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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1363 OF 2007

Lilawati Agarwal (D) By Lrs.  Appellant(s) and Others

                Versus

State of Jharkhand    Respondent(s)  

J U D G M E N T  

Dipak Misra, J.

A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Lilawati Agarwal  

(Dead) By Lrs. and Others vs. State of Jharkhand1, after  

referring  to  the  paragraphs  31  and  34  of  the  

1 (2008 15 SCC 464

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pronouncement  in  Union  of  India  and  Another  vs.   

Raghubir  Singh  (Dead)  By  Lrs. Etc.2,  expressed  doubt  

with  regard  to  the  correctness  of  the  decision  in  K.S.  

Paripoornan (II)  vs.  State  of  Kerala  and Others3 and  

eventually expressed thus:-

“In Raghubir Singh case two terminus points were  fixed i.e. award by the Collector or decision of the  Reference Court must have been taken between  3-4-1982  and  24-9-1984.   It  has  been  clearly  stated in the last line of para 34 that every case  “must” have been decided between the aforesaid  terminus.  In Paripoornan II case at para 4 it was  observed that restrictive interpretation should not  be given.   With great  respect  we are unable  to  subscribe to the view.  As a matter of fact a three- Judge Bench was trying to give an interpretation  different from what was specifically given by the  Constitution Bench.

Therefore,  we  think  it  appropriate  to  refer  the  matter to a larger Bench to consider correctness  of the view expressed in para 4 in Paripoornan II   case holding  that  a  restricted  interpretation  should not be given, on the face of what has been  stated  in  para  34  of  Raghubir  Singh  case.  Records may be placed before the Hon'ble Chief  Justice of India for necessary details.”

On the  basis  of  the  aforesaid  order,  the  matter  has  

been placed before us.   

2. As we perceive, it is necessary to express an opinion  

whether  the  correctness  of  the  decision  in  K.S.  

2 (1989) 2 SCC 754 3  (1995) 1 SCC 367

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Paripoornan  (II) deserves  to  be  considered  by  a  

Constitution Bench as the pronouncement in the said case  

is binding on us.

3. To appreciate the controversy, we think it appropriate  

to  reproduce  paragraphs  30,  31  and  34  from  Raghubir  

Singh (supra):-

“30. We now come to the merits of the reference.  The reference is  limited to the interpretation of  Section  30(2)  of  the  Land  Acquisition  (Amendment) Act of 1984. Before the enactment  of  the  Amendment  Act,  solatium  was  provided  under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act  (shortly, "the parent Act") at 15% on the market  value of the Land computed in accordance with  Section  23(1)  of  the  Act,  the  solatium  being  provided  in  consideration  of  the  compulsory  nature of  the acquisition.  The Land Acquisition  Amendment  Bill,  1982  was  introduced  in  the  House of the People on 30 April, 1982 and upon  enactment the Land Acquisition Amendment Act  1984 commenced operation with effect  from 24  September, 1984. Section 15 of the Amendment  Act amended Section 23(2) of the parent Act and  substituted the words '30 per centum' in place of  the words '15 per centum'. Parliament intended  that the benefit of the enhanced solatium should  be made available albeit to a limited degree, even  in respect of acquisition proceedings taken before  that date. It sought to effectuate that intention by  enacting  Section  30(2)  in  the  Amendment  Act,  Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act provides: "(2)  the provisions of  sub-Section (2)  of  Section  23......of the principal Act, as amended by clause  (b) of Section 15........of this Act ....... shall apply  and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and

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in relation to, any award made by the Collector or  Court or to any order passed by the High Court  or  Supreme  Court  in  appeal  against  any  such  award under the provisions of  the principal Act  after  the  30th  day  of  April,  1982  [the  date  of  introduction  of  the  Land  Acquisition  (Amendment)  Bill,  1982,  in  the  House  of  the  People]  and  before  the  commencement  of  this  Act.”

31. In construing Section 30(2), it is just as well  to be clear that the award made by the Collector  referred  to  here  is  the  award  made  by  the  Collector under Section 11 of the parent Act, and  the award made by the Court is the award made  by  the  Principal  Civil  Court  of  Original  Jurisdiction under Section 23 of the parent Act on  a  reference  made  to  it  by  the  Collector  under  Section  19  of  the  parent  Act.  There  can  be  no  doubt that the benefit of the enhanced solatium is  intended by Section 30(2) in respect of an award  made by the Collector between 30 April 1982 and  24 September, 1984. Likewise the benefit of  the  enhanced solatium is extended by Section 30(2) to  the case of an award made by the Court between  30  April  1982  and  .24  September  1984,  even  though it be upon reference from an award made  before 30 April, 1982.

xxxxx xxxxx

34. Our attention was drawn to the order made  in State of  Punjab v. Mohinder Singh4, but in the  absence  of  a  statement  of  the  reasons  which  persuaded the  learned  Judges  to  take  the  view  they  did  we  find  it  difficult  to  endorse  that  decision.  It  received the approval  of  the learned  Judges  who  decided  Bhag  Singh5,  but  the  

4   (1986) 1 SCC 365 5   (1985) 3 SCC 737

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judgment in Bhag Singh, (supra) as we have said  earlier, has omitted to give due significance to all  the  material  provisions  of  Section  30(2),  and  consequently we find ourselves at variance with it.  The  learned  Judges  proceeded  to  apply  the  principle that an appeal is a continuation of the  proceeding  initiated before  the  Court  by  way of  reference  under-Section 18 but,  in  our  opinion,  the application of a general principle must yield to  the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself.  Learned  counsel  for  the  respondents  has  strenuously  relied  on the  general  principle  that  the appeal is a re-hearing of the original matter,  but we are not satisfied that he is on good ground  in invoking that principle. Learned counsel for the  respondents  points  out  that  the  word  'or'  has  been  used  in  Section  30(2),  as  a  disjunctive  between the reference to the award made by the  Collector or the Court and an order passed by the  High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal and,  he says, properly understood it must mean that  the period 30 April, 1982 to 24 September, 1984  is as much applicable to the appellate order of the  High Court or of the Supreme Court as it is to the  award  made  by  the  Collector  or  the  Court.  We  think that what Parliament intends to say is that  the benefit of Section 30(2) will be available to an  award by the Collector or the Court made between  the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of  the High Court  or  of  the  Supreme Court  which  arises  out  of  an  award  of  the  Collector  or  the  Court made between the said two dates. The word  'or' is used with reference to the stage at which  the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit  under-Section 30(2) is sought to be extended.  If  the proceeding has terminated with the award of  the Collector or of  the Court made between the  aforesaid two dates, the benefit  of  Section 30(2)  will be applied to such award made between the  aforesaid two dates. If the proceeding has passed  to the stage of appeal before the High Court or the  Supreme  Court,  it  is  at  that  stage  when  the

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benefit  of  Section  30(2)  will  be  applied.  But  in  every case,  the award of  the Collector or  of  the  Court  must  have  been  made  between  30  April,  1982 and 24 September, 1984.”

[Emphasis supplied]

4. In  Raghubir  Singh (supra),  the  question  of  law  

referred to the Constitution Bench was:-

“Whether under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  as  amended  by  the  Land  Acquisition  (Amendment) Act, 1984 the claimants are entitled  to solatium at 30 per cent of  the market value  irrespective of the dates on which the acquisition  proceedings were initiated or the dates on which  the award had been passed?”

5. In  the  said  case,  the  award  with  regard  to  

compensation was passed by the Collector in March, 1963  

and the reference under Section 18 of the Act was disposed  

of by the Additional District Judge on June 10, 1968.  The  

reference court had enhanced the compensation granted by  

the  Collector  under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  (for  

brevity, ‘the Act’).  The claimant had preferred an appeal to  

the High Court claiming further compensation.  During the  

pendency of the appeal, the Land Acquisition (Amendment)  

Bill,  1982 was introduced in the Parliament  on April  30,  

1982 and became law as the Land Acquisition (Amendment)

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Act, 1984 when it received the assent of the President on  

September 24, 1984.  The High Court disposed of the appeal  

by its judgment and order dated December 6, 1984.  While  

it raised the rate of compensation it also raised the rate of  

interest  payable  on  the  compensation  and  taking  into  

account  the  amendment  Act,  awarded  solatium  at  30%.  

The judgment and order of the High Court was under assail  

before this Court and a two-Judge Bench keeping in view  

the  decisions  in  K.  Kamalajammanniavaru  v.  Special  

Land  Acquisition  Officer6,  and  Bhag  Singh  v.  Union  

Territory of Chandigarh7 thought it apt to refer the matter  

to a larger Bench which ultimately resulted in the verdict in  

Raghubir Singh (supra).

6. To understand the dictum in Raghubir Singh (supra),  

it  is  necessary  to  understand  what  was  stated  in  Bhag  

Singh  (supra) and what has been overruled in  Raghubir  

Singh (supra).  In Bhag Singh (supra) a three-Judge Bench  

was  dealing  with  the  question  of  law  relating  to  

interpretation of Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act. In the  

said case,  the  award was passed by the land acquisition  

6   (1985) 1 SCC 582 7   (1985) 3 SCC 737

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collector on October 9, 1975 and the reference court had  

passed the award on July 31, 1979. The award passed by  

the reference court was assailed in appeal before the High  

Court. The three-Judge  Bench  considered  the decisions  

in   State  of  Punjab  v.  Mohinder  Singh8 and  K.  

Kamalajammanniavaru  (supra) and agreed with the view  

expressed in  Mohinder Singhis case and recorded therein  

disagreement  with  the  view  taken  in  K.  

Kamalajammanniavaru (supra).  Be it stated, the three-

Judge Bench in Bhag Singh (supra) while agreeing with the  

earlier three-Judge Bench decision has opined thus:-  

“We may first consider what would be the posi- tion  if  Section  30  sub-section (2)  were  not  en- acted and the amendments in Section 23 subsec- tion (2) and Section 28 were effective only from  the date on which they were made, namely, Sep- tember 24, 1984 when the Amending Act received  the assent of the President and was brought into  force. If at the date of the commencement of the  Amending Act, any proceedings for determination  of compensation were pending before the Collec- tor  under  Section  11  of  the  Act  or  before  the  court on a reference under Section 18 of the Act,  the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Sec- tion 28 would admittedly be applicable to such  proceedings. This much indeed was conceded by  the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the re- spondents  and  even  in  Kamalajammanniavaru  case (supra) it was accepted to be the correct po- sition. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking on behalf of  

8  Civil Appeal No. 3267 of 1979 decided on May 1, 1985

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the Court in Kamalajammanniavaru case (supra)  observed (SCC p. 584): “The new Section 23(2), of  course,  necessarily  applies  to  awards  made  by  the Collector or court after the commencement”  of the Amending Act. …”   

7. Regard  being  had  to  the  both  the  aspects,  it  is  

imperative to understand the issue that was referred to the  

Constitution  Bench.  As  is  noticeable,  the  larger  Bench  

observed that the reference was limited to the interpretation  

of Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act.  The Constitution  

Bench  noted  the  intention  of  the  Parliament,  referred  to  

Section 30(2)  of  the  Amendment  Act  and in  that  context  

opined that:-

“32. The question is: What is the meaning of the  words “or to any order passed by the High Court  or  Supreme Court  on appeal  against  any  such  award?” Are they limited, as contended by the ap- pellants, to appeals against an award of the Col- lector or the Court made between 30-4-1982 and  24-9-1984, or do they include also, as contended  by the respondents, appeals disposed of between  30-4-1982  and  24-9-1984  even  though  arising  out of awards of the Collector or the Court made  before 30-4-1982. We are of opinion that the in- terpretation placed by the appellants should be  preferred over that suggested by the respondents.  Parliament  has  identified  the  appeal  before  the  High Court and the appeal  before the Supreme  Court by describing it as an appeal against “any  such award”. The submission on behalf of the re- spondents  is  that  the  words  “any  such  award”  mean the award made by the Collector or Court,

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and carry no greater limiting sense; and that in  this context, upon the language of Section 30(2),  the order in appeal is an appellate order made be- tween 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 — in which case  the related award of the Collector or of the Court  may have been made before 30-4-1982. To our  mind, the words “any such award” cannot bear  the broad meaning suggested by learned counsel  for the respondents. No such words of description  by way of  identifying the appellate order of  the  High Court or of the Supreme Court were neces- sary. Plainly, having regard to the existing hierar- chical structure of fora contemplated in the par- ent Act those appellate orders could only be or- ders arising in appeal against the award of the  Collector or of  the Court.  The words “any such  award” are intended to have deeper significance,  and in the context in which those words appear  in Section 30(2) it is clear that they are intended  to refer to awards made by the Collector or Court  between  30-4-1982  and  24-9-1984.  In  other  words Section 30(2)  of  the  Amendment  Act  ex- tends  the  benefit  of  the  enhanced  solatium  to  cases where the award by the Collector or by the  Court is made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984  or to appeals against such awards decided by the  High Court and the Supreme Court whether the  decisions of the High Court or the Supreme Court  are rendered before 24-9-1984 or after that date.  All that is material is that the award by the Col- lector or by the Court should have been made be- tween  30-4-1982  and  24-9-1984.  We  find  our- selves in agreement with the conclusion reached  

by this Court in K. Kamalajammanniavaru v.  Special  Land Acquisition  Officer1,  and find  our- selves  unable  to  agree  with  the  view  taken  in  Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh2. The  expanded meaning given to Section 30(2) in the  latter case does not, in our opinion, flow reason- ably  from  the  language  of  that  sub-section.  It  seems to us that the learned Judges in that case  missed the significance of the word “such” in the

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collocation  “any  such  award”  in  Section  30(2).  Due significance must be attached to that word,  and to our mind it must necessarily intend that  the  appeal  to  the  High  Court  or  the  Supreme  Court, in which the benefit of the enhanced so- latium is to be given, must be confined to an ap- peal against an award of the Collector or of the  Court  rendered  between  30-4-1982  and  24-9- 1984”.

8. The aforesaid larger Bench decision, as we find, was  

only concerned with the grant of solatium in respect of the  

award passed between two dates,  namely, April  30, 1982  

and September 24, 1984.  The issue before the Constitution  

Bench was not relatable to any award as such passed after  

the amended date.  

9. In  K.S.  Paripoornan  (II) (supra),  the  three-Judge  

Bench appreciated the law laid down in Raghubir Singh’s  

case  and referred to Section 30(2) of the Land Acquisition  

(Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984) which was a transitory  

provision and reproduced paragraph 31 of the Constitution  

Bench judgment and then proceeded to state  thus:-

“This Court thereby clearly held that even in the  pending reference made before 30-4-1982, if the  civil  court  makes  an  award  between  30-4-1982  and 24-9-1984, Section 30(2) gets attracted and  thereby the enhanced solatium was available  to  the claimants. Since Section 30(2) deals with both  the amendments to Section 23(2) and Section 28

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of the Principal Act by Section 15(b) and Section  18, respectively, of the Amendment Act by parity  of  the  reasoning  the  same  ratio  applies  to  the  awards  made  by  the  civil  court  between  those  dates.  The  conflict  of  decisions  as  to  whether  Section 23(2) as amended by Section 15(b) of the  Amendment  Act  through  Section  30(2)  of  the  transitory  provisions would be applicable  to the  pending  appeals  in  the  High  Court  and  the  Supreme Court was resolved in Raghubir  Singh  case 1 by the Constitution Bench holding that the  award of the Collector or the court made between  13-4-1982  and  24-9-1984  would  alone  get  attracted  to  Section  30(2)  of  the  transitory  provision. The restricted interpretation should not  be understood to mean that Section 23(2) would  not apply to the award of the civil court pending  at  the  time  when  the  Act  came  into  force  or  thereafter. In this case, admittedly the award of  the civil court was made after the Act had come  into force, namely, 28-2-1985.”

10. On  a  perusal  of  the  principle  stated  in  Raghubir  

Singh case and  what  has  been  clarified  in  K.S.  

Paripoornan (II) case, we do not find that the three-Judge  

Bench  decision  runs  counter  to  the  authority  in  the  

Constitution  Bench.   It  also  does  not  give  a  different  

interpretation to Section 30(2) that what has been stated by  

the  Constitution  Bench.  In  fact,  K.S.  Paripoornan  (II)  

clearly postulates about the awards that have been passed  

by the court after the Act has come into force which is in  

consonance with the ratio laid down in  Raghubir Singh’s

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case.  The three-Judge Bench has only observed  that the  

restricted interpretation placed by the Constitution Bench  

in Raghubir Singh (supra) should not convey that Section  

23(2)  would  not  apply  to  the  awards  of  the  civil  court  

pending  at  the  time  when  the  Act  came  into  force  or  

thereafter.  Thus,  the  controversy  with  which  the  three-

Judge Bench was dealing with was absolutely different and  

the view expressed by it  is  absolutely  in accord with the  

principles  laid  down  in  Raghubir  Singh’s case.  

Additionally,  it  is  also  in  consonance with the  provisions  

contained in Section 23(2) of the Act.  Therefore, we do not  

see any reason to disagree with the view expressed in K.S.  

Paripoornan (II) as we are of the convinced opinion that it  

has appositely understood the rule exposited in  Raghubir  

Singh’s  case.   

11. Having  so stated,  ordinarily  we would  have  directed  

the matter to be placed before a two-Judge Bench, but it is  

not necessary to do so.  We have been apprised at the Bar  

that  the  award  in  this  case  had  been  passed  by  the  

reference court on 30th September, 1985.  Therefore, there  

cannot be any trace of doubt that principle stated in  K.S.

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Paripoornan (II) would squarely be applicable.   

12. The High Court by the impugned judgment has opined  

that  the  principle  stated  in  the  K.S.  Paripoornan  (II)  

(supra) would not be applicable. The said view is perceptibly  

erroneous.   We  are  of  the  considered   opinion  that  the  

appellant shall be entitled to the benefits as per the law laid  

down in K.S. Paripoornan (II).  It is not disputed at the Bar  

that the appellants are not entitled to the benefits under  

Section 23(1A) in view of the decision in K.S. Paripoornan  

(I) vs. State of Kerala9.

13. We will be failing in our duty if we do not take note of  

another  aspect.   A  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  

Sunder vs. Union of India10  has opined that:-

“24. The proviso to Section 34 of the Act makes  the position further clear. The proviso says that  "if  such  compensation"  is  not  paid  within  one  year  from the  date  of  taking  possession of  the  land,  interest  shall  stand escalated to  15% per  annum from the date of expiry of the said period  of one year "on the amount of compensation or  part thereof which has not been paid or deposited  before the date of such expiry". It is inconceivable  that the solatium amount would attract only the  escalated rate of interest from the expiry of one  year  and  that  there  would  be  no  interest  on  solatium during the preceding period. What the  

9   (1994) 5 SCC 593 10  (2001) 7 SCC 211

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legislature  intended was to  make the  aggregate  amount under Section 23 of the Act to reach the  hands of the person as and when the award is  passed, at any rate as soon as he is deprived of  the possession of his land. Any delay in making  payment of the said sum should enable the party  to have interest on the said sum until he receives  the payment. Splitting up the compensation into  different components for the purpose of payment  of  interest  under  Section  34  was  not  in  the  contemplation  of  the  legislature  when  that  section was framed or enacted.

xxx xxx xxx

27. In our view the aforesaid statement of law is  in  accord  with  the  sound  principle  of  interpretation.  Hence the person entitled to the  compensation  awarded  is  also  entitled  to  get  interest  on  the  aggregate  amount  including  solatium. The reference is answered accordingly.”

14. We  have  referred  to  the  aforesaid  authority  by  

abundant caution so that the respondent while computing  

the  amount  shall  take  the  same  into  consideration.  

Needless to say, in case the respondent do not comply with  

the judgment, execution can be levied and at that juncture  

this aspect can also be taken note of as it forms a part of  

the decree.

15. Resultantly,  the  appeal  is  allowed and it  is  directed  

that the appellants shall be entitled to the benefits as stated

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herein-above. The judgment and the decree passed by the  

High Court stands modified. The respondents are directed  

to deposit the amount before the executing court within six  

weeks hence.  If any amount has already been deposited,  

that shall be taken into consideration while computing the  

amount.  In the fact and circumstances of the case, there  

shall be no order as to costs.   

..............................J.       (Dipak Misra)

    …..........................J.       (V. Gopala Gowda)

…..........................J.        (Kurian Joseph)

New Delhi  April 01, 2016.