21 March 2016
Supreme Court
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LARSEN & TOUBRO LTD. Vs STATE OF JHARKHAND .

Bench: MADAN B. LOKUR,R.K. AGRAWAL
Case number: C.A. No.-005390-005390 / 2007
Diary number: 33251 / 2006
Advocates: PAREKH & CO. Vs ANIL K. JHA


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       REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5390 OF 2007

M/s Larsen & Toubro Ltd. .... Appellant(s)

Versus

State of Jharkhand and Ors.             .... Respondent(s)

                  J U D G M E N T

R.K. Agrawal, J.

1) The  present  appeal  has  been  filed  against  the  final

judgment and order dated 17.11.2006 passed by the Division

Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in W.P. (T)

No.  2630  of  2006  whereby  the  High  Court  dismissed  the

petition  filed  by  M/s  Larsen  &  Toubro  Ltd.-the  appellant

–Company while upholding the order dated 27.02.2006 passed

by  the  Deputy  Commissioner,  Commercial  Taxes,  Urban

Circle, Jamshedpur.   

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2) Brief facts:

(a) The  appellant-Company,  having  its  registered  office  at

Mumbai,  is  a  public  limited  company  and  is  involved  in

manufacturing,  trading,  leasing  and  construction  business

throughout  the  country.   At  the  relevant  time,  the

appellant-Company was involved in the execution of civil work

contracts for its client, viz., Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd.

(TISCO)  and  had  been  filing  its  returns  under  the  Bihar

Finance Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the State Act’)

and also under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter

referred  to  as  ‘the  Central  Act’)  in  the  Commercial  Taxes

Department, Urban Circle, Jamshedpur.

(b) For  the  Assessment  Year  (AY)  1991-92,  the

appellant-Company  filed  returns  under  the  State  Act.

However, the assessment proceedings in relation to the above

period, i.e., AY 1991-92 was completed in the year 1996 and

an  assessment  order  dated  24.01.1996  was  passed  by  the

assessing authority.      

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(c) After the assessment proceedings, an audit team of the

Auditor General,  Bihar, audited the assessment order dated

24.01.1996 and found that the dealer was allowed exemption

of Rs. 3,12,47,916/-, being the amount of goods consumed by

the  appellant-Company  during  the  course  of  execution  of

works contract.   The appellant-Company claimed that  such

goods were purchased on payment of tax but no declaration in

Form IX-C along with other evidence was submitted whereas

the production or declaration of  Form IX-C was mandatory,

hence,  the  claim  was  not  allowable  and  the  said  fact  was

conveyed to the assessing authority.   

(d) On  28.09.2000,  the  office  of  Commissioner  of

Commercial  Tax,  Urban Circle,  Jamshedpur,  served a  show

cause notice to the appellant-Company to state as to why tax

should not be levied on it for the amount of Rs. 3,12,47,916/-

which  was  wrongly  exempted  from  being  taxed  under  the

provision of the State Act.

(e) After  affording  an  opportunity  of  hearing  to  the

appellant-Company, a re-assessment order dated  27.02.2006

was passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes,

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Urban Circle, Jamshedpur whereby an additional demand of

Rs. 35,72,475/- was created against the appellant-Company.

f) Being  aggrieved  by  the  re-assessment  order  dated

27.02.2006, the appellant-Company preferred a writ petition

being W.P.  (T)  No.  2630 of  2006 before the High Court.   A

Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court,  vide  order  dated

17.11.2006,  dismissed  the  petition  filed  by  the  appellant

–Company while upholding the order dated 27.02.2006 passed

by  the  Deputy  Commissioner,  Commercial  Taxes,  Urban

Circle, Jamshedpur.   

(g) Aggrieved  by  the  order  dated  17.11.2006,  the

appellant-Company has preferred this appeal by way of special

leave.

3)  Heard the arguments advanced by Mr. Pravin H. Parekh,

learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellant-Company  and  Mr.

Amarendra Saran and Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned senior

counsel for the respondent-State and perused the records.   

Point for consideration:

4) The  only  point  for  consideration  before  this  Court  is

whether  on the  information given by  the audit  team of  the

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Auditor General, Bihar, the Assessing Authority was satisfied

that  reasonable  ground exists  to  believe  that  a  part  of  the

turnover of  the appellant-Company has escaped assessment

within the meaning of Section 19 of the State Act based on

which the assessing officer can re-open the assessment?

Rival contentions:

5) Learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellant-Company

contended that  an ‘audit  objection’  cannot  be  construed as

‘information’ within the meaning of Section 19 of the State Act,

based on which the assessing officer can change his opinion

and re-open the assessment.  The ‘audit objection’ relates to

tax levied on turnover relating to ‘consumables’ wherein there

is  no  sale/deemed sale  involved.   Consumables  by  its  very

nature are goods used for own consumption.  The assessment

order dated 24.01.1996 rightly records the said fact.  

6) Learned  senior  counsel  further  contended  that  the

original  assessment  order  specifically  considered  whether

purchase tax is to be paid under the State Act on the disputed

items and the same was decided in negative and hence taxing

the items later on is a mere change of opinion by the Assessing

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Authority on the very same set of facts that were available on

the date of passing the assessment order dated 24.01.1996.

7) Learned senior counsel further contended that non-filing

of Form IX-C under Section 11 of the State Act read with Rule

12 of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1983 (hereinafter referred to

as  ‘the Rules’)  does not  attract  the  levy in  the  facts  of  the

present case as the goods are used for ‘own consumption’ and

there is no sale or ‘deemed sale’ of the said goods involving a

transfer of property in the said goods to anybody.   

8) It was further contended that Section 19 of the State Act

read  with  Rule  20  and  Form  XIV  of  the  Rules  specifically

requires the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority regarding

requirement of re-assessment before the issuance of the notice

in this regard.  The initiation of the re-assessment proceedings

and the subsequent re-assessment order dated 27.02.2006 are

illegal  as  there  was  no  satisfaction  on  the  part  of  the

Prescribed Authority about existence of reasonable grounds to

believe  that  turnover  has  escaped  assessment.   Hence,  the

same are liable to be set aside.

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9) Learned  senior  counsel  further  contended  that  it  is

relevant  to  note  the  circumstances  under  which  the

appellant-Company  was  unable  to  produce  the  relevant

records.   The assessment year (AY)  in question is  1991-92.

The assessment order in relation to the same was passed on

24.01.1996.  The show cause notice proposing to re-open the

assessment  was  served  on  the  appellant-Company  on

28.09.2000  which  was  replied  in  detail  by  the

appellant-Company vide letter dated 13.11.2000.  Thereafter,

for a period of five years, there was no communication from

the side of the respondents and the appellant-Company, under

the  bonafide belief  that  the  letter  dated  13.11.2000  had

satisfied the requirements of show cause notice, forwarded all

the  records  to  their  dumping  yards  at  Chennai.   Learned

senior  counsel  contended  that  owing  to  the  above

circumstances  the  failure  of  the  appellant-Company  to

produce the aforesaid records was not at all willful.

10) Learned senior counsel finally contended that the order

of  re-assessment  dated  27.02.2006  is  illegal  and  the

assessment proceedings cannot be re-opened on the basis of

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audit objection, as the same does not amount to ‘information’

as  contemplated  under  Section  19  of  the  State  Act.   The

impugned order amounts to change of opinion on the same set

of  facts  and  law  which  were  available  even  at  the  time  of

passing the order of assessment.   

11) In  support  of  the  above  contentions,  learned  senior

counsel  has  relied  upon  the  following  decisions,  viz.,  M/s

Indian  &  Eastern  Newspaper  Society,  New  Delhi vs.

Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi (1979) 4 SCC 248,

Bhimraj Madanlal vs.  State of Bihar and Another (1984)

56 STC 273,  Usha Sales (Pvt.) Ltd. vs.  The State of Bihar

(1985) 58 STC 217 and Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax

(Law),  Board  of  Revenue  (Taxes),  Ernakulam vs.  M/s

Thomas Stephen & Co. Ltd. Quilon (1988) 2 SCC 264.   

12) Per  contra,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the

respondent-State submitted that the assessing authority has

not revised the assessment on the basis of  the audit report

only rather it had satisfied itself before revising and the same

can be seen from the fact that it had rejected part of the audit

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opinion  and  applied  its  mind  before  passing  the  order

impugned.     

13) Learned senior counsel for the respondent-State further

submitted that the ‘audit objection’ in the present case is an

‘information’ within the meaning of Section 19 of the State Act

and  the  competent  authority  has  rightly  re-assessed  the

turnover and demanded legally payable valid tax which was

escaped.   He  further  submitted  that  the  word  ‘information’

used  in  the  Section  is  of  the  widest  amplitude  and

comprehends  variety  of  factors  including  information  from

external sources of any kind including discovery of new facts

or  information  available  in  the  record  of  assessment  not

previously noticed or investigated.

14) Learned  senior  counsel  for  the  respondent-State

submitted that  if  there is  obvious mistake apparent  on the

face of the record of assessment, that record itself can be a

source of information, if that information leads to a discovery

or belief  that  there has been an escape of  assessment.  He

finally  submitted  that  there  is  no  illegality  in  the

re-assessment order dated 27.02.2006 as well as in the order

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dated 17.11.2006 passed by the High Court and the claim of

the appellant-Company is liable to be rejected.

15) In  support  of  his  submissions,  learned  senior  counsel

has relied upon the following decisions, viz., Commissioner of

Income Tax vs.  P.V.S. Beedies Pvt. Ltd. (1998) 9 SCC 272,

Anandji  Haridas  and  Co.  (P)  Ltd. vs.  S.P.  Kasture  and

Others AIR  1968  SC  565,  Commissioner  of  Customs,

Mumbai vs.  Virgo  Steels,  Bombay  and Another (2002)  4

SCC  316,  Supreme  Paper  Mills  Limited vs.  Assistant

Commissioner,  Commercial  Taxes,  Calcutta  and  Others

(2010) 11 SCC 593 and  Chatturam & Ors. vs.  CIT, Bihar

AIR 1947 FC 32.   

Discussion:

16) In the instant case, an audit team of the Auditor General,

audited assessment order dated 24.01.1996 and found that

the  dealer  was  allowed  an  exemption  of  Rs.  3,12,47,916/-

being  the  amount  for  goods  consumed  by  the

appellant-Company during the course of  execution of  works

contract.  It is the claim of the appellant-Company that those

goods were purchased on payment of tax but no declaration in

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Form IX-C along with other evidence was submitted. The same

fact was brought to the notice of the assessing authority which

in  furtherance  thereof  issued  a  show  cause  notice  to  the

appellant-Company.   The production of Form IX-C was held to

be mandatory and the claim of  the appellant-Company was

disallowed and an order of  re-assessment dated 27.02.2006

was  passed  by  the  competent  authority  for  an  additional

amount  of  tax  of  Rs.  35,72,475/-  after  following  the  due

procedure of law.

17) The point  arises for  consideration is  as to  whether  an

‘audit objection’ can be construed as ‘information’ within the

meaning of Section 19 of  the State Act  based on which the

assessing officer was satisfied that reasonable grounds exist to

believe that any part of the turnover of the appellant-Company

had escaped assessment under Section 19 of the State Act.

18)  Learned senior counsel for the appellant-Company argued

that  it  is  mere  a  change  of  opinion  which  resulted  in

re-assessment order and is not information as contemplated

under Section 19 of the State Act.  Learned senior counsel for

the  respondent-State  submitted that  ‘audit  objection’  in the

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present case is definitely ‘information’ within the meaning of

Section  19  and  the  High  Court  has  rightly  uphold  the

re-assessment order dated 27.02.2006.

19)  In view of the above, it is relevant to quote Section 19 of

the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 which is as under:-

“19.  Turnover of registered dealer escaping assessment – (1) If upon information which has come into his possession, the prescribed authority is satisfied that reasonable grounds exist to believe that any turnover of a registered dealer or a dealer  to  whom  grant  of  registration  certificate  has  been refused under the third proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 14,  in respect  of  any period has,  for  any reason,  escaped assessment or any turnover of any such dealer or a dealer assessed  under  sub-section  (5)  of  Section  17  has  been under-assessed or assed at a rate lower than that which was correctly  applicable or any deductions therefrom has been wrongly made, the prescribed authority may, subject to such rules  may,  be  made  by  the  State  Government  under  this part, and –  

(a) Within eight years from the date of the order of the assessment  or  reassessment  where  the  said authority has reasons to believe that the dealer has concealed, omitted or failed to disclose willfully the particulars  of  such  turnover  or  has  furnished incorrect particulars of such turnover and thereby returned figures below the reason amount,  

(b) Within eight years’ from the date of the order of the assessment or reassessment in any other case.  

Serve on the dealer a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section  (2)  of  Section  17  and  proceed  to  assess  or reassess the amount of tax due from the dealer in respect of such turnover, and the provisions of this part shall, so far as may  be,  apply  accordingly  as  if  the  notice  under  this sub-section was a notice under sub-section (2) of Section 17:

Provided that the amount of tax shall be assessed or re-assessed  after  allowing  such  deductions  as  were permissible during the said period and at rates at which it

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would  have  been  assessed  had  the  turnover  not  escaped assessment or full assessment, as the case may be.  

Explanation:  -  Production  before  the  prescribed authority  of  accounts,  registers  or  documents  from which material  facts  could,  with  due  diligence,  have  been discovered by the said authority, will not necessarily amount to full disclosure within the meaning of this section.  

(2) (a) The prescribed authority shall,  in a case falling under clause (a) of sub-section (1), direct that the  dealer  shall  pay  by  way  of  penalty  a  sum  not exceeding  three  times but  not  less  than an amount equivalent to the amount of tax which is or may be assessed on the escaped turnover.  (b) The penalty imposed under clause (a) shall be in addition  to  the  amount  of  tax  which  is  or  may  be assessed  on  the  escaped  turnover,  and  the  order imposing  penalty  may  precede  the  assessment  of escaped turnover.  (c) For  determining  the  amount  of  penalty  under clause  (a),  where  the  penalty  precedes  assessment under  clause  (b)  the  prescribed  authority  shall quantify the amount of suppression and tax thereon provisionally in the prescribed manner.  (d) No order shall be passed under this sub-section without  giving  the  dealer  an  opportunity  of  being heard in the prescribed manner.  3) Any assessment or reassessment made and any penalty imposed under this section shall  be without prejudice  to  any  action  which  is  or  may  be  taken under section 49.”

Sub-Section (1) of Section 19 very clearly prescribes that the

competent  authority,  upon  information,  if  satisfied  that

reasonable  ground  exists  to  believe  that  any  turnover  of  a

registered  dealer  or  a  dealer  to  whom grant  of  registration

certificate has been refused in respect of any period has, for

any reason, escaped assessment or any turnover of any such

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dealer assessed under sub-Section (5) of Section 17 has been

under-assessed or assessed at a rate lower than that which

was correctly applicable, may, within eight years from the date

of  order  of  assessment,  proceed  to  assess  or  reassess  the

amount of tax in respect of such turnover.   

20) For  ready  reference,  the  relevant  portion  of  the

assessment  order  dated  24.01.1996  is  also  extracted

hereunder:-

“The Company has used the following work under its Tender work  

on its level and if we separate the both, then it is like this.  

Camp equipments Rs. 227301.00

Electric goods for work site Rs. 773223.00

Electrode Welding Cable and Accessories Rs. 871294.00

Fuel & Lubricants Rs. 3189205.00

General Consumables Rs. 2945086.00

(Handgloves) contenvest

Oxygen & D.A. Gas Rs. 21223.00

Plywood for Shuttering Rs. 2826674.00

Safety Appliances Rs. 408392.00

Spares Rs. 8232442.00

Staging Materials Rs. 3888798.00

Shuttering & Walk-way (For Timber) Rs. 4191982.00

Tools and Tackles Rs. 3672296.00

_________________

Total       Rs. 3,12,47,916.00”

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21)  It  is  also pertinent to understand the meaning of  the

word ‘information’ in its true sense.  According to the Oxford

Dictionary, ‘information’ means facts told, heard or discovered

about somebody/something.  The Law Lexicon describes the

term  ‘information’  as  the  act  or  process  of  informing,

communication  or  reception  of  knowledge.   The  expression

‘information’ means instruction or knowledge derived from an

external  source  concerning  facts  or  parties  or  as  to  law

relating to and/or having a bearing on the assessment.  We

agree that a mere change of opinion or having second thought

about it by the competent authority on the same set of facts

and materials on the record does not constitute ‘information’

for the purposes of the State Act. But the word “information”

used in the aforesaid Section is of the widest amplitude and

should not be construed narrowly. It  comprehends not only

variety of factors including information from external sources

of any kind but also the discovery of new facts or information

available in the record of assessment not previously noticed or

investigated.  Suppose  a  mistake  in  the  original  order  of

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assessment  is  not  discovered  by  the  Assessing  Officer,  on

further scrutiny, if it came to the notice of another assessor or

even  by  a  subordinate  or  a  superior  officer,  it  would  be

considered as information disclosed to the incumbent officer.

If the mistake itself is not extraneous to the record and the

informant  gathered  the  information  from  the  record,  the

immediate  source  of  information  to  the  Officer  in  such

circumstances is in one sense extraneous to the record.  It will

be information in his possession within the meaning of Section

19  of  the  State  Act.  In  such  cases  of  obvious  mistakes

apparent on the face of the record of assessment, that record

itself can be a source of information, if that information leads

to  a  discovery  or  belief  that  there  has  been  an  escape  of

assessment or under-assessment or wrong assessment.   

22) There are a catena of  judgments of  this Court holding

that  assessment  proceedings  can  be  reopened  if  the  audit

objection points out the factual information already available

in the records and that it  was overlooked or not taken into

consideration.  Similarly, if audit points out some information

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or  facts  available  outside  the  record  or  any  arithmetical

mistake, assessment can be re-opened.   

23) In P.V.S. Beedies (supra), this Court has held as under:-

“3. We are of  the view that both the Tribunal and the High  Court  were  in  error  in  holding  that  the  information given  by  internal  audit  party  could  not  be  treated  as information  within  the  meaning  of  Section  147(b)  of  the Income Tax Act. The audit party has merely pointed out a fact which has been overlooked by the Income Tax Officer in the assessment. The fact that the recognition granted to this charitable trust had expired on 22-9-1992 was not noticed by the Income Tax Officer. This is not a case of information on a question of law. The dispute as to whether reopening is permissible  after  audit  party  expresses  an  opinion  on  a question of law is now being considered by a larger Bench of this Court.  There can be no dispute that the audit party is entitled to point out a factual error or omission in the assessment.  Reopening  of  the  case  on  the  basis  of  a factual  error  pointed  out  by  the  audit  party  is permissible  under  law. In  view  of  that  we  hold  that reopening of the case under Section 147(b)  in the facts of this case was on the basis of factual information given by the internal  audit  party  and  was  valid  in  law.  The  judgment under appeal is set aside to this extent.”

     (emphasis supplied)

24) Similarly,  in  Commissioner  of  Income  Tax,  U.P.,

Lucknow vs. M/s Gurbux Rai Harbux Rai (1971) 3 SCC 654,

this Court has held as under:-

“6. Section 15 of the Act provides that if in consequence of definite information which has come into the possession of the Excess Profits Tax Officer he discovers that profits of any chargeable accounting period have escaped assessment, etc., he may at any time serve a notice containing all or any of the requirements  which  may  be  included  in  a  notice  under

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Section  13  and  may  proceed  to  assess  or  reassess  the amount of such profits liable to excess profits tax. The power so conferred can be exercised in the course of the original assessment or reassessment. It is essential, according to the law laid down by this Court, that before any action can be taken or an order made under Section 10-A there should be a  proceeding  which  should  be  pending  for  assessment  or reassessment of excess profits tax…..”

“7. On the first question the submission of Mr M.C. Chagla for  the assessee  is  that  there was no definite  information which  had  come  into  possession  of  the  Tax  Officer  from which it could be said that he had discovered that profits of the  relevant  chargeable  accounting  period  had  escaped assessment. We are unable to agree. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner had made an order on October 10, 1947, in the proceedings relating to the assessment of income tax of the assessee that there had been only a partial partition in respect  of  the  movable  property  business  of  Gurbux  Rai. That  was  certainly  an  information  which  came  into  the possession of the Excess Profits Tax Officer not because of any change of opinion by himself but because of the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in the income tax proceedings.  This  Court  has  consistently  held  that  the Income Tax Officer  would have jurisdiction  to initiate proceedings  under  Section  34(1)(  b  )  of  the  Income Tax Act, 1922, which is in pari materia with Section 15 of the  Act  if  he  acted  on  information  received  from the decision of the superior authorities or the court even in the  assessment  proceedings.  (See    R.B.  Bansilal Abirchand  Firm   v.    CIT  1   and    Assistant  Controller  of Estate Duty  ,    Hyderabad   v.    Nawab Sir Osman Ali Khan Bahadur  ,   H.E.H. The Nizam of Hyderabad and others  . It has  next  been  urged  that  the  alleged  object  of  having  a partial partition, namely, of reducing the liability to excess profits  tax  had  never  been  examined  by  the  Appellate Assistant Commissioner in the income tax proceedings and therefore  it  could  not  be  said  that  there  had  been escapement of income as a result of information derived from his order. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner apparently did not go into that question because the proceedings before him related to assessment of income tax. Section 10-A of the Act is a special provision which deals with the transactions designed to avoid or reduce liability to excess profits tax. The information which came into possession of the Excess Profits

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Tax  Officer  of  partial  partition  having  been  effected  was relevant  for  the  purpose  of  Section  15  and  once  he  had initiated  proceedings  under  that  section  he  was  perfectly competent and had jurisdiction to examine for the purpose of Section 10-A whether partial partition had been effected for avoidance or reduction of liability to excess profits tax. The  first  question,  therefore,  should  have  been  answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.”

    (emphasis supplied)

25) In M/s Phool Chand Bajrang Lal and Another vs.

Income Tax Officer & Another (1993) 4 SCC 77 this

Court has held as under:-

“25….. He may start reassessment proceedings either because some  fresh  facts  come  to  light  which  were  not  previously disclosed  or  some  information  with  regard  to  the  facts previously disclosed comes into his possession which tends to expose the untruthfulness of those facts. In such situations, it is  not  a case of  mere change of  opinion or the drawing of  a different inference from the same facts as were earlier available but acting on fresh information…..”  

26)  The contention whether finding the information from the

very facts that were already available on record amounts to

information for the purpose of Section 19 of the State Act, it

would  be  sufficient  to  refer  to  a  judgment  of  this  Court  in

Anandjiharidas & Co. vs. S.P. Kasture AIR 1968 SC 565

wherein it  was held that  a fact which was already there in

records  doesn’t  by its  mere  availability  becomes an item of

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“information” till the time it has been brought to the notice of

assessing  authority.  Hence,  the  audit  objections  were  well

within the parameters of being construed as ‘information’ for

the purpose of section 19 of the State Act.

27) The  expression  ‘information’  means  instruction  or

knowledge derived from an external source concerning facts or

parties or  as to law relating to and/or after  bearing on the

assessment.   We are of  the clear view that  on the basis  of

information received and if  the  assessing  officer  is  satisfied

that reasonable ground exists to believe, then in that case the

power  of  the  assessing  authority  extends  to  re-opening  of

assessment, if  for any reason, the whole or any part of  the

turnover of the business of the dealer has escaped assessment

or has been under assessed and the assessment in such a

case would be valid even if the materials, on the basis of which

the  earlier  assessing  authority  passed  the  order  and  the

successor  assessing  authority  proceeded,  were  same.   The

question  still  is  as  to  whether  in  the  present  case,  the

assessing authority was satisfied or not.

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28) At this stage, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the

matter dealt with between the audit team and the assessing

authority  which  led  to  the  initiation  of  re-assessment

proceedings  under  Section 19 of  the  State  Act  which is  as

under:-

“Part – II Section – ‘A’

Para 1. Non levy of purchase tax Rs. 24,19,385.31

Name of the dealer M/s Larsen & Toubro  Ltd., ECC  

Construction Group,  Jamshedpur

Registration No. JU 848 ®

Nature of Business Works Contract

Asstt. Year 1991-92

Date of Order 24.01.1996

G.T.O. Determined Rs. 17,57,01,372.00 Less: Sale of tax paid goods Rs. 1,31,75,779.63

------------------------- Rs. 16,25,25,592.37

Less: Works done by sub-contractor Rs.      27,17,304.00 -------------------------- Rs. 15,98,08,208.37

Less: Labour charges and  overhead charges Rs. 11,91,66,742.38

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------------------------- Rs. 4,06,41,465.99

Tax was levied  @ 4% on Rs. 17,48,096.90 Rs.     69,923.00 @ 8% on Rs. 1,96,71,099.14 Rs. 15,73,678.93 @ 9% on Rs. 1,45,34,488.10 Rs. 13,08,103.92 @ 10% on Rs. 2,048.00 Rs.           204.80 @ 11% on Rs. 4,82,125.70 Rs.      53,033.86 @ 12% on Rs. 42,03,608.15 Rs.   5,04,432.97

--------------------- Rs. 35,09,387.36

Add: Tax @ 1% on Rs. 5,55,08,612.25 Rs.   5,55,086.12 --------------------- Rs. 40,64,473.48

Surcharge @ 10% on Rs. 39,94,549.60 Rs.   3,99,454.00 --------------------- Rs. 44,63,928.44

Penalty U/S 16 (8) Rs.           920.00 --------------------- Rs. 44,64,848.44

The Scrutiny of  assessment order revealed that the dealer was allowed exemption of Rs. 11,91,66,742.38 on account of labour  charges  and  overhead  charges  claimed as  detailed below:

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Labour Charges Rs. 7,02,77,549.00

Overhead charges Rs. 1,87,15,545.00

Goods consumed in course of  execution of work Rs. 3,12,47,916.00

------------------------

Rs. 12,02,41,010.00

Out of the above claim, a sum of Rs. 10,74,267.62 to us  

disallowed as below:

Tax paid claim disallowed Rs. 3,50,698.37

Recovery of cement taxable Rs. 2,20,972.50

Amount of plant hire charges Rs. 5,02,596.75

--------------------

Rs.10,74,267.62

The  dealer  had  furnished  the  statement  of  material utilized in the contract work and goods consumed for own use.  Scrutiny of assessment order revealed that the dealer was  allowed  exemption  on  Rs.  3,12,47,916.00  being  the amount  of  goods  consumed  or  used  itself  in  course  of execution of  work,  details of  which were discussed in the assessment  order.   It  had  been  stated  by  the  assessing authority that  such goods were purchased on payment  of tax,  but  no  declaration  in  form  IX  C  along  with  other evidences  were kept  on record.   Production of  declaration form in IX C was mandatory one and hence the claim was not allowable.  

The entire materials received from outside the State or purchased  within  the  State  without  payment  of  tax  was normally leviable to tax at specified rates under section 12 of B.F. Act 1981.  Under section 4 of the Act ibid, every dealer liable to pay under section 3 of the Act, if otherwise disposes

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the goods in any manner other than by way of sale in the State was also liable to purchase tax.  In this connection a reference to the judgement of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court and duly confirmed by the Hon’ble  Supreme Court  in the case of Chevvabbo Vs. State of Karnataka (1986) 62 STG 194 Se) is invited ……. Disposal of goods in this section (Similar to those Karnataka) was clarified as transfer of title over the goods  otherwise  than  sale,  included  gifts,  own  use  or consumption  section  4  of  the  Act  (B.F.  Act)  is  similar  to section 7 A of Tamil Nadu General Court in the case of the State of  Tamil  Nadu Vs.  M.K.  Kandaswami (1975 36 STC 191)  where it  was held that  (1)  this Section is a separate charging provision in the Act and is not subject to section 3 and (ii) brings to tax goods, the sale of which would normally have been taxed at the same point or other in the State but could  not  be  taxed  even  due to  destroying  them or  other reasons.   Thus  the  purchase  tax  was  leviable  on  goods consumed for own use.  Since cost price/purchase price was reflected  as  value  of  goods  consumed  for  own use  of  the dealer, the tax at the rate specified in section 12 of the Act ibid was leviable.   In this case,  even if  same charges like Electrodes,  Welding  Cables,  welding  appliances,  fuel  and lubricants,  oxygen  and  P.A.  Gas  safety,  safety  appliances valued at Rs. 44,90,114.00 was not considered as taxable, the  consumable  goods  worth  Rs.  2,67,57,802.00  attracted levying of tax at specified rates.  

The case may please be re-examined in the light of above observation  and  levying  of  purchase  tax  amounting  to Rs.24,19,385.31 (including additional tax and surcharge) as calculated  below  may  be  considered  under  intimation  to audit.  

S.  

No.

Name of  Goods

Purchase value  

of goods

Rate  

applicable

Non-levy of  

purchase tax 1. Camp

Equipment, general consumable, plywood  for shuttering spares  and staying material

Rs. 1,81,20,301.00

8% Rs. 14,49,624.08

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2. Electrical Goods  and Timber

Rs. 49,65,205.00

12% Rs. 5,95,824.60

3. Tools  & Tackles

Addl.  Tax  @ 1%  on 20,45,448.68

Surcharge  @ 10%  on 20,65,903.16

Rs. 36,72,296.00

4% Rs. 1,46,891.84 Rs.21,92,340.52 Rs.     20,454.48 Rs.22,12,795.00 Rs.  2,06,590.31 Rs.24,19,385.31

The use of fuel and lubricants may please be bifurcated and value of lubricants only may be levied to tax.  

On being pointed out in audit, it was stated that since the goods had not  been transferred to contractee co-under the provisions of works contract, but it had been consumed and so it does not come under the purview of taxation.  The reply is not tanable in view of the above judgements and hence the case needed to be reviewed.”  

(emphasis supplied)

29) From  a  perusal  of  the  last  paragraph  of  the

aforementioned report of the audit party, it is clear that the

Assessing Officer was of the opinion that as the goods had not

been  transferred  to  appellant-Company  but  had  been

consumed, so it does not come under the purview of taxation.

In other words, the Assessing Officer was not satisfied on the

basis of information given by the audit party that any of the

turnover of  the appellant-Company had escaped assessment

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so as to invoke Section 19 of the State Act.  From the above, it

also appears that the assessing officer had to issue notice on

the ground of direction issued by the audit party and not on

his personal satisfaction which is not permissible under law.

30) In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered

view that  the order dated 27.02.2006 passed by the Deputy

Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Urban Circle, Jamshedpur

is without jurisdiction and the High Court was not  right in

dismissing the petition filed by the appellant-Company.  We,

therefore,  allow  the  appeal  and  set  aside  the  order  dated

27.02.2006 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial

Taxes, Urban Circle, Jamshedpur as well as the order dated

17.11.2006 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of

Jharkhand.  However, the parties shall bear their own costs.

...…………….………………………J.                (MADAN B. LOKUR)                                  

.…....…………………………………J.         (R.K. AGRAWAL)                         

NEW DELHI; MARCH 21, 2017.  

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