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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 973 of 2008

Krishnan & Ors.                           …Appellants

Versus

State of Haryana & Ors.       …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order  

dated 22.2.2007 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at  

Chandigarh  in  Criminal  Misc.  No.  63845-M of  2006,  wherein  the  

High Court has upheld the validity of the letter dated 28.6.2006 issued  

by the Deputy Inspector General of Prisons, Haryana, giving effect to  

the provisions of Section 32-A of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic  

Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as `NDPS Act’).

2. The High Court referring to various provisions of the Punjab  

Jail Manual held that the appellants are not entitled to any remission

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in view of the provisions of Section 32-A of NDPS Act.  Section 32-A  

of the NDPS is reproduced herein as under:

“32A.  No  suspension,  remission  or  commutation  in  any sentence awarded under this Act.-Notwithstanding  anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,  1973 or any other law for  the time being in  force but  subject  to  the  provisions  of  Section  33,  no  sentence  awarded under this Act (other than Section 27) shall be  suspended or remitted or commuted.”

3. The  High  Court  has  held  that  legal  provisions  concerning  

remission are governed by the statutory provisions as laid down in  

Punjab Jail Manual rather than under Article 161 of the Constitution  

of India.   The provisions of Section 32-A of NDPS Act  would have  

overriding effect, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of  

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as `Cr.P.C.’), or any  

other law for the time being in force.  Thus, the appellants were not  

entitled for the relief sought by them.  

4. This Court while examining the issue, has considered the three  

Judge Bench judgment of this Court in  Dadu @Tulsidas  v. State of  

Maharashtra, (2000)  8 SCC 437, wherein the validity of  the said  

provisions  was challenged.  Relevant  part  of  the judgment  reads as  

under:  

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“1…….The  section  is  alleged  to  be  arbitrary,   discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the   Constitution  of  India  which  creates  unreasonable   distinction between the prisoners convicted under the Act   and the prisoners convicted for the offences punishable   under  various  other  statutes.  It  is  submitted  that  the   legislature is not competent  to take away, by statutory   prohibition,  the  judicial  function  of  the  court  in  the   matter  of  deciding  as  to  whether  after  the  conviction   under the Act the sentence can be suspended or not. The   section  is  further  assailed  on  the  ground  that  it  has   negated the statutory provisions of Sections 389, 432 and   433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.……. It is further   contended  that  the  legislature  cannot  make  relevant   considerations irrelevant or deprive the courts of their   legitimate  jurisdiction  to  exercise  the discretion.  It  is   argued  that  taking  away  the  judicial  power  of  the  appellate  court  to  suspend  the  sentence  despite  the   appeal meriting admission, renders the substantive right   of appeal illusory and ineffective.  

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 15. The restriction imposed under the offending section,   upon the executive are claimed to be for a reasonable   purpose  and object  sought  to  be  achieved  by  the  Act.   Such  exclusion  cannot  be  held  unconstitutional,  on   account  of  its  not  being  absolute  in  view  of  the   constitutional  powers  conferred  upon  the  executive.   Articles  72  and 161 of  the  Constitution  empowers  the   President and the Governor of a State to grant pardons,   reprieves,  respites  or  remissions  of  punishments  or  to   suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person   convicted of any offence against  any law relating to a   matter to which the executive power of the Union and   State exists…..The distinction of the convicts under the   Act and under other statutes, insofar as it relates to the   exercise of executive powers under Sections 432 and 433   of the Code is concerned, cannot be termed to be either   arbitrary or discriminatory being violative of Article 14   of the Constitution. Such deprivation of the executive can   also not be stretched to hold that the right to life of a   

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person  has  been  taken  away  except,  according  to  the   procedure  established  by  law.  It  is  not  contended  on   behalf  of  the petitioners  that  the procedure  prescribed   under the Act for holding the trial is not reasonable, fair   and just.  The offending section, insofar as it relates to   the  executive  in  the  matter  of  suspension,  remission   and  commutation  of  sentence,  after  conviction,  does   not, in any way, encroach upon the personal liberty of   the  convict  tried  fairly  and  sentenced  under  the  Act.  The procedure prescribed for holding the trial under the   Act  cannot  be  termed  to  be  arbitrary,  whimsical  or   fanciful.  There  is,  therefore,  no  vice  of   unconstitutionality in the section insofar as it takes away   the  powers  of  the  executive  conferred  upon  it  under   Sections 432 and 433 of the Code, to suspend, remit or   commute the sentence of a convict under the Act.

16. Learned counsel appearing for the parties were   more concerned with the adverse effect of the section   on the powers of the judiciary. Impliedly conceding that   the  section  was  valid  so  far  as  it  pertained  to  the   appropriate  Government,  it  was  argued  that  the   legislature is  not competent to take away the judicial   powers of the court by statutory prohibition as is shown   to have been done vide the impugned section. Awarding  sentence,  upon  conviction,  is  concededly  a  judicial   function  to  be  discharged  by  the  courts  of  law  established  in  the  country.  It  is  always  a  matter  of   judicial  discretion,  however,  subject  to  any mandatory   minimum sentence prescribed by the law. The award of   sentence by a criminal court wherever made subject to   the right of appeal cannot be interfered or intermeddled   with in a way which amounts to not only interference but   actually  taking  away  the  power  of  judicial  review.   Awarding the sentence and consideration of its legality   or adequacy in appeal is essentially a judicial function   embracing  within  its  ambit  the  power  to  suspend  the   sentence under the peculiar circumstances of each case,   pending the disposal of the appeal.

xxx   xxx xxx xxx xxx

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25. Judged from any angle, the section insofar as it   completely debars the appellate courts from the power to   suspend the sentence awarded to a convict under the Act   cannot stand the test of constitutionality. Thus Section   32-A insofar as it ousts the jurisdiction of the court to   suspend the sentence awarded to a convict under the   Act is unconstitutional……..  

26.  Despite  holding  that  Section  32-A  is   unconstitutional to the extent it affects the functioning   of  the  criminal  courts  in  the  country,  we  are  not   declaring the whole of the section as unconstitutional   in  view of  our  finding that  the  section,  insofar  as  it   takes away the right of the executive to suspend, remit   and commute the sentence, is valid and intra vires of   the Constitution. The declaration of Section 32-A to be   unconstitutional, insofar as it affects the functioning of   the courts in the country, would not render the whole of   the  section  invalid,  the  restriction  imposed  by  the   offending section being distinct and severable.

27. Holding Section 32-A as void insofar as it takes   away the right  of  the courts  to  suspend the sentence   awarded  to  a  convict  under  the  Act,  would  neither   entitle  such  convicts  to  ask  for  suspension  of  the   sentence as a matter of right in all cases nor would it   absolve the courts of their legal obligations to exercise   the  power  of  suspension  of  sentence  within  the   parameters prescribed under Section 37 of the Act.  

xxx xxx xxx xxx 29. Under  the  circumstances  the  writ  petitions  are   

disposed of by holding that: (1)  Section  32-A  does  not  in  any  way  affect  the   

powers of the authorities to grant parole. (2) It is unconstitutional to the extent it takes away   

the right of the court to suspend the sentence of a convict   under the Act.

(3) Nevertheless,  a sentence awarded under the Act   can be suspended by the appellate court only and strictly   subject to the conditions spelt  out in Section 37 of the   Act, as dealt with in this judgment.      (Emphasis added)

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5. Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid judgment that the validity  

of  the  aforementioned  provisions,  so  far  as  the  competence  of  the  

court  is  concerned,  was  partly  struck down.  As to  the  question  of  

imposing  complete  embargo on remission  and  commutation  in  the  

context of Articles 72  and 161 of the Constitution of India, the issue  

was not conclusively decided by the court. More so, in paragraph 15,  

the reference has been made that such exclusion cannot be held as  

unconstitutional on account of it not being absolute, in view of the  

constitutional powers conferred upon the executives.  Articles 72 and  

161  of  the  Constitution  empower  the  President  of  India  and  the  

Governor  of a State to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions  

of punishments or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any  

person convicted of any offence against any law relating to a matter to  

which the executive power of the Union and State exists.   

6. A two Judge Bench of this Court heard the matter on 8.1.1993  

and  prima  facie had  been  of  the  view that  on  a  plain  reading  of  

Section 32-A of NDPS Act, it appeared to be quite draconian and to  

understand  the  matter  further,  the  Court  requested  Shri  Huzefa  

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Ahmadi,  learned  senior  counsel  and  Shri  Paras  Kuhad,  learned  

Additional Solicitor General, to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae, as  

to whether Section 32-A of NDPS Act, would apply to the clemency  

powers of the President of India and the Governor of the State and  

what  could  be  its  applicability  with  respect  to  the  statutory  rules  

which have  been framed by the  State,  in  exercise  of  its  executive  

powers  under  the  Constitution.  In  view  thereof,  both  Shri  Huzefa  

Ahmadi, learned senior counsel and Shri Paras Kuhad, learned ASG  

made  their  submissions  pointing  out  that  the  powers  of  clemency  

under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution, cannot be controlled by  

any statute and, therefore, it requires a clarification that the provisions  

of Section 32-A of NDPS Act cannot be a fetter to the said powers of  

clemency by any means whatsoever.   

7. In  fact,  Articles  72  and  161  of  the  Constitution  provide  for  

residuary sovereign power, thus, there could be nothing to debar the  

concerned authorities to exercise such power even after rejection of  

one clemency petition and even in the changed circumstances.  (Vide:  

Krishta Goud and J. Bhoomaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh &  

Ors., (1976) 1 SCC 157).  

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8. In   State of Haryana & Ors. v. Jagdish, AIR 2010 SC 1690,  

this Court has considered as under:  

“33. Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution provide for   a residuary sovereign power, thus, there can be nothing   to debar the concerned authority to exercise such power,   even  after  rejection  of  one  clemency  petition,  if  the   changed circumstances so warrant.  

xx xx xx xx

35. In view of the above, it is evident that the clemency   power  of  the  Executive  is  absolute  and  remains   unfettered for the reason that the provisions contained   under Article  72 or 161 of  the Constitution cannot  be   restricted  by  the  provisions  of  Sections  432,  433  and   433-A  Cr.PC.  though  the  Authority  has  to  meet  the   requirements  referred  to  hereinabove  while  exercising   the clemency power.

To say that clemency power under Articles 72/161 of the   Constitution cannot be exercised by the President or the   Governor,  as  the  case  may  be,  before  a  convict   completes the incarceration period provided in the short- sentencing policy, even in an exceptional case, would be   mutually  inconsistent  with  the  theory  that  clemency   power is unfettered.

The Constitution Bench of this Court in Maru Ram, (AIR   1980  SC  2147)  (supra)  clarified  that  not  only  the   provisions  of  Section  433-A  Cr.  P.C.,  would  apply   prospectively  but  any  scheme  for  short  sentencing   framed by the State would also apply prospectively. Such   a view is in conformity  with the provisions  of  Articles   20(1)  and  21  of  the  Constitution.  The  expectancy  of   period  of  incarceration  is  determined  soon  after  the   conviction on the basis of the applicable laws and the   established  practices  of  the  State.  When  a  short   

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sentencing  scheme  is  referable  to  Article  161  of  the   Constitution,  it  cannot  be  held  that  the  said  scheme   cannot be pressed in service. Even if, a life convict does   not  satisfy  the  requirement  of  remission  rules/short   sentencing schemes, there can be no prohibition for the   President or the Governor of the State, as the case may   be,  to  exercise  the  power  of  clemency  under  the   provisions  of  Articles  72  and  161 of  the  Constitution.   Right of the convict is limited to the extent that his case   be considered in accordance with the relevant rules etc.,   he cannot claim premature release as a matter of right.”

9. In  State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sanjay Kumar, (2012) 8 SCC  

537, this Court held that commutation of death sentence to a specified  

term of imprisonment without entitlement to premature release is the  

via  media  found  by  courts,  where  considering  the  facts  and  

circumstances  of  a  particular  case,  the  court  has  come  to  the  

conclusion that it was not "the rarest of rare cases", warranting death  

penalty, but a sentence of 14 years or 20 years, as referred to in the  

guideline laid down by the States, would be totally inadequate. Life  

imprisonment cannot be equivalent to imprisonment for 14 years or 20  

years, rather it always means the whole natural life. This Court has  

always clarified that the punishment of a fixed term of imprisonment  

so awarded would he subject to any order passed in exercise of the  

clemency powers of the President of India or the  Governor of the  

State, as the case may be. Pardons, reprieves and remissions under  

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Article 72 or Article 161 of the Constitution are granted in exercise of  

prerogative power. There is no scope of Judicial review of such orders  

except on very limited grounds. The power to grant pardons and to  

commute sentences is coupled with a duty to exercise the same fairly  

and  reasonably.  Administration  of  justice  cannot  he  perverted  by  

executive  or  political  pressure.  Of  course,  adoption  of  uniform  

standards may not be possible while exercising the power of pardon.  

Thus,  directions  of  the  court  specifying  a  minimum  term  of  

incarceration do not interfere with the sovereign power of the State.  

Such directions have been passed by courts considering the gravity of  

the offences directing that  the accused would not  be entitled to be  

considered for premature release under the guidelines issued for that  

purpose  i.c.  under  Jail  Manual,  etc.  or  even  under  Section  433-A  

Cr.P.C.  

10. In Epuru Sudhakar & Anr. v. Government of A.P. & Ors.,  

(2006) 8 SCC 161, this Court held as under:

“34.  The  position,  therefore,  is  undeniable  that   judicial  review  of  the  order  of  the  President  or  the   Governor under Article 72 or Article 161, as the case   may be, is available and their orders can be impugned   on the following grounds:

(a) that the order has been passed without application   of mind;

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(b) that the order is mala fide; (c) that the order has been passed on extraneous or   

wholly irrelevant considerations; (d)  that  relevant  materials  have  been  kept  out  of   

consideration; (e) that the order suffers from arbitrariness.”

11. It has further been submitted by the said learned senior counsel  

that reading down of provisions of Section 32-A of NDPS Act will not  

serve  the purpose  and he has  placed a  very heavy reliance  on the  

judgment  of  this  Court  in  Union  of  India  &  Ors.  v.  Ind-Swift  

Laboratories  Limited, (2011)  4  SCC  635,  wherein  the  Court  

observed:

“19. This Court has repeatedly laid down that in the   garb of reading down a provision it is not open to read   words and expressions not found in the provision/statute   and thus venture into a kind of judicial legislation. It is   also held by this Court that the rule of reading down is to   be used for the limited purpose of making a particular   provision workable and to bring it in harmony with other   provisions of the statute.”  

12. In  Sardar Syedna  Taher  Saifuddin  Saheb  v.  State  of  

Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853, this Court while dealing with the people  

of Bohra community, while interpreting the provisions of Article 25  

and 26 of the Constitution, and dealing with the particular Act  held as  

under:  

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“It is not possible in the definition of excommunication   which  the  Act  carries,  to  read  down the  Act  so  as  to   confine  excommunication  as  a  punishment  of  offences   which are unrelated to the practice of the religion which   do not touch and concern the very existence of the faith   of the denomination as such. Such an exclusion cannot   be achieved except by rewriting the section.”  

Thus, it is submitted that as far as the plain language of Section  

32-A of NDPS Act is concerned, it is absolute in its terms and gives  

no  leeway  for  remission  or  commutation  of  any  sentence  or  any  

ground whatsoever, thus contrary to the mandate of Articles 72 and  

161. There is no scope for reading down the section, as the language  

is absolute in its terms and the same cannot be read down without  

doing violence to the language.  

13. From  the  above,  it  is  evident  that  the  petition  raises  the  

following substantial questions of law:

I. Whether Section 32A NDPS Act is violative of Articles 72 and  

161 of the Constitution of India.  

II. Whether Section 32A NDPS Act is violative of Articles 14 and  

21 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch, as the same abrogates  

the rights of  an accused/convict  under the Act to be granted  

remission/commutation, etc.  

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14. In  Coir Board Ernakulam & Anr. v. Indira Devai P.S. &  

Ors.,  (2000)  1  SCC  224,  this  Court  while  dealing  with  a  similar  

reference by a Bench of two Judges doubting the correctness of seven  

Judges’ Bench judgment in  Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage  

Board v. A Rajappa, AIR 1978 SC 548,  held as under:-

“The judgment delivered by the seven learned Judges of   the Court in Bangalore Water Supply case, does  not, in   our opinion, require any reconsideration on a reference   being made by a two Judge Bench of the Court, which is   bound by the judgment of the larger Bench.  The appeals   shall, therefore, be listed before the appropriate Bench   for further proceedings.”    

    15. The  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  Pradip  Chandra  

Parija & Ors. v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik & Ors., AIR 2002 SC  

296, while dealing with a similar situation held that judgment of a co-

ordinate Bench or larger Bench is binding.  However, if a Bench of  

two Judges concludes that an earlier judgment of three Judges is so  

very incorrect that in no circumstances it can be followed, the proper  

course  for it to adopt is to refer the matter to a Bench of three  Judges  

setting  out,  the  reasons  why  it  could  not  agree  with  the  earlier  

judgment.   If,  then,  the  Bench  of  three  Judges  also  comes  to  the  

conclusion that  the earlier  judgment of  a Bench of  three Judges  is  

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incorrect, reference to a Bench of five Judges is justified. (See also:  

Union of India & Anr. v. Hansoli Devi, (2002) 7 SCC 273)

16. In view of  the above,  we are  of  the opinion that  the matter  

requires to be considered by a larger bench, either by a three Judges  

Bench first or by a five Judges Bench directly. The papers may be  

placed  before  Hon’ble  the  Chief  Justice  of  India  for  appropriate  

orders.   

………………………………..................................J.                   (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

………………………………...................................J. (FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA)

NEW DELHI; May 7, 2013.

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