Page 1

REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 106   OF 2014   [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.5126 of 2011]

KESHAR BAI … APPELLANT

Versus

CHHUNULAL … RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This  appeal,  by  grant  of  special  leave,  is  directed  

against the judgment and order dated 03/08/2010 passed by  

the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore allowing  

Second Appeal No. 756 of 2004 filed by the respondent.  

1

Page 2

3.  Briefly  put,  the  facts  are  that  the  appellant-landlady  

purchased  House  No.  1/2,  Street  No.  6,  Parsi  Mohallah,  

Indore  (‘the said building’) from M/s. Pyare Mohan Khar,  

Hari  Mohan  Khar,  Shayam  Sunder  Khar  and  Anil  Khar  

predecessors-in-title of the appellant  by a registered sale  

deed dated 26/9/1991  for a consideration of Rs. 1,70,000/-.  

At the time of purchase of the said building, the respondent-

tenant was occupying one room (‘suit premises’) situated  

on  the  rear  side  of  the  said  building  as  tenant.   The  

respondent was informed by the predecessors-in-title of the  

appellant that the appellant is the new landlady of the said  

building and he should pay the rent to her. The respondent  

agreed to pay the rent but failed to pay it.  Failure of the  

respondent to pay the rent resulted in a notice being sent by  

the appellant to him on 23/11/2002, but despite the notice  

the respondent did not pay the rent.  

4.  On 06/1/2003, the appellant filed a suit for eviction of  

the respondent under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act,  

1961 (‘the M.P. Act’)  on grounds of non-payment of rent,  

2

Page 3

denial of the appellant’s title by the respondent, bona fide  

need for residential purpose and reconstruction of the said  

building as it  had become unsafe for human habitation. It  

was specifically averred in the plaint that the appellant had  

purchased the said building vide a registered document on  

26/9/1991.

5. The  respondent  contested  the  said  suit  and  filed  a  

written statement denying the title of the appellant as well  

as the grounds on which his eviction from the suit premises  

was  sought.  The  respondent  denied  that  there  was  any  

attornement  between  the  parties  and  that  there  was  a  

landlord-tenant relationship between him and the appellant.  

He claimed to be tenant of the earlier landlord Shri Khar.  He  

contended that he had never paid any rent to the appellant.  

He denied the genuineness of the registered sale deed dated  

26/9/1991.   

6. The trial court decreed the suit under Section 12(1)(c)  

of the M.P. Act.  The suit was dismissed so far as the other  

grounds  are  concerned.   The  trial  court’s  judgment  was  

3

Page 4

confirmed by the first appellate court.  The High Court by the  

impugned order set aside the eviction decree passed by the  

courts below holding that in the facts of the case no decree  

under Section 12 (1) (c) of the M.P. Act could be passed.  The  

controversy, therefore, revolves around Section 12(1)(c) of  

the M.P. Act in the context of the facts of this case.  

7. Shri Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad, learned counsel for  

the  appellant,  submitted  that  both  the  courts  having  

concurrently found that the landlord was entitled to a decree  

of eviction under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act and since  

there  was  no  perversity  attached to  the  said  finding,  the  

High Court ought not to have interfered with it while dealing  

with  a  second  appeal,  particularly,  when  there  was   no  

substantial question of law involved in the matter.  In this  

connection,  he  relied  on  Deep  Chandra  Juneja   v.  

Lajwanti Kathuria (dead) through LRs.  1  ,  Yash Pal  v.    

Ram Lal  & Ors.  2   and Firojuddin & Anr.    v.    Babu    

Singh  3  .  Mr. Prasad submitted that it is clearly established  

1 (2008) 8 SCC 497 2 (2005) 12 SCC 239 3 (2012) 3 SCC 319

4

Page 5

from the evidence on record that the respondent had denied  

the title of the appellant and, therefore, the case clearly falls  

within  the  ambit  of  Section  12(1)(c)  of  the  M.P.  Act.  The  

eviction decree was, therefore, correctly passed by the trial  

court  and  confirmed  by  the  first  appellate  court.  In  this  

connection he relied on Devasahyam v. P. Savithramma  4  ,    

State  of  Andgra  Pradesh  &  Ors.   v.  D.  Raghukul  

Pershad(dead)  by  LRs.&  Ors.  5    and    Bhogadi    

Kannababu  &  Ors.  v.  Vuggina  Pydamma  &  Ors.6.  

Counsel submitted that in the circumstances the impugned  

order be set aside.    

8.  Shri Amit Pawan, learned counsel for the respondent,  

on the other hand submitted that attornment of tenancy to  

the  appellant  is  not  proved.  Counsel  submitted  that  the  

respondent  had  no  knowledge  about  the  sale  transaction  

that  allegedly  took  place  between  the  appellant  and  Shri  

Khar, under which the appellant is said to have purchased  

4 (2005) 7 SCC 653 5 (2012) 8 SCC 584 6 (2006) 5 SCC 532

5

Page 6

the suit premises.  This is a case of derivative title which the  

tenant  can  deny  if  he  had  no  knowledge  of  the  sale  

transaction.  Counsel submitted that the trial court and lower  

appellate  court  ignored  this  vital  legal  position  and,  

therefore,  the  High  Court  rightly  set  aside  the  eviction  

decree.   Counsel  relied  on  Mohd.  Nooman  &  Ors.  v.  

Mohd. Jabed Alam & Ors.  7   in support of his submission  

that the issue regarding title can be decided in an eviction  

suit  and,  therefore,  it  was  correctly  raised  by  the  

respondent.  

9. It  is  well  settled  by  a  long line  of  judgments  of  this  

Court  that  the  High  Court  should  not  interfere  with  a  

concurrent finding of fact unless it is perverse. (See:  Deep  

Chandra Juneja,  Yash Pal  &  Firojuddin).  In this case,  

for the reasons which we shall soon record, we are unable to  

find  any  such  perversity  in  the  concurrent  finding  of  fact  

returned by the  courts  below warranting the High Court’s  

interference.  

7 (2010) 9 SCC 560

6

Page 7

10. The trial court passed the decree under Section 12 (1)

(c) of the M.P. Act on the ground that the respondent-tenant  

denied the title of the appellant-landlady.  It was confirmed  

by the first  appellate court.   It  is,  therefore,  necessary to  

reproduce  Section  12(1)  (c)  of  the  M.P.  Act.   It  reads  as  

under:  

“12.  Restriction  on  eviction  of  tenants.—(1)  Notwithstanding  anything  to  the  contrary  contained in any other law or contract, no suit  shall be filed in any civil court against a tenant  for his eviction from any accommodation except  on one or more of the following grounds only,  namely—   (a) xxx

(b) xxx

(c) that the tenant or any person residing with  him has created nuisance or has done any act  which is inconsistent with the purpose for which  he  was  admitted  to  the  tenancy  of  the  accommodation,  or  which  is  likely  to  affect  adversely and substantially the interest of the  landlord therein:

Provided that the use by a tenant of a portion of  the  accommodation  as  his  office  shall  not  be  deemed  to  be  an  act  inconsistent  with  the  

7

Page 8

purpose  for  which  he  was  admitted  to  the  tenancy;”

11. The first question that arises is how denial of title falls  

within the ambit of Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act.  Under  

Section  111(g)  of  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act,  1882,  the  

lease is  determined by forfeiture,  if  the lessee denies the  

lessor’s title.  While dealing with eviction suit, arising out of  

the M.P. Act, in  Devasahayam  ,   this Court has held that so  

just is the above rule that in various rent control legislations  

such a ground is recognized and incorporated as a ground  

for eviction of a tenant either expressly or impliedly within  

the net of an act injurious to the interest of the landlord.  It is  

further  held that  denial  of  landlord’s  title  or  disclaimer  of  

tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely to affect adversely  

and substantially the interest of the landlord.  It is, therefore,  

covered by Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act.  The following  

observations of this Court in Devasahayam are relevant:  

“27. In  Sheela   v.    Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash  8    whereupon  Mr.  Nageswara  Rao  placed  strong  reliance, Lahoti, J., as the learned Chief Justice then  

8 (2002) 3 SCC 375

8

Page 9

was, while construing the provisions of clause (c) of  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  12  of  the  M.P.  Accommodation Control Act, 1961 observed:  

13.  The  law  as  to  tenancy  being  determined by forfeiture by denial of the  lessor’s title or disclaimer of the tenancy  has been adopted in India from the law  of  England  where  it  originated  as  a  principle  in  consonance  with  justice,  equity  and  good  conscience.  On  enactment  of  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act,  1882,  the  same was  incorporated  into clause (g) of Section 111. So just is  the rule that it has been held applicable  even in the areas where the Transfer of  Property Act does not apply. (See: Raja  Mohammad  Amir  Ahmad  Khan   v.    Municipal  Board  of  Sitapur9.)  The  principle of determination of tenancy by  forfeiture consequent upon denial of the  lessor’s  title  may  not  be  applicable  where rent control legislation intervenes  and  such  legislation  while  extending  protection to tenants from eviction does  not recognise such denial or disclaimer  as a ground for termination of tenancy  and  eviction  of  tenant.  However,  in  various rent control  legislations such a  ground  is  recognised  and  incorporated  as a ground for eviction of tenant either  expressly  or  impliedly  by  bringing  it  within the net of an act injurious to the  interest of the landlord on account of its  mischievous  content  to  prejudice  adversely and substantially the interest  of the landlord.

9 AIR 1965 SC 1923

9

Page 10

… … … … … … … …

17.  In  our  opinion,  denial  of  landlord’s  title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant  is  an  act  which  is  likely  to  affect  adversely and substantially the interest  of the landlord and hence is a ground for  eviction of tenant within the meaning of  clause (c)  of sub-section (1) of Section  12 of  the M.P.  Accommodation Control  Act, 1961. To amount to such denial or  disclaimer, as would entail forfeiture of  tenancy rights and incur the liability to  be  evicted,  the  tenant  should  have  renounced his character as tenant and  in  clear  and unequivocal  terms set  up  title  of  the  landlord  in  himself  or  in  a  third  party.  A  tenant  bona  fide  calling  upon  the  landlord  to  prove  his  ownership  or  putting  the  landlord  to  proof of his title so as to protect himself  (i.e. the tenant) or to earn a protection  made  available  to  him  by  the  rent  control  law  but  without  disowning  his  character  of  possession  over  the  tenancy premises as  tenant  cannot  be  said to have denied the title of landlord  or disclaimed the tenancy. Such an act  of  the  tenant  does  not  attract  applicability  of  Section  12(1)(c)  abovesaid.  It  is  the  intention  of  the  tenant, as culled out from the nature of  the  plea  raised  by  him,  which  is  determinative of its vulnerability.”

1

Page 11

12. Having ascertained the legal position we will now state  

why we feel that the High Court is not right in disturbing the  

concurrent finding of fact that the respondent-tenant denied  

the title of the appellant-landlady.

13. There is a specific reference to the registered document  

under which the appellant purchased the suit building from  

the  earlier  landlord  in  the  plaint.   Yet,  in  the  written  

statement the respondent denied the title of the appellant.  

We  notice  that  there  are  several  documents  on  record  

relating to the ownership of the appellant,  apart from the  

registered sale deed, such as municipal tax receipts, ration  

card etc.  Yet,  the respondent refused to acknowledge the  

appellant’s title.  He denied it in his evidence.  This is not a  

simple case of denial of derivative title by a person who did  

not know about the purchase of the building by the landlord.  

Even after going through the relevant documents relating to  

the appellant’s title the respondent feigned ignorance about  

it.   The  High  Court  has  accepted  that  in  his  cross-

examination  the  respondent  has  stated  that  he  was  not  

1

Page 12

accepting the appellant as his landlady. The High Court has,  

however, gone on to say that by this piece of evidence no  

decree  of  eviction  can  be  passed  against  the  respondent  

under  Section  12(1)(c)  of  the  M.P.  Act  because  the  

respondent  will  have  no  occasion  to  establish  in  what  

circumstances he denied the title of the appellant.  The High  

Court  has  further  held  that  the  respondent  was  within  

permissible  limit  in  asking  the  appellant  to  produce  

documentary  evidence  about  his  title  as  a  landlord.   The  

High Court, in our opinion, fell into a grave error in drawing  

such a conclusion.  Even denial of a landlord’s title in the  

written  statement  can  provide  a  ground  for  eviction  of  a  

tenant.   It  is  also  settled  position  in  law  that  it  is  not  

necessary that the denial of title by the landlord should be  

anterior to the institution of eviction proceedings.  This is so  

stated  by  this  Court  in  Majati  Subbarao  v.  P.V.K.  

Krishnarao(deceased) by LRs.10.  

14. The High Court has expressed that the respondent was  

justified in asking the appellant to produce the documents.  10 (1989) 4 SCC 732

1

Page 13

Implicit in this observation is the High Court’s view that the  

respondent could have in an eviction suit got the title of the  

appellant finally adjudicated upon.  There is a fallacy in this  

reasoning.  In eviction proceedings the question of title to  

the properties in question may be incidentally gone into, but  

cannot  be  decided  finally.   Similar  question  fell  for  

consideration of this Court in Bhagadi Kannabalu.  In that  

case  it  was  argued  that  the  landlady  was  not  entitled  to  

inherit  the  properties  in  question  and  hence  could  not  

maintain the application for eviction on the ground of default  

and  sub-letting  under  the  A.P.  Tenancy  Act.   This  Court  

referred  to  its  decision  in  Tej  Bhan  Madan   v.   II   

Additional District Judge and Ors.  11   in which it was held  

that a tenant was precluded from denying the title of the  

landlady  on  the  general  principle  of  estoppel  between  

landlord  and  tenant  and  that  this  principle,  in  its  basic  

foundations,  means  no  more  than  that  under  certain  

circumstances law considers it unjust to allow a person to  

approbate and reprobate.  Section 116 of the Evidence Act is  

11 (1988) 3 SCC 137

1

Page 14

clearly applicable to such a situation.  This Court held that  

even if the landlady was not entitled to inherit the properties  

in  question,  she  could  still  maintain  the  application  for  

eviction and the finding of fact recorded by the courts below  

in favour of the landlady was not liable to be disturbed.  The  

position on law was stated by this Court as under:  

“In  this  connection,  we  may  also  point  out  that in an eviction petition filed on the ground  of sub-letting and default, the court needs to  decide whether  relationship  of  landlord and  tenant exists and not the question of title to  the  properties  in  question,  which  may  be  incidentally gone into, but cannot be decided  finally in the eviction proceeding.”

15. Reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondent  

on Mohd. Nooman  is misplaced.  In that case, the landlord  

had filed an eviction suit  described as  Title  Suit  No.36 of  

1973  to  evict  the  tenant.   The  trial  court  held  that  the  

relationship of landlord and tenant had not been proved and  

since the tenant had raised the question of title the proper  

course would be to dismiss the suit and not to convert it into  

a  declaratory  suit  because  the  suit  was  neither  for  

1

Page 15

declaration of title nor had the plaintiff paid ad valorem court  

fee.   The  trial  court  dismissed  the  suit  as  there  was  no  

landlord and tenant relationship, but,  upheld the plaintiff’s  

claim  of  title.   In  the  appeal,  the  first  appellate  court  

observed that by filing a suit for eviction and paying court  

fee on twelve months alleged rent, the plaintiff had adopted  

a tricky way of getting the title decided.  The plaintiff, then,  

filed a suit on title.  The trial court decreed the suit.  The first  

appellate court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.  

In the second appeal before the High Court the question was  

whether the judgment and decree regarding title passed in  

the  earlier  suit  shall  operate  as  res  judicata  between the  

parties on the question of title.   The High Court observed  

that pleas taken by both parties regarding title in both the  

title  suits  are  the  same  and  answered  the  question  in  

affirmative.  This Court endorsed the High Court’s view and  

held that the issue of title was directly and substantially an  

issue between the parties in the earlier eviction suit, hence,  

the High Court was right in holding that the finding of title  

recorded in the earlier suit would operate as res judicata in  

1

Page 16

the subsequent suit.  This view was expressly restricted by  

this Court  to  the facts before it.   This Court clarified that  

ordinarily it is true that in a suit for eviction even if the court  

goes into the question of title it  examines the issue in an  

ancillary manner and in such cases (which constitute a very  

large majority) any observation or finding on the question of  

title would certainly not be binding in any subsequent suit on  

the dispute of title.  This Court further clarified that the case  

with which it was dealing fell in an exceptional category of  

very  limited  number  of  cases.   Thus,  in  our  opinion,  no  

parallel can be drawn from  Mohd. Nooman.  In that case  

issue of title was framed.   In the instant case issue of title  

was  not  even  framed.   Mohd.  Nooman arose  out  of  

exceptional facts and must be restricted to those facts.  

16. In view of the above,  we are of the opinion that the  

High Court was wrong in setting aside the concurrent finding  

of fact recorded by the courts below that the respondent had  

denied the title of the appellant.  We are of the view that the  

present case is covered by Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act.  

1

Page 17

It is, therefore, necessary to restore the decree of eviction.  

In the circumstances, we allow the appeal.  The impugned  

judgment of the High Court is set aside and eviction decree  

passed by the trial court and confirmed by the first appellate  

court under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act is restored.  

17. The appeal is disposed of in the afore-stated terms.

………………………………………J. (Ranjana Prakash Desai)

………………………………………J. (J. Chelameswar)

New Delhi, January 7, 2014.

1

Page 18

ITEM NO.1A               COURT NO.12             SECTION IVA (For Judgment)

           S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A                          RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No.106 of 2014 arising out of     Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.5126/2011

(From  the  judgement  and  order   dated  03/08/2010  in  SA  No.756/2004 of The HIGH COURT OF M.P AT INDORE)

KESHAR BAI                           Petitioner(s)

                VERSUS

CHHUNULAL                             Respondent(s)

Date: 07/01/2014  This Petition was called on for     pronouncement of judgment today.

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad, Adv. Mr. A. Shukla, Adv.

                   Mr. Nirnimesh Dube,Adv.

For Respondent(s)    Mr. Amit Pawan,Adv.

Hon'ble  Mrs.  Justice  Ranjana  Prakash  Desai  

pronounced  the  reportable  judgment  of  the  Bench  

comprising Her Ladyship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.  

Chelameswar.

The  appeal  is  disposed  of  in  terms  of  the  

signed reportable judgment.         

     [RAJNI MUKHI]            [USHA SHARMA]              SR. P.A.         COURT MASTER

     (Signed reportable Judgment is placed on  the file)

1