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PETITIONER: KULJIT SINGH ALIAS RANGA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/01/1982

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1982 AIR  774            1982 SCR  (3)  58  1982 SCC  (1) 417        1982 SCALE  (1)1  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1989 SC 653  (9)

ACT:      Clemency  jurisdiction-Power   of  President  to  grant pardon etc.  and to  suspend, remit  or commute sentences in certain cases-Constitution of India, 1950, Article 72, scope of the power.

HEADNOTE:      Dismissing the petition, the Court ^      HELD: 1.  Whatever be  the guidelines  observed for the exercise of  the  power  conferred  by  Article  72  of  the Constitution. the  only  sentence  which  can,  possibly  be imposed upon  the petitioner in The instant case, is that of death and  no circumstances exist for interference with that sentence. Not  even  tho  most  liberal  use  of  his  mercy jurisdiction could have persuaded tho President to interfere with the  sentence of  death imposed  upon the petitioner in view particularly  of the  considerations mentioned  in  KS. Ranga v.  Union of  India and  Anr., [1981]  - 3 S.C R. 512. Therefore, in  refusing to  commute the  sentence the  death imposed upon  the petitioner  into  a  lesser  sentence  the President  has   not  in   any   manner   transgressed   his discretionary power under Article 72. [59 D-E, 60 B-C]      2. Undoubtedly,  the President  has  the  power  in  an appropriate case  to commute  any sentence  imposed by Court into a  lesser sentence.  But tho question as to whether the case is  appropriate for the exercise of the power conferred by Article  72 depends  upon the  facts and circumstances of each particular case. [59 E, G]      3. After  all the  power conferred by Article 72 can be used only  for the purpose of reducing the sentence, not for enhancing it.  Therefore, no useful purpose will be achieved by the  petitioner by ensuring the imposition of any severe, judicially evolved constraints on the wholesome power of the President to  use it  as the  justice of a case may require. [59 H, 60 A]      James Shewan  & Sons v. United Stares, 69 L. Ed. 527 at 535, referred to.

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JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:  Writ Petition  (Crl.) No. 8193A of 1981.      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)      R. K  Garg, V.  J. Francis,  Sunil Kumar  Jain and D. K Garg for the Petitioner-Ranga 59      R. K. Jain and P K. Jain for the Petitioner-Billa.      N. C. Talukdar and R. N. Poddar for Respondent No. 1.      L. N.  Sinha, Attorney  General and  Miss A. Subhashini for Attorney General.      K.  Parasaran,   Solicitor  General,   M.  K.  Banerji, Additional Solicitor  General and  Miss  A.  Subhashini  for Union of India.      N. Nettar for the State of Karnataka.      Raju Ramachandran  for  Applicant/intervener-Chhaganlal Aggarwal.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      CHANDRACHUD C.  J. The question as regards the scope of the  power   of  the  President  under  article  72  of  the Constitution to  commute a  sentence of  death into a lesser sentence may  have to  await examination  on an  appropriate occasion. This  clearly is  not that  occasion because in so far as  this case  is concerned,  whatever be the guidelines observed for  the exercise of the power conferred by article 72, the only sentence which can possibly be imposed upon the petitioner is  that of  death and no circumstances exist for interference  with   that  sentence.  Therefore  we  see  no justification for  saying that  in refusing  to commute  the sentence of  death imposed upon the petitioner into a lesser sentence, the  President has  in any manner transgressed his discretionary  power  under  article  72.  Undoubtedly,  the President has  the power  in an  appropriate case to commute any sentence  imposed by  a court into a lesser sentence and as said  by Chief  Justice Taft  in James  Shewan &  Sons  v United States,  the "executive  clemency  exists  to  afford relief from  undue  harshness  or  evident  mistake  in  the operation or  enforcement of  the criminal law" and that the administration of  justice by  the courts is not necessarily or certainly considerate of circumstances which may properly mitigate guilt.  But the  question as to whether the case is appropriate for  the exercise  of  the  power  conferred  by Article 72  depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case.  The necessity  or  the  justification  for exercising that  power has  therefore to be judged from case to case.  In fact, we do not see what useful purpose will be achieved by the petitioner by 60 ensuring the  imposition of  any severe, judicially- evolved constraints on  the wholesome  power of the President to use it as  the justice  of a  case may  require. After  all, the power conferred  by Article  72 can  be used  only  for  the purpose of  reducing the  sentence, not for enhancing it. We need not, however, go into that question elaborately because in so far as this case is concerned, we are quite clear that not even  the most  liberal use  of his  mercy  jurisdiction could have  persuaded the  President to  interfere with  the sentence of  death imposed  upon  the  petitioner,  in  view particularly of  the considerations  mentioned by  us in our judgment in  Kuljeet Singh  @ Ranga v. Union of India & Anr. We may  recall what we said in that judgment that "the death of the  Chopra children was caused by the petitioner and his companion Billa  after  a  savage  planning  which  bears  a

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professional  stamp",  that  the  "survival  of  an  orderly society demands  the extinction  of the life of persons like Ranga and  Billa who  are  a  menace  to  social  order  and security", and  that "they  are professional  murderers  and deserve no  sympathy even in terms of the evolving standards of decency of a mature society".      The petition is accordingly dismissed.      We have  heard Shri  R. K.  Jain as amicus on behalf of the accused  Billa. We  see  no  substance  in  Shri  Jain’s contentions also.      The order  of stay  of execution  of the death sentence which we had passed in favour of the accused Ranga and Billa as also  the general  order of stay are hereby vacated If in any specific  case or  cases there  is an  express order  of stay, it  will not  be affected  by the  order which  we are passing today. S.R.                                    Petition dismissed. 61