REPORTABL E

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2909-2913 OF 2005

Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRs.                          .. Appellants

VERSUS

State of A.P. & Ors                                   ..Respondents

J U D G M E N T

SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.

1. These appeals are directed against the order passed  

by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature of  

Andhra  Pradesh  at  Hyderabad  in  CMP  Nos.  21114,  

21115,  21116,  21117  and  21118  of  2003  dated  19th  

August,  2003.  By the aforesaid order, the High Court  

has allowed all the petitions/applications.

2. In  the  applications/petitions,  respondent  No.3,  

herein, had sought the following directions:-

“  CMP  No.  21114/2003:     Petition  under  Order 22 Rule 4 of the CPC praying  that in  the circumstances stated in the affidavit titled  therewith,  the  High  Court  will  be  pleased to  permit the petitioners to bring the above stated  persons  as  legal  representatives  of  the  deceased  sole  respondent  in  Appeal  No. 8 of 1985 on the file of the High Court.

CMP No.  21115/2003: Petition  U/s praying  that  the  High  Court  may  be  pleased  to  set  aside the dismissal Order dated 6.2.98 in AS  No.8 of 1985 and to restore the appeal to file.

CMP No. 21116/2003: Petition Under Order 9  Rule 9 read with section 151 CPC, praying that  the High Court may be pleased to set aside the  abatement  caused  due  to  the  death  of  sole  respondent i.e. Lanka Venkateswarlu.

CMP No. 21117/2003:  Between Sri D.E.V Apparao …Petitioner/impleaded  Petitioner  in  AS  No.8  of  1985  on  the  file  of  High Court

            And:

1. The  State  of  A.P.  rep.  by  District  Collector, Visakhapatnam.

2. The Tahsildar, Visakhpatnam                                    …Respondent/Appellants

3. Lanka  Venkateswarlu  (died)                                            …Respondent

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Petition under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, prays this  Hon’ble  Court  may be  pleased to  permit  the  petitioners  society  to  be  impleaded  as  appellant No.3 along with the appellants No. 1  and  2  in  AS.  8  of  1985  on  the  file  of  the  Hon’ble Court to prosecute the appeal.

CMP  No.  21118/2003:  Petition  U/s  5  of  Limitation Act praying the High Court may be  pleased to condone the delay of  883 days in  filing  the  petition  seeking  to  set  aside  the  dismissal order dated 6.2.1998.

These  petitions  coming on for  hearing,  upon  perusing the petition and the affidavit filed in  support  thereof  and  upon  hearing  the  arguments  of  Govt.  pleader  for  Appeal  for  Petitioners in CMP Nos. 21114, 21115, 21116,  21118 of 2003 and of  Mr. K. Sarva Bhouma  Rao,  Advocate  for  petitioner  in  CMP  No.  21117  of  2003  and  of  Mr.  M.S.R.  Subramanyam,  Advocate  for  the  respondents  in CMP Nos. 21114, 21115, 21116, 21118 of  2003 and G.P. for Appeal for the respondents  in CMP No. 21117 of 2003.”

3. We  may  now  briefly  notice  the  relevant  facts  as  

stated in the pleadings of the parties and the impugned  

order  of  the  High  Court.  The  predecessor  of  the  

appellants,  i.e.,  Shri  Lanka Venkateswarlu,  (hereinafter  

referred to as  ‘original plaintiff’), brought a suit O.S. No.  

72 of 1979 before the  subordinate judge Visakhapatnam  

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for the declaration of his title as the absolute owner of  

the suit schedule property and for permanent injunction  

restraining  respondents  Nos.  1  and  2  from  interfering  

with his peaceful possession. The suit schedule property,  

to  the  extent of  2  acres  was,  according to the original  

plaintiff, covered by survey No. 73/12 in Thokada village.  

He  had  purchased  the  suit  schedule  property  by  a  

registered  sale  deed  dated  15th July,  1961  from  one  

Gonna Appanna son of Venkataswamy of China Gantyda  

village. The original plaintiff was constrained to file the  

aforesaid suit on coming to know that respondent Nos. 1  

and 2 were claiming the suit schedule land to be “banjar  

land”  which  vested  in  the  Government.   He  had  also  

learned that the land was in imminent danger of being  

illegally alienated by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2.  They  

were claiming that the land was required to issue Pattas  

to weaker sections of society.  

4. Respondent  Nos.  1  and  2  were  impleaded  as  the  

defendants  to  the  suit.   Subsequently,  the  suit  was  

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transferred to the Court of IVth Additional District Judge,  

Visakhapatnam and renumbered as O.S. No. 83 of 1981.

5. The  aforesaid  averments  of  the  original  plaintiffs  

were controverted by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2.  It was  

claimed  that  the  plaint  schedule  property  was  not  

covered by old survey No. 73/12 of the original village of  

Thokada.  The boundaries as well as survey number were  

stated to be fictitious, forged and imaginary.  Even the  

ownership of the ancestors of the vendor of the original  

plaintiff  of the suit schedule land was denied. Further,  

the alleged sale deed dated 15th July, 1961 between the  

original plaintiff and the vendor was denied.  It was also  

stated that  the  original  plaintiff  was not  in possession  

and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property.

6. On  the  pleadings  of  the  parties,  the  trial  court  

framed six issues. Issue No. 1 pertains to the title of the  

original plaintiff to the schedule property.  Issues No.2 &  

3 were with regard to, whether the original plaintiff was  

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entitled to relief of declaration and injunction as prayed  

for.  Issue No.4 was whether the suit is not maintainable.  

A perusal of the judgment of the trial court shows that  

the  suit  was hotly  contested on each and every issue.  

Issues 1,  2,  3,  4  and 6 were decided in favour of  the  

original  plaintiff  and  against  the  defendants,  i.e.,  

respondent  Nos.  1  and  2.  Issue  No.5  with  regard  to  

valuation of the suit was not pressed by the government  

pleader.  The  suit  was  decreed  by  judgment  dated  

24th September, 1982.

7. The respondents challenged the aforesaid judgment  

and decree by filing an appeal before the High Court of  

Andhra  Pradesh  being  A.S.  No.  8  of  1985.   The  sole  

respondent, i.e., original plaintiff died on 25th February,  

1990.   Therefore,  the  Advocate  appearing  for  the  

deceased original plaintiff being the ‘sole respondent’ in  

the  appeal  filed  a  memo before  the  High  Court  giving  

intimation about the death of his client. The memo was  

filed after  giving  notice  to  the  advocate  for  respondent  

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Nos.  1  and  2,  who  were  appellants  in  the  aforesaid  

appeals. In spite of such intimation, respondent Nos. 1  

and  2  failed  to  bring  the  legal  representatives  of  the  

deceased original plaintiff on record.

8. From the judgment of the High Court it is apparent  

that the appeal came up for hearing on 24th April, 1997.  

At  that  stage,  the  counsel  for  the  appellants  again  

brought  to  the  notice  of  the  Court  that  his  client  has  

passed away on 25th February,  1990.   The High Court  

directed the government pleader to take steps to bring on  

the  record  the  legal  representatives  of  the  original  

plaintiff and posted the matter for hearing on 16th June,  

1997.   It  appears  that  no  actions  were  taken  by  the  

respondents to comply with the order passed by the High  

Court on 24th April,  1997.  Therefore,  on 6th February,  

1998,  Justice  V.  Rajagopala  Reddy,  J.  passed  the  

following order:-

“Appeal  under  Section  96  CPC  against  the  order  of  the  Court  of  the  IV  Addl.  District  Judge,  Visakhapatnam dt.24.09.1982 in O.S.  No. 83/81.

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    This  appeal  coming  on  for  orders  under  Rule 64 of the Appellate Side Rules of the High  Court on the failure of the Appellant herein.

1. To take steps to bring on record the LRs. of  the deceased sole respondent.

In  the  presence  of  G./P.  for  Excise  for  the  Appellant  and  of  Mr.  M.S.R.  Subramanyam,  Advocate for the respondent No.1.

It is ordered as follows:

1. That the Appellant do within one week from  the  date  of  this  order  comply  with  the  requisitions of the Office referred to above  and;

2. That in default of compliance with the said  requisitions within the time prescribed in  clause  1  supra,  the  Appeal  shall  stand  dismissed as  against  the  sole  respondent  herein.”

9. The  aforesaid  order  was  admittedly  not  complied  

with.  Consequently, the appeal stood abated in terms of  

the  order  dated  6th February,  1998.  It  appears  that  

thereafter  CMPSR  No.  49656  of  2000  was  moved  by  

respondent  Nos.  1  and  2  seeking  condonation  of  883  

days delay in filing the petition to set aside the dismissal  

order  dated  6th February,  1998.  The  application  was  

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accompanied by an affidavit where it is candidly admitted  

by respondent  No.2 that  the  order  dated  6th February,  

1998 was not  complied  with.   It  was further  admitted  

that  as  the  order  dated  6th February,  1998  was  not  

complied with, the default order came into force and the  

appeal stood dismissed.   

10. In this affidavit,  the explanation given is  that the  

predecessors  of  the  officer,  who  affirmed  the  affidavit  

dated 11th July, 2000 came to know about the dismissal  

of  the  appeal  during  the  course  of  investigation  in  

original O.S. No. 6 of 2000 which had been filed by the  

widow and the children of the deceased original plaintiff,  

i.e., sole respondent in the appeal.  It  is also admitted  

that thereafter, an application was filed for setting aside  

the  order  of  abatement  dated 6th February,  1998,  but,  

without any application seeking condonation of delay of  

883  days  in  filing  the  petition.   To  cover  the  foresaid  

lapse,  CMP  No.  21118  of  2003  was  filed  seeking  

condonation of delay of 883 days in filing the petition.

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11. Thereafter CMPSR No. 58644 of 2000 was filed on  

17th August, 2000 with a prayer to condone the delay of  

3703 days to bring the legal representatives on record.  

CMPSR No. 58646 of 2000 was filed to bring the legal  

representatives  of  the  deceased  original  plaintiff  on  

record and CMPSR No. 58645 of 2000 to set aside the  

order of dismissal in AS No. 8 of 1985 dated 6th February,  

1998 was filed.   These applications were  subsequently  

numbered  as  noted  in  the  heading  of  the  impugned  

judgment.  

12. It  appears  from  the  impugned  order  of  the  High  

Court and CMPSR No. 58644 of 2000 was numbered as  

CMP no. 17186 of 2000 on 17th August, 2000 and listed  

before  the  Court  on  27th September,  2000.   The  High  

Court granted two weeks time for filing the counter. The  

aforesaid CMP was posted for hearing before the bench  

on 16th October, 2000 (Venkatanarayan,J.). At that time,  

counsel for the deceased original plaintiff submitted that  

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his client had died in 1990 and he had no instructions.  

Therefore,  the  Court  directed  to  issue  notice  to  the  

parties  on  the  petition.   Even  at  that  stage  the  

government  pleader  did  not  bring  to  the  notice  of  the  

Court  that  the  applications filed by respondent  Nos.  1  

and 2 to set aside the order of dismissal and to bring the  

legal  representatives  on  record  were  pending  

consideration.

13. Thereafter it appears the matter was adjourned on a  

number of occasions from 27th June, 2001 to 9th April,  

2002.  Surprisingly, on 3rd June, 2002 the government  

pleader again took time from the Court to verify whether  

any separate application was filed for  restoration of the  

appeal and whether any such application was pending or  

not.  Thereafter  the  matter  was  not  pursued  by  the  

government pleader.

14. In the meantime, the alleged beneficiaries to whom  

Pattas had been granted by the Government Poramboke  

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in the year 1979 filed CMP No. 21705 of 2000, seeking  

permission of the Court to come on record as the third  

appellant in the appeal.  In the impugned order, it is also  

pointed out  that  the  pendency  of  the  applications had  

come to the notice of the Court intermittently. It appears  

that  the  application  to  condone the  delay  in  filing  the  

petition for setting aside the order of dismissal was filed,  

when the lapse was pointed by the Court.

15. Thereafter, it seems that without the adjudication of  

any of the applications on merits, the appeal was listed  

for  hearing  before  the  Bench,  which  culminated  into  

passing the judgment and order dated 19th August, 2003,  

subject  matter  of  the  present  appeal.  By  the aforesaid  

judgment, the High Court has allowed all the applications  

restored the appeal posted it for hearing on 25th August,  

2003.

16. This  Court  while  issuing  notice  in  the  SLP  

on 15th December, 2003 directed that “in the meantime,  

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proceedings  in  the  appeal  pending  in  the  High  Court  

shall  remain  stayed”.  Therefore,  it  is  evident  that  the  

situation today is as it was when the order was passed on  

6th February, 1998, i.e.,  appeal filed by the respondent  

Nos. 1 and 2 stood abated and hence dismissed.

17. We  have  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  parties.  

Mr. P.S. Narasimha, senior advocate,  appearing for the  

appellant submitted that the impugned order of the High  

Court  cannot  be  justified  on  any  legal  ground.   He  

submits that the High Court having itself  recorded the  

utter  negligence  of  the  respondents  in  pursuing  the  

appeal at every stage, without any justification, condoned  

the delay.  The learned senior counsel  pointed out that  

there  was  no  explanation,  much  less  any  plausible  

explanation to justify the delay of 3703 days in filing the  

application for  bringing on record the  LRs.  of  the  sole  

respondent or for the delay in filing the application for  

setting aside the order dated 6th February, 1998. It was  

further  submitted  that  there  was  no  justification  to  

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permit the respondent No.3 to be impleaded as a party in  

the appeal.  Learned counsel relied on the judgment of  

this  Court  in  the  case  of  Balwant  Singh  (dead) Vs.  

Jagdish Singh  1   in  support  of  the  submission that  the  

law  of  limitation  has  to  be  enforced  in  its  proper  

prospective.  Even  though  the  Courts  have  power  to  

condone the delay, it can not be condoned without any  

justification. Such an approach would result in rendering  

the provisions contained in the Limitation Act redundant  

and inoperative.  

18. On  the  other  hand,  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondents relied on the judgments of this Court in the  

case  of  N.  Balakrishnan Vs. M.  Krishnamurthy  2  ,  

Mithailal Dalsangar Singh & Ors. Vs. Annabai Devram  

Kini & Ors.3 and Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (dead) by  

LRs Vs.  Pramod Gupta (dead) by LRs.  4   and submitted  

1  (2010)8 SCC 685 2 (1998) 7 SCC 123 3 (2003) 10 SCC 691 4 (2003) 3 SCC 272

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that the High Court in condoning the delay has merely  

advanced the cause of substantial justice.

19. We have considered the submissions made by the  

learned counsel.  At the outset, it needs to be stated that  

generally speaking, the courts in this country, including  

this Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the  

application  for  condonation  of  delay  on  the  ground  of  

sufficient  cause under  Section 5 of  the  Limitation Act.  

This  principle  is  well  settled  and  has  been  set  out  

succinctly  in the case of  Collector,  Land Acquisition,  

Anantnag & Ors. Vs. Katiji & Ors.5  

20. In the case of  M. Balakrishnan (supra), this Court  

again reiterated the principle that rules of limitation are  

not  meant  to  destroy  the  rights  of  parties.   They  are  

meant to see that the parties do not resort  to  dilatory  

tactics, but seek their remedy promptly.  

5 (1987) 2 SCC 107

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21. In the case of Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (supra),  

this Court again emphasized that provisions contained in  

the Order 22 CPC were devised to ensure continuation  

and culmination in an effective adjudication and not to  

retard further progress of the proceedings. The provisions  

contained in the Order 22 are not to be construed as a  

rigid matter of principle, but must ever be viewed as a  

flexible  tool  of  convenience  in  the  administration  of  

justice.  It was further observed that laws of procedure  

are meant to regulate effectively, assist and aid the object  

of  doing  a  substantial  and  real  justice  and  not  to  

foreclose  even  adjudication  on  merits  of  substantial  

rights of citizen under personal, property and other laws.  

In the case of  Mithailal Dalsangar Singh and Ors. Vs.  

Annabai Devram Kini & Ors, (Supra), this Court again  

reiterated that in as much as abatement results in denial  

of hearing on the merits of the case, the provision of an  

abatement  has  to  be  construed  strictly.  On  the  other  

hand,  the  prayer  of  setting  aside  abatement  and  the  

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dismissal  consequent  upon  abatement  had  to  be  

considered liberally. It was further observed as follows:-

“The Courts have to adopt a justice oriented  approach  dictated  by  the  uppermost  consideration  that ordinarily a litigant  ought  not to be denied an opportunity of having a lis  determined on merits unless he has, by gross  negligence,  deliberate  inaction  or  something  akin  to  misconduct,  disentitled  himself  from  seeking the indulgence of the court.”

22. The  concepts  of  liberal  approach  and  

reasonableness in exercise of the discretion by the Courts  

in condoning delay, have been again stated by this Court  

in the case of  Balwant Singh (supra), as follows:-

“25.  We  may  state  that  even  if  the  term  “sufficient  cause”  has  to  receive  liberal  construction, it must squarely fall  within the  concept of reasonable time and proper conduct  of  the  party  concerned.   The  purpose  of  introducing liberal construction normally is to  introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it  is understood in its general connotation.”

“26.  The law of limitation is a substantive law  and  has  definite  consequences  on  the  right  and  obligation  of  party  to  arise.   These  principles  should  be  adhered  to  and applied  appropriately  depending  on  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  a  given  case.   Once  a  valuable  right  has  accrued  in  favour  of  one  party  as  a  result  of  the  failure  of  the  other  party to explain the delay by showing sufficient  

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cause  and  its  own  conduct,  it  will  be  unreasonable to take away that right  on the  mere  asking  of  the  applicant,  particularly  when  the  delay  is  directly  a  result  of  negligence,  default  or  inaction  of  that  party.  Justice must be done to both parties equally.  Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.  If  a  party  has  been  thoroughly  negligent  in  implementing its rights and remedies, it will be  equally unfair to deprive the other party of a  valuable right that has accrued to it in law as  a result of his acting vigilantly.”

23. Let us now examine as to whether the High Court  

was justified in condoning the delay in the peculiar facts  

of the presence case.  The High Court in its judgment  

records the following conclusions:-

“(1)  The Government Pleader having filed the  appeal  on  18.2.1983  has  taken  three  long  years to get the appeal numbered.  

(2)  The  sole  respondent  died  in  1990.  The  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  submits  that  he  served  a  letter  on  the  learned  Government  Pleader  bringing  to  his  notice  about  the  death  of  his  client  in  1990  itself.  Since the letter is not traced we are not giving  much importance to that fact.  But at the same  time this fact was brought to the notice of the  Government  Pleader  on  24.2.1997  when  the  appeal was listed for hearing.  

(3) Even though the Court gave sufficient time  the  Government  Pleader  has  not  taken  any  steps to bring LRs. on record.  

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(4)  After  one  year  the  Court  passed  a  Conditional Order on 6.2.1998 and the appeal  was  dismissed  for  not  bringing  the  LRs.  on  record.  

(5) After  two  more  years  the  concerned  officials  of  the  Government  and  the  Government  Pleader  in  office  at  the  relevant  point  of  time,  filed  some applications,  which  are not in order.   

(6) Even  then  they  have  not  bestowed  any  attention either to comply with the defects in  filing the application or in getting the orders  are passed on these applications.  But at the  same time they went on taking time without  knowing  for  what  purpose  they  were  taking  time.

In the result an appeal which would have been  disposed of in 1997 remained pending all these  years mainly due to the negligence on the part  of the Government Pleader in office.

Thereafter  at  the  two  stages,  the  High  Court  records  

that:-  

“In the normal course we would have thrown  out these applications without having second  thought in the matter…………..”

“We have already observed that in the normal  course  we  would  have  dismissed  the  applications for severe latches on the part of  the appellants and their counsel.”

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24. Having recorded the aforesaid conclusions, the High  

Court proceeded to condone the delay.  In our opinion,  

such a course was not open to the High Court, given the  

pathetic  explanation offered by the  respondents  in  the  

application seeking condonation of delay.   

25. This is especially so in view of the remarks made by  

the  High  Court  about  the  delay  being  caused  by  the  

inefficiency and ineptitude of  the government  pleaders.  

The displeasure of the Court is patently apparent from  

the impugned order itself.  In the opening paragraph of  

the  impugned  order  the  High  Court  has,  rather  

sarcastically, dubbed the government pleaders as without  

merit  and  ability.   Such  an  insinuation  is  clearly  

discernable from the observation that “This is a classic  

case, how the learned government pleaders appointed on  

the  basis  of  merit  and  ability (emphasis  supplied) are  

discharging their function protecting the interest of their  

clients”.   Having  said  so,  the  High  Court,  graphically  

narrated the clear dereliction of duty by the concerned  

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government pleaders in not pursuing the appeal before  

the High Court diligently.  The High Court has set out the  

different  stages at  which the government  pleaders had  

exhibited almost  culpable  negligence in performance of  

their duties.  The High Court found the justification given  

by the government pleaders to be unacceptable.  Twice in  

the impugned order, it was recorded that in the normal  

course,  the  applications  would  have  been  thrown  out  

without having a second thought in the matter.  Having  

recorded such conclusions, inexplicably, the High Court  

proceeds to condone the unconscionable delay.  

26. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale,  

which could have impelled the High Court to condone the  

delay  after  holding  the  same to  be  unjustifiable.   The  

concepts  such  as  “liberal  approach”,  “justice  oriented  

approach”, “substantial justice” can not be employed to  

jettison the substantial  law of  limitation.  Especially,  in  

cases  where  the  Court  concludes  that  there  is  no  

justification for the delay.  In our opinion, the approach  

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adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of  

judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required  

to  maintain  whilst  adjudicating  any  lis  between  the  

parties.  We are rather pained to notice that in this case,  

not  being  satisfied  with  the  use  of  mere  intemperate  

language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms.  

The  use  of  unduly  strong  intemperate  or  extravagant  

language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved  

by this Court in a number of cases.  Whilst considering  

applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of  

the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and  

unbridled discretionary powers.  All discretionary powers,  

especially  judicial  powers,  have  to  be  exercised  within  

reasonable  bounds,  known to  the  law.   The  discretion  

has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by  

reason.   Whims  or  fancies;  prejudices  or  predilections  

can  not  and  should  not  form  the  basis  of  exercising  

discretionary powers.  

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27. The  order  of  the  High  Court,  in  our  opinion,  is  

based  purely  on  the  personal  perceptions  and  

predilections  of  the  Judges  on  the  bench.   The  latent  

anger and hostility ingrained in the expressions employed  

in  the  judgment  have  denuded  the  judgment  of  

impartiality.   In  its  desire  to  castigate  the  government  

pleaders  and  the  Court  staff,  the  High  Court  has  

sacrificed the “justice oriented approach”, the bedrock of  

which is fairness and impartiality.  Judges at all levels in  

this  country subscribe to an oath when entering upon  

office of Judgeship, to do justice without fear or favour, ill  

will or malice.  This commitment in form of a solemn oath  

is  to  ensure  that  Judges  base  their  opinions  on  

objectivity  and  impartiality.   The  first  casualty  of  

prejudice is objectivity and impartiality.   It is also well  

known that anger deprives a human being of his ability  

to reason.  Judges being human are not immune to such  

disability.  It is of utmost importance that in expressing  

their opinions, Judges and Magistrates be guided only by  

the considerations of doing justice.  We may notice here  

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the observations made by a Constitution Bench of this  

Court  in  the  case  of  State  of  U.P.  Vs.  Mohammad  

Naim  6  ,  which  are  of  some  relevance  in  the  present  

context.   In  Paragraph  11  of  the  judgment,  it  was  

observed as follows:-

“If there is one principle of cardinal importance  in the administration of justice, it is this: the  proper  freedom and  independence  of  Judges  and Magistrates must be maintained and they  must  be  allowed  to  perform  their  functions  freely  and  fearlessly  and  without  undue  interference by any body, even by this Court.  At the same time it is equally necessary that in  expressing  their  opinions  Judges  and  Magistrates must be guided by considerations  of  justice,  fair-play  and  restraint.  It  is  not  infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat  the very purpose for which they are made. It  has  been  judicially  recognised  that  in  the  matter of making disparaging remarks against  persons  or  authorities  whose  conduct  comes  into consideration before courts of law in cases  to  be  decided  by  them,  it  is  relevant  to  consider (a) whether the party whose conduct  is  in  question is  before  the  court  or  has  an  opportunity of explaining or defending himself;  (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing  on that conduct,  justifying the remarks;  and  (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of  the  case,  as  an  integral  part  thereof,  to  animadvert on that conduct. It has also been  recognised that judicial pronouncements must  be judicial in nature, and should not normally  depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve.”

6  (1964) 2 SCR 363

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28. We are of the considered opinion that the caustic  

remarks made by the High Court, against the government  

pleaders and the Court staff clearly exhibits a departure  

from the principles quoted above.  

29. We are of the considered opinion that the judgment  

of  the High Court  is  unsustainable either in law or in  

equity.   Consequently,  the  appeals  are  allowed.   The  

impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside with  

no order as to costs.  

    ……………………………..J.     [B.Sudershan Reddy]

……………………………..J.  [Surinder Singh Nijjar]

New Delhi; February 24, 2011.          

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