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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1478 OF 2015 (@ SLP(C) NO. 14918 OF 2009)

Krishnamoorthy ... Appellant

                               Versus

Sivakumar & Ors. ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

In a respectable and elevated constitutional democracy  

purity  of  election,  probity  in  governance,  sanctity  of  

individual dignity, sacrosanctity of rule of law, certainty and  

sustenance  of  independence  of  judiciary,  efficiency  and  

acceptability  of  bureaucracy,  credibility  of  institutions,  

integrity and respectability of those who run the institutions  

and prevalence of mutual deference among all the wings of  

the State are absolutely  significant,  in  a way,  imperative.  

They are not only to be treated as essential concepts and

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remembered as glorious precepts but also to be practised so  

that in the conduct of every individual they are concretely  

and fruitfully manifested.  The crucial recognised ideal which  

is required to be realised is eradication of criminalisation of  

politics and corruption in public life.  When criminality enters  

into the grass-root level as well as at the higher levels there  

is  a feeling that ‘monstrosity’  is  likely to wither away the  

multitude and eventually usher in a dreadful fear that would  

rule supreme creating an incurable chasm in the spine of the  

whole citizenry.  In such a situation the generation of today,  

in its effervescent ambition and volcanic fury, smothers the  

hopes, aspirations and values of tomorrow’s generation and  

contaminate  them with  the  idea  to  pave the  path  of  the  

past,  possibly  thinking,  that  is  the  noble  tradition  and  

corruption can be a way of life and one can get away with it  

by  a  well  decorated  exterior.    But,  an  intervening  and  

pregnant one, there is a great protector, and an unforgiving  

one, on certain occasions and some situations, to interdict –  

“The law’, the mightiest sovereign in a civilised society.   

2. The preclude, we are disposed to think, has become a  

necessity,  as,  in the case at hand, we are called upon to

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decide, what constitutes “undue influence” in the context of  

Section 260 of Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994 (for short  

‘the 1994 Act’) which has adopted the similar expression as  

has been used under Section 123 (2) of the Representation  

of  People’s  Act,  1951 (for  brevity  ‘the 1951 Act’)  thereby  

making  the  delineation  of  great  significance,  for  our  

interpretation of the aforesaid words shall be applicable to  

election law in all spheres.

3. The instant  case  is  a  case  of  non-disclosure  of  full  

particulars of criminal cases pending against a candidate, at  

the  time  of  filing  of  nomination  and  its  eventual  impact  

when the election is challenged before the election tribunal.  

As the factual score is exposited the appellant was elected  

as the President of Thekampatti  Panchayat,  Mettupalayam  

Taluk, Coimbatore District in the State of Tamil Nadu in the  

elections  held  for  the  said  purpose  on  13.10.2006.   The  

validity of the election  was called in question on the sole  

ground that he had filed a false declaration suppressing the  

details  of  criminal  cases  pending  trial  against  him  and,  

therefore,  his  nomination  deserved  to  be  rejected  by  the  

Returning  Officer  before  the  District  Court  Coimbatore  in

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Election O.P. No. 296 of 2006.  As the factual matrix would  

unfurl that Tamil Nadu State Election Commission (TNSEC)  

had  issued  a  Notification  bearing  S.O.  No.  

43/2006/TNSEC/EG  dated  1.9.2006  which  stipulated  that  

every candidate desiring to contest  an election to a local  

body, was required to furnish full and complete information  

in regard to five categories referred to in paragraph five of  

the  preamble  to  the  Notification,  at  the  time of  filing his  

nomination paper.  One of the mandatory requirements of  

the disclosure was whether the candidate was accused in  

any  pending  case  prior  to  six  months  of  filing  of  the  

nomination of any offence punishable with imprisonment for  

two years or more and in which, charges have been framed  

or cognizance taken by a court of law.  It was asserted in the  

petition  that  the  appellant,  who  was  the  President  of  a  

cooperative  society,  on  allegations  of  criminal  breach  of  

trust,  falsification  of  accounts,  etc.,  was  arrayed  as  an  

accused in complaint case in Crime No. 10 of 2001.  During  

investigation,  the  police  found  certain  other  facets  and  

eventually  placed eight  different  chargesheets,  being C.C.  

Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of 2004 before the Judicial

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Magistrate-IV,  Coimbatore  and  the  Magistrate  had  taken  

cognizance much before the Election Notification.  Factum of  

taking cognizance and thereafter framing of charges in all  

the eight cases for the offences under Sections 120-B, 406,  

408  and  477-A  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code,  1860  (‘IPC’  for  

short)  prior  to  the  cut-off  date  are  not  in  dispute.   The  

appellant  had  filed  a  declaration  and  the  affidavit  only  

mentioning Crime No 10 of 2001 and did not mention the  

details  of  the  chargesheets  filed  against  him  which  were  

pending trial.   In  this  backdrop,  the Election Petition  was  

filed to declare his election as null and void on the ground  

that he could not have contested the election and, in any  

case, the election was unsustainable.  

4. In the Election Petition, the petitioner mentioned all the  

eight case by way of a chart.  It is as follows:   

S.No. Crime  No.10/01/Section

C.C. No. Complainant Court

01. U/s 406 477A IPC 3/2004 CCIW/CID JM IV  Coimbator e

02. U/s 120 (b) r/w 406  477 A IPC

6/2004 ” ”

03. U/s 408, 406 477 A  IPC

6/2004 ” ”

04. ” 6/2004 ” ” 05. ” 7/2004 ” ” 06. U/s 120 (b) r/w 408,  

406 477 A IPC 8/2004 ” ”

07. ” 9/2005 ” ” 08. ” 10/2004 ” ”

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5. After asseverating certain other facts,  it  was pleaded  

that the 1st respondent had deliberately suppressed material  

facts which if declared would enable his nomination papers  

being rejected.  That apart, emphasis was laid on the fact  

that the elected candidate had not declared the particulars  

regarding the criminal cases pending against him.  

6. In  this  backdrop,  the election of  the first  respondent  

was sought to be declared to be invalid with certain other  

consequential reliefs.  In the counter-statement filed by the  

elected candidate, a stand was put forth that the election  

petitioner though was present at the time of scrutiny of the  

nomination papers, had failed to raise any objection and, in  

any case, he had mentioned all the necessary details in the  

nomination  papers  perfectly.   It  was  further  set  forth  as  

follows:

“All  the averments  stated in  the 3rd para  of  the  petition is false and hereby denied.  The averment  stated that 1st respondent had deliberately omitted  to  provide  the  details  of  charge  sheets  having  been filed against him which have been on file in  eight  cases  is  false  and  hereby  denied.   It  is  humbly submitted that this respondent has clearly  mentioned  about  the  case  pending  in  Cr.  No.  10/2001 pending before the JM No. 4 at page No. 2  in details of candidate.  Therefore the above said  averments  are  false,  misleading  and

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unsustainable.”

7. The Principal District Judge of Coimbatore, the Election  

Tribunal,  adverted  to  the  allegations,  the  ocular  and  the  

documentary  evidence that  have been brought  on record  

and  came  to  hold  that  nomination  papers  filed  by  the  

appellant,  the  first  respondent  to  the  Election  Petition,  

deserved to be rejected and, therefore, he could not have  

contested  the  election,  and  accordingly  he  declared  the  

election as null and void and ordered for re-election of the  

post  of  the  President  in  question.   The  said  order  was  

challenged in revision  before the High Court.  

8. In revision, the High Court referred to the decisions in  

Union  of  India  Vs.  Association  for  Democratic  

Reforms,1 People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) &  

Another  V.  Union  of  India  and  Another2,  Notification  

issued  by  the  Election  Commission  of  India  and  the  

Notification of the State Election Commission, Sections 259  

and 260 of the 1994 Act and adverted to the issues whether  

there was suppression by the elected candidate and in that  

context referred to the ‘Form’ to be filled up by a candidate  

1  (2002) 5 SCC 294 2  (2003) 4 SCC 399

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as per the Notification dated 1.9.2006 and opined that an  

element of sanctity and solemnity  is attached to the said  

declaration, by the very fact that it is required to be in the  

form  of  an  affidavit  sworn  and  attested  in  a  particular  

manner.   The  High  Court  emphasised  on  the  part  of  the  

verification containing the declaration that “nothing material  

has been concealed”.  On the aforesaid analysis, the High  

Court held that the elected candidate had not disclosed the  

full  and complete information.  Thereafter,  the High Court  

referred to the authority  in  Association for Democratic  

Reforms (supra), incorporation of Sections 33A and 44A in  

the 1951 Act, Rule 4A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961  

and Form 26 to the said Rules, Section 125A of the 1951 Act,  

the definition of ‘Affidavit’ as per Section 3(3) of the General  

Clauses Act, 1897, the conceptual meaning of Oath, Section  

8  of  The  Oaths  Act,  1969  and  scanned  the  anatomy  of  

Sections 259 and 260 of the 1994 Act and the principles that  

have been set  out  in  various  decisions  of  this  Court  and  

opined  that  the  non-disclosure  of  full  and  complete  

information  relating  to  his  implication  in  criminal  cases  

amounted to an attempt to interfere with the free exercise

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of  electoral  right  which  would  fall  within  the  meaning  of  

‘undue influence’ and consequently ‘corrupt practice’ under  

Section 259(1)(b) read with Section 260(2) of the 1994 Act.  

Being of this view, the High Court agreed with the ultimate  

conclusion of the tribunal though for a different reason.  

9. We have heard Ms. V. Mohana, learned counsel for the  

appellant,  Mr.  Subramonium  Prasad,  learned  AAG  for  the  

State  Election  Commission,  Mr.  R.  Anand  Padmanabhan,  

learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  No.1  and  Mr.  R.  

Neduamaran,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  no.2.  

Regard  being  had  to  the  impact  it  would  have  on  the  

principle relating to corrupt practice in all election matters  

as interpretation of the words ‘undue influence’ due to non-

disclosure  of  criminal  antecedents  leading  to  “corrupt  

practice” under the 1951, Act, we also sought assistance of  

Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned senior counsel and Mr. Maninder  

Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General for Union of India.  

10. First,  we  intend,  as  indicated  earlier,  to  address  the  

issue whether non-disclosure of criminal antecedents would  

tantamount to undue influence, which is a facet of corrupt  

practice as per Section 123(2) of the 1951 Act.  After our

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advertence in that regard, we shall dwell upon the facts of  

the case as Ms. V. Mohana, learned counsel for the appellant  

has astutely highlighted certain aspects to demonstrate that  

there  has  been  no  suppression  or  non-disclosure  and,  

therefore,  the  election  could  not  have been declared null  

and void either by the Election Tribunal or by the High Court.  

Postponing the discussions on the said score,  at  this  

stage, we shall delve into the aspect of corrupt practice on  

the foundation of non-disclosure of criminal antecedents.  

11. The  issue  of  disclosure,  declaration  and  filing  of  the  

affidavit in this regard has a history, albeit,  a recent one.  

Therefore,  one  is  bound  to  sit  in  a  time-machine.   In  

Association for Democratic Reforms (supra), the Court  

posed the following important question:-

“...In  a  nation  wedded  to  republican  and  democratic form of government, where election as  a  Member  of  Parliament  or  as  a  Member  of  Legislative Assembly is of utmost importance for  governance  of  the  country,  whether,  before  casting votes, voters have a right to know relevant  particulars of their candidates?  Further connected  question  is  –  whether  the  High  Court  had  jurisdiction to issue directions, as stated below, in  a  writ  petition  filed  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution of India?”

12. To  answer  the  said  question,  it  referred  to  the

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authorities in  Vineet Narain V. Union of India3,  Kihoto  

Hollohan V. Zachillhu4 and opined that in case when the  

Act  or  Rules  are  silent  on  a  particular  subject  and  the  

authority  implementing  the  same  has  constitutional  or  

statutory power to implement it, the Court can necessarily  

issue  directions  or  orders  on  the  said  subject  to  fill  the  

vacuum or void till the suitable law is enacted; that one of  

the basic structures of our Constitution is “republican and  

democratic  form  of  government  and,  therefore,  the  

superintendence, direction and control of the “conduct of all  

elections” to Parliament and to the legislature of every State  

vests in the Election Commission; and the phrase “conduct  

of elections” is held to be of wide amplitude which would  

include  power  to  make  all  necessary  provisions  for  

conducting free and fair elections.”

13. After so holding, the Court posed a question whether  

the Election Commission is empowered to issue directions.  

Be it noted, such a direction was ordered by the High Court  

of Delhi and in that context the Court relied upon Mohinder  

Singh Gill  V.  Chief  Election  Commissioner5,  Kanhiya  

3  (1998) 1 SCC 226 4  1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 5  (1978) 1 SCC 405

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Lal Omar V. R.K. Trivedi6,  Common Cause V. Union of  

India7 and opined thus:

“If right to telecast and right to view sport games  and  the  right  to  impart  such  information  is  considered to be part and parcel of Article 19(1) (a),  we  fail  to  understand  why  the  right  of  a  citizen/voter — a little man — to know about the  antecedents of his candidate cannot be held to be  a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a). In our  view, democracy cannot survive without free and  fair  election,  without  free  and  fairly  informed  voters. Votes cast by uninformed voters in favour  of  X  or  Y  candidate  would  be  meaningless.  As  stated  in  the  aforesaid  passage,  one-sided  information,  disinformation,  misinformation  and  non-information, all equally create an uninformed  citizenry  which  makes  democracy  a  farce.  Therefore, casting of a vote by a misinformed and  non-informed  voter  or  a  voter  having  one-sided  information only is bound to affect the democracy  seriously.  Freedom  of  speech  and  expression  includes  right  to  impart  and  receive  information  which  includes  freedom  to  hold  opinions.  Entertainment  is  implied  in  freedom  of  “speech  and  expression”  and  there  is  no  reason  to  hold  that freedom of speech and expression would not  cover right to get material information with regard  to a candidate who is contesting election for a post  which is of utmost importance in the democracy.”

14. In this regard, a reference was made to a passage from  

P.V. Narasimha Rao V. State (CBI/SPE)8,  jurisdiction of  

the Election Commission and ultimately the Court issued the  

following directions:

6  (1985) 4 SCC 628 7  (1996) 2 SCC 752 8  (1998) 4 SCC 626

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“The  Election  Commission  is  directed  to  call  for  information on affidavit by issuing necessary order  in exercise of its power under Article 324 of the  Constitution of India from each candidate seeking  election to Parliament or a State Legislature as a  necessary part of his nomination paper, furnishing  therein,  information  on  the  following  aspects  in  relation to his/her candidature:

(1)  Whether  the  candidate  is  convicted/acquitted/discharged  of  any  criminal  offence  in  the  past  —  if  any,  whether  he  is  punished with imprisonment or fine.

(2)  Prior  to  six  months  of  filing  of  nomination,  whether the candidate is accused in any pending  case, of any offence punishable with imprisonment  for  two  years  or  more,  and  in  which  charge  is  framed or cognizance is taken by the court of law.  If so, the details thereof.

(3)  The  assets  (immovable,  movable,  bank  balance, etc.) of a candidate and of his/her spouse  and that of dependants.

(4) Liabilities, if any, particularly whether there are  any overdues of any public financial institution or  government dues.

(5)  The  educational  qualifications  of  the  candidate.”

15. After  the  said  decision  was  rendered,  The  

Representation  of  the  People  (Amendment)  Ordinance,  

2002, 4 of 2002 was promulgated by the President of India  

on  24.8.2002  and the  validity  of  the  same was  called  in

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question under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.  The  

three-Judge Bench in  People’s Union for Civil Liberties  

(PUCL) (supra) posed the following questions:-

“Should we not have such a situation in selecting  a  candidate  contesting  elections?   In  a  vibrant  democracy – is  it  not required that a little voter  should  know  the  biodata  of  his/her  would-be  rulers,  law-  makers  or  destiny-makers  of  the  nation?”

And thereafter,

“Is there any necessity of keeping in the dark the  voters  that  their  candidate  was  involved  in  criminal cases of murder, dacoity or rape or has  acquired the wealth by unjustified means?  Maybe,  that  he  is  acquitted  because  the  investigating  officer failed to unearth the truth or because the  witnesses  turned  hostile.   In  some  cases,  apprehending danger to their life, witnesses fail to  reveal what was seen by them.”

And again

“Is there any necessity of permitting candidates or  their supporters to use unaccounted money during  elections?   It  assets  are  declared,  would  it  no  amount  to  having  some control  on  unaccounted  elections expenditure?”

16. During the pendency of the judgment of the said case,  

the 1951 Act was amended introducing Section 33B.  The  

Court  reproduced  Section  33-A  and  33-B,  which  are  as  

follows:-

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“33-A.  Right  to  information.—(1)  A  candidate  shall,  apart  from  any  information  which  he  is  required  to  furnish,  under  this  Act  or  the  rules  made  thereunder,  in  his  nomination  paper  delivered under sub-section (1) of Section 33, also  furnish the information as to whether—

(i)  he is  accused of any offence punishable with  imprisonment for two years or more in a pending  case in which a charge has been framed by the  court of competent jurisdiction;

(ii) he has been convicted of an offence other than  any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub- section  (2),  or  covered  in  sub-section  (3),  of  Section 8 and sentenced to imprisonment for one  year or more.

(2) The candidate or his proposer, as the case may  be, shall, at the time of delivering to the Returning  Officer the nomination paper under sub-section (1)  of  Section  33,  also  deliver  to  him  an  affidavit  sworn  by  the  candidate  in  a  prescribed  form  verifying the information specified in sub-section  (1).

(3) The Returning Officer shall, as soon as may be  after  the  furnishing  of  information  to  him under  sub-section (1), display the aforesaid information  by affixing a copy of the affidavit, delivered under  sub-section  (2),  at  a  conspicuous  place  at  his  office for the information of the electors relating to  a constituency for which the nomination paper is  delivered.

33-B. Candidate to furnish information only under  the Act and the rules.—Notwithstanding anything  contained in any judgment, decree or order of any  court  or  any  direction,  order  or  any  other  instruction issued by the Election Commission, no  candidate shall be liable to disclose or furnish any

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such information, in respect of his election, which  is not required to be disclosed or furnished under  this Act or the rules made thereunder.”

17. Though various issues were raised in the said case, yet  

we are really to see what has been stated with regard to the  

disclosure,  and  the  Ordinance  issued  after  the  judgment.  

M.B. Shah, J., in his ultimate analysis held as follows:-

“What emerges from the above discussion can be  summarised thus:

(A)  The  legislature  can  remove  the  basis  of  a  decision rendered by a competent court  thereby  rendering  that  decision  ineffective  but  the  legislature  has  no  power  to  ask  the  instrumentalities  of  the  State  to  disobey  or  disregard  the  decisions  given  by  the  court.  A  declaration that an order made by a court of law is  void is normally a part of the judicial function. The  legislature cannot declare that decision rendered  by the Court is not binding or is of no effect.

It is true that the legislature is entitled to change  the law with retrospective effect which forms the  basis of a judicial decision. This exercise of power  is subject to constitutional provision, therefore, it  cannot  enact  a  law  which  is  violative  of  fundamental right.

(B)  Section  33-B  which  provides  that  notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the  judgment of any court or directions issued by the  Election Commission, no candidate shall be liable  to  disclose  or  furnish  any  such  information  in  respect of his election which is not required to be  disclosed or furnished under the Act or the rules  made thereunder, is on the face of it beyond the

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legislative competence, as this Court has held that  the  voter  has  a  fundamental  right  under  Article  19(1)(a) to know the antecedents of a candidate  for  various  reasons  recorded  in  the  earlier  judgment as well as in this judgment.

The  Amended  Act  does  not  wholly  cover  the  directions issued by this Court. On the contrary, it  provides that a candidate would not be bound to  furnish  certain  information  as  directed  by  this  Court.

(C) The judgment rendered by this Court in  Assn.  for  Democratic  Reforms has  attained  finality,  therefore,  there  is  no  question  of  interpreting  constitutional  provision  which  calls  for  reference  under Article 145(3).

(D)  The  contention  that  as  there  is  no  specific  fundamental  right  conferred  on  a  voter  by  any  statutory provision to know the antecedents of a  candidate, the directions given by this Court are  against the statutory provisions is, on the face of  it,  without any substance. In an election petition  challenging  the  validity  of  an  election  of  a  particular  candidate,  the  statutory  provisions  would  govern  respective  rights  of  the  parties.  However,  voters’  fundamental  right  to  know the  antecedents  of  a  candidate  is  independent  of  statutory rights under the election law. A voter is  first  citizen  of  this  country  and  apart  from  statutory rights,  he is  having fundamental  rights  conferred  by  the  Constitution.  Members  of  a  democratic society should be sufficiently informed  so that they may cast their votes intelligently in  favour of persons who are to govern them. Right  to vote would be meaningless unless the citizens  are  well  informed  about  the  antecedents  of  a  candidate. There can be little doubt that exposure  to public  gaze and scrutiny is  one of  the surest  means  to  cleanse  our  democratic  governing  system and to have competent legislatures.

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(E)  It  is  established  that  fundamental  rights  themselves have no fixed content, most of them  are  empty  vessels  into  which  each  generation  must pour its content in the light of its experience.  The attempt of the Court should be to expand the  reach  and  ambit  of  the  fundamental  rights  by  process of  judicial  interpretation.  During the last  more than half a decade, it has been so done by  this  Court  consistently.  There  cannot  be  any  distinction  between  the  fundamental  rights  mentioned in  Chapter  III  of  the Constitution and  the declaration of such rights on the basis of the  judgments rendered by this Court.”

Being of this view, he declared Section 33-B as illegal,  

null and void.  

18. P.  Venkatarama  Reddi,  J.  adverted  to  freedom  of  

expression and right to information in the context of voters’  

right to know the details of contesting candidates and right  

of  the  media  and  others  to  enlighten  the  voter.   As  a  

principle,  it  was  laid  down  by  him  that  right  to  make  a  

choice  by  means  of  a  ballot  is  a  part  of  freedom  of  

expression.  Some of the eventual conclusions recorded by  

him that are pertinent for our present purpose, are:-

“(1)  Securing  information  on  the  basic  details  concerning the candidates contesting for elections  to  Parliament  or  the  State  Legislature  promotes  freedom of expression and therefore the right to  information forms an integral part of Article 19(1) (a).  This  right  to  information  is,  however,  qualitatively  different  from  the  right  to  get

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information  about  public  affairs  or  the  right  to  receive  information  through  the  press  and  electronic  media,  though,  to  a  certain  extent,  there may be overlapping.

xxx xxx xxx

(3) The directives given by this Court in Union of  India  v.  Assn.  for  Democratic  Reforms were  intended to operate only till the law was made by  the legislature and in that sense “pro tempore” in  nature. Once legislation is made, the Court has to  make  an  independent  assessment  in  order  to  evaluate  whether  the  items  of  information  statutorily  ordained  are  reasonably  adequate  to  secure  the  right  of  information  available  to  the  voter/citizen.  In  embarking  on  this  exercise,  the  points of disclosure indicated by this Court, even if  they be tentative or ad hoc in nature, should be  given  due  weight  and  substantial  departure  therefrom cannot be countenanced.

xxx xxx xxx

5) Section 33-B inserted by the Representation of  the People (Third Amendment) Act, 2002 does not  pass  the  test  of  constitutionality,  firstly,  for  the  reason  that  it  imposes  a  blanket  ban  on  dissemination of information other than that spelt  out in the enactment irrespective of the need of  the hour and the future exigencies and expedients  and secondly, for the reason that the ban operates  despite the fact that the disclosure of information  now provided for is deficient and inadequate.

(6)  The  right  to  information  provided  for  by  Parliament  under  Section  33-A  in  regard  to  the  pending  criminal  cases  and  past  involvement  in  such cases  is  reasonably  adequate to  safeguard  the right to information vested in the voter/citizen.  However, there is no good reason for excluding the

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pending cases in which cognizance has been taken  by the Court from the ambit of disclosure.”

19. Dharmadhikari,  J.  in  his  supplementing  opinion,  

observed thus:

“The reports of the advisory commissions set up  one after the other by the Government to which a  reference  has  been  made  by  Brother  Shah,  J.,  highlight  the  present  political  scenario  where  money  power  and  muscle  power  have  substantially  polluted  and  perverted  the  democratic processes in India.  To control the ill- effects  of  money  power  and  muscle  power  the  commissions  recommend  that  election  system  should be overhauled and drastically changed lest  democracy  would  become  a  teasing  illusion  to  common citizens of this country.  Not only a half- hearted attempt in the direction of reform of the  election system is to be taken, as has been done  by  the  present  legislation  by  amending  some  provisions of the Act here and there, but a much  improved  elections  system  is  required  to  be  evolved  to  make  the  election  process  both  transparent and accountable so that influence of  tainted money and physical force of criminals do  not  make  democracy  a  farce  –  the  citizen’s  fundamental  “right  to  information”  should  be  recognised and fully effectuated.  This freedom of  a citizen to participate and choose a candidate at  an election is distinct from exercise of his right as  a voter which is to be regulated by statutory law  on the election like the RP Act.”   

20. The purpose of referring to the aforesaid authorities in  

extenso is to focus how this Court has given emphasis on  

the rights of a voter to know about the antecedents of a  

candidate, especially,  the criminal antecedents, contesting

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the  election.   With  the  efflux  of  time,  the  Court  in  

subsequent  decisions  has  further  elaborated  the  right  to  

know in the context of election, as holding a free and fair  

election  stabilises  the  democratic  process  which  leads  to  

good  governance.   In  this  regard,  reference  to  a  recent  

three-Judge  Bench  decision  in  Resurgence  India  V.  

Election Commission of India & Anr.9 is advantageously  

fruitful.   A writ  petition was filed  under Article 32 of the  

Constitution of India to issue specific directions to effectuate  

the meaningful implementation of the judgments rendered  

by  this  Court  in  Association  for  Democratic  Reforms  

(supra),  People’s  Union  for  Civil  Liberties  (PUCL)  

(supra) and also to direct the respondents therein to make it  

compulsory  for  the  Returning  Officers  to  ensure  that  the  

affidavits  filed  by  the  contestants  are  complete  in  all  

respects and to reject the affidavits having blank particulars.  

The  Court  referred  to  the  background,  relief  sought  and  

Section 33A, 36 and 125A of the 1951 Act.   A reference was  

also made to the authority in  Shaligram Shrivastava V.  

Naresh Singh Patel10.  Culling out the principle from the  

earlier precedents, the three-Judge Bench opined: 9  AIR 2014 SC 344 10  (2003) 2 SCC 176

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“Thus,  this  Court  held  that  a  voter  has  the  elementary  right  to  know  full  particulars  of  a  candidate  who  is  to  represent  him  in  the  Parliament  and  such  right  to  get  information  is  universally  recognized  natural  right  flowing  from  the concept of democracy and is an integral part of  Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.  It was further  held that the voter’s speech or expression in case  of election would include casting of votes, that is  to say, voter speaks out or expresses by casting  vote.   For  this  purpose,  information  about  the  candidate  to  be  selected  is  a  must.   Thus,  in  unequivocal  terms,  it  is  recognized  that  the  citizen’s  right  to  know  of  the  candidate  who  represents him in the Parliament will constitute an  integral part of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution  of  India  and any act,  which is  derogative of  the  fundamental  rights  is  at  the  very  outset  ultra  vires”.  

The  Court  posed   the  question  whether  filing  of  

affidavit stating that the information given in the affidavit is  

correct,  but  leaving  the  contents  blank  would  fulfil  the  

objectives  behind  filing  the  same,  and  answered  the  

question in the negative on the reasoning that the ultimate  

purpose  of  filing  of  affidavit  along  with  the  nomination  

paper is to effectuate the fundamental right of the citizen  

under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India and the  

citizens are required to have the necessary information in  

order to make a choice of their voting and, therefore, when  

a candidate files an affidavit with blank particulars at the

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time  of  filing  of  the  nomination  paper,  it  renders  the  

affidavit itself nugatory.  

21. It  is  apt  to  note  here  that  the  Court  referred  to  

paragraph 73 of the judgment in People’s Union for Civil   

Liberties  (PUCL)  (supra)  case  and  elaborating  further  

ruled thus:

“If  we accept  the  contention  raised  by  Union  of  India, viz., the candidate who has filed an affidavit  with false information as well as the candidate who  has  filed  an  affidavit  with  particulars  left  blank  should be treated at par, it will result in breach of  fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution, viz., ‘right to know’ which is  inclusive of freedom of speech and expression as  interpreted in  Association for Democratic Reforms  (supra).”

22. The Court further held that filing of an affidavit with  

blank places will be directly hit by Section 125A(i) of the  

1951 Act.  Ultimately, the Court held:-  

“In  succinct,  if  the  Election  Commission  accepts  the nomination papers in spite of blank particulars  in  the  affidavits,  it  will  directly  violate  the  fundamental  right  of  the  citizen  to  know  the  criminal  antecedents,  assets  and  liabilities  and  educational  qualification  of  the  candidate.  Therefore,  accepting  affidavit  with  blank  particulars  from  the  candidate  will  rescind  the  verdict  in  Association  for  Democratic  Reforms  (supra).   Further,  the  subsequent  act  of  prosecuting  the  candidate  under  Section  125A(i)  will  bear  no significance as far  as the breach of  fundamental right of the citizen is concerned.  For

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the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to accept the  contention of the Union of India.”

23. The Court summarized its  directions in the following  

manner:

“(i)  The voter has the elementary right to know  full particulars of a candidate who is to represent  him in the Parliament/Assemblies and such right  to get information is universally recognized. Thus,  it is held that right to know about the candidate is  a  natural  right  flowing  from  the  concept  of  democracy and is an integral part of Article  19(1) (a) of the Constitution.

(ii) The ultimate purpose of filing of affidavit along  with  the  nomination  paper  is  to  effectuate  the  fundamental  right  of  the  citizens  under  Article  19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The citizens  are supposed to have the necessary information  at the time of filing of nomination paper and for  that purpose, the Returning Officer can very well  compel  a  candidate  to  furnish  the  relevant  information.

(iii)  Filing  of  affidavit  with  blank  particulars  will  render the affidavit nugatory. (iv) It is the duty of the Returning Officer to check  whether the information required is fully furnished  at  the  time  of  filing  of  affidavit  with  the  nomination paper since such information is very  vital for giving effect to the 'right to know' of the  citizens. If a candidate fails to fill the blanks even  after  the reminder by the Returning Officer,  the  nomination  paper  is  fit  to  be  rejected.  We  do  comprehend that the power of Returning Officer to  reject  the  nomination  paper  must  be  exercised  very sparingly but the bar should not be laid so  high that the justice itself is prejudiced.

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(v)  We  clarify  to  the  extent  that  Para  73  of People's  Union  for  Civil  Liberties  case  (supra) will not come in the way of the Returning  Officer  to  reject  the  nomination  paper  when  affidavit is filed with blank particulars.

(vi) The candidate must take the minimum effort  to explicitly remark as 'NIL' or 'Not Applicable' or  'Not known' in the columns and not to leave the  particulars blank. (vii) Filing of affidavit with blanks will be directly  hit by Section 125A(i) of the RP Act However, as  the  nomination  paper  itself  is  rejected  by  the  Returning  Officer,  we  find  no  reason  why  the  candidate must be again penalized for the same  act by prosecuting him/her.”

24. The fear to disclose details of pending cases has been  

haunting the people who fight the elections at all  levels.  

Fear,  compels  a  man  to  take  the  abysmal  and  

unfathomable  route;  whereas  courage,  mother  of  all  

virtues, not only shatters fears, but atrophies all that come  

in  its  way  without  any  justification  and  paralyses  

everything  that  does  not  deserve  to  have  locomotion.  

Democracy  nurtures  and  dearly  welcomes  transparency.  

Many a cobweb is woven or endeavoured to be woven to  

keep  at  bay  what  sometimes  becomes  troublesome.  

Therefore, Rules 41(2) and (3) and 49-O of the Conduct of  

Election Rules, 1961 (for short, ‘the Rules’) came into force,

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to  give  some  space  to  the  candidates  and  deny  the  

advantage to the voters.  At that juncture, a writ petition  

under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was filed by the  

People’s  Union  for  Civil  Liberties  (PUCL)  and  another,  

challenging the constitutional validity of the said Rules to  

the extent that the said provisions violate the secrecy of  

voting which is fundamental to free and fair elections and is  

required to be maintained as per Section 128 of the 1951  

Act and Rules 39, 49-M of the Rules.  Relevant parts of Rule  

41 and Rule 49-O read as follows:

“41. Spoilt  and  returned ballot  papers –  (1)

…….

(2) If  an  elector  after  obtaining  a  ballot  paper  decides  not  to  use  it,  he  shall  return  it  to  the  Presiding Officer, and the ballot paper so returned  and the counterfoil  of such ballot paper shall  be  marked as ‘Returned: cancelled’ by the Presiding  Officer.  

(3) All ballot papers cancelled under sub-rule (1)  or sub-rule (2) shall be kept in a separate packet.  

xxx xxx xxx

49-O. Elector deciding not to vote – If an elector,  after  his  electoral  roll  number  has  been  duly  entered in the register of voters in Form 17-A and  has put his signature or thumb impression thereon  as required under sub-rule (1) of Rule 49-L decided  not to record his vote, a remark to this effect shall

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be made against the said entry in Form 17-A by  the Presiding Officer and the signature or thumb  impression of the elector shall be obtained against  such remark.”

25. Testing  the  validity  of  the  aforesaid  Rules,  a  three-

Judge Bench in  People’s Union for Civil Liberties and  

Another V. Union of India and Another11 after dwelling  

upon many a facet opined thus:

“Democracy  being  the  basic  feature  of  our  constitutional set-up, there can be no two opinions  that free and fair elections would alone guarantee  the growth of a healthy democracy in the country.  The “fair” denotes equal opportunity to all people.  Universal adult suffrage conferred on the citizens  of India by the Constitution has made it possible  for these millions of individual voters to go to the  polls and thus participate in the governance of our  country.  For democracy to survive, it  is essential  that the best available men should be chosen as  people’s representatives for proper governance of  the  country.  This  can  be  best  achieved  through  men of high moral and ethical values, who win the  elections  on  a  positive  vote.  Thus  in  a  vibrant  democracy,  the  voter  must  be  given  an  opportunity to choose none of the above (NOTA)  button,  which  will  indeed  compel  the  political  parties  to  nominate  a  sound  candidate.  This  situation  palpably  tells  us  the  dire  need  of  negative voting.”

26. Ultimately, the Court declared Rules 41(2) and (3) and  

Rule 49-O of the Rules as ultra vires the Section 128 of the  

1951  Act  and  Article  19(1)(a)  of  the  Constitution  to  the  

11  (2013) 10 SCC 1

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extent they violate the secrecy of voting and accordingly  

directed  the  Election  Commission  to  provide  necessary  

provision  in  the  ballot  papers/EVMs  and  another  button  

called “None of the Above” (NOTA).

27. The aforesaid decisions pronounce beyond any trace of  

doubt that a voter has a fundamental right to know about  

the candidates contesting the elections as that is essential  

and a necessary concomitant for a free and fair election.  In  

a way, it is the first step.  The voter is entitled to make a  

choice after coming to know the antecedents of a candidate  

a requisite for making informed choice.  It has been held by  

Shah, J. in People’s Union of Civil Liberties (supra) that  

the voter’s fundamental right to know the antecedents of a  

candidate is independent of statutory requirement under the  

election law, for a voter is first a citizen of this country and  

apart from statutory rights, he has the fundamental right to  

know and be informed.  Such a right to know is conferred by  

the Constitution.

28. Speaking about the concept of voting, this Court in Lily  

Thomas V. Speaker of Lok Sabha12, has ruled that:-  

“…..Voting is a formal expression of will or opinion  

12  (1993) 4 SCC 234

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by the person entitled to exercise the right on the  subject  or  issue  in  question  [and  that]  ‘right  to  vote means right to exercise the right in favour of  or against the motion or resolution.  Such a right  implies right to remain neutral as well’.”

29. Emphasising on the choice in People’s Union for Civil  

Liberties (NOTA case), the Court has expressed thus:-  

“55. Democracy is  all  about  choice.  This  choice  can be better expressed by giving the voters an  opportunity to verbalise themselves unreservedly  and by imposing least restrictions on their ability  to make such a choice. By providing NOTA button  in the EVMs, it will accelerate the effective political  participation  in  the  present  state  of  democratic  system and the voters in fact will be empowered.  We are of the considered view that in bringing out  this  right  to  cast  negative  vote  at  a  time when  electioneering  is  in  full  swing,  it  will  foster  the  purity of the electoral process and also fulfil one of  its objective, namely, wide participation of people.

56. Free and fair  election is a basic structure of  the Constitution and necessarily includes within its  ambit  the  right  of  an  elector  to  cast  his  vote  without  fear  of  reprisal,  duress  or  coercion.  Protection  of  elector’s  identity  and  affording  secrecy  is  therefore  integral  to  free  and  fair  elections and an arbitrary distinction between the  voter who casts his vote and the voter who does  not cast his vote is violative of Article 14. Thus,  secrecy  is  required  to  be  maintained  for  both  categories of persons.

57. Giving  right  to  a  voter  not  to  vote  for  any  candidate while protecting his right of secrecy is  extremely  important  in  a  democracy.  Such  an  option  gives  the  voter  the  right  to  express  his  disapproval  with the kind of  candidates that  are  being  put  up  by  the  political  parties.  When  the

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political parties will realise that a large number of  people are expressing their  disapproval  with the  candidates being put up by them, gradually there  will be a systemic change and the political parties  will be forced to accept the will of the people and  field candidates who are known for their integrity.

58. The direction  can  also  be supported by the  fact that in the existing system a dissatisfied voter  ordinarily does not turn up for voting which in turn  provides  a  chance  to  unscrupulous  elements  to  impersonate the dissatisfied voter and cast a vote,  be it a negative one. Furthermore, a provision of  negative  voting  would  be  in  the  interest  of  promoting  democracy  as  it  would  send  clear  signals to political parties and their candidates as  to what the electorate thinks about them.”

30. Having  stated  about  the  choice  of  a  voter,  as  is  

requisite in the case at hand, we are required to dwell upon  

the failure to disclose the criminal cases pending against a  

candidate and its eventual impact; whether it would come  

within the concept of undue influence and thereby corrupt  

practice  as  per  Section  123(2)  of  the  1951  Act.    To  

appreciate  the  said  facet,  the  sanctity  of  constitutional  

democracy and how it  is  dented by the criminalisation of  

politics  are  to  be  taken  note  of.    The  importance  of  

constitutional democracy has been highlighted from various  

angles  by  this  Court  in  S.  Raghbir  Singh  Gill  V.  S.  

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Gurcharan Singh Tohra13,  S.S. Bola V. B.D. Sardana14,  

State  of  U.P.  V.  Jai  Bir  Singh15,  Reliance  Natural  

Resources  Ltd.,  V.  Reliance  Industries  Ltd.16,  Ram  

Jethmalani V. Union of India17 and State of Maharahtra  

V. Saeed Sohail Sheikh18.  

31. In a constitutional democracy, we are disposed to think  

that any kind of criminalisation of politics is an extremely  

lamentable situation.  It is an anathema to the sanctity of  

democracy.  The criminalisation creates a concavity in the  

heart  of  democracy  and  has  the  potentiality  to  paralyse,  

comatose  and  strangulate  the  purity  of  the  system.   In  

Dinesh Trivedi V. Union of India19, a three-Judge Bench  

while dealing with the cause for the malaise which seems to  

have  stricken  Indian  democracy  in  particular  and  Indian  

society in general, one of the primary reasons was identified  

as  criminalisation  of  politics.   The  Court  referred  to  the  

report of Vohra Committee and observed thus:

“...In the main report, these various reports have  been analysed and it is noted that the growth and  spread of crime syndicates in Indian society has  

13  (1980) Supp SCC 53 14  (1997) 8 SCC 522 15  (2005) 5 SCC 1 16  (2010) 7 SCC 1 17  (2011) 8 SCC 1 18  (2012) 13 SCC 192 19  (1997) 4 SCC 306

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been pervasive. It is further observed that these  criminal  elements  have  developed  an  extensive  network of contacts with bureaucrats, government  functionaries  at  lower  levels,  politicians,  media  personalities,  strategically located persons in the  non-governmental  sector  and  members  of  the  judiciary; some of these criminal syndicates have  international  links,  sometimes  with  foreign  intelligence  agencies.  The  Report  recommended  that an efficient nodal cell be set up with powers  to take stringent action against crime syndicates,  while ensuring that it would be immune from being  exploited or influenced.”  

In the said case, the Court further observed:

“We may now turn our focus to the Report and the  follow-up measures that need to be implemented.  The Report  reveals  several  alarming  and deeply  disturbing trends that are prevalent in our present  society. For some time now, it has been generally  perceived  that  the  nexus  between  politicians,  bureaucrats and criminal elements in our society  has been on the rise, the adverse effects of which  are increasingly being felt  on various aspects of  social  life  in  India.  Indeed,  the  situation  has  worsened to such an extent that the President of  our country felt constrained to make references to  the phenomenon in his Addresses to the Nation on  the eve of the Republic Day in 1996 as well as in  1997.”  

32. In Anukul Chandra Pradhan V. Union of India and  

others20, the Court was dealing with the provisions made in  

the  election  law  which  excluded  persons  with  criminal  

background  and  the  kind  specified  therein,  from  the  

20  (1997) 6 SCC 1

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elections  as  candidates  and  voters.   In  that  context,  the  

Court held thus:

“......The  object  is  to  prevent  criminalisation  of  politics  and  maintain  probity  in  elections.  Any  provision  enacted  with  a  view  to  promote  this  object  must  be  welcomed  and  upheld  as  subserving the constitutional purpose. The elbow  room available to  the legislature in  classification  depends  on  the  context  and  the  object  for  enactment  of  the  provision.  The  existing  conditions  in  which  the  law  has  to  be  applied  cannot be ignored in adjudging its validity because  it is relatable to the object sought to be achieved  by the legislation. Criminalisation of politics is the  bane of society and negation of democracy. It is  subversive  of  free  and  fair  elections  which  is  a  basic feature of the Constitution. Thus, a provision  made in the election law to promote the object of  free and fair elections and facilitate maintenance  of  law  and  order  which  are  the  essence  of  democracy  must,  therefore,  be  so  viewed.  More  elbow room to the legislature for classification has  to be available to achieve the professed object.”

Be it stated, the Court did not accept the challenge to  

the constitutional validity of sub-Section 5 of Section 62 of  

the 1951 Act which was amended to provide that no person  

shall vote at any election if he is confined in prison, whether  

under  a  sentence  of  imprisonment,  or  under  lawful  

confinement, or otherwise or is in the lawful custody of the  

police.   A  proviso  was  carved  out  to  exclude  a  person  

subjected to preventive detention under any law for the time

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being in force.  

33. Recently,  in  Manoj Narula V. Union of India21,  the  

Constitution  Bench  harping  on  the  concept  of  systemic  

corruption, has been constrained to state thus:

“12. It  is  worth  saying  that  systemic  corruption  and  sponsored  criminalisation  can  corrode  the  fundamental  core  of  elective  democracy  and,  consequently,  the constitutional governance. The  agonised  concern  expressed  by  this  Court  on  being  moved  by  the  conscious  citizens,  as  is  perceptible  from  the  authorities  referred  to  hereinabove,  clearly  shows  that  a  democratic  republic polity hopes and aspires to be governed  by  a  government  which  is  run  by  the  elected  representatives who do not have any involvement  in serious criminal offences or offences relating to  corruption,  casteism, societal  problems, affecting  the  sovereignty  of  the  nation  and  many  other  offences.  There  are  recommendations  given  by  different  committees  constituted  by  various  Governments  for  electoral  reforms.  Some of  the  reports that have been highlighted at the Bar are  (i)  Goswami  Committee  on  Electoral  Reforms  (1990),  (ii)  Vohra  Committee  Report  (1993),  (iii)  Indrajit  Gupta  Committee  on  State  Funding  of  Elections (1998),  (iv)  Law Commission Report on  Reforms of the Electoral Laws (1999), (v) National  Commission  to  Review  the  Working  of  the  Constitution  (2001),  (vi)  Election  Commission  of  India  — Proposed  Electoral  Reforms  (2004),  (vii)  the  Second  Administrative  Reforms  Commission  (2008), (viii) Justice J.S. Verma Committee Report  on Amendments to Criminal Law (2013), and (ix)  Law Commission Report (2014).

13. Vohra  Committee  Report  and  other  reports  have been taken note of on various occasions by  

21  (2014) 9 SCC 1

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this Court. Justice J.S. Verma Committee Report on  Amendments  to  Criminal  Law  has  proposed  insertion  of  Schedule  1  to  the  1951  Act  enumerating  offences  under  IPC  befitting  the  category of  “heinous” offences.  It  recommended  that  Section  8(1)  of  the  1951  Act  should  be  amended to cover, inter alia, the offences listed in  the proposed Schedule 1 and a provision should be  engrafted that a person in respect of whose acts or  omissions  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction  has  taken cognizance under Sections 190(1)(a), (b) or  (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure or who has  been  convicted  by  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction with respect to the offences specified  in  the proposed expanded list  of  offences under  Section 8(1) shall be disqualified from the date of  taking cognizance or conviction, as the case may  be. It further proposed that disqualification in case  of conviction shall continue for a further period of  six years from the date of release upon conviction  and in case of acquittal, the disqualification shall  operate from the date of taking cognizance till the  date of acquittal.”

34. Criminalisation  of  politics  is  absolutely  unacceptable.  

Corruption  in  public  life  is  indubitably  deprecable.   The  

citizenry has been compelled to stand as a silent, deaf and  

mute  spectator  to  the corruption either  being helpless  or  

being  resigned  to  fate.   Commenting  on  corruption,  the  

court  in  Niranjan  Hemchandra  Sashittal  V.  State  of   

Maharashtra22, was constrained to say thus:

“It can be stated without any fear of contradiction  that corruption is not to be judged by degree, for  

22  (2013) 4 SCC 642

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corruption mothers disorder, destroys societal will  to  progress,  accelerates  undeserved  ambitions,  kills  the  conscience,  jettisons  the  glory  of  the  institutions,  paralyses  the  economic  health  of  a  country,  corrodes the sense of  civility  and mars  the marrows of governance. It is worth noting that  immoral acquisition of wealth destroys the energy  of  the  people  believing  in  honesty,  and  history  records with agony how they have suffered. The  only  redeeming  fact  is  that  collective  sensibility  respects such suffering as it is in consonance with  the constitutional morality.”

35. The Constitution  Bench in  Subramanian Swamy V.  

CBI23, while striking down Section 6-A of the Delhi Special  

Police Establishment Act, 1946, observed thus:

“Corruption is an enemy of the nation and tracking  down corrupt public servants and punishing such  persons  is  a  necessary  mandate  of  the  PC  Act,  1988. It is difficult to justify the classification which  has been made in Section 6-A because the goal of  law in the PC Act, 1988 is to meet corruption cases  with a very strong hand and all public servants are  warned  through  such  a  legislative  measure  that  corrupt public servants have to face very serious  consequences.”

And thereafter:

“Corruption  is  an  enemy  of  nation  and  tracking  down corrupt  public  servant,  howsoever  high he  may be, and punishing such person is a necessary  mandate under  the PC Act,  1988.  The status  or  position  of  public  servant  does  not  qualify  such  public  servant  from  exemption  from  equal  treatment.  The  decision-making  power  does  not  segregate corrupt officers into two classes as they  are common crimedoers and have to be tracked  

23  (2014) 8 SCC 682

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down  by  the  same  process  of  inquiry  and  investigation.”

36. In  this  backdrop,  we  have  looked  and  posed  the  

question  that whether a candidate who does not disclose  

the criminal cases in respect of heinous or serious offences  

or moral turpitude or corruption pending against him would  

tantamount to undue influence and as a fallout to corrupt  

practice.  The issue is important, for misinformation nullifies  

and countermands the very basis and foundation of voter’s  

exercise  of  choice  and  that  eventually  promotes  

criminalisation  of  politics  by  default  and  due  to  lack  of  

information  and  awareness.   The  denial  of  information,  a  

deliberate  one,  has  to  be  appreciated  in  the  context  of  

corrupt  practice.  Section  123  of  the  1951  Act  deals  with  

corrupt practices.  Sub-Section 2 of Section 123 deals with  

undue influence.  The said sub-Section reads as follows:

“(2) Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or  indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the  part of the candidate or his agent, or of any other  person [with the consent of the candidate or his  election  agent],  with  the  free  exercise  of  any  electoral right:

Provided that-

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(a) without  prejudice  to  the  generality  of  the  provisions  of  this  clause  any  such  person  as  is  referred to therein who-

(i) threatens  any  candidate  or  any  elector,  or  any person in whom a candidate or an elector  interest, with injury of any kind including social  ostracism and  ex-communication  or  expulsion  from any caste or community; or (ii) induces  or  attempt  to  induce  a  candidate or an elector to believe that he, or  any  person  in  whom  he  is  interested,  will  become or will be rendered an object of divine  displeasure or spiritual censure, shall  be  deemed  to  interfere  with  the  free  exercise of the electoral right of such candidate  or elector within the meaning of this clause;

(b) a  declaration  of  public  policy,  or  a  promise  of  publication,  or  the  mere  exercise  of  a  legal  right  without intent to interfere with an electoral right, shall  not be deemed to be interference within the meaning  of this clause.”   

37. Section  259  of  the  1994  Act  deals  with  grounds  for  

declaring elections to be void.  Section 259(1) is as follows:  

“259. Grounds  for  declaring  elections  to  be  void.-  (1)  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  sub- section (2), if the District Judge is of opinion-

(a) that  on the date of  his  election a  returned  candidate was not qualified or was disqualified, to  be chosen as a member under this Act, or,

(b) that  any  corrupt  practice  has  been  committed by a returned candidate or his agent or  by  any  other  person  with  the  consent  of  a  returned candidate or his agent, or

(c) that  any  nomination  paper  has  been

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improperly rejected, or

(d)   that the result of the election insofar as it  concerns  a  returned  candidate  has  been  materially affected-

(i)by  the  improper  acceptance  of  any  nomination, or  (ii) by  any  corrupt  practice  committed  in  the  interests  of  the  returned  candidate  by  a  person other than that candidate or his agent  or  a  person  acting  with  the  consent  of  such  candidate or agent, or (iii) by the improper acceptance or refusal of  any vote or reception of any vote which is void;  or (iv) by  the  non-compliance  with  the  provisions of this Act or of any rules or orders  made thereunder,  the Court  shall  declare the  election of the returned candidate to be void.”

38. Section 260 deals with corrupt practices.  Sub-Sections  

(1) and (2) of Section 260 read as follows:  

“260. Corrupt practices – The following shall  be deemed to be corrupt practice for the purposes  of this Act:-

(1) Bribery  as  defined  in  Clause  (1)  of  Section  123  of  the  Representation  of  People  Act,  1951.  (Central Act XLIII of 1951)

(2) Undue influence as defined in Clause (2)  of  the said section.”

39. From the aforesaid provisions,  it  is  clear  as day that  

concept of undue influence as is understood in the context  

of Section 123(2) of the 1951 Act has been adopted as it is a

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deemed conception for all purposes.  Thus, a candidate is  

bound to provide the necessary information at the time of  

filing  nomination  paper  and  for  the  said  purpose,  the  

Returning Officer can compel the candidate to furnish the  

relevant information and if a candidate, as has been held in  

Resurgence India (supra),  files  an affidavit  with a blank  

particulars would render the affidavit nugatory.  As has been  

held  in  the  said  judgment  if  a  candidate  fails  to  fill  the  

blanks even after the reminder by the Returning Officer, the  

nomination paper is liable to be rejected.  It has been further  

directed in the said case that the candidate must make a  

minimum  effort  to  explicitly  remark  as  ‘Nil’  or  ‘Not  

Applicable’ or ‘Not Known’ in the columns and not to leave  

the  particulars  blank.   It  is  because  the  citizens  have  a  

fundamental right to know about the candidate, for it is a  

natural right flowing from the concept of democracy.  Thus,  

if  a  candidate  paves  the  path  of  adventure  to  leave  the  

column blank and does not rectify after the reminder by the  

Returning Officer, his nomination paper is fit to be rejected.  

But, once he fills up the column with some particulars and  

deliberately  does  not  fill  up  other  relevant  particulars,

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especially,  pertaining  to  the  pendency  of  criminal  cases  

against him where cognizance has been taken has to be in a  

different sphere.    

40. Mr.  Harish  Salve,  learned  senior  counsel,  who  was  

requested to assist the Court, would unequivocally submit  

that it would come within the arena of corrupt practice.  The  

propositions  that  have  been  presented  by  the  learned  

Amicus Curiae are as follows:

A. The notion of what constitutes the free exercise  

of  any  electoral  right  cannot  be  static.   The  

exercise of  electoral  rights  in  a  democracy is  

central  to the very existence of a democracy.  

The notion of the free exercise of any electoral  

right is thus not something that can be ossified  

–  it  must  evolve  with  the  constitutional  

jurisprudence and be judged by contemporary  

constitutional values.

B. The disclosure by a candidate of his character  

antecedents was premised by this Court on the  

right of an elector to know – which right flows

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from the right to  the informed exercise of an  

electoral right.

C. Section  123(2)  of  the  1951  Act  necessarily  

implies that any influence on the mind of the  

voter that interferes with a free exercise of the  

electoral right is a corrupt practice.  Misleading  

voters  as  to  character  antecedents  of  a  

candidate  in  contemporary  times  is  a  serious  

interference with the free exercise of a voter’s  

right.  

D. In the context of disclosure of information, if the  

falsity or suppression of information relating to  

the  criminal  antecedents  of  a  candidate  is  

serious  enough  to  mislead  voters  as  to  his  

character, it would clearly  influence a voter in  

favour of a candidate.  This Court should take  

judicial notice of the problem of criminalization  

of  politics  –  which  led  this  Court  to  ask  

Parliament  to  seriously  consider  ameliorative  

changes to the law.

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E. Section  123  of  the  1951  Act  defines  “undue  

influence” in terms of interference with the free  

exercise of an electoral right.  This result, i.e.,  

interference  with  the  free  exercise  of  an  

electoral right, may apply to a person or a body  

of persons.  As clarified in Ram Dial v. Sant Lal,   

(1959)  2  SCR  748,  Section  123  does  not  

emphasise the individual aspect of the exercise  

of such influence, but pays regard to the use of  

such  influence  as  has  the  tendency  to  bring  

about the result contemplated in the clause.

F. It  is  not  every  failure  to  disclose  information  

that  would constitute an  undue influence.   In  

the context of criminal antecedents, the failure  

to  disclose  the  particulars  of  any  charges  

framed, cognizance taken, or conviction for any  

offence  that  involves  moral  turpitude  would  

constitute an act that causes  undue influence  

upon the voters.       

G. Purity  of  public  life  has  its  own hallowedness  

and  hence,  there  is  emphasis  on  the

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importance of truth in giving information.  Half  

truth  is  worse  than  silence;  it  has  the  effect  

potentiality to have a cacophony that can usher  

in anarchy.  

Learned Amicus Curiae has commended us to certain  

paragraphs  from  Association  for  Democratic  Reforms  

(supra),  People’s  Union  for  Civil  Liberties  (PUCL)  

(supra) and Manoj Narula (supra).

41. Mr.  Maninder  Singh,  learned  Additional  Solicitor  

General, who was requested to assist us, has submitted that  

to sustain the paradigms of constitutional governance, it is  

obligatory on the part of the candidate to strictly state about  

the  criminal  cases  pending  against  him,  especially,  in  

respect of the offences which are heinous, or involve moral  

turpitude or corruption.  He would submit, with all fairness at  

his  command,  that  for  democracy  to  thrive,  the  ‘right  to  

know’ is paramount and if a maladroit attempt is made by a  

candidate  not  to  disclose  the  pending  cases  against  him  

pertaining to criminal offences, it would have an impact on  

the voters as they would not be in a position to know about  

his  antecedents  and  ultimately  their  choice  would  be

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affected.   Learned  ASG  would  urge  that  as  the  non-

disclosure  of  the  offence  is  by  the  candidate  himself,  it  

would fall in the compartment of corrupt practice.    

42. Mr. Subramonium Prasad, learned AAG for the State of  

Tamil  Nadu  and  learned  counsel  for  private  respondents  

have supported the contentions raised by Mr. Harish Salve  

and Mr. Maninder Singh.  

43. Ms. V. Mohana, learned counsel for the appellant would  

submit that the High Court has fallen into error by treating it  

as a corrupt practice.  It is her submission that as a matter  

of  fact,  there  has  been  no  non-disclosure  because  the  

appellant had stated about the crime number, and all other  

cases are ancillary to the same and, in a way, connected  

and, therefore, non-mentioning of the same would not bring  

his case in the arena of non-disclosure.  That apart, learned  

counsel  would  contend  that  the  appellant  has  read  upto  

Class  X  and  he  had  thought  as  the  other  cases  were  

ancillary to the principal one, and basically offshoots, they  

need not be stated and,  therefore, in the absence of any  

intention,  the  concept  of  undue  influence  cannot  be  

attracted.   Learned counsel would urge that though there

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was assertion of  the registration of  cases and cognizance  

being taken in respect of the offences, yet the allegation of  

corrupt practices having not mentioned, the election could  

not have been set aside.  To buttress her submissions, she  

has commended us to the decisions in  Mahadeo V. Babu  

Udai Pratap Singh & Ors.24, Baburao Patel & Ors. V.  

Dr.  Zakir  Hussain  &  Ors.25,  Jeet  Mohinder  Singh  V.  

Harminder  Singh  Jassi26,  Govind  Singh  V.  Harchand  

Kaur27, Mangani Lal Mandal V. Bishnu Deo Bhandari28,  

and Shambhu Prasad Sharma V. Charandas Mahant29,

44. At  this  stage,  we  think  it  condign  to  survey  certain  

authorities  how undue influence has been viewed by this  

Court  and the  relevant  context  therein.   In  Ram Dial  v.  

Sant  Lal30 while  discussing  about  the  facet  of  undue  

influence, the three-Judge Bench distinguished the words of  

English Law relating to undue influence by stating that the  

words  of  the  English  statute  lay  emphasis  upon  the  

individual  aspect  of  the  exercise  of  undue  influence.  

Thereafter,  the Court proceeded to state about the undue  24  AIR 1966 SC 824 25  AIR 1968 SC 904 26  (1999) 9 SCC 386 27  (2011) 2 SCC 621 28  (2012) 3 SCC 314 29  (2012) 11 SCC 390 30  AIR 1959 SC 855

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influence under the Indian law by observing thus:

“…The Indian  law,  on  the  other  hand,  does  not  emphasize the individual aspect of the exercise of  such influence, but pays regard to the use of such  influence as has the tendency to bring about the  result contemplated in the clause. What is material  under  the  Indian  law,  is  not  the  actual  effect  produced,  but  the  doing  of  such  acts  as  are  calculated to interfere with the free exercise of any  electoral  right. Decisions  of  the  English  courts,  based on the words of the English statute, which  are not strictly in pari materia with the words of  the Indian statute, cannot, therefore, be used as  precedents in this country.”

[Emphasis added]

After so stating, the Court considered the submission  

that a religious leader has as much the right to freedom of  

speech as any other citizen and, that, therefore, exhortation  

in favour of a particular candidate should not have the result  

of  vitiating the election.   Elaborating further,  it  has  been  

held:

“......... the religious leader has a right to exercise  his influence in favour of any particular candidate  by  voting  for  him  and  by  canvassing  votes  of  others  for  him.  He  has  a  right  to  express  his  opinion on the individual merits of the candidates.  Such a course of conduct on his part, will only be a  use  of  his  great  influence  amongst  a  particular  section of the voters in the constituency; but it will  amount to an abuse of his great influence if the  words  he  uses  in  a  document,  or  utters  in  his  speeches,  leave  no  choice  to  the  persons  addressed by him, in the exercise of their electoral  rights.  If  the  religious  head  had  said  that  he

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preferred  the  appellant  to  the  other  candidate,  because, in his opinion, he was more worthy of the  confidence  of  the  electors  for  certain  reasons  good, bad or indifferent, and addressed words to  that effect to persons who were amenable to his  influence,  he would be within his rights,  and his  influence,  however  great,  could  not  be  said  to  have been misused. But in the instant case, as it  appears,  according  to  the  findings  of  the  High  Court,  in  agreement  with  the  Tribunal,  that  the  religious  leader  practically  left  no  free  choice to  the  Namdhari  electors,  not  only  by  issuing  the  hukam or farman, as contained in Exh. P-1, quoted  above, but also by his speeches, to the effect that  they  must  vote  for  the  appellant,  implying  that  disobedience  of  his  mandate  would  carry  divine  displeasure or spiritual censure, the case is clearly  brought  within  the  purview  of  the  second  paragraph of the proviso to Section 123(2) of the  Act.”

In view of the aforesaid analysis, the Court dismissed  

the  appeal  and  affirmed  the  decision  of  the  High  Court  

whereby it had given the stamp of approval to the order of  

Election Tribunal setting aside the appellants election.  

45. In Baburao Patel (supra), the Court while dealing with  

the challenge to the Presidential Election, addressed to the  

issue pertaining to undue influence.  The Court observed:

“We may in this connection refer to Section 123(2)  of  the  Representation  of  the  People  Act  1951  which  also  defines  “undue  influence”.  The  definition  there  is  more  or  less  in  the  same  language as in Section 171-C of the Indian Penal  Code  except  that  the  words  “direct  or  indirect”  have  been  added  to  indicate  the  nature  of

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interference. It  will  be seen that if  anything, the  definition  of  “undue  influence”  in  the  Representation of the People Act may be wider. It  will therefore be useful to refer to cases under the  election  law  to  see  how  election  tribunals  have  looked at the matter while considering the scope  of the words “undue influence”.”

46. The Court referred to the authority in  R.B. Surendra  

Narayan  Sinha  V.  Amulyadhone  Roy31 where  the  

question  arose  whether  by  issuing  a  whip  on  the  day  of  

election requesting the members to cast their preference in  

a  particular  order,  the  leader  of  a  party  exercises  undue  

influence  and  the  answer  was  given  in  the  negative.   A  

reference was made to Linge Gowda V. Shivananjappa32,  

wherein it has been held that a leader of a political party  

was entitled to declare the public the policy of the party and  

ask the electorate to vote for his party without interfering  

with any electoral right and such declarations on his part  

would not amount to undue influence under the 1951 Act.  

In Mast Ram V. S. Iqbal Singh33, the legitimate exercise of  

influence by a political party or an association should not be  

confused with  undue influence.   After  referring to various  

authorities, the Court opined thus: 31  1940 IC 30 32  (1953) 6 Ele LR 288 (Ele. Tri Bangalore) 33  (1955) 12 Ele LR 34 (Ele Tri Amritsar)

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“It will be seen from the above review of the cases  relating  to  undue  influence  that  it  has  been  consistently held in this country that it is open to  Ministers to canvass for candidates of their party  standing  for  election.  Such  canvassing  does  not  amount to undue influence but is proper use of the  Minister's  right  to  ask  the  public  to  support  candidates belonging to the Minister's party. It is  only where a Minister abuses his position as such  and  goes  beyond  merely  asking  for  support  for  candidates belonging to his party that a question  of undue influence may arise. But so long as the  Minister  only  asks  the  electors  to  vote  for  a  particular  candidate  belonging  to  his  party  and  puts  forward before the public  the merits  of  his  candidate it cannot be said that by merely making  such  request  to  the  electorate  the  Minister  exercises  undue  influence.  The  fact  that  the  Minister's  request  was  addressed in  the  form of  what is called a whip, is also immaterial so long as  it  is  clear  that  there  is  no  compulsion  on  the  electorate to vote in the manner indicated.”

47. In  S.K.  Singh  V.  V.V.  Giri34,  the  majority  while  

interpreting  Section  18  of  the  Presidential  and  Vice-

Presidential Elections Act, 1952 (for short, ‘the 1952 Act’) in  

the context of Section 171-C I.P.C., expressed thus:

“..... In our opinion, if distribution of the pamphlet  by post to electors or in the Central Hall is proved  it  would  constitute  “undue  influence”  within  Section  18  and  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  petitioners  to  go  further  and  prove  that  statements contained in the pamphlet were made  the subject  of  a  verbal  appeal  or  persuasion by  one member  of  the  electoral  college to  another  and particularly to those in the Congress fold.”

34  (1970) 2 SCC 567

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After  so  stating,  the  Court  drew  distinction  between  

Section 18 of the 1952 Act and Section 123 of the 1951 Act.  

It referred to Chapter IX A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860  

which deals with offences relating to elections and adverted  

to the issue of undue influence at elections as enumerated  

under  Section  171-C.   The  argument  that  was  advanced  

before the Court was to the following effect:

“…the  language  of  Section  171-C  suggests  that  undue influence comes in at the second and not at  the first  stage,  and therefore,  it  can only  be by  way of some act which impedes or obstructs the  elector in his freely casting the vote, and not in  any  act  which  precedes  the  second  stage  i.e.  during the stage when he is making his choice of  the  candidate  whom  he  would  support.  This  argument was sought to be buttressed by the fact  that  canvassing  is  permissible  during  the  first  stage,  and,  therefore,  the  interference  or  attempted  interference  contemplated  by  Section  171-C can only be that which is committed at the  stage when the elector exercises his right i.e. after  he has made up his mind to vote for his chosen  candidate or to refrain from voting. It was further  argued that the words used in Section 171-C were  “the  free  exercise  of  vote”  and not  “exercise  of  free  vote”.  The  use  of  those  words  shows  that  canvassing or propaganda, however virulent, for or  against a candidate would not amount to undue  influence, and that under influence can only mean  some act by way of threat or fear or some adverse  consequence administered at the time of casting  the vote.”

Repelling the said contention, the Court held thus:

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“We  do  not  think  that  the  Legislature,  while  framing  Chapter  IX-A  of  the  Code  ever  contemplated  such  a  dichotomy  or  intended  to  give  such  a  narrow meaning  to  the  freedom of  franchise essential in a representative system of  Government.  In  our  opinion  the  argument  mentioned  above  is  fallacious.  It  completely  disregards  the  structure  and  the  provisions  of  Section 171-C. Section 171-C is enacted in three  parts. The first sub-section contains the definition  of  “undue influence”.  This  is  in  wide terms and  renders  a  person  voluntarily  interfering  or  attempting to interfere with the free exercise of  any  electoral  right  guilty  of  committing  undue  influence. That this is very wide is indicated by the  opening sentence of sub-section (2), i.e. “without  prejudice  to  the  generality  of  the  provisions  of  sub-section (1)”. It is well settled that when this  expression  is  used  anything  contained  in  the  provisions  following  this  expression  is  not  intended  to  cut  down  the  generality  of  the  meaning of the preceding provision. This was so  held  by  the  Privy  Council  in  King-Emperor v.  Sibnath Banerj35.”

After so stating, the Court proceeded to lay down  

as follows:-  

“It follows from this that we have to look at sub- section (1) as it is without restricting its provisions  by  what  is  contained  in  sub-section  (2).  Sub- section  (3)  throws  a  great  deal  of  light  on  this  question.  It  proceeds  on  the  assumption  that  a  declaration of public policy or a promise of public  action or the mere exercise of a legal right can  interfere with an electoral right, and therefore it  provides that if there is no intention to interfere  with the electoral right it shall not be deemed to  be interference within the meaning of this section.  At what stage would a declaration of public policy  

35  AIR 1945 PC 156

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or  a  promise  of  public  action  act  and  tend  to  interfere? Surely only at the stage when a voter is  trying to make up his mind as to which candidate  he would support. If a declaration of public policy  or a promise of public action appeals to him, his  mind would decide in favour of the candidate who  is  propounding  the  public  policy  or  promising  a  public action. Having made up his mind he would  then go  and vote  and the  declaration  of  public  policy  having  had  its  effect  it  would  no  longer  have any effect on the physical final act of casting  his vote.

Sub-section (3) further proceeds on the basis that  the expression “free exercise of his electoral right”  does  not  mean  that  a  voter  is  not  to  be  influenced. This expression has to be read in the  context of an election in a democratic society and  the  candidates  and  their  supporters  must  naturally  be  allowed  to  canvass  support  by  all  legal and legitimate means. They may propound  their programmes, policies and views on various  questions which are exercising the minds of the  electors. This exercise of the right by a candidate  or  his  supporters  to  canvass  support  does  not  interfere  or  attempt  to  interfere  with  the  free  exercise  of  the  electoral  right.  What  does,  however,  attempt  to  interfere  with  the  free  exercise of an electoral right is, if we may use the  expression,  “tyranny  over  the  mind”.  If  the  contention of the respondent is to be accepted, it  would  be  quite  legitimate  on  the  part  of  a  candidate  or  his  supporter  to  hypnotise  a  voter  and then send him to vote. At the stage of casting  his ballot paper there would be no pressure cast  on him because his mind has already been made  up for him by the hypnotiser.

It was put like this in a book on Elections:

“The  freedom  of  election  is  two-fold;  (1)  freedom in the exercise of judgment. Every

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voter  should  be  free  to  exercise  his  own  judgment,  in  selecting  the  candidate  he  believes to be best fitted to represent the  constituency; (2) Freedom to go and have  the means of going to the poll to give his  vote without fear or intimidation.”36

We are supported in this view by the statement of  Objects  and  Reasons  attached  to  the  bill  which  ultimately  resulted in  the enactment  of  Chapter  IX-A.  That  statement  explains  in  clear  language  that  “undue  influence  was  intended  to  mean  voluntary  interference or  attempted interference  with  the right  of  any person to  stand or  not  to  stand as or withdraw from being a candidate or to  vote or refrain from voting, and that the definition  covers all threats of injury to person or property  and  all  illegal  methods  of  persuasion,  and  any  interference with the liberty of the candidates or  the  electors”.  “The  Legislature  has  wisely  refrained  from  defining  the  forms  interference  may  take.  The  ingenuity  of  the  human  mind  is  unlimited and perforce the nature of interference  must also be unlimited.”  

[Emphasis supplied]

48. In  Bachan  Singh  V.  Prithvi  Singh37,  there  was  a  

publication of posters bearing the caption “Pillars of Victory”  

with  photographs  of  the  Prime  Minister,  Defense  Minister  

and Foreign Minister.   It  was contended before this  Court  

that the publication of the poster not only amounted to the  

exercise of  “undue influence” within the contemplation of  

Section 123(2) but also constituted an attempt to obtain or  

36  Law of Elections and Election Petitions – Nanak Chand – 1950 Edn., p. 263 37  (1975) 1 SCC 368

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procure assistance from the members of the armed forces of  

the  Union  for  furtherance  of  the  prospects  of  returned  

candidate’s election within the purview of  Section 123(7).  

The  Court,  treating  the  contention  as  unsustainable  held  

thus:

“Doubtless the definition of “undue influence” in  sub-section (2) of Section 123 is couched in very  wide  terms,  and  on  first  flush  seems  to  cover  every conceivable act which directly or indirectly  interferes  or  attempts  to  interfere with  the free  exercise  of  electoral  right.  In  one  sense  even  election  propaganda  carried  on  vigorously,  blaringly  and  systematically  through  charismal  leaders or  through various media in favour of a  candidate  by  recounting  the  glories  and  achievements  of  that  candidate  or  his  political  party  in  administrative  or  political  field,  does  meddle with and mould the independent volition  of  electors,  having  poor  reason  and  little  education, in the exercise of their franchise. That  such  a  wide  construction  would  not  be  in  consonance with the intendment of the legislature  is discernible from the proviso to this clause. The  proviso illustrates that ordinarily interference with  the free exercise of electoral right involves either  violence  or  threat  of  injury  of  any  kind  to  any  candidate or an elector or inducement or attempt  to induce a candidate or elector to believe that he  will  become  an  object  of  divine  displeasure  or  spiritual  censure.  The  prefix  “undue”  indicates  that  there  must  be  some  abuse  of  influence.  “Undue influence” is used in contra-distinction to  “proper influence”. Construed in the light of the  proviso, clause (2) of Section 123 does not bar or  penalise  legitimate  canvassing  or  appeals  to  reason and judgment of the voters or other lawful  means of persuading voters to vote or not to vote

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for a candidate. Indeed, such proper and peaceful  persuasion is the motive force of our democratic  process.

We are unable to appreciate how the publication  of  this  poster  interfered  or  was  calculated  to  interfere  with  the  free  exercise  of  the  electoral  right of any person. There was nothing in it which  amounted  to  a  threat  of  injury  or  undue  inducement  of  the  kind  inhibited  by  Section  123(2).”

49. In  Ziyauddin  Burhanuddin Bukhari  v.  Brijmohan  

Ramdass Mehra38, a three-Judge Bench speaking through  

Beg, J., about undue influence had to say this:

“Section  123(2),  gives  the  “undue  influence”  which could  be exercised by a  candidate  or  his  agent  during  an  election  a  much  wider  connotation  than  this  expression  has  under  the  Indian  Contract  Act.  “Undue  influence”,  as  an  election offence under the English law is explained  as  follows  in  Halsbury’s  Laws  of  England,  Third  Edn., Vol. 14, pp. 223-24(para 387):

“A person is guilty of undue influence, if  he directly or indirectly, by himself or by  any other person on his behalf, makes use  of or threatens to make use of any force,  violence  or  restraint,  or  inflicts,  or  threatens to inflict, by himself or by any  other  person,  any  temporal  or  spiritual  injury,  damage,  harm  or  loss  upon  or  against any person in order to induce or  compel that person to vote or refrain from  voting,  or  on  account  of  that  person  having voted or refrained from voting.

A person is also guilty of undue influence  38  (1976) 2 SCC 17

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if, by abduction, duress or any fraudulent  device  or  contrivance,  he  impedes  or  prevents the free exercise of the franchise  of an elector or proxy for  an elector,  or  thereby compels, induces or prevails upon  an elector or proxy for an elector either to  vote or to refrain from voting.”

It will be seen that the English law on the subject  has the same object as the relevant provisions of  Section  123  of  our  Act.  But,  the  provisions  of  Section 123(2), (3) and (3-A) seem wider in scope  and also contain specific mention of what may be  construed  as  “undue  influence”  viewed  in  the  background of our political history and the special  conditions which have prevailed in this country.

We have  to  determine  the  effect  of  statements  proved to have been made by a candidate, or, on  his  behalf  and  with  his  consent,  during  his  election,  upon  the  minds  and  feelings  of  the  ordinary average voters of this country in every  case  of  alleged  corrupt  practice  of  undue  influence  by  making  statements.  We  will,  therefore, proceed to consider the particular facts  of the case before us.

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

To return to the precise question before us now,  we may  repeat  that  what  is  relevant  in  such  a  case  is  what  is  professed  or  put  forward  by  a  candidate  as  a  ground  for  preferring  him  over  another and not the motive or reality behind the  profession which may or may not be very secular  or  mundane.  It  is  the  professed  or  ostensible  ground  that  matters.  If  that  ground  is  religion,  which is put on the same footing as race, caste, or  language as an objectionable ground for seeking  votes, it is not permissible.  On the other hand, if  support  is  sought  on  a  ground  distinguishable  from those falling in the prohibited categories, it

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will  not  be  struck  by  Section  123  of  the  Act  whatever else it may not offend. It is then left to  the  electorate  to  decide  whether  a  permissible  view is right or wrong.”

50. In  Aad Lal  v.  Kanshi  Ram39, while  deliberating  on  

undue influence as enshrined under Section 123(2) of the  

1951 Act, it has been held thus:  

“It  has to be remembered that it  is an essential  ingredient  of  the  corrupt  practice  of  “undue  influence” under sub-section (2) of Section 123 of  the Act, that there should be any “direct or indirect  interference or attempt to interfere” on the part of  the candidate or his agent, or of any other person  with  the  consent  of  the  candidate  or  his  agent,  “with  the  free  exercise  of  any  electoral  right”.  There are two provisos to the sub-section, but they  are  obviously  not  applicable  to  the  controversy  before  us.  It  was  therefore  necessary,  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  the  corrupt  practice  of  “undue  influence”,  to  prove  that  there  was  any  direct  or  indirect  interference  or  attempt  to  interfere with the exercise of any electoral right.”

51. At this stage, it is useful to clarify that the provisos to  

Section 123(2) are, as has been postulated in the provision  

itself, without prejudice to the generality of the said clause.  

The meaning of the said phraseology has been interpreted  

in  Shiv  Kripal  Singh (supra).   In  this  context,  we  may  

profitably quote a passage from  Om Prakash & Ors. V.  

Union of India & Ors.40  

39  (1980) 2 SCC 350 40  (1970) 3 SCC 942

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“It  is  therefore contended relying on sub-section  (2)  that  inasmuch  as  no  fraud  or  false  representation or concealment of any material fact  has been alleged or proved in this case, the Chief  Settlement  Commissioner  cannot  exercise  the  revisionary  power  under  Section  24.  This  contention in our view has no validity. It is a well  established  proposition  of  law  that  where  a  specific  power  is  conferred  without  prejudice  to  the  generality  of  the  general  powers  already  specified, the particular power is only illustrative  and  does  not  in  any  way  restrict  the  general  power.  The  Federal  Court  had  in  Talpade’s  case  indicated the contrary but the Privy Council in King  Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee Indian Appeals – Vol.  72 p. 241 observed at page 258:

“Their Lordships are unable to agree with the  learned Chief Justice of the Federal Court on  his  statement  of  the  relative  positions  of  subsections  (1)  and (2)  of  Section 2 of  the  Defence  of  India  Act,  and  counsel  for  the  respondents  in  the  present  appeal  was  unable  to  support  that  statement,  or  to  maintain  that  Rule  26  was  invalid.  In  the  opinion  of  Their  Lordships,  the  function  of  sub-section (2) is merely an illustrative one;  the rule-making power is  conferred by sub- section (1) and ‘the rules’ which are referred  to in the opening sentence of sub-section (2)  are  the  rules  which  are  authorised  by,  and  made under,  sub-section (1);  the provisions  of sub-section (2) are not restrictive of sub- section (1) as, indeed is expressly stated by  the words ‘without prejudice to the generality  of the powers conferred by sub-section (1)’.”

52. Similar  view  has  been  expressed  in  V.T.  Khanzode  

and  Ors.  V.  Reserve  Bank  of  India  and  Anr.41,  D.K.  41  (1982) 2 SCC 7

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Trivedi & Sons V. State of Gujarat42,  State of J&K V.  

Lakhwinder Kumar43, and BSNL V. Telecom Regulatory  

Authority of India44.  Thus, the first part of Section 123(2)  

is not restricted or controlled by the provisos.  

53. From the aforesaid authorities, the following principles  

can be culled out:-

(i) The words  “undue influence”  are  not  to  be  

understood or conferred a meaning in the context  

of English statute.

(ii) The Indian election law pays regard to the use  

of  such  influence  having  the  tendency  to  bring  

about  the  result  that  has  contemplated  in  the  

clause.

(iii) If an act which is calculated to interfere with  

the free exercise of electoral right, is the true and  

effective test whether or not a candidate is guilty  

of undue influence.  

(iv)  The  words  “direct  or  indirect”  used  in  the  

provision have their significance and they are to  

be applied bearing in mind the factual context.

42  (1986) Supp. SCC 20 43  (2013) 6 SCC 333 44  (2014) 3 SCC 222

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(v) Canvassing by a Minister or an issue of a whip  

in the form of a request is permissible unless there  

is  compulsion  on  the  electorate  to  vote  in  the  

manner indicated.

(vi) The structure of the provisions contained in  

Section 171-C of IPC are to be kept in view while  

appreciating  the  expression  of  ‘undue  influence’  

used in Section 123(2) of the 1951 Act.

(vii) The two provisos added to Section 123(2) do  

not take away the effect of the principal or main  

provision.

(viii)  Freedom in the exercise of judgment which  

engulfs a voter’s right, a free choice, in selecting  

the candidate whom he believes to be best fitted  

to represent the constituency, has to be given due  

weightage.

(ix) There should never be tyranny over the mind  

which  would  put  fetters  and  scuttle  the  free  

exercise of an electorate.

(x) The  concept  of  undue  influence  applies  at  

both  the  stages,  namely,  pre-voting  and  at  the

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time of casting of vote.

(xi) “Undue influence” is not to be equated with  

“proper  influence”  and,  therefore,  legitimate  

canvassing is permissible in a democratic set up.  

(xii) Free exercise of  electoral  right  has a  nexus  

with direct or indirect interference or attempt to  

interfere.     

54. The aforesaid principles are required to be appreciated  

regard being had to the progression of the election law, the  

contemporaneous situation, the prevalent scenario and the  

statutory content.  We are absolutely conscious, the right to  

contest  an  election  is  neither  a  fundamental  right  nor  a  

common law right.  Dealing with the constitutional validity of  

Sections 175(1) and 177(1) of the Haryana Panchayati Raj  

Act,  1994,  the  three-Judge  Bench  in  Javed  V.  State  of  

Haryana45 opined thus:

“Right  to  contest  an  election  is  neither  a  fundamental right nor a common law right. It is a  right conferred by a statute. At the most, in view  of Part IX having been added in the Constitution, a  right to contest election for an office in Panchayat  may be said to be a constitutional right — a right  originating in the Constitution and given shape by  a statute. But even so, it cannot be equated with a  fundamental right. There is nothing wrong in the  

45  (2003) 8 SCC 369

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same statute which confers the right to contest an  election  also  to  provide  for  the  necessary  qualifications without which a person cannot offer  his candidature for an elective office and also to  provide for disqualifications which would disable a  person from contesting for, or holding, an elective  statutory office.

Reiterating the law laid down in N.P. Ponnuswami  v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency46 and  Jagan Nath v.  Jaswant Singh47 this Court held in  Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal48:  

“8. A right to elect, fundamental though it  is  to democracy,  is,  anomalously enough,  neither a fundamental right nor a common  law right. It is pure and simple, a statutory  right. So is the right to be elected. So is the  right  to  dispute  an  election.  Outside  of  statute, there is no right to elect, no right  to  be elected and no right  to  dispute an  election. Statutory creations they are, and  therefore, subject to statutory limitation.”

55. The purpose of referring to the same is to remind one  

that the right to contest in an election is a plain and simple  

statutory right and the election of an elected candidate can  

only  be  declared  null  and  void  regard  being  had  to  the  

grounds  provided  in  the  statutory  enactment.   And  the  

ground of ‘undue influence’ is a part of corrupt practice.   

56. Section 100 of the 1951 Act provides for grounds for  

declaring  election  to  be  void.   Section  100(1)  which  is  

46  AIR 1952 SC 64 47  AIR 1954 SC 210 48  (1982) 1 SCC 691

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relevant for the present purpose reads as under:

“100.  Grounds for  declaring election to be  void.-  

(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if  the High Court is of opinion-

(a) that  on  the  date  of  his  election  a  returned  candidate  was  not  qualified,  or  was  disqualified, to be chosen to fill the seat under  the Constitution or this Act or the Government  of Union Territories Act, 1963 (20 of 1963); or

(b) that any corrupt practice has been committed  by a returned candidate or his election agent  or by any other person with the consent of a  returned candidate or his election agent; or

(c) that  any  nomination  has  been  improperly  rejected; or  

(d) that  the result  of  the election,  insofar as it  concerns  a  returned  candidate,  has  been  materially affected-

(i) by the improper acceptance or any  nomination, or  

(ii) by any corrupt practice committed  in the interests of the returned candidate  by an agent other than his election agent,  or

(iii) by the improper reception, refusal  or rejection of any vote or the reception of  any vote which is void, or

(iv) by  any  non-compliance  with  the  provisions of the Constitution or of this Act  or of any rules or orders made under this  Act,

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The High Court shall  declare the election of the  returned candidate to be void.”

57. As is clear from the provision, if the corrupt practice is  

proven, the Election Tribunal or the High Court is bound to  

declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.  

The said view has been laid down in M. Narayan Rao V. G.  

Venkata Reddy & Others49 and  Harminder Singh Jassi  

(supra).

58. At  this  juncture,  it  is  necessary  to  elucidate  on  one  

essential aspect.  Section 100(1)(d)(ii) stipulates that where  

the  High  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  result  of  the  

election  has  been  materially  affected  by  any  corrupt  

practice, committed in the interest of the returned candidate  

by an agent, other than his election agent, the High Court  

shall  declare the election of the returned candidate to be  

void.  This stands in contra distinction to Section 100(1)(b)  

which provides that election of a returned candidate shall be  

declared to be void if corrupt practice has been committed  

by  a  returned  candidate  or  his  election  agent  or  by  any  

other  person with  his  consent  or  with  the consent  of  the  

returned  candidate  or  his  election  agent.   Thus,  if  the  

49  (1977) 1 SCC 771

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corrupt  practice  is  proven  on  the  foundation  of  Section  

100(1)(b),  the  High  Court  is  not  to  advert  to  the  facet  

whether result of the election has been materially affected,  

which has to be necessarily recorded as a finding of a fact  

for the purpose of Section 100(1)(d)(ii).  

59. In  this  context,  we  may  refer  to  the  authority  in  

Samant N.  Balkrishna and Anr. V. George Fernandez   

and Others50, wherein Hidayatullah, C.J., speaking for the  

Court opined thus:

“If  we were not  to  keep this  distinction in  mind  there  would  be  no  difference  between  Section  100(1)(b)  and  100(1)(d)  insofar  as  an  agent  is  concerned. We have shown above that a corrupt  act per se is enough under Section 100(1)(b) while  under  Section  100(1)(d)  the  act  must  directly  affect  the  result  of  the  election  insofar  as  the  returned candidate is concerned. Section 100(1)(b)  makes  no  mention  of  an  agent  while  Section  100(1)(d)  specifically  does.  There must be some  reason why this is so. The reason is that an agent  cannot make the candidate responsible unless the  candidate has consented or the act of the agent  has materially affected the election of the returned  candidate. In the case of any person (and he may  be an agent) if he does the act with the consent of  the returned candidate there is no need to prove  the consent of the returned candidate and there is  no need to prove the effect on the election.”

60. In Manohar Joshi V. Nitin Bhaurao Patil and Anr.51,  

a three-Judge Bench reiterated the principle by stating that: 50  (1969) 3 SCC 238 51  (1996) 1 SCC 169

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“The distinction between clause (b) of sub-section  (1)  and  sub-clause  (ii)  of  clause  (d)  therein  is  significant. The ground in clause (b) provides that  the  commission  of  any  corrupt  practice  by  a  returned candidate or his election agent or by any  other  person  with  the  consent  of  a  returned  candidate  or  his  election  agent  by  itself  is  sufficient to declare the election to be void. On the  other  hand,  the  commission  of  any  corrupt  practice in the interests of the returned candidate  by an agent other than his election agent (without  the  further  requirement  of  the  ingredient  of  consent  of  a  returned  candidate  or  his  election  agent) is a ground for declaring the election to be  void only when it  is  further pleaded and proved  that the result of the election insofar as it concerns  a  returned  candidate  has  been  materially  affected.”  

61. The  distinction  between  the  two  provisions,  as  has  

been explained by this Court is of immense significance.  If  

the corrupt practice, as envisaged under Section 100(1)(b) is  

established, the election has to be declared void.  No other  

condition is  attached to  it.   Keeping this  in  view,  we are  

required to advert to the fundamental issue whether non-

disclosure of criminal antecedents,  as has been stipulated  

under Section 33A and the Rules framed under the 1951 Act,  

would tantamount to corrupt practice and if so, how is it to  

be proven.  We have already referred to the facet of undue  

influence in  some decisions  of  this  Court.   Emphasis  has  

been laid by Mr. Salve, learned amicus curiae, on influence

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on  the  mind  of  the  voter  that  interferes  with  the  free  

exercise of the electoral right and how such non-disclosure  

or suppression of facts can be a calculated act to interfere  

with  such  right.   The  undue  influence  as  has  been  

mentioned under Section 123(2) uses the words ‘direct or  

indirect’.   The  Court  has  drawn  distinction  between  

legitimate  canvassing  and  compulsion  on  the  electorate.  

Emphasis  has  been given  to  the  ingenuity  of  the  human  

mind which is unlimited and how the nature of interference  

can be unlimited.  The ostensibility of the ground has been  

taken into consideration.  In this context, we think it apt to  

reproduce Section 171-C that deals with undue influence at  

elections. The said provision reads as follows:

“171C - Undue influence at elections (1) Whoever voluntarily interferes or attempts to  interfere  with  the  free  exercise  of  any  electoral  right commits the offence of undue influence at an  election. (2)  Without  prejudice  to  the  generality  of  the  provisions of sub-section (1), whoever-- (a)  threatens  any  candidate  or  voter,  or  any  person in whom a candidate or voter is interested,  with injury of any kind, or (b) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or  voter to believe that he or any person in whom he  is  interested will  become or  will  be rendered an  object of Divine displeasure or of spiritual censure,

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shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise  of the electoral right of such candidate or voter,  within the meaning of sub-section (1). (3) A declaration of public policy or a promise of  public action, or the mere exercise of a legal right  without intent to interfere with an electoral right,  shall not be deemed to be interference within the  meaning of this section.”

The  said  provision  has  been  referred  to  by  the  

Constitution Bench in Shiv Kripal Singh’s case.  

62. At this juncture, it is fruitful to refer to Notes on Clauses  

which are relevant for the present purpose when the Bill No.  

106 of 1950 was introduced.  It reads as follows:

“Clauses  121  to  133  deal  with  certain  offences  with respect to elections.  It may be pointed out  that Chapter IX-A of the Indian Penal Code already  contains provisions for punishment for the corrupt  practices  of  bribery,  undue  influence  and  personation  at  elections.   “Bribery”,  “undue  influence” and “personation” as defined in the said  Chapter  do  not  differ  materially  from  the  descriptions of such practices contained in clause  118 of the Bill which have been reproduced from  Part I of the First Schedule to the Government of  India (Provincial Elections) (Corrupt Practices and  Election  Petitions)  Order,  1936,  and  from  the  electoral  rules  which  have  been  in  force  since  1921.   The  said  Chapter  IX-A  also  contains  provisions for punishment for false statements and  for illegal payments in connection with an election  and for failure to keep election accounts.  It has,  therefore, been considered necessary to include in  this Bill any provision for the corrupt practices and  other electoral offences already dealt with in the  Indian  Penal  Code.   Further,  it  would  not  be  possible to omit those provisions from the Indian

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Penal Code and include them in this Bill, as they  apply  not  only  in  relation  to  an  election  in  Parliament,  or  to  the Legislature of  a  State,  but  also  to  every  other  kind  of  election,  such  as,  election to Municipalities, District Boards and other  local authorities.  Accordingly, only provisions with  regard  to  certain  other  electoral  offences  have  been included in these clauses.”

63. In  Shiv  Kripal  Singh (supra),  as  has  been  stated  

earlier,  the Court had referred to the objects and reasons  

attached to the Bill, which ultimately resulted in enactment  

of Chapter IX-A of the I.P.C.

64. In Charan Lal Sahu V. Giani Zail Singh and Anr.52,  

the Court after referring to Section 171C opined thus:

“The gravamen of this section is that there must  be interference or attempted interference with the  “free  exercise”  of  any  electoral  right.  “Electoral  right” is defined by Section 171-A(b) to mean the  right of a person to stand, or not to stand as, or to  withdraw from being,  a  candidate  or  to  vote  or  refrain from voting at an election......”

65. Similarly,  in  Baburao  Patel  (supra),  the  Court  has  

compared  Section  123(2)  which  defines  undue  influence,  

more or less, in the same language as in Section 171-C IPC  

except the words “direct or indirect” which have been added  

into  the  nature  of  interference.   In  the  said  case  while  

dealing with the definition of Section 171-C IPC, the Court  

52  (1984) 1 SCC 390

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has observed thus:

“It will be seen from the above definition that the  gist of undue influence at an election consists in  voluntary interference or attempt at interference  with the free exercise of any electoral right.  Any  voluntary action which interferes with or attempts  to  interfere  with  such  free  exercise  of  electoral  right would amount to undue influence.  But even  though the definition in sub-s.  (1)  of s.  171-C is  wide in terms it cannot take in mere canvassing in  favour of a candidate at an election.  If that were  so,  it  would  be  impossible  to  run  democratic  elections.   Further  sub-s.  (2)  of  s.  171-C  shows  what the nature of undue influence is though of  course it does not cut down the generality of the  provisions  contained  in  sub-section  (1).   Where  any threat is held out to any candidate or voter or  any  person  in  whom  a  candidate  or  voter  is  interested and the threat is of injury of any kind,  that  would  amount  to  voluntary  interference  or  attempt at interference with the free exercise of  electoral  right  and  would  be  undue  influence.  Again  where  a  person  induces  or  attempts  to  induce a candidate, or voter to believe that he or  any person in whom he is interested will become  or will be rendered an object of Divine displeasure  or of spiritual censure, that would also amount to  voluntary interference with the free exercise of the  electoral  right  and  would  be  undue  influence.  What  is  contained  in  sub-s.  (2)  of  S.  171-C  is  merely  illustrative.   It  is  difficult  to  lay  down in  general  terms where mere canvassing ends and  interference  or  attempt  at  interference  with  the  free exercise of any electoral right begins.  That is  a matter to be determined in each case; but there  can be no  doubt  that  if  what  is  done is  merely  canvassing it  would not be undue influence.   As  sub-section  (3)  of  s.  171-C  shows,  the  mere  exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere  with  an  electoral  right  would  not  be  undue  influence.”  

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66. Regard being had to the aforesaid position of law and  

the meaning given under Section 123(2) of the 1951 Act to  

“undue influence”, we may refer to Section 33-A of the 1951  

Act.  Section  33-A  of  the  1951  Act,  which  has  been  

introduced w.e.f. 24.08.2002, requires a candidate to furnish  

the information as to whether he is accused of any offence  

punishable with imprisonment for  two years or  more in a  

pending case in which charge has been framed by the court  

of competent jurisdiction.  Sub-Section 2 of Section 33-A of  

the 1951 Act requires the candidate or his proposer, as the  

case maybe, at the time of delivery to the Returning Officer  

an  affidavit  sworn by  the  candidate  in  a  prescribed form  

verifying  the  information  specified  in  sub-Section  (1).   It  

need no special emphasis to state that giving a declaration  

by way of an affidavit duly sworn by the candidate has its  

own signification.  

67. This Court had issued certain directions in Association  

for Democratic Reforms (supra) and People’s Union for  

Civil  Liberties (PUCL)  (supra).   Section  33-A  which  has  

been  reproduced  earlier  is  relatable  to  furnishing  of  an  

information  in  respect  of  an  offence  punishable  with

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imprisonment for two years or more in a pending case in  

which a charge has been framed by the court of competent  

jurisdiction.    At  this  stage,  it  is  appropriate  to  refer  to  

Section 169 of the 1951 Act, the same being pertinent in the  

context.  It reads as under:

“Section 169 - Power to make rules

(2)  In  particular,  and  without  prejudice  to  the  generality of the foregoing power, such rules may  provide  for  all  or  any  of  the  following  matters,  namely:-- (a) the form, of affidavit under sub-section (2) of  section 33A; (aa)  the  duties  of  presiding  officers  and  polling  officers at polling stations; (aaa) the form of contribution report; (b)  the  checking  of  voters  by  reference  to  the  electoral roll; (bb) the manner of allocation of equitable sharing  of time on the cable television network and other  electronic media; (c) the manner in which votes are to be given both  generally  and  in  the  case  of  illiterate  voters  or  voters under physical or other disability; (d) the manner in which votes are to be given by a  presiding officer,  polling  officer,  polling  agent  or  any  other  person,  who  being  an  elector  for  a  constituency is authorised or appointed for duly at  a polling station at which he is not entitled to vole; (e) the procedure to be followed in respect of the  lender of vote by a person representing himself to

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be an elector after another person has voted as  such elector; (ee) the manner of giving and recording of voles  by means of voting machines and the procedure  as  to  voting  to  be  followed  at  polling  stations  where such machines are used; (f)  the procedure as  to  voting to be followed at  elections  held  in  accordance with  the  system of  proportional representation by means of the single  transferable vote; (g)  the  scrutiny  and counting  of  votes  including  cases  in  which  a  recount  of  the  votes  may  be  made before the declaration of the result  of  the  election; (gg)  the  procedure  as  to  counting  of  votes  recorded by means of voting machines; (h)  the  safe  custody  of ballot  boxes,  voting  machines, ballot papers and other election papers,  the  period  for  which  such  papers  shall  be  preserved  and  the  inspection  and  production  of  such papers; (hh)  the  material  to  be  supplied  by  the  Government  to  the  candidates  of  recognised  political parties at any election to be held for the  purposes of constituting the House of the People  or the Legislative Assembly of a State;. (i) any other matter required to be prescribed by  this Act.”

68. Rule 4A has been inserted in Conduct of Election Rules,  

1961 (‘for short, 1961 Rules) w.e.f. 3.9.2002.  Rule 4A reads  

as follows:

“4A.Form of affidavit to be filed at the time  of  delivering  nomination  paper –  The  candidate  or  his  proposer,  as  the  case  may be,

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shall,  at  the  time  of  delivering  to  the  returning  officer the nomination paper under sub-section (1)  of  section 33 of  the Act,  also  deliver  to  him an  affidavit  sworn  by  the  candidate  before  a  Magistrate of the first  class or  a Notary in Form  26.”

As per the aforesaid Rule, the affidavit is required to be  

filed in Form 26.  For the present purpose, the relevant part  

is as follows:-

“    FORM 26

(See rule 4A)

Affidavit  to  be  filed  by  the  candidate  alongwith  nomination  paper  before  the  returning  officer  for  election  to  ………………………(name  of  the  House)  from  …………………………………constituency  (Name  of  the  Constituency)

X – X – X  

(5) I am /am not accused of any offence(s) punishable with  imprisonment for two years or more in a pending case(s) in  which a charge (s) has/have been framed by the court(s) of  competent jurisdiction.  

If the deponent is accused of any such offence(s) he shall  furnish the following information:-  

(i)  The  following  case(s)  is  /are  pending  against  me in  which  charges  have  been  framed  by  the  court  for  an  offence  punishable  with  imprisonment  for  two  years  or  more :-  

(a)  Case/First  Information  Report  No./  Nos. together with complete  details  of  concerned  Police  Station/District/State

(b)  Section(s)  of  the  concerned  Act(s) and short description of the  offence(s) for which charged

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(c)  Name of  the Court,  Case No.  and  date  of  order  taking  cognizance:  

(d)  Court(s)  which  framed  the  charge(s)

(e) Date(s) on which the charge(s)  was/were framed

(f)  Whether  all  or  any  of  the  proceedings(s)  have been stayed  by  any  Court(s)  of  competent  jurisdiction

(ii)  The  following  case(s)  is  /are  pending  against  me  in  which cognizance has been taken by the court other than  the cases mentioned in item (i) above:-  

(a) Name of the Court, Case No.  and  date  of  order  taking  cognizance:  

(b) The details of cases where the  court  has  taken  cognizance,  section(s)  of  the  Act(s)  and  description  of  the  offence(s)  for  which cognizance taken

(c)  Details  of  Appeal(s)/Application(s)  for  revision (if  any) filed against  the  above order(s)  

(6) I have been/have not been convicted, of an offence(s)  [other than any offence (s) referred to in sub-section (1) or  sub-section (2), or covered in sub-section (3), of section 8  of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951)]  and sentenced to imprisonment for one year or more.  

If the deponent is convicted and punished as aforesaid, he  shall furnish the following information:

In the following case, I have been convicted and sentenced  to imprisonment by a court of law:  

(a)  The  Details  of  cases,  section(s) of the concerned Act(s)

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and description  of  the  offence(s)  for which convicted  

(b)  Name of the Court,  Case No.  and date of order(s):  

(c) Punishment imposed  

d)  Whether  any  appeal  was/has  been filed  against  the  conviction  order.  

If  so,  details  and  the  present  status of the appeal:  

” 69. On  a  perusal  of  the  aforesaid  format,  it  is  clear  as  

crystal that the details of certain categories of offences in  

respect of which cognizance has been taken or charges have  

been  framed  must  be  given/furnished.    This  Rule  is  in  

consonance  with  Section  33-A  of  the  1951  Act.   Section  

33(1)  envisages  that  information  has  to  be  given  in  

accordance  with  the  Rules.   This  is  in  addition  to  the  

information to be provided as per Section 33(1) (i) and (ii).  

The affidavit  that is required to be filed by the candidate  

stipulates  mentioning  of  cases  pending  against  the  

candidate in which charges have been framed by the Court  

for offences punishable with imprisonment for two years or  

more and also the cases which are pending against him in  

which cognizance has been taken by the court other than  

the cases which have been mentioned in Clause 5(i) of Form

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26.  Apart from the aforesaid, Clause 6 of Form 26 deals with  

conviction.  

70. The singular question is, if a candidate, while filing his  

nomination  paper  does  not  furnish  the  entire  information  

what would be the resultant effect.  In  Resurgence India  

(supra), the Court has held that if a nomination paper is filed  

with particulars left blank, the Returning Officer is entitled to  

reject  the nomination  paper.  The Court  has  proceeded to  

state  that  candidate  must  take  the  minimum  effort  to  

explicitly remark as ‘Nil’ or ‘Not Applicable’ or ‘Not known’ in  

the columns.  In the said case, it has been clarified that para  

73 of People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) case will  

not  come  in  the  way  of  Returning  Officer  to  reject  the  

nomination  paper  when  the  affidavit  has  been  filed  with  

blank particulars.   It  is necessary to understand what has  

been  stated  in  para  73  of  People’s  Union  for  Civil   

Liberties (PUCL)  case,  how it  has  been understood and  

clarified in Resurgence India (supra).  Para 73 of People’s  

Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) case reads as follows:

“While no exception can be taken to the insistence  of affidavit with regard to the matters specified in  the  judgment  in  Assn  for  Democratic  Reforms  case, the direction to reject the nomination paper

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for  furnishing  wrong  information  or  concealing  material information and providing for a summary  enquiry at the time of scrutiny of the nominations,  cannot  be  justified.  In  the  case  of  assets  and  liabilities,  it  would  be  very  difficult  for  the  Returning  Officer  to  consider  the  truth  or  otherwise of the details furnished with reference to  the  'documentary  proof'.  Very  often,  in  such  matters  the  documentary  proof  may  not  be  clinching  and  the  candidate  concerned  may  be  handicapped  to  rebut  the  allegation  then  and  there. If sufficient time is provided, he may be able  to  produce  proof  to  contradict  the  objector's  version.  It  is  true  that  the  aforesaid  directions  issued by the Election Commission are not under  challenge  but  at  the  same  time  prima  facie  it  appears that the Election Commission is required  to revise its instructions in the light of directions  issued in Assn for Democratic Reforms case and as  provided under the Representation of the People  Act and its third Amendment.”

In  Resurgence  India (supra),  the  aforequoted  said  

paragraph has been explained thus:

“The aforesaid paragraph,  no doubt,  stresses on  the  importance  of  filing  of  affidavit,  however,  opines that the direction to reject the nomination  paper  for  furnishing  wrong  information  or  concealing material information and providing for  a summary inquiry at the time of scrutiny of the  nominations  cannot  be  justified  since  in  such  matters  the  documentary  proof  may  not  be  clinching  and  the  candidate  concerned  may  be  handicapped  to  rebut  the  allegation  then  and  there.  This  Court  was  of  the  opinion  that  if  sufficient time is provided, the candidate may be  in  a  position  to  produce  proof  to  contradict  the  objector's  version.  The  object  behind  penning  down the aforesaid reasoning is to accommodate

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genuine situation where the candidate is trapped  by  false  allegations  and  is  unable  to  rebut  the  allegation  within  a  short  time.  Para  73  of  the  aforesaid  judgment  nowhere  contemplates  a  situation  where  it  bars  the  Returning  Officer  to  reject  the nomination paper on account of  filing  affidavit with particulars left blank. Therefore, we  hereby clarify that the above said paragraph will  not come in the way of the Returning Officer to  reject the nomination paper if the said affidavit is  filed with blank columns.”

71. Both the paragraphs when properly understood relate  

to the stage of scrutiny of  the nomination paper.   In  this  

context, a question may arise if a candidate fills up all the  

particulars  relating  to  his  criminal  antecedents  and  the  

nomination is not liable for rejection in law, what would be  

the impact.  At the stage of scrutiny, needless to say, even if  

objections are raised, that possibly cannot be verified by the  

Returning Officer.  Therefore, we do not intend to say that if  

objections are raised, the nomination paper would be liable  

for rejection.  However, we may hasten to clarify that it is  

not the issue involved in the present case.  The controversy  

which has emanated in this case is whether non-furnishing  

of  the  information  while  filing  an  affidavit  pertaining  to  

criminal cases, especially cases involving heinous or serious  

crimes  or  relating  to  corruption  or  moral  turpitude would

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tantamount  to  corrupt  practice,  regard  being  had  to  the  

concept of undue influence.  We have already referred to the  

authorities  in  Association  for  Democratic  Reforms  

(supra)  and  People’s  Union  for  Civil  Liberties  (NOTA  

case), (supra).  Emphasis on all these cases has been given  

with  regard  to  essential  concept  of  democracy,  

criminalisation of politics and preservation of a healthy and  

growing democracy.  The right of a voter to know has been  

accentuated.  As a part of that right of a voter, not to vote in  

favour of any candidate has been emphasised by striking  

down  Rules  41(2),  41(3)  and  49-O  of  the  Rules.   In  

Association for Democratic Reforms (supra), it has been  

held thus:

“For  health  of  democracy  and  fair  election,  whether the disclosure of assets by a candidate,  his/her  qualification  and  particulars  regarding  involvement  in  criminal  cases  are  necessary  for  informing voters, maybe illiterate, so that they can  decide  intelligently,  whom  to  vote  for.  In  our  opinion, the decision of even an illiterate voter, if  properly  educated  and  informed  about  the  contesting candidate, would be based on his own  relevant  criteria  of  selecting  a  candidate.  In  democracy, periodical elections are conducted for  having efficient governance for the country and for  the benefit  of citizens — voters. In a democratic  form  of  government,  voters  are  of  utmost  importance. They have right to elect or re-elect on  the basis of the antecedents and past performance

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of  the  candidate.  The  voter  has  the  choice  of  deciding  whether  holding  of  educational  qualification or holding of property is relevant for  electing  or  re-electing  a  person  to  be  his  representative.  Voter  has  to  decide  whether  he  should cast vote in favour of a candidate who is  involved in a criminal case. For maintaining purity  of elections and a healthy democracy, voters are  required to be educated and well informed about  the contesting candidates. Such information would  include  assets  held  by  the  candidate,  his  qualification  including  educational  qualification  and antecedents of his life including whether he  was involved in a criminal case and if the case is  decided — its result, if pending — whether charge  is  framed  or  cognizance  is  taken  by  the  court.  There is no necessity of suppressing the relevant  facts from the voters.”

[Emphasis supplied]

72. In  People’s Union for Civil Liberties (NOTA case),  

(supra), emphasis has been laid on free and fair elections  

and it has been opined that for democracy to survive, it is  

fundamental that the best available man should be chosen  

as the people’s representative for proper governance of the  

country and the same can be at best be achieved through  

persons  of  high  moral  and  ethical  values  who  win  the  

elections  on  a  positive  vote.   Needless  to  say,  the  

observations were made in the backdrop of negative voting.  

73. In  Manoj  Narula (supra)  the  court,  while  discussing  

about  democracy  and  the  abhorrent  place  the  corruption

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has in a body polity, has observed that a democratic polity,  

as  understood  in  its  quintessential  purity,  is  conceptually  

abhorrent  to  corruption and,  especially  corruption at  high  

places, and repulsive to the idea of criminalisation of politics  

as  it  corrodes  the  legitimacy  of  the  collective  ethos,  

frustrates the hopes and aspirations of the citizens and has  

the  potentiality  to  obstruct,  if  not  derail,  the  rule  of  law.  

Democracy, which has been best defined as the government  

of  the people,  by the people and for  the people,  expects  

prevalence  of  genuine  orderliness,  positive  propriety,  

dedicated  discipline  and  sanguine  sanctity  by  constant  

affirmance of constitutional morality which is the pillar stone  

of  good  governance.  While  dealing  with  the  concept  of  

democracy,  the majority in  Indira Nehru Gandhi v.  Raj  

Narain53, stated that “democracy” as an essential feature of  

the  Constitution  is  unassailable.  The  said  principle  was  

reiterated  in  T.N.  Seshan,  CEC  of  India v.  Union  of  

India54 and Kuldip  Nayar v.  Union  of  India55.  It  was  

pronounced with asseveration that democracy is the basic  

and fundamental structure of the Constitution. There is no  

53  (1975) Supp SCC 1 54  (1995) 4 SCC 611 55  (2006) 7 SCC 1

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shadow of doubt that democracy in India is a product of the  

rule  of  law  and  also  an  embodiment  of  constitutional  

philosophy.

74. Having stated about the need for vibrant and healthy  

democracy, we think it appropriate to refer to the distinction  

between  disqualification  to  contest  an  election  and  the  

concept  or  conception  of  corrupt  practice  inhered  in  the  

words  “undue  influence”.    Section  8  of  the  1951  Act  

stipulates  that  conviction  under  certain  offences  would  

disqualify a person for being a Member either of House of  

Parliament or the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council  

of  a  State.   We repeat  at  the  cost  of  repetition unless  a  

person is disqualified under law to contest the election, he  

cannot be disqualified to contest.  But the question is when  

an election petition is filed before an Election Tribunal or the  

High Court, as the case may be, questioning the election on  

the  ground  of  practising  corrupt  practice  by  the  elected  

candidate on the foundation that he has not fully disclosed  

the criminal cases pending against him, as required under  

the Act and the Rules and the affidavit that has been filed  

before  the  Returning  Officer  is  false  and  reflects  total

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suppression, whether such a ground would be sustainable  

on  the  foundation  of  undue  influence.   We  may  give  an  

example at  this  stage.   A  candidate  filing  his  nomination  

paper  while  giving  information  swears  an  affidavit  and  

produces before the Returning Officer  stating that  he has  

been involved in a case under Section 354 IPC and does not  

say  anything  else  though  cognizance  has  been  taken  or  

charges have been framed for the offences under Prevention  

of  Corruption  Act,  1988  or  offences  pertaining  to  rape,  

murder, dacoity, smuggling, land grabbing, local enactments  

like  MCOCA,  U.P.  Goonda  Act,  embezzlement,  attempt  to  

murder  or  any other  offence which may come within  the  

compartment of serious or heinous offences or corruption or  

moral turpitude.  It is apt to note here that when an FIR is  

filed a person filling a nomination paper may not be aware  

of lodgement of the FIR but when cognizance is  taken or  

charge is framed, he is definitely aware of the said situation.  

It is within his special knowledge.  If the offences are not  

disclosed in entirety, the electorate remain in total darkness  

about such information.  It can be stated with certitude that  

this  can  definitely  be  called  antecedents  for  the  limited

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purpose, that is, disclosure of information to be chosen as a  

representative to an elected body.

75.  The  sanctity  of  the  electoral  process  imperatively  

commands  that  each  candidate  owes  and  is  under  an  

obligation  that  a  fair  election  is  held.   Undue  influence  

should  not  be  employed  to  enervate  and  shatter  free  

exercise of choice and selection. No candidate is entitled to  

destroy  the  sacredness  of  election  by  indulging  in  undue  

influence.  The basic concept of “undue influence” relating  

to  an  election  is  voluntary  interference  or  attempt  to  

interfere  with  the  free  exercise  of  electoral  right.   The  

voluntary act also encompasses attempts to interfere with  

the  free  exercise  of  the  electoral  right.   This  Court,  as  

noticed earlier, has opined that legitimate canvassing would  

not  amount  to  undue  influence;  and  that  there  is  a  

distinction  between  “undue  influence”  and  “proper  

influence”.  The former is totally unacceptable as it impinges  

upon  the  voter’s  right  to  choose  and  affects  the  free  

exercise of the right to vote.  At this juncture, we are obliged  

to  say  that  this  Court  in  certain  decisions,  as  has  been  

noticed  earlier,  laid  down  what  would  constitute  “undue

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influence”.   The  said  pronouncements  were  before  the  

recent decisions in PUCL (supra), PUCL (NOTA) (supra) and  

Association  of  Democratic  Reforms (supra)  and  other  

authorities  pertaining  to  corruption  were  delivered.   That  

apart, the statutory provision contained in Sections 33, 33A  

and Rules have been incorporated.   

76. In this backdrop, we have to appreciate the spectrum of  

“undue influence”.  In PUCL (supra) Venkattarama Reddi, J.  

has stated thus:  

“Freedom of voting as distinct from right to vote is  thus  a  species  of  freedom  of  expression  and  therefore  carries  with  it  the  auxiliary  and  complementary  rights  such  as  right  to  secure  information  about  the  candidate  which  are  conducive to the freedom”.

77. In Patangrao Kadam v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Yadav  

Deshmukh56, the Court observed that:  

“Clean,  efficient  and  benevolent  administration  are  the  essential  features  of  good  governance  which  in  turn  depends  upon  persons  of  competency and good character”.

78. From the aforesaid, it is luculent that free exercise of  

any electoral right is paramount.  If there is any direct or  

indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the part of  

the candidate, it amounts to undue influence.  Free exercise  56 (2001) 3 SCC 594

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of the electoral right after the recent pronouncements of this  

Court  and  the  amendment  of  the  provisions  are  to  be  

perceived regard  being  had  to  the  purity  of  election  and  

probity in public life which have their hallowedness.   A voter  

is entitled to have an informed choice.  A voter who is not  

satisfied with any of  the candidates,  as has been held in  

People’s Union for Civil Liberties (NOTA case), can opt  

not  to  vote  for  any  candidate.    The  requirement  of  a  

disclosure,  especially  the  criminal  antecedents,  enables  a  

voter to have an informed and instructed choice.  If a voter  

is  denied  of  the  acquaintance  to  the  information  and  

deprived of the condition to be apprised of the entire gamut  

of  criminal  antecedents  relating  to  heinous  or  serious  

offences  or  offence  of  corruption  or  moral  turpitude,  the  

exercise of electoral right would not be an advised one.  He  

will be exercising his franchisee with the misinformed mind.  

That apart, his fundamental right to know also gets nullified.  

The attempt has to be perceived as creating an impediment  

in the mind of a voter, who is expected to vote to make a  

free, informed and advised choice.  The same is sought to  

be scuttled at the very commencement.  It is well settled in

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law that election covers the entire process from the issue of  

the  notification  till  the  declaration  of  the  result.   This  

position has been clearly settled in Hari Vishnu Kamath V.  

Ahmad Ishaque and others57,  Election Commission of  

India V. Shivaji58 and V.S. Achuthanandan V. P.J. Francis   

and Another59.  We have also culled out the principle that  

corrupt practice can take place prior to voting.  The factum  

of non-disclosure of the requisite information as regards the  

criminal antecedents, as has been stated hereinabove is a  

stage prior to voting.  

79. At this juncture, it will be appropriate to refer to certain  

instructions  issued  from  time  to  time  by  the  Election  

Commission of India.  On 2.7.2012, the Election Commission  

of India has issued the following instructions:

“To The Chief Electoral Officer of all States and UTs.

Sub:- Affidavit filed by candidates along with their  nomination papers-dissemination thereof.

Sir/Madam,

Please refer to the Commission’s instructions  regarding  dissemination  of  information  in  the  affidavits filed by the candidates along with the  

57  AIR 1955 SC 233 58  (1988) 1 SCC 277 59  (1999) 3 SCC 737

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nomination  papers.   The  Commission  has,  inter  alia,  directed that  copies of  affidavits should be  displayed on the notice board of RO/ARO, and in  cases where offices of RO and ARO are outside the  boundary of the constituency concerned, copies of  affidavits should be displayed in the premises of a  prominent  public  office  within  the  limits  of  the  constituency.  Further, affidavits of all contesting  candidates  are  required  to  be  uploaded  on  the  website of the CEO

2. There  are  complains  at  times  that  in  the  absence  of  adequate  publicity/awareness  mechanism,  the  general  public  is  not  sensitized  about the availability of the affidavits filed by the  candidates with the result  that the affidavits  do  not fully serve the intended purpose of enabling  the  electors  to  know  the  background  of  the  candidates  so  as  to  enable  them  to  make  an  informed choice of their representative.

3. The Commission has directed that, at every  election,  press  release  should  be  issued  at  the  State and District  level  stating that  affidavits  of  the  candidates  are  available  for  the  electors  to  see and clearly mentioning in the Press release of  the DEO place (s) at which copies of the affidavits  have been displayed.   The press release should  also make it clear that the affidavits can also be  viewed  on  the  website,  and  the  path  to  locate  them on the website should also be mentioned.  

4. Please bring these instructions to the notice  of all DEOs, ROs and other authorities concerned  for compliance in future elections.

Yours faithfully, (K.F. WILFRED)

PRINCIPAL SECRETARY”

80. In continuation, some further instructions were issued

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on 12.10.2012.   The relevant  paragraph is  reproduced as  

follows:

“Now  the  Commission  has  reviewed  the  above  instruction and has decided that the affidavit filed  by  all  candidates,  whether  set  up  by  the  recognized  political  parties  or  unrecognized  political  parties or independents shall  be put up  on the website soon after the candidates file same  and within 24 hours in  any event.   Even if  any  candidate withdraws his candidature, the affidavit  already  uploaded  on  the  website  shall  not  be  removed.”  

81. At  this  juncture,  it  is  also  relevant  to  refer  to  the  

circular  dated  12.6.2013  which  deals  with  

complaints/counter affidavits filed against the statements in  

the affidavits  and dissemination thereof.   It  is  condign to  

reproduce the relevant para:

“From  the  year  2004  onwards,  the  affidavits  of  candidates are being uploaded on the website of  the  CEO.   However,  the  same  is  not  done  in  respect  of  counter  affidavits  filed,  if  any.  The  Commission has now decided that henceforth, all  counter  affidavits  (duly  notarized)  filed  by  any  person against the statements in the affidavit filed  by  the  candidate  shall  also  be  uploaded  on  the  website alongwith the affidavit  concerned.   Such  uploading should also be done within 24 hours of  filing of the same.”

82. Recently  on  3.3.2014,  the  Commission  has  issued  a  

circular  no.  3/ER/2013/SDR  Vol.V  to  the  Chief  Electoral  

Officers  of  all  States  and  Union  Territories  relating  to

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affidavits filed by candidates and dissemination thereof.  We  

think it appropriate to reproduce the same in toto as it has  

immense significance.  

“As  per  the  existing  instructions  of  the  Commission the affidavits filed by the candidates  with  the  nomination  paper  are  uploaded  on  the  website  of  the  CEO  and  full  hard  copies  of  affidavits are displayed on the notice board of the  Returning Officer for dissemination of information.  In case the office of the ARO is at a place different  from the office of the RO, then a copy each of the  affidavits is also displayed on the notice board in  ARO’s office.  If the offices of the both RO and ARO  are  outside  the  territorial  limits  of  the  constituency,  copies  of  the  affidavits  are  to  be  displayed at a prominent public place within the  constituency.  Further, if any one seeks copies of  the  affidavits  from  the  RO,  copies  are  to  be  supplied.  

2. There  have  been  demands  from  different  quarters  seeking  wider  dissemination  of  the  information declared in the affidavits filed by the  contesting   candidates,  for  easier  access  to  the  electors.   Accordingly,  views  of  the  CEOs  were  sought  in  this  regard.   The  responses  received  from the various Chief Electoral Officers have been  considered  by  the  Commission.   The  response  received from CEOs showed that most of the CEOs  are in favour of displaying the abstracts part of the  affidavit as given in PART-II of the affidavit in Form  26, in different public officers in the constituency.   

3. The  Commission  after  due  consideration  of  the  matter  has  decided  that  for  wider  dissemination of information,  apart from existing  mode  of  dissemination  of  information,  as  mentioned in para I above, the Abstract Part-II of  the affidavit (given in part B of Form 26) filed by

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the  contesting  candidates  shall  be  displayed  at  specified  additional  public  offices,  such  as  (I)  Collectorate,  (20)  Zila  Parishad  Office  (3)  SDM  Office (4) Panchayat Samiti office (i.e. Block Office)  (5)  office  of  Municipal  Body  or  bodies  in  the  constituency  (6)  Tahsil/Taluka  office  and  (7)  Panchayat Office.  This shall be done within 5 days  of the date of withdrawal of candidature.  In the  Collectorate  and Zila Parishad Office, abstracts of  affidavits of all candidates in all constituencies in  the District shall be displayed.   Abstracts of one  constituency should be displayed together and not  in scattered manner.  Similarly, if there are more  than  one  constituency  in  a  Sub-Division,  all  abstracts of all candidates in such constituencies  shall be displayed in SDM’s office.  

Kindly  convey  these  directions  to  all  DEOs,  ROs,  SDMs  etc.  for  elections  to  Lok  Sabha  Legislative  Assembly  and  Legislative  Council  constituencies.  These instructions will not apply to  elections to Council of States and State Legislative  Council  by MLAs as only elected representatives  are electors for these elections.”

83. The  purpose  of  referring  to  the  instructions  of  the  

Election  Commission  is  that  the  affidavit  sworn  by  the  

candidate  has  to  be  put  in  public  domain  so  that  the  

electorate can know.  If they know the half truth, as submits  

Mr. Salve, it is more dangerous, for the electorate are denied  

of the information which is within the special knowledge of  

the candidate.  When something within special knowledge is  

not disclosed, it tantamounts to fraud, as has been held in  

S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) By LRs V. Jagannath

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(Dead) By LRs & Others60.   While filing the nomination  

form, if the requisite information, as has been highlighted by  

us,  relating  to  criminal  antecedents,  are  not  given,  

indubitably,  there  is  an  attempt  to  suppress,  effort  to  

misguide  and  keep  the  people  in  dark.   This  attempt  

undeniably  and  undisputedly  is  undue  influence  and,  

therefore, amounts to corrupt practice.  It  is necessary to  

clarify here that if a candidate gives all the particulars and  

despite that he secures the votes that will be an informed,  

advised and free exercise of right by the electorate. That is  

why there is a distinction between a disqualification and the  

corrupt  practice.    In  an  election  petition,  the  election  

petitioner is required to assert about the cases in which the  

successful candidate is involved as per the rules and how  

there has been non-disclosure in the affidavit.  Once that is  

established, it would amount to corrupt practice.  We repeat  

at  the  cost  of  repetition,  it  has  to  be  determined  in  an  

election petition by the Election Tribunal.   

84. Having  held  that,  we  are  required  to  advert  to  the  

factual matrix at hand. As has been noted hereinbefore, the  

appellant was involved in 8 cases relating to embezzlement.  

60  (1994) 1 SCC 1

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The  State  Election  Commission  had  issued  a  notification.  

The relevant part of the said notification reads as under:-   

“1. Every  candidate  at  the  time  of  filing  his  nomination  paper  for  any  election  or  casual  election  for  electing  a  member  or  Members  or  Chairperson or Chairpersons of any Panchayat or  Municipality,  shall  furnish  full  and  complete  information  in  regard  to  all  the  five  matters  referred  in  paragraph-5  of  the  preamble,  in  an  Affidavit or Declaration, as the case may be, in the  format annexed hereto:-  

Provided that  having regard to the difficulties in  swearing an affidavit in a village, a candidate at  the  election  to  a  Ward  Member  of  Village  Panchayat under the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act,  1994 shall, instead of filing an Affidavit, file before  the  Returning  Officer  a  declaration  in  the  same  format annexed to this order:

2. The said affidavit by each candidate shall be  duly sworn before a Magistrate of the First Class or  a  Notary  Public  or  a  Commissioner  of  Oaths  appointed by the High Court of the State or before  an Officer competent for swearing an affidavit.

3. Non-furnishing of the affidavit or declaration,  as the case,  may be,  by any candidate shall  be  considered to  be violation  of  this  order  and the  nomination  of  the  candidate  concerned  shall  be  liable for rejection by the Returning Officer at the  time  of  scrutiny  of  nomination  for  such  non- furnishing of the affidavit/declaration, as the case  may be.

4. The  information  so  furnished  by  each  candidate in the aforesaid affidavit or declaration  as the case may be, shall be disseminated by the  respective Returning Officers by displaying a copy  of  the affidavit  on the notice board of his  office

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and also by making the copies thereof available to  all  other  candidate  on  demand  and  to  the  representatives of the print and electronic media.  

5. If any rival candidate furnished information to  the contrary, by means of a duly sworn affidavit,  then such affidavit of the rival candidate shall also  be  disseminated  along  with  the  affidavit  of  the  candidate  concerned  in  the  manner  directed  above.  

6. All the Returning Officers shall ensure that the  copies  of  the  affidavit/declaration,  prescribed  herein  by  the  Tamil  Nadu  State  Election  Commission in the Annexure shall be delivered to  the candidates along with the forms of nomination  papers as part of the nomination papers.”

85. We  have  also  reproduced  the  information  that  is  

required to be given.  Sections 259 and 260 of the 1994 Act  

makes the provisions  contained under  Section 123 of  the  

1951 Act applicable.  Submission of Ms. V. Mohana, learned  

counsel for the appellant is that there was no challenge on  

the ground of corrupt practice.  As we find the election was  

sought to be assailed on many a ground.   The factum of  

suppression of the cases relating to embezzlement has been  

established.  Under these circumstances, there is no need to  

advert  to  the  authorities  which  are  cited  by  the  learned  

counsel for the appellant that it has no material particulars  

and there was no ground for corrupt practice.  In fact, in a

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way, it is there.  The submission of the learned counsel for  

the  appellant  that  he  has  passed  up  to  Class  X  and,  

therefore,  was  not  aware  whether  he  has  to  give  all  the  

details as he was under the impression that all  the cases  

were one case or off-shoots of the main case.  The aforesaid  

submission is noted to be rejected.  Therefore, we are of the  

view that  the High Court  is  justified in  declaring that  the  

election as null and void on the ground of corrupt practice.   

86. In  view of  the  above,  we  would  like  to  sum up  our  

conclusions:

(a) Disclosure  of  criminal  antecedents  of  a  candidate,  

especially,  pertaining  to  heinous  or  serious  offence  or  

offences relating to corruption or moral turpitude at the time  

of  filing  of  nomination  paper  as  mandated  by  law  is  a  

categorical imperative.  

(b) When there is non-disclosure of the offences pertaining  

to the areas mentioned in the preceding clause, it creates an  

impediment in the free exercise of electoral right.  

(c) Concealment or suppression of this nature deprives the  

voters  to  make  an  informed  and  advised  choice  as  a  

consequence  of  which  it  would  come  within  the

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compartment of direct or indirect interference or attempt to  

interfere with the free exercise of the right to vote by the  

electorate, on the part of the candidate.

(d) As  the  candidate  has  the  special  knowledge  of  the  

pending cases where cognizance has been taken or charges  

have been framed and there is a non-disclosure on his part,  

it  would  amount  to  undue  influence  and,  therefore,  the  

election  is  to  be  declared  null  and  void  by  the  Election  

Tribunal under Section 100(1)(b) of the 1951 Act.

(e) The question whether it materially affects the election  

or not will not arise in a case of this nature.  

87. Before parting with the case, we must put on record our  

unreserved  appreciation  for  the  valuable  assistance  

rendered by Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned senior counsel and  

Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General for  

Union of India.

88. Ex  consequenti,  the  appeal,  being  sans  substance,  

stands  dismissed  with   costs,   which  is   assessed  at  

Rs.50,000/-.

..........................., J. (Dipak Misra)

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..........................., J. (Prafulla C. Pant)

New Delhi February 05, 2015