably, in that capacity  he  was  subject  to  the discipline of the Army Act, 1950. It is a  normal  practice  that  the  personnel belonging to the Armed Forces, namely, Army,  Air  Force  or  Naval  Force,  are seconded to the other offices under the Ministry  of  Defence,  which  include Department  of  Defence  Production, Department  of  Defence  Research  and Development  and  Department  of  Ex- Servicemen  Welfare.  We  are  concerned here  with  the  Department  of  Defence Production, which has Director General of  Quality  Assurances  (“DGQA”,  for short) as well as Defence Public Sector Undertaking (DPSU). The respondent was seconded  to  DGQA  on  6-11-2004  in  the rank  of  Major.  At  that  time,  it  was temporary secondment.”

18. A  policy  decision  was  taken,  which  adversely

affected the respondent’s claim for further promotion

in  DGQA.   He  challenged  the  policy  decision  and

consequently  the  order.   Before  the  Tribunal,  the

judgment  of  Principal  Bench  in  Maj.  General  S.B.

Akali  Etc.  Etc.  (supra)  was  relied  on,  which  was

brushed aside by the Tribunal.  The Tribunal decided

to entertain the application, however, observed that

the same will not be treated as a precedent.  The

Union of India, aggrieved by the said order of the

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Tribunal  has  approached  the  Supreme  Court.   This

Court considered the matter in the aforesaid light

and set aside the order of the AFT and remitted the

matter. This Court held that it was required to be

examined  as  to  whether  the  relief  claimed  was

entirely within the domain of the DGQA or for that

matter, the Ministry of Defence or it can still be

treated  as  Service  Matter  Under  Section  3(o).

Following was held in Para 26:-

“26. No doubt, it is open to Mr Bhati to refer to the statutory provisions in the AFT Act or even the Army Act in support of  his  submission.  But  many  other documents of which the learned counsel is  relying  upon  were  not  part  of  the record before the Tribunal. Secondly, as already  pointed  out  above,  no  such aspects  are  considered  either  by  the Chandigarh  Bench  in  the  impugned judgment or by the Principal Bench in Major General S.B. Akali case1. We may point  out  that  merely  because  the respondent is subject to the Army Act would  not  by  itself  be  sufficient  to conclude  that  the  Tribunal  has  the jurisdiction  to  deal  with  any  case brought before it by such a person. It would  depend  upon  the  subject-matter which is brought before the Tribunal and the  Tribunal  is  also  required  to determine as to whether such a subject- matter  falls  within  the  definition  of “service  matters”,  as  contained  in Section 3(o) of the AFT Act. In Major

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General S.B. Akali case1, the Principal Bench  primarily  went  by  this consideration.  The  subject-matter  was promotion  to  the  rank  of  Lieutenant General and this promotion was governed by the Rules contained in the Policy of DRDO  and  not  under  the  Army  Act. Therefore, in the instant case, it is required to be examined as to whether the  relief  claimed  is  entirely  within the domain of DGQA or for that matter, the Ministry of Defence or it can still be  treated  as  “service  matter”  under Section  3(o)  of  the  AFT  Act  and  two aspects are intertwined and inextricably mixed with each other. Such an exercise is to be taken on the basis of documents produced by both the sides. That has not been done. For this reason, we deem it proper  to  remit  the  case  back  to  the Tribunal  to  decide  the  question  of jurisdiction  keeping  in  view  these parameters.”

19. Although in the above case, this court did not

decide finally as to whether the claim of respondent

G.S. Grewal in the said case could be entertained by

AFT  or  not.   The  Court  remitted  the  matter  to

consider as to whether the claim is entirely within

the domain of the DGQA.   Thus, the jurisdiction of

AFT  in  a  case  where  a  person  claims  permanent

secondment  in  DGQA,  the  nature  of  relief  and  the

action  challenged  have  to  be  looked  into  for

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answering  the  question.   A  subsequent  judgment  of

this Court in the case of Mohammed Ansari Vs. Union

of India & Ors., (2017) 3 SCC 740, is also relevant

in this context.  In this case, the appellant was

appointed  as  an  Assistant  Executive  Engineer  in

Border  Roads  Engineering  Service  (BRES).   The

appellant  was  not  granted  non-functional  financial

upgradation for officers of Organised Group A.  He

made  representation  to  the  concerned  authorities,

which was turned down.  Thereafter, he filed Original

Application  No.  102  of  2012  before  the  Central

Administrative  Tribunal.   The  Tribunal  decided  the

issue  of  jurisdiction  in  favour  of  the  appellant,

which was opposed.  The Tribunal held that it has

jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the appellant.

Aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal, Union of

India  filed  a  Writ  Petition  for  quashment  of  the

order of the Tribunal.  The High Court framed the

question as to whether a member of the GREF can be

regarded as member of Armed Forces.  The High Court

after referring to Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007

and Central Civil Services (Control, Classification

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and  Appeal)  Rules,  1965  held  that  the  Central

Administrative Tribunal had no jurisdiction and only

remedy was to file an application under Article 226.

The appellant challenging the order of the High Court

came up before this Court.  In the above context,

this Court also examined the question as to whether

after  coming  into  the  force  of  the  Armed  Forces

Tribunal  Act,  2007,  it  shall  be  the  Armed  Forces

Tribunal which shall deal with the controversy or the

High Court has jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India. The judgment of this Court in

Union  of  India  &  Ors.  Vs.  Colonel  G.S.  Grewal,

(supra)  was  extensively  quoted  by  this  Court  and

after quoting Paragraph 26 of the judgment, following

was stated in Para 29:-   

“29. Thus, the Court in G.S. Grewal case clearly  held  that  merely  because  the respondent is subjected to the 1950 Act would  not  by  itself  be  sufficient  to conclude  that  the  Tribunal  had jurisdiction  to  deal  with  any  case brought before it by such a person. It would  depend  upon  the  subject-matter which is brought before the Tribunal and the  Tribunal  is  also  required  to determine as to whether such a subject- matter  falls  within  the  definition  of “service matter” as contained in Section

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3(o) of the 2007 Act.

20. This Court further laid down in Paragraphs 33 and

34:-

“33.  The  situation  insofar  as jurisdiction  of  the  Armed  Forces Tribunal  (AFT)  to  hear  the  appeals arising  out  of  court  martial  verdicts qua GREF personnel, however, appears to stand  on  a  different  footing.  It  is because  the  provisions  of  Chapter  VI i.e.  offences,  Chapter  VII  i.e. punishment,  Chapter  X  i.e.  “courts martial”,  etc.  apply  with  full  force, subject  to  minor  exceptions  and modifications here and there, as applied to  GREF.  Therefore,  the  provisions  of the  1950  Act  dealing  with  various punishments inflicted by way of courts martial  qua  GREF  personnel  as  applied can be agitated before AFT and AFT shall have  jurisdiction  to  hear  appeals arising out of courts martial verdicts. There can be no doubt that in respect of said  matters  AFT  shall  have jurisdiction. Denial of jurisdiction to the said Tribunal would be contrary to the  1950  Act  and  the  provisions engrafted  under  the  2007  Act.  To elaborate, right to approach AFT by the personnel  of  GREF  who  are  tried  by  a court martial held under the very same Act has to be recognised. At the same time, if the punishment is imposed on GREF  personnel  by  way  of  departmental proceedings  held  under  the  CCS  (CCA) Rules,  1965  then  obviously  the  same cannot be agitated before AFT since the penalty in such cases will not be one

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under the 1950 Act but will be under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The distinction, as the law exists in the present, has to be done.

34.  From  the  aforesaid,  the  legal position that emerges is that AFT shall have  jurisdiction  (i)  to  hear  appeals arising out of courts martial verdicts qua GREF personnel. To this extent alone AFT shall have jurisdiction. At the same time, if the punishment is imposed on GREF  personnel  by  way  of  departmental proceedings  held  under  the  CCS  (CCA) Rules, 1965 the same cannot be agitated before AFT; and (ii) AFT shall have no jurisdiction  to  hear  and  decide grievances of GREF personnel relating to their terms and conditions of service or alternatively put “service matters”.

21. This Court in the above case has clearly held

that  AFT  can  exercise  jurisdiction  if  the  action,

which is complained flow from the Army Act, 1950, the

example of court martial verdict was given to which

the  personnel  of  GREF  were  subject.   This  Court

further held that in event, the personnel of GREF had

been administratively dealt with in the departmental

proceedings held under the CCS(CCA) Rules, the same

cannot be agitated before the AFT.  

22. Coming back to the facts of the present case, the

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action,  which  is  impugned  before  the  AFT  was  the

refusal of permanent secondment of the appellant in

DGQA  by  QASB.  For  permanent  secondment  of  a

Commission Officer, there were orders issued by the

Ministry  of  Defence,  which  regulated  the  permanent

secondment, i.e. Government Order dated 28.10.1978,

as amended from time to time and the Government of

India O.M. dated 22.12.1993.  Non-selection of the

appellant which was impugned in the application was

by a different organisation, i.e., by QASB of DGQA.

 23. We  thus  are  of  the  view  that  action  impugned

before  the  Tribunal  cannot  be  held  to  be  service

matter  within  the  meaning  of  Section  3(o)  of  the

Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007.   

24. The  appellant,  who  has  appeared  in-person  has

further relied on two provisions namely, Section 27

and  Section  33  of  the  Army  Act,  1950,  which  are

extracted as below:-

“27. Remedy of aggrieved officers.-- Any officer who deems himself wronged by his commanding  officer  or  any  superior officer and who on due application made

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to  his  commanding  officer  does  not receive  the  redress  to  which  he considers himself entitled, may complain to the Central Government in such manner as may from time to time be specified by the proper authority. 33.  Saving  of  rights  and  privileges under laws.-- The rights and privileges specified in the preceding sections of this Chapter shall be in addition to, and  not  in  derogation  of,  any  other rights  and  privileges  conferred  on persons  subject  to  this  Act  or  on members of the regular Army, Navy and Air Force generally by any other law for the time being in force.”  

25. Section  27  provides  a  remedy  to  aggrieved

officers  to  submit  a  complaint  to  the  Central

Government, if he has been wronged by a commanding

officer or any superior officer.  Present is not a

case where any action of commanding officer or any

superior  officer  of  appellant  was  complained  or

questioned.  Thus Section 27 has no application.

26. Coming to Section 33 of the Act, which provides

for  “saving  of  rights  and  privileges  under  other

laws”.   The  said  provision  indicates  that  the

provision saves the rights and privileges conferred

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on persons subject to Army Act, by any other law for

the  time  being  in  force.”   Few  examples  of  such

privileges are as under:-

“(a)  All  Govt.  pensions  (including military  persons)  are  immune  from attachment  in  the  execution  of  the decrees  of  civil  courts;  s.  11  of pensions Act 1871, proviso (g) to s. 60 of Code of Civil Procedure 1908.  

(b) Receipts for pay or allowances of NCOs,  or  Sepoys  when  serving  in  such capacity  need  not  be  stamped;  Indian Stamp Act, schedule 1.  

(c) All officers, JCOs, WOs and OR of the regular Army on duty or on the march as well as their authorized followers, families, horses, baggage and transport are exempt from all tolls except certain tolls  for  the  transit  of  barges  etc. along canals; s. 3 of Indian Tolls (Army and Air Force ) Act 1901.”

27. The above provision has no application in facts

of the present case.  Present is not a case where the

appellant  is  claiming  any  privilege  conferred  on

persons subject to Army Act or by any other law in

force.  Section 33, thus, has no application.

28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of

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the  view  that  the  Tribunal  committed  no  error  in

holding that the application filed by the appellant

was  not  maintainable  before  the  AFT.   AFT  has

returned  the  application  of  the  applicant  to  take

proceeding before competent authorities.  In result,

the appeal is dismissed.    

..........................J. ( A.K. SIKRI )

..........................J.     ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )

NEW DELHI, MAY 18, 2018.