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       REPORTABLE    

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                          ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

CONTEMPT PETITION (C) No. 363 OF 2011

IN

WRIT PETITION (CRL.) No. 279 OF 2004

Life Convict Bengal @ Khoka @ Prasanta Sen    .... Petitioner (s)

Versus

B.K. Srivastava & Ors.                         .... Alleged Contemnors/ Respondent(s)

     J U D G M E N T

P.Sathasivam,J.

1) The petitioner – a life convict has filed this contempt  

petition against the respondents – the State of West Bengal  

and its officers for disobeying the order dated 24.11.2010  

passed by this Court by not complying with the same within  

the prescribed period of eight weeks and failure to release  

him in accordance with the statute.

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2) Brief facts:

(a) Prior to the above contempt petition, the petitioner filed  

a writ of Habeas Corpus being W.P. (Crl.) No. 279 of 2004 -  

for his immediate release in which it was stated that as per  

his  calculation,  he  has  undergone  total  sentence  of  

imprisonment for a period of 22 years 2 months and 16 days  

including earned remission.  According to him, even as per  

the  stand  taken  by  the  respondents  in  their  counter  

affidavits,  he  had undergone  sentence for  a  period  of  20  

years 1 month and 17 days including remission and set off  

as  on  31.12.2004.   In  other  words,  according  to  the  

petitioner,  he  has  already  undergone  full  sentence  of  20  

years with remission.

(b) By order dated 24.11.2010, this Court disposed of W.P.  

(Crl.) Nos. 20 and 279 of 2004 with the following directions:

“In  the  light  of  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  State  of  Haryana  &  Ors. vs.  Jagdish,  2010  (4)  SCC  216  and  considering the relief prayed in both the writ petitions, we  dispose of the writ petitions by the following directions:

The State of West Bengal is directed to consider the  claim of both the writ petitioners, life convicts and proceed  to conclude the sentence for the purpose of consideration  of  remission  as  per  the  Statute/Policy  applicable  on  the  date of conviction and pass appropriate orders in terms of  

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the above decision within a period of eight weeks from the  date of the receipt of the copy of this order.

The Writ Petitions are disposed of.

Sd/-             (P.Sathasivam,J.)   

 Sd/-                 (Dr. B.S.ChauhanJ.)”

3) It is the claim of the petitioner that in spite of the said  

order of this Court dated 24.11.2010 and in view of the West  

Bengal Correctional Services Act, 1992 (West Bengal Act 32  

of  1992)  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  W.B.Act”),  the  

respondents have not released him which necessitated him  

to file the above contempt petition.

4) Pursuant  to  the  notice issued by this  Court,  Mr.  B.K.  

Srivastava, respondent No.1, Secretary to the Government of  

West  Bengal,  Judicial  Department  has  filed  the  counter  

affidavit highlighting their stand.  In addition to the same,  

Dr.  G.D.  Gautama,  respondent  No.2,  Additional  Chief  

Secretary  to  the  Government  of  West  Bengal,  Home  

Department  and  Mr.  Biplab  Das  -  respondent  No.3,  

Superintendent  of  the  Presidency Correctional  Home have  

filed  counter  affidavits  reiterating  their  stand.   In  these  

counter  affidavits,  the  State  Government  has  highlighted  

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that on going into the period of custody, other particulars  

and the provisions of the West Bengal Act,  it  rejected the  

prayer  of  the petitioner  for  his  premature release,  hence,  

according  to  them,  there  is  no  violation  of  order  dated  

24.11.2010 passed by this Court and prayed for dismissal of  

the present contempt petition.

5) We heard Mr. B.S. Malik, learned senior counsel for the  

petitioner and Mr. Avijit Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for  

the respondents.

Discussion:

6) In order to appreciate the claim of both the parties, it is  

useful  to  refer  relevant  provisions  relating  to  release  of  

prisoners under the W.B. Act.  Section 2(c) of the W.B. Act  

defines “correctional home” which reads as under:

“2(c)  “correctional  home”  means  any  place  used  permanently or temporarily under the orders of the State  Government for detention of persons, whether under-trial  or convicted, in accordance with any order for confinement  under any law providing for  preventive detention or  any  other law for the time being in force, but does not include a  place for confinement of a person under the custody of the  police;”

Chapter  XVII  of  the said Act deals with remission,  release  

and parole.  Section 58 speaks about remission, Section 59  

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relates to special  remission to examinees and Section 61,  

with which we are concerned, speaks about release.  Section  

61 contains 6 sub-sections and thereafter Explanation has  

been appended to.  Mr. B.S. Malik, learned senior counsel for  

the petitioner heavily relied on the Explanation to Section 61  

which reads as under:

“Explanation – For the purpose of calculation of the total  period of  imprisonment under this  section,  the period of  imprisonment for life shall be taken to be equivalent to the  period of imprisonment for 20 years.”

7) Relying on the Explanation and in view of the fact that  

even according to the State, the petitioner has crossed 20  

years in correctional home (prison), according to the learned  

senior counsel, as per order of this Court dated 24.11.2010,  

the respondents ought to  have released the petitioner  on  

completion of a period of 20 years.  The above claim was  

resisted by Mr. Avijit Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the  

respondents.  According to him, it cannot be construed that  

the  period  of  imprisonment  for  life  is  equivalent  to  

imprisonment for 20 years.  He further pointed out that in  

the absence of remission order for the whole period by the  

State Government, the petitioner cannot be released.

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8) Even  at  the  outset,  Mr.  B.S.  Malik,  learned  senior  

counsel for the petitioner, relied on a decision rendered by  

this Court on 16.09.2011 in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 38 of 2011  

titled Harpal Singh vs. State of Haryana & Another.  The  

said writ petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution, was  

filed by one Harpal Singh for issuing a writ of Habeas Corpus  

and to set him at liberty forthwith from his illegal detention  

in the prison beyond 20 years of his sentence.  This Court,  

after going into the Jail Custody Certificate dated 28.08.2011  

issued  by  the  Superintendent  Central  Jail,  Ambala  and  

finding that the petitioner had undergone imprisonment of  

more than 20 years with remissions, allowed the writ petition  

and directed the authorities to release him forthwith from  

the jail unless his presence in jail is needed with reference to  

any other case.

9) After going into the relevant provisions, viz., Section 57  

of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”), Sections 2(c)  

and 61 of the W.B. Act as well as various decisions of this  

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Court on this point, we are unable to accept the claim of the  

petitioner for the following reasons.   

10) Before  adverting  to  various  decisions,  it  is  useful  to  

reproduce Section 57 of IPC which reads as under:

“57.  Fractions of term of punishment – In calculating  fractions  of   terms of  punishment,  imprisonment  for  life  shall be reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty  years.”

11) At the foremost, it is useful to refer the decision of the  

Constitution Bench of this Court in  Gopal Vinayak Godse  

vs.  The State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 600.  

In  that  case,  a  writ  petition,  under  Article  32  of  the  

Constitution, was filed for an order in the nature of  Habeas  

Corpus claiming that the petitioner therein has justly served  

his  sentence and should,  therefore,  be released forthwith.  

Among other questions, the main question considered by the  

Constitution Bench was whether there is any provision of law  

whereunder a sentence for  life imprisonment,  without any  

formal  remission  by  appropriate  Government,  can  be  

automatically  treated  as  one  for  a  definite  period?   The  

Constitution Bench, in an answer to the above question, said  

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“No”.  The following discussion and ultimate conclusion are  

relevant:

“5………… No such provision is found in the Indian Penal  Code,  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  or  the  Prisons  Act.  Though the Government of India stated before the Judicial  Committee in the case cited supra that, having regard to  Section  57  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code,  20  years'  imprisonment  was  equivalent  to  a  sentence  of  transportation  for  life,  the  Judicial  Committee  did  not  express  its  final  opinion  on  that  question.  The  Judicial  Committee observed in that case thus at p. 10:

“Assuming that the sentence is to be regarded as  one  of  twenty  years,  and  subject  to  remission  for  good conduct, he had not earned remission sufficient  to  entitle  him  to  discharge  at  the  time  of  his  application,  and it  was therefore  rightly  dismissed,  but in saying this, Their Lordships are not to be taken  as meaning that a life sentence must in all cases be  treated as one of not more than twenty years, or that  the convict is necessarily entitled to remission.” Section  57  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  has  no  real  bearing  on  the  question  raised  before  us.  For  calculating  fractions  of  terms  of  punishment  the  section provides that transportation for life shall be  regarded as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty  years. It does not say that transportation for life shall  be deemed to be transportation for twenty years for  all  purposes;  nor  does the amended section  which  substitutes  the  words  “imprisonment  for  life”  for  “transportation  for  life”  enable  the drawing  of  any  such  all  embracing  fiction.  A  sentence  of  transportation for life or imprisonment for life must  prima  facie  be  treated  as  transportation  or  imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period  of the convicted person's natural life.”

“7. It  is  common case that the said rules were made  under the Prisons Act, 1894 and that they have statutory  force. But the Prisons Act does not confer on any authority  a power to commute or remit sentences; it provides only  for  the  regulation  of  prisons  and  for  the  treatment  of  prisoners confined therein.  Section 59 of  the Prisons Act  

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confers a power on the State Government to make rules,  inter  alia,  for  rewards  for  good  conduct.  Therefore,  the  rules made under the Act should be construed within the  scope of the ambit of the Act. The rules, inter alia, provide  for three types of remissions by way of rewards for good  conduct,  namely, (i) ordinarily,  (ii)  special and (iii)  State.  For  the  working  out  of  the  said  remissions,  under  Rule  1419(c), transportation for life is ordinarily to be taken as  15  years'  actual  imprisonment.  The  rule  cannot  be  construed  as  a  statutory  equation  of  15  years'  actual  imprisonment  for  transportation  for  life.  The  equation  is  only for a particular purpose, namely, for the purpose of  “remission  system”  and  not  for  all  purposes.  The  word  “ordinarily” in the rule also supports the said construction.  The  non  obstante  clause  in  sub-rule  (2)  of  Rule  1447  reiterates that notwithstanding anything contained in Rule  1419  no  prisoner  who  has  been  sentenced  to  transportation for life shall  be released on completion of  his  term  unless  orders  of  the  Government  have  been  received on a report  submitted to it.  This  also indicates  that the period of 15 years' actual imprisonment specified  in  the  rule  is  only  for  the  purpose  of  calculating  the  remission  and  that  the  completion  of  the  term  on  that  basis does not ipso facto confer any right upon the prisoner  to release. The order of the Government contemplated in  Rule  1447  in  the  case  of  a  prisoner  sentenced  to  transportation for life can only be an order under Section  401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for in the case of a  sentence  of  transportation  for  life  the  release  of  the  prisoner can legally be effected only by remitting the entire  balance of the sentence. Rules 934 and 937(c) provide for  that  contingency.  Under  the  said  rules  the  orders  of  an  appropriate  Government  under  Section  401  Criminal  Procedure Code, are a pre-requisite for a release. No other  rule  has  been  brought  to  our  notice  which  confers  an  indefeasible right on a prisoner sentenced to transportation  for  life  to  an  unconditional  release  on  the  expiry  of  a  particular term including remissions. The rules under the  Prisons  Act  do  not  substitute  a  lesser  sentence  for  a  sentence of transportation for life.

8. Briefly stated the legal position is this: Before Act 26  of  1955  a  sentence  of  transportation  for  life  could  be  undergone by a prisoner by way of rigorous imprisonment  for life in a designated prison in India. After the said Act,  such a convict shall be dealt with in the same manner as  one  sentenced  to  rigorous  imprisonment  for  the  same  

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term. Unless the said sentence is commuted or remitted by  appropriate authority under the relevant provisions of the  Indian Penal  Code or  the Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  a  prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound in law to  serve the life term in prison. The rules framed under the  Prisons Act enable such a prisoner to earn remissions —  ordinary, special and State — and the said remissions will  be given credit towards his term of imprisonment. For the  purpose  of  working  out  the  remissions  the  sentence  of  transportation for life is ordinarily equated with a definite  period, but it is only for that particular purpose and not for  any other purpose. As the sentence of transportation for  life or its prison equivalent, the life imprisonment, is one of  indefinite  duration,  the  remissions  so  earned  do  not  in  practice help such a convict as it is not possible to predict  the time of his death. That is why the Rules provide for a  procedure to enable the appropriate Government to remit  the sentence under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure  on  a  consideration  of  the  relevant  factors,  including the period of remissions earned. The question of  remission  is  exclusively  within  the  province  of  the  appropriate  Government;  and in  this  case  it  is  admitted  that,  though  the  appropriate  Government  made  certain  remissions  under  Section  401  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  it  did  not  remit  the  entire  sentence.  We,  therefore, hold that the petitioner has not yet acquired any  right to release.”

From the above decision, it is clear that in the absence of  

subsequent  order  of  remission  by  the  competent  

Government either based on Section 57 of IPC or any other  

provision  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  1973,  the  life  

convict  cannot  be  released.   The  above  decision  of  the  

Constitution Bench has been followed in various subsequent  

decisions.

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12) In  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh vs.  Ratan  Singh  &  

Ors.,  (1976)  3  SCC  470,  following  the  decision  of  the  

Constitution  Bench  in  Gopal  Vinayak Godse’s  case  

(supra), this Court held as under:

“4. As regards the first point, namely, that the prisoner  could be released automatically on the expiry of 20 years  under the Punjab Jail Manual or the Rules framed under the  Prisons Act, the matter is no longer res integra and stands  concluded  by  a  decision  of  this  Court  in  Gopal  Vinayak  Godse v. State of Maharashtra where the Court, following a  decision of the Privy Council in  Pandit Kishori Lal v.  King- Emperor,AIR 1945 PC 64 observed as follows:

“Under that section, a person transported for life  or any other term before the enactment of the said  section would be treated as a person sentenced to  rigorous imprisonment for life or for the said term.

If  so,  the next  question is  whether there is  any  provision  of  law  whereunder  a  sentence  for  life  imprisonment,  without  any  formal  remission  by  appropriate  Government,  can  be  automatically  treated  as  one  for  a  definite  period.  No  such  provision is found in the Indian Penal Code, Code of  Criminal Procedure or the Prisons Act.

* * * A  sentence  of  transportation  for  life  or  

imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as  transportation or imprisonment for the whole of the  remaining period of  the convicted  person's  natural  life.” The Court further observed thus:

“But  the  Prisons  Act  does  not  confer  on  any  authority a power to commute or remit sentences; it  provides only for the regulation of prisons and for the  treatment of prisoners confined therein. Section 59  of  the  Prisons  Act  confers  a  power  on  the  State  Government to make rules, inter alia, for rewards for  good conduct. Therefore, the rules made under the  Act  should  be  construed  within  the  scope  of  the  

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ambit of the Act.... Under the said rules the orders of  an appropriate Government under Section 401 of the  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  are  a  prerequisite  for  a  release. No other rule has been brought to our notice  which  confers  an  indefeasible  right  on  a  prisoner  sentenced  to  transportation  for  life  to  an  unconditional  release on  the  expiry  of  a  particular  term  including  remissions.  The  rules  under  the  Prisons Act do not substitute a lesser sentence for a  sentence of transportation for life.

The question of remission is exclusively within the  province of the appropriate Government; and in this  case  it  is  admitted  that,  though  the  appropriate  Government made certain remissions under Section  401  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  it  did  not  remit the entire sentence. We, therefore,  hold that  the  petitioner  has  not  yet  acquired  any  right  to  release.”

It  is,  therefore,  manifest  from the decision  of  this  Court  that the Rules framed under the Prisons Act or under the  Jail Manual do not affect the total period which the prisoner  has  to  suffer  but  merely  amount  to  administrative  instructions regarding the various remissions to be given to  the  prisoner  from  time  to  time  in  accordance  with  the  rules. This Court further pointed out that the question of  remission of the entire sentence or a part of it lies within  the exclusive domain of the appropriate Government under  Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and neither  Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code nor any Rules or local  Acts  can  stultify  the  effect  of  the  sentence  of  life  imprisonment given by the court  under the Indian Penal  Code.  In  other  words,  this  Court  has  clearly  held that  a  sentence for life would enure till the lifetime of the accused  as  it  is  not  possible  to  fix  a  particular  period  of  the  prisoner's  death  and  remissions  given  under  the  Rules  could not  be regarded as a substitute for  a sentence of  transportation for life. In these circumstances, therefore, it  is clear that the High Court was in error in thinking that the  respondent  was  entitled  to  be  released  as  of  right  on  completing the term of 20 years including the remissions.  For these reasons, therefore, the first contention raised by  the Learned Counsel for the appellant is well founded and  must prevail.

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9. From  a  review  of  the  authorities  and  the  statutory  provisions  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  the  following  propositions emerge:

“(1) that a sentence of imprisonment for life does not  automatically expire  at the end of  20 years including  the remissions, because the administrative rules framed  under the various Jail Manuals or under the Prisons Act  cannot supersede the statutory provisions of the Indian  Penal Code. A sentence of imprisonment for life means  a sentence for the entire life of the prisoner unless the  appropriate  Government  chooses  to  exercise  its  discretion  to  remit  either  the  whole  or  a  part  of  the  sentence  under  Section  401  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure;

(2)  that  the  appropriate  Government  has  the  undoubted  discretion  to  remit  or  refuse  to  remit  the  sentence and where it refuses to remit the sentence no  writ  can be issued directing the State Government to  release the prisoner;

(3)  that  the  appropriate  Government  which  is  empowered to grant remission under Section 401 of the  Code of Criminal  Procedure  is  the Government  of  the State where the prisoner has been convicted and  sentenced, that is to say, the transferor State and not  the transferee State where the prisoner may have been  transferred  at  his  instance  under  the  Transfer  of  Prisoners Act; and

(4)  that  where  the  transferee  State  feels  that  the  accused  has  completed  a  period  of  20  years  it  has  merely  to  forward  the  request  of  the  prisoner  to  the  concerned  State  Government,  that  is  to  say,  the  Government  of  the  State  where  the  prisoner  was  convicted  and  sentenced  and  even  if  this  request  is  rejected  by  the  State  Government  the  order  of  the  Government cannot be interfered with by a High Court  in its writ jurisdiction.”

After holding so, this Court set aside the order of the High  

Court  releasing  the  prisoner  therein  from  Central  Jail,  

Amritsar.  

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13) In Kartar Singh & Ors.  vs. State of Haryana, (1982)  

3  SCC  1,  a  Bench  of  three  Judges  of  this  Court  while  

considering the similar claim held as under:

“6……Further,  Section  57  IPC  or  the  remission  rules  contained in Jail Manual (e.g. para 516-B of Punjab/Haryana  Jail Manual) are irrelevant in this context. Section 57 IPC  provides that imprisonment for  life  shall  be reckoned as  equivalent  to imprisonment  for  20 years  for  the specific  purpose  mentioned  therein,  namely,  for  the  purpose  of  calculating fractions of terms of punishment and not for all  purposes;  similarly  remission  rules  contained  in  Jail  Manuals cannot override statutory provisions contained in  the Penal Code and the sentence of imprisonment for life  have to be regarded as a sentence for the remainder of the  natural  life  of  the  convict.  The  Privy  Council  in  Pandit  Kishori Lal case and this Court in  Gopal Godse case have  settled this position once and for all by taking the view that  a sentence for transportation for life or imprisonment for  life must be treated as transportation or imprisonment for  the  whole  of  the  remaining  period  of  the  convicted  person's  natural  life.  This  view has  been  confirmed  and  followed by this Court in two subsequent decisions — in  Ratan Singh case,  and Maru Ram case In this view of the  matter  life  convicts  would  not  fall  within  the purview of  Section 428 CrPC.”

The Bench also considered Gopal Godse case (supra) and  

the decision of the Privy Council in  Pandit Kishori Lal vs.  

King Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 64.

14) In Laxman Naskar vs. Union of India & Ors., (2000)  

2 SCC 595, this Court reiterated the same proposition.

15) The last decision which is directly on the point similar to  

the case on hand is  Mohd. Munna vs.  Union of India &  

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Ors. etc. (2005) 7 SCC 417.  The said case arose in a writ  

petition filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution.  According to  

the  petitioner  therein,  the  length  of  duration  of  

imprisonment for life is equivalent to 20 years’ imprisonment  

and that too subject to further remission admissible under  

law.  It was further pointed out that on completion of this  

term, he was liable to be released under Rule 751(c) of the  

West Bengal Jail Code.  The petitioner relied on Explanation  

to Section 61 of the West Bengal Correctional Services Act,  

1992  (West  Bengal  Act  32  of  1992)  whereunder  

imprisonment  for  life  is  equated  to  a  term  of  20  years’  

imprisonment.  As said earlier, it is a case identical to the  

case on hand.  Here again, Explanation to Section 61 of the  

West Bengal Act was pressed into service.  After going into  

the very same provisions and considering the decision of the  

Privy Council in  Pandit Kishori Lal’s case  (supra) as well  

as the decision of the Constitution Bench in Gopal Vinayak  

Godse’s case (supra), this Court concluded thus:

“13. The counsel contended that by virtue of Rule 751(c) of  the  West  Bengal  Jail  Code,  the  petitioner  was  liable  to  be  released  from  jail  on  completion  of  twenty  years.  He  also  relied on the Explanation to Section 61 of the West Bengal  

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Correctional Services Act, 1992 (W.B. Act 32 of 1992) wherein  the imprisonment for life is equated to a term of twenty years'  simple imprisonment for the purpose of remission. But there  is no provision either in the Indian Penal Code or in the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  whereby  life  imprisonment  could  be  treated as fourteen years or twenty years without there being  a formal remission by the appropriate Government.  Section  57 of the Penal Code reads as follows:

“57.  Fractions  of  terms  of  punishment.—In  calculating  fractions  of  terms  of  punishment,  imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalent to  imprisonment for twenty years.” The  above  section  is  applicable  for  the  purpose  of  remission  when  the  matter  is  considered  by  the  Government under the appropriate provisions. This very  plea was placed before the Judicial  Committee of  the  Privy Council  in  Kishori  Lal v.  Emperor5 and the Privy  Council held as under: (AIR p. 67)

“Assuming that  the sentence is  to  be regarded as  one  of  20  years,  and  subject  to  remission  for  good  conduct,  he  had  not  earned  remission  sufficient  to  entitle him to discharge at the time of his application  and  it  was  therefore  rightly  dismissed  but,  in  saying  this,  Their  Lordships  are not  to be taken as  meaning  that a life sentence must and in all cases be treated as  one of  not more than 20 years or that the convict  is  necessarily entitled to remission.” 14. The Prisons Rules are made under the Prisons Act and  

the  Prisons  Act  by  itself  does  not  confer  any  authority  or  power to commute or remit sentence. It only provides for the  regulation of the prisons and for the terms of the prisoners  confined  therein.  Therefore,  the  West  Bengal  Correctional  Services Act or the West Bengal Jail Code do not confer any  special right on the petitioner herein.

15. In  Godse case6, the Constitution Bench of this Court  held that the sentence of imprisonment for life is not for any  definite  period  and  the  imprisonment  for  life  must,  prima  facie,  be  treated  as  imprisonment  for  the  whole  of  the  remaining period of the convicted person's natural life. It was  also held in AIR para 5 as follows: (SCR pp. 444-45)

“It does not say that transportation for life shall be  deemed  to  be  transportation  for  twenty  years  for  all  purposes;  nor  does  the  amended  section  which  substitutes  the  words  ‘imprisonment  for  life’  for  ‘transportation for life’ enable the drawing of any such  

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all-embracing fiction.  A  sentence of  transportation  for  life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated  as transportation or imprisonment for the whole of the  remaining period of the convicted person's natural life.”

16. Summarising the decision, it was held in AIR para 8 as  under: (SCR p. 447)

“Briefly stated the legal position is this: Before Act 26  of  1955 a sentence of transportation for life could be  undergone  by  a  prisoner  by  way  of  rigorous  imprisonment  for  life  in  a  designated prison  in  India.  After the said Act, such a convict shall be dealt with in  the  same  manner  as  one  sentenced  to  rigorous  imprisonment  for  the  same  term.  Unless  the  said  sentence  is  commuted  or  remitted  by  appropriate  authority  under  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  or  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  a  prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound in law  to serve the life term in prison. The Rules framed under  the  Prisons  Act  enable  such  a  prisoner  to  earn  remissions — ordinary, special and State — and the said  remissions  will  be  given  credit  towards  his  term  of  imprisonment.  For  the  purpose  of  working  out  the  remissions  the  sentence  of  transportation  for  life  is  ordinarily equated with a definite period, but it is only  for  that  particular  purpose  and  not  for  any  other  purpose. As the sentence of transportation for life or its  prison  equivalent,  the  life  imprisonment,  is  one  of  indefinite duration, the remissions so earned do not in  practice  help  such  a  convict  as  it  is  not  possible  to  predicate the time of his death. That is why the Rules  provide  for  a  procedure  to  enable  the  appropriate  Government to remit the sentence under Section 401 of  the Code of  Criminal  Procedure  on a consideration  of  the relevant factors, including the period of remissions  earned. The question of remission is exclusively within  the province of the appropriate Government; and in this  case  it  is  admitted  that,  though  the  appropriate  Government made certain remissions under Section 401  of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it did not remit the  entire sentence. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner  has not yet acquired any right to release.”

We  are  bound  by  the  above  dicta  laid  down  by  the  Constitution Bench and we hold that life imprisonment is not  

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equivalent to imprisonment for fourteen years or for twenty  years as contended by the petitioner.

17. Thus, all the contentions raised by the petitioner fail  and the petitioner is not entitled to be released on any of the  grounds urged in the writ petition so long as there is no order  of  remission  passed  by  the  appropriate  Government  in  his  favour. We make it clear that our decision need not be taken  as expression of our view that the petitioner is not entitled to  any remission at all. The appropriate Government would be at  liberty  to  pass  any  appropriate  order  of  remission  in  accordance with law.”

16) It is clear that neither Section 57 IPC nor Explanation to  

Section 61 of the W.B. Act lays down that a life imprisonment  

prisoner has to be released after completion of 20 years.  20  

years mentioned in Explanation to Section 61 of the W.B. Act  

is only for the purpose of ordering remission.  If the State  

Government  taking  into  consideration  various  aspects  

refused  to  grant  remission  of  the  whole  period  then  the  

petitioner cannot take advantage of the above Explanation  

and even Section 57 IPC and seek for pre-mature release.  

Further the question of remission of the entire sentence or a  

part of it lies within the exclusive domain of the appropriate  

Government  under  Section  401  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure, 1973 and neither Section 57 of the IPC nor any  

rules or local Acts (in the case on hand W.B. Act) can stultify  

the effect of the sentence of life imprisonment given by the  

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Court  under  the  IPC.   To  put  it  clear,  once  a  person  is  

sentenced  to  undergo  life  imprisonment  unless  

imprisonment  for  life  is  commuted  by  the  competent  

authority, he has to undergo imprisonment for the whole of  

his life.  It is equally well settled that Section 57 of the IPC  

does not, in any way, limit the punishment of imprisonment  

for life to a term of 20 years.   

17) In the case on hand,  it  is  highlighted by the learned  

counsel for the respondents that in West Bengal there is a  

duly  constituted  Review  Board  for  consideration  of  

applications for premature release made by life convicts.  It  

consists of:

1. Additional  Chief  Secretary,  Home  Department  –  Chairman of the Review Board;

2. Commissioner of Police, Kolkata – Member 3. Chief Probation Officer, West Bengal – Member 4. Inspector General of Prisons, West Bengal – Member 5. Judicial Secretary, West Bengal – Convener 6. Director General and Inspector General of Police, West  

Bengal – Member 7. Principal  Secretary,  Jails  Department,  West  Bengal  –  

Member

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On receipt of the application for premature release except  

under  Article  161  of  the  Constitution,  the  Review  Board  

would  go  into  all  the  details  and  place  it  before  the  

Government.   Ultimately on approval  of  the Hon’ble Chief  

Minister, the convict is prematurely released under Section  

432  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  1973.   Insofar  as  

application under Article 161 is concerned, it was explained  

that the procedure followed remains the same but the file is  

finally  placed  before  His  Excellency  the  Governor  of  the  

State through the Hon’ble Chief Minister.   

18) In the counter affidavits filed by the State, it is pointed  

out  that  regarding  the  case  of  the  petitioner  –Khoka  @  

Prasanta  Sen,  the  Sentence  Review  Board  observed  as  

under:

“The  life  convict  was  convicted  on  18.01.1990  under  Section 302/34 IPC and detained in connection with S.T.  No.  01  of  June  1989.   He  was  released  on  parole  from  Presidency  Correctional  Home  on  29.04.2005  in  compliance  with  Hon’ble  Supreme  Court’s  order  in  Writ  Petition (Criminal) No. 279 of 2004.  The police authority  vehemently  opposed  the  premature  release  of  the  life  convict on the following grounds: (a) He  was  a  notorious  fellow  in  the  area  before  his  

conviction. (b) He still maintains relationship with his old associates.

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(c) He is within the age of 52 years with sound health. (d) His socio economic condition is not sound. (e) In  case  of  his  premature  release  there  is  every  

possibility of his reverting to criminality. (f) During his parole he has been technically serving life  

imprisonment  binding  him to  refrain  from criminal  activities  for  the  time  being.   There  is  every  possibility of his committing further crimes.

Considering the above fact, the Review Board did not  find any reason to recommend premature release of  the life convict now on parole.”

It is seen that after careful consideration of all the aspects,  

the Review Board in its meeting held on 27.01.2011 did not  

recommend  the  petitioner  for  his  premature  release.  The  

recommendation of the Review Board was placed before the  

State Government and the State Government accepted the  

recommendation of the State Sentence Review Board.  The  

decision of the State Government was communicated to the  

petitioner vide letter No. 790-J dated 09.02.2012.   

19) In view of the decision of the State Sentence Review  

Board, approval by the State Government and the principles  

enunciated in various decisions of this Court including the  

decision  of  the  Constitution  Bench  in  Gopal  Vinayak  

Godse’s  case (supra),  we find no merit  in  the contempt  

petition, consequently, the same is dismissed.   

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………….…………………………J.                   (P. SATHASIVAM)                                  

       ………….…………………………J.                  (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)   

NEW DELHI; FEBRUARY 13, 2013.

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