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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 3872 OF 2009

Karedla Parthasaradhi                 Appellant(s)

Versus

Gangula Ramanamma (D) Through L.Rs. & Ors.               Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1. This appeal is filed by the plaintiff against the  

judgment and decree dated 19.12.2008 passed by

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the High Court  of  Judicature,  Andhra Pradesh at  

Hyderabad in Appeal Suit No. 1842 of 1996 which  

in turn arises out of judgment and decree dated  

15.03.1996  passed  by  the  IInd  Additional  

Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada, in O.S. No. 15 of  

1985.  

2. By  impugned  judgment,  the  learned  Single  

Judge of the High Court  allowed the first  appeal  

filed by defendant no. 1 (respondent no. 1 herein),  

reversed  the  judgment  and  decree  of  the  trial  

court,  which  had  decreed  plaintiff's  suit  for  

ejectment against defendant no.  1 in relation to  

the suit house and in consequence dismissed the  

plaintiff's suit.

3. So the question that arises for consideration  

in  this  appeal  is  whether  the  High  Court  was  

justified  in  allowing  the  first  appeal  filed  by  

defendant  no.  1  thereby  justified  in  dismissing  

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plaintiff's  suit  filed  for  ejectment  against  

defendant no. 1 in relation to the suit house?  

4. In  order  to  appreciate  the  controversy  

involved in this appeal, it is necessary to state the  

relevant facts in brief infra.

5. The dispute relates to house bearing No. RS  

233/1 situated in an area called  "Gunadala" within  

the  Municipal  Corporation  limits  of  Vijayawada,  

bearing door No.2/172 (Old Assessment No.225),  

new No.37687 (described in detail in the schedule  

attached to the plaint) (hereinafter referred to as  

“the suit house”).

6. One Karedla Satyanarayna purchased the suit  

house by registered sale deed dated 15.12.1975  

from one Smt. Abdul Amina Bee and her sister. At  

the time of purchase, there was only a tiled house.  

Subsequently he reconstructed the suit house. He  

died  intestate  on  19.12.1983.  On his  death,  the  

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plaintiff (appellant herein), who is real brother of  

late Karedla Satyanarayna,  claimed that the suit  

house has devolved upon him along with his sister  

(defendant no. 2) in equal share being Class II (II)  

(3) (4) heirs as specified in the Schedule appended  

to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (in short “the  

Act”).   However,  the  plaintiff  could  not  get  

possession of the suit house because he noticed  

that defendant no. 1 was claiming herself to be in  

its  possession  and  declined to  vacate  the  same  

when demanded by the plaintiff. The plaintiff also  

noticed that defendant no. 1 had been asserting  

her ownership rights over the suit house after the  

death of Satyanarayana as his wife. Therefore, on  

20.10.1984, the plaintiff  served a legal notice to  

defendant no. 1 calling upon her to vacate the suit  

house and handover its possession to the plaintiff.  

7. Since defendant no.1 did not vacate the suit  

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house despite service of notice to her, the plaintiff  

filed  a  suit  for  eviction  against  defendant  no.  1  

(respondent  no.  1  herein)  in  the  Court  of  IInd  

Additional  Subordinate  Judge,  Vijayawada.   The  

suit was founded on the allegations inter alia that  

on the death of K. Satyanarayana, the suit house  

devolved upon the  plaintiff  being  his  brother  as  

provided under Section 8 read with Class II (II) (3)  

of the Act. It was alleged that defendant no.1 was  

employed by K. Satynarayana to cook his food. It  

was  alleged  that  since  K.  Satyanarayana  was  a  

bachelor, he had allowed defendant no. 1 to stay  

in the suit house as its caretaker and also because  

he used to  be  mostly  on tour  to  various  places  

being  an  active  member  of  the  Viswa  Hindu  

Parishad. It was alleged that defendant no. 1 had  

neither any ownership nor any tenancy rights over  

the suit house. It was further alleged that even as  

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a  servant,  she  had  no  right  to  remain  in  the  

occupation  of  the  suit  house  and  in  any  event,  

after  K.  Satyanarayana's  death,  the  so-called  

contract  of  employment  between  her  and  K.  

Satyanaryana  having  come  to  an  end,  her  

permissive  possession  in  the  suit  house  had  

become  unauthorized  and  was  that  of  the  

trespasser  qua its real owner – the plaintiff.  The  

plaintiff,  therefore,  claimed  a  decree  for  

possession of the suit house and damages at the  

rate of Rs.1000/-  per month for its wrongful use  

from defendant no 1. The plaintiff also arrayed his  

sister  as  proforma  defendant  no.  2  without  

claiming any relief against her.

8. In answer to the plaint, defendant no. 1 filed  

her  written  statement.   While  denying  the  

plaintiff's case, it was alleged that she was legally  

married wife of K. Satyanarayana and was living  

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with him since decades in the suit house. It was  

alleged  that  after  Satynarayana's  death,  she  

became the sole owner of the suit house by virtue  

of law of inheritance being a class-I heir i.e., wife.  

It was alleged that she invested her own money in  

renovation  of  the  suit  house,  got  her  name  

mutated in the Municipal records as its owner and  

paid municipal taxes.  It was thus contended that  

her  possession  over  the  suit  house  is  on  the  

strength  of  the  ownership  and hence cannot  be  

disturbed.  

9. The trial court framed the following issues on  

the basis of aforesaid pleadings:

“1. Whether  defendant  No.1  is  legally  married wife of Late Satyanaryana?

2. Whether  the  plaintiff  and  2nd  defendant  are  entitled  for  possession  of  suit  schedule  property?

3. To what relief?

Additional issue dated 4.2.1992.

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1. Whether  the  plaintiff  has  preferred  title by adverse possession?”

10. The parties adduced evidence. By judgment  

and  decree  dated  15.03.1996,  the  trial  court  

decreed  the  suit  holding  that  the  suit  house  

belonged  to  K.  Satyanaryana  as  its  sole  owner;  

that  K.  Satyanarayana  died  intestate;  that  the  

plaintiff  was  Satyanarayana's  brother;  that  the  

plaintiff  inherited the suit  house as its  owner as  

provided under Section 8 read with Clause (II) (II)  

(3)  of  the  Schedule  appended  to  the  Act;  that  

defendant  no.  1  was  working  as  cook  for  K.  

Satyanaryana  during  his  life  time  and  being  his  

servant, neither acquired nor inherited any right,  

title  and  interest  and  nor  did  acquire  any  

possessory rights in the suit house after the death  

of  K.  Satyanaryana.  With  these  findings,  the  

decree for eviction was passed against defendant  

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no. 1 in relation to the suit house.

11. Feeling  aggrieved  by  the  said  judgment,  

defendant no. 1 filed first appeal before the High  

Court.  During  the  pendency  of  first  appeal,  on  

09.06.2000,  defendant  no.  1  Gangula  

Ramanamma (appellant in first appeal), died.  On  

09.09.2000,  K  Sanjiva  Rao  (respondent  no.1  

herein) filed an application being CMP No.17902 of  

2000 under Order  XXII Rule 4 read with Section  

151  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1908,  

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the CPC’ ) and prayed  

that his name be substituted in place of deceased  

appellant.  It  was alleged that  he is  the adopted  

son of the deceased defendant no. 1 (appellant)  

and secondly, defendant no. 1 has also executed  

one Will on 02.01.1984 in his favour bequeathing  

the suit house to him.  He, therefore, claimed that  

he,  being  the  legal  representative  of  defendant  

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no.1,  either  as  her  adopted  son  or/and  as  her  

legatee  on  the  strength  of  the  Will  dated  

02.01.1984, he has a right to prosecute the appeal  

and continue the lis  on merits.  The plaintiff (who  

was  respondent  in  the  appeal  before  the  High  

Court) opposed the application. However, the High  

Court,  by  order  dated  09.10.2000  allowed  the  

application  and  permitted  K  Sanjiva  Rao  to  

become the appellant and prosecute the appeal on  

merits.   The  order  dated  09.10.2000  reads  as  

under:

“Petition  under  Order  22  Rule  4  r/w  Section 151 of the CPC praying that in the  circumstances stated in the affidavit filed  herewith, the High Court will be pleased  to bring the petitioner/proposed appellant  No.2  herein  as  the  2nd appellant  in  the  above A.S. No. 1842/96 and all connected  proceedings to represent the estate left  by  the  deceased  appellant  Smt.  Ramanamma.

This petition coming on for hearing upon  perusing  the  petition  and  the  affidavit  filed  in  support  thereof  Sri  V.S.R.  Anjaneyulu,  Advocate  for  the  petitioner  and  Sri  O.  Manohar  Reddy  for  Sri  G.  

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Vivekananad,  Advocate  for  the  respondent.

This Court made the following order:

“Ordered”         

12. The appeal was accordingly heard on merits  

by the High Court.

13.  By impugned judgment, the learned Single  

Judge of the High Court  allowed the first  appeal  

filed by defendant no.1 which as stated above was  

being  prosecuted  by  K.  Sanjiva  Rao  and  while  

reversing  the  judgment  and  decree  of  the  trial  

court dismissed the plaintiff’s suit.  It was held that  

the  plaintiff  was  the  brother  of  late  K.  

Satyanarayana  and  that  K.  Satyanarayana  died  

intestate. The High Court, however, disagreed with  

the  finding  of  the  trial  court  on  the  issue  of  

defendant  no.1’s  (Ms.  Gangula  Ramanamma)  

status.  The High Court reversed the finding on this  

issue  and  held  that  defendant  no.1  was  legally  

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married wife of late K. Satyanarayana.  As a result  

of reversal of this finding, the High Court further  

held that defendant no.1, inherited the suit house  

after the death of K. Satyanarayana as class-I heir  

being  his  wife  to  the  exclusion  of  plaintiff  and  

defendant no. 2 because both were class II heirs  

being brother and sister of late K. Satyanarayana  

and thus had no right to succeed the estate of late  

K. Satyanarayana.  With these findings, the High  

Court allowed the first appeal and in consequence  

dismissed the plaintiff’s suit giving rise to filing of  

this appeal by the plaintiff.

14. Shri Pramod Swarup, learned senior counsel  

appearing  for  the  appellant  (plaintiff)  while  

assailing  the  legality  and  correctness  of  the  

impugned  judgment  mainly  raised  five  

contentions. In the first place, he contended that  

the High Court erred in allowing defendant no.1's  

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appeal thereby erred in dismissing plaintiff's suit.  

According to him, there was neither any basis and  

nor  reason  for  such  reversal.   Secondly,  he  

contended that well reasoned finding recorded by  

the  trial  court  on  the  question  as  to  whether  

defendant no.1 was legally married wife of Late K.  

Satyanarayana  or  not,  should  not  have  been  

reversed by the High Court for want of any cogent  

evidence. According to him, a finding of trial court  

on this issue holding that she was not his legally  

married wife, was just, legal and proper and hence  

it should have been upheld. Thirdly, he contended  

that when admittedly plaintiff was the real brother  

of late K. Satyanarayana then he was entitled to  

inherit the suit house as per provisions of Section  

8  read  with  class  II  (II)  (3)  of  the  Schedule  

appended  to  the  Act  on  the  death  of  late  K.  

Satyanarayana. Fourthly, he contended that in any  

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event, due to subsequent event which came into  

existence  during  pendency  of  the  appeal  viz.  

death of defendant no.1 on 09.06.2000, the suit  

house devolved upon the plaintiff  because there  

was  no  class-I  heir  in  the  family  of  K.  

Satyanarayana  who  could  succeed  to  his  estate  

after  him  except  the  plaintiff  being  the  nearest  

class II heir as brother and hence he should have  

been held entitled to succeed the suit house as its  

owner and  lastly,  he urged that the High Court  

erred  in  allowing  the  application  filed  by   K.  

Sanjiva Rao (respondent no.1 herein) under Order  

XXII Rule 4 of the CPC.  According to him, the order  

allowing  the  application  was  passed  without  

following the procedure prescribed in  Order  XXII  

Rule  5  proviso  and  more  importantly  without  

recording any finding as to whether K. Sanjiva Rao  

was  the  legal  representative  of  defendant  no.1  

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and  if  so,  in  what  capacity  i.e.,  adopted  son  of  

defendant no.1 or legatee on the strength of Will  

dated  02.01.1984  alleged  to  be  executed  by  

defendant  no.1  in  his  favour.  Learned  counsel  

pointed  out  that  it  was  necessary  for  the  High  

Court to have remanded the case to the trial court  

as provided in proviso to Rule 5 of Order XXII for  

holding an inquiry to  determine the status of  K.  

Sanjiva  Rao  qua deceased  defendant  no.1  and  

then depending upon the finding, he should have  

been  allowed  to  become  the  appellant  and  

prosecute the appeal.  Learned counsel, therefore,  

urged that in the absence of any finding on this  

material issue, the impugned judgment is also not  

legally  sustainable  and  hence  liable  to  be  set  

aside.

15. Learned  counsel  for  respondent  no.1  (K.  

Sanjiva  Rao)  supported  the  impugned  judgment  

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and  contended  that  no  case  is  made  out  to  

interfere  in  the  impugned  judgment,  which  

deserves to be upheld by dismissing the appeal.

16. Having  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

parties and on perusal of the record of the case,  

we are inclined to uphold one finding of the High  

Court on merits and remand the case for holding  

an inquiry on limited specific questions to enable  

this Court to finally decide the appeal in the light  

of findings so recorded on the questions framed  

infra for inquiry.

17. Coming  first  to  the  main  question  as  to  

whether  the  High  Court  was  justified  in  holding  

that defendant no.1 (Gangula Ramanamma )was  

legally married wife of late K. Satyanarayana, we  

are of the considered opinion that the High Court  

was justified  in  holding so.   In  other  words,  the  

reversal  of  finding of the trial  court by the High  

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Court on this issue is justified.

18. The question as  to  in  which circumstances,  

the Court can draw presumption as to the legality  

of marriage was succinctly explained by Mulla in  

his  book-  Hindu Law,  17th Edition in  Article  438,  

page 664 under the heading – “Presumption as  

to legality of marriage” - in following words:

“438.  Presumption  as  to  legality  of  marriage  –  Where  it  is  proved  that  a  marriage was performed in fact, the court  will  presume that it  is  valid in law,  and  that the necessary ceremonies have been  performed.   A   Hindu  marriage  is  recognized as a valid marriage in English  law.

Presumption  as  to  marriage  and  legitimacy – There is an extremely strong  presumption in favour of the validity of a  marriage  and  the  legitimacy  of  its  offspring if from the time of the alleged  marriage the parties are recognized by all  persons concerned as man and wife and  are so described in important documents  and  on  important  occasions.   The  like  presumption  applies  to  the  question  whether  the formal requisites of  a valid  marriage  ceremony  were  satisfied.  Similarly the fact that a woman was living  under the control and protection of a man  who  generally  lived  with  her  and  acknowledged  her  children  raises  a  

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strong presumption that she is the wife of  that  man.   However,  this  presumption  may  be  rebutted  by  proof  of  facts  showing  that  no  marriage  could  have  taken place.”

19. The  question  arose  before  this  Court  in  

Thakur  Gokal  Chand  vs.  Parvin  Kumari  @  

Usha Rani,  AIR 1952 SC 231,  as to whether on  

facts/evidence,  the  Court  could  record  a  finding  

about  the  existence of  lawful  marriage between  

the parties and, if so, what should be the principle  

to  be  applied  while  deciding  such  question.  

Learned Judge - Fazal Ali J, speaking for the Bench  

examined this question in the context of Section  

50  of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act,  1872  and  other  

relevant  provisions  of  law  and  laid  down  the  

following principle of law for determination of such  

question:

“It  seems to us that the question as to  how far the evidence of those particular  witnesses is relevant under section 50 is  academic,  because it is well-settled that  

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continuous cohabitation for a number of  years  may  raise  the  presumption  of  marriage.  In the present case, it seems  clear that the plaintiff and Ram Piari lived  and were treated as husband and wife for  a number of years, and, in the absence of  any  material  pointing  to  the  contrary  conclusion,  a  presumption  might  have  been  drawn  that  they  were  lawfully  married.   But the presumption which may  be  drawn  from  long  cohabitation  is  rebuttable, and if there are circumstances  which  weaken  or  destroy  that  presumption,  the  court  cannot  ignore  them”

20. In recent time, this Court in  Madan Mohan  

Singh & Ors. vs. Rajni Kant & Anr.   (2010) 9  

SCC 209,  relying upon the aforesaid principle of  

law,  reiterated  the  same  principle  in  following  

words:

“24. The  courts  have  consistently  held  that  the  law  presumes  in  favour  of  marriage and against concubinage, when  a  man  and  woman  have  cohabited  continuously  for  a  number  of  years.  However,  such  presumption  can  be  rebutted  by  leading  unimpeachable  evidence.  (Vide  Mohabbat  Ali  Khan v.  Mohd.  Ibrahim  Khan,  AIR  1929  PC  135,  Gokal Chand v.  Parvin Kumari,  AIR 1952  SC  231,  S.P.S.  Balasubramanyam v.  Suruttayan, (1994) 1 SCC 460, Ranganath  Parmeshwar  Panditrao  Mali v.  Eknath  Gajanan Kulkarni,  (1996) 7 SCC 681 and  

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Sobha  Hymavathi  Devi v.  Setti  Gangadhara Swamy, (2005) 2 SCC 244)”

21. Coming  now  to  the  facts  of  this  case,  we  

consider it apposite to reproduce the finding of the  

High  Court  on  this  issue  in  verbatim,  which  is  

contained in paras 26 to 30 in the judgment:  

“26. When  the  first  defendant  asserted  that she is the legally wedded wife of late  Satyanarayana,  we have to examine the  material  placed  by  her  to  establish  the  said fact.  It is an undisputed fact that the  first  defendant  lived  with  late  Satyanarayana.   The  first  defendant  claims that their  marriage took place at  Rajahmundry about 30 years ago.  They  lived at Rajahmundry for about 10 years.  During  their  wedlock,  she  became  pregnant  twice  and  those  pregnancies  were  got  abort  at  the  instance  of  her  husband.  Ultimately, she got her sister’s  son  adopted  during  the  lifetime  of  late  Satyanarayana.   Later,  they  shifted  to  Rajahmundry, constructed the house and  performed the house warming ceremony.  Her name was included in the voters list  as the wife of  late Satyanarayana.   She  also stated that the deceased being the  Pracharak  of  Viswa  Hindu  Parishad,  he  took all care to see that no photographs  are  taken  either  for  the  marriage  or  house  warming  ceremony  or  any  other  occasion.   In  support  of  her  contention,  DW-2, the neighbour at Vijayawada, was  examined, who stated that the deceased  Satyanarayana  was  the  husband  of  the  

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first defendant.  They resided in the said  house to the knowledge of one and all as  wife and husband.  The deceased used to  take the first  defendant to some camps  along with him.  D-1 also looked after the  construction work of the house.  D-1 and  late  Satyanarayana  sat  as  wife  and  husband for performing pooja at the time  of house warming ceremony.  The plaintiff  and the second defendant did not attend  the said function.  He finally said that D-1  is the wife of late Satyanarayana, but not  his  maidservant.   In  the  cross- examination also, he stated that he heard  that  Satyanarayana  and  D-1  married  at  the temple near their house even prior to  the  shifting  of  their  residence  to  his  locality and as they have no issues, they  brought  up  one  boy  by  name  Sanjeeva  Rao.  Though the plaintiff cross-examined  DWs  1  and  2,  he  could  not  elicit  any  favourable  information in  support  of  his  contention that the first defendant lived  in the house of late Satyanarayana only  as a cook, but not in any capacity.  Ex. X-1  is  a  Kalpatharuvu  deposit  receipt  of  Andhra  Bank,  Vijayawada.   DW-1,  an  officer of the Andhra Bank, deposed that  the deceased Satyanarayana and the first  defendant kept an amount of Rs.42,650/-  in  Kalpatharuvu  fixed  deposit.  Satyanarayana wrote letters to the bank  informing that after maturity, the amount  may be paid either to him or to the first  defendant.  The application was signed by  both of them at the time of depositing the  amount.   But,  he  does  not  know  their  relationship.  In the fixed deposit receipt,  the  first  defendant  was described  as  K.  Ramanamma, but not as G. Ramanamma,  which is her parents’ surname.   Had the  first defendant lived in the house of late  

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Satyanarayana  as  a  cook,  he  would  not  have  allowed her  to  join  him in  making  the  deposit  and  he  would  not  have  written letters to the bank asking them to  pay the amount to her after its maturity.  This  is  also  one  of  the  strong  circumstances to draw an inference that  the first  defendant was the wife of  late  Satyanarayana.   After  maturity,  D-1  withdrew  the  amount  as  per  the  authorization  given  by  the  deceased  Satyanarayana.   In  the  voters  lists  covered by Exs. B-42 and 44, the name of  D-1  was  shown  as  the  wife  of  late  Satyanarayana.   Had  she  not  been  the  wife  of  Satyanarayana,  he  would  have  definitely  raised  an  objection  not  to  designate her as his wife, therefore, this  is also one of the strong circumstances to  establish  that  the first  defendant is  the  wife of the deceased Satyanarayana.  In  1983, the deceased was 53 years old and  the  first  defendant  was  32  years  old.  Though there  is  difference of  age of  20  years between them, on account of long  association  and  continuous  living  in  the  same  house,  the  deceased  might  have  developed  affection  towards  the  first  defendant and married her as wife.  For  sake  of  society,  he  might  have  taken  precautions to indicate that he remained  as  a  bachelor.   The  postman  of  the  locality  was  examined  as  DW-5,  who  stated that he saw the first defendant in  the house of the deceased from 1980, but  he does not know the relationship and the  first defendant used to receive letters in  her name to the said address.  Ex. B-46 is  one  of  such  letters  addressed  by  late  Satyanarayana,  wherein  the  address  of  the  first  defendant  is  described  as  K.  Ramanamma indicating his  surname.  In  

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the  said  letter,  the  deceased  described  the  first  defendant  as  Chiranjeevi  Ramanamma and mentioned that she has  to take care of  the domestic  needs and  perform karthika Monday festival without  caring  for  the  expenditure  and  also  advised  to  instruct  Sanjeeva  Rao  (their  foster son) to study well.  The manner in  which  the  letter  was  written  is  also  reflecting  the  affection  of  the  deceased  towards the first defendant.  Had the first  defendant was not his wife, the deceased  would not have mentioned her name as K.  Ramanamma  instead  of  her  parents’  surname as Gangula Ramanamma.

27.  In  the  letter  addressed  to  the bank  covered  by  Ex.  X-2,  the  deceased  described the first defendant as Smt. K.  Ramanamma, which is also an indication  that he is treating her as his wife for all  practical  purposes except describing her  as  his  wife.   DW-6,  an  ex-corporator  of  Vijaywada Municipality deposed that after  the  construction  of  house,  the  first  defendant,  her  mother  and  a  boy  name  Sanjeeva  Rao  resided  there  along  with  late  Satyanarayana  till  his  death.   Late  Satyanarayana  and  the  first  defendant  lived together.  Their names find place in  the voters list.   Late Satyanarayana and  the  first  defendant  used  to  take  treatment from him, as he was a Doctor  and Satyanarayana himself used to bring  D-1  for  treatment.   In  the  cross- examination,  DW-6  stated  that  the  first  defendant  was  residing  in  the  house  of  late Satyanarayana in the capacity of his  wife.  He knows the said fact as both of  them performed Satyanarayana Vratham  at the time of house warming ceremony.  He asserted in the cross-examination that  

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late  Satyanarayana  and  the  first  defendant are the husband and wife and  they brought up one Sanjeeva Rao, who is  no other than the sister’s son of the first  defendant.  DW-7, the fostered son of the  defendant  also,  stated  that  the  first  defendant is his fostered mother and late  Satyanarayana  was  his  fostered  father.  He was brought up by both of them.  No  relatives  of  Satyanarayana attended the  function  when  Satyanarayana  Vratham  was performed by late Satyanarayana and  D-1  at  the  time  of  house  warming  ceremony.   He  also  performed  the  obsequies  of  late  Satyanarayana  in  the  suit schedule premises.

28. The above evidence is  also lending  support  to  the  contention  of  the  first  defendant  that  she  is  the  wife  of  late  Satyanarayana.   A  presumption  can  be  drawn that a woman is the wife of a man  with  whom  she  lived  for  a  very  long  period  and  on  account  of  their  long  association and she can be recognised as  his wife.  Various circumstances placed by  the  first  defendant  by  way  of  oral  and  documentary evidence also indicate that  she  was  recognised  as  the  wife  of  late  Satyanarayana,  therefore,  she  can  be  treated as wife of late Satyanarayana.

29.   Though the plaintiff and the second  defendant  claimed  that  they  are  the  brother and sister of the deceased, they  severed  connections  with  the  deceased  about four decades prior to the filing of  the  suit  and his  whereabouts  were also  not known to those persons.  There was  no  exchange  of  visits  and  they  never  helped  and financed  late  Satyanarayana  either for the construction of the house or  

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for  any  other  purpose.   Since  there  is  house in the name of the deceased, they  entertained an idea of claiming the same  as  legal  heirs  of  the  deceased  Satyanarayana.

30. On  account  of  long  association  of  the first defendant with the deceased for  more than 33 years and on account of the  conduct  and  affection  shown  by  the  deceased towards first defendant, it can  be  said  that  she  was  married  by  him  surreptitiously  pretending  to  be  a  bachelor to the outside world and with a  view  to  provide  shelter  to  her,  he  constructed  the  house  and  fostered  her  sister’s  son to  be the successor  to  D-1.  The  totality  of  the  circumstances  would  indicate that D-1 was the legally wedded  wife of late Satyanarayana, therefore, she  is  entitled  to  the  house  property  being  Class-I heir.”

22. Mere  perusal  of  the  afore-quoted  finding  

would  go  to  show  that  it  is  based  on  proper  

appreciation of evidence and being just, legal and  

proper, it does not call for any interference by this  

Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. That  

apart,  the  High  Court  while  exercising  its  first  

appellate jurisdiction under Section 96 of the CPC  

had ample jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence  

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independent to that of the appreciation done by  

the  trial  court  and  come  to  its  own  conclusion.  

Indeed, this being the well-settled principle of law  

laid  down by  this  Court  in  several  decisions,  no  

elaborate discussion is necessary on this question.

23. We, therefore, find no good ground to reverse  

the finding though assailed by the appellant and  

uphold  the  same  and  accordingly  hold  that  

defendant  no.1 (late  Gangula  Ramanamma) was  

legally married wife of late K. Satyanarayana.  

24. This takes us to the next question which is  

equally  material  in  the  facts  of  this  case  as  to  

whether  the High Court  was justified in  allowing  

the application filed by K. Sanjiva Rao (respondent  

no.1) under Order XXII Rule 4 of the CPC thereby  

justified in permitting him to become the appellant  

to prosecute the appeal as defendant no.1’s legal  

representative?  

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25. The  question  as  to  whether  a  particular  

person  is  a  legal  representative  of  a  deceased  

plaintiff or defendant is required to be decided by  

the  Court  as  per  procedure  prescribed  in  Order  

XXII Rule 5 of the CPC which reads as under:

“Order  XXII  Rule  5  –  Determination  of  question  as  to  legal  representative –  Where  a  question  arises  as  to  whether  any  person  is  or  is  not  the  legal  representative of a deceased plaintiff or a  deceased defendant, such question shall  be determined by the Court:

Provided  that  where  such  question  arises  before  an  Appellate  Court,  that  Court  may,  before  determining  the  question, direct any subordinate Court to  try the question and to return the records  together with evidence, if any recorded at  such  trial,  its  findings  and  reasons  therefor,  and  the  Appellate  Court  may  take  the  same  into  consideration  in  determining the question.”     

26. This  Court  in  Jaladi  Suguna  (deceased)  

through LRs. Vs.  Satya Sai  Central  Trust &  

Ors. ,  (2008)  8  SCC  521,  had  the  occasion  to  

interpret Order XXII Rules 4 and 5 ibid, Justice R.V.  

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Raveendran  speaking  for  the  Bench  after  

examining  the  object  underlying  in  Order  XXII  

Rules 4 and 5, held as under:

“15. Filing  an  application  to  bring  the  legal representatives on record, does not  amount  to  bringing  the  legal  representatives  on  record.  When  an  LR  application  is  filed,  the  court  should  consider  it  and  decide  whether  the  persons  named  therein  as  the  legal  representatives,  should  be  brought  on  record  to  represent  the  estate  of  the  deceased.  Until  such  decision  by  the  court,  the  persons  claiming  to  be  the  legal  representatives  have  no  right  to  represent the estate of the deceased, nor  prosecute or defend the case. If there is a  dispute  as  to  who  is  the  legal  representative,  a  decision  should  be  rendered on such dispute. Only when the  question  of  legal  representative  is  determined by the court  and such legal  representative is brought on record, can  it be said that the estate of the deceased  is  represented.  The  determination  as  to  who  is  the  legal  representative  under  Order 22 Rule 5 will of course be for the  limited purpose of representation of the  estate  of  the deceased,  for  adjudication  of that case. Such determination for such  limited  purpose  will  not  confer  on  the  person  held  to  be  the  legal  representative, any right to the property  which  is  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit,  vis-à-vis  other  rival  claimants  to  the  estate of the deceased.

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16. The  provisions  of  Rules  4  and  5  of  Order  22  are  mandatory.  When  a  respondent  in  an appeal  dies,  the court  cannot simply say that it will hear all rival  claimants to the estate of  the deceased  respondent and proceed to dispose of the  appeal.  Nor  can  it  implead  all  persons  claiming  to  be  legal  representatives,  as  parties  to  the  appeal  without  deciding  who  will  represent  the  estate  of  the  deceased, and proceed to hear the appeal  on merits. The court cannot also postpone  the  decision  as  to  who  is  the  legal  representative  of  the  deceased  respondent, for being decided along with  the  appeal  on  merits.  The  Code  clearly  provides that where a question arises as  to  whether  any  person  is  or  is  not  the  legal  representative  of  a  deceased  respondent,  such  question  shall  be  determined by the court.  The Code also  provides  that  where  one  of  the  respondents  dies  and  the  right  to  sue  does  not  survive  against  the  surviving  respondents,  the  court  shall,  on  an  application made in that behalf, cause the  legal  representatives  of  the  deceased  respondent to be made parties, and then  proceed  with  the  case.  Though  Rule  5  does  not  specifically  provide  that  determination  of  legal  representative  should precede the hearing of the appeal  on merits, Rule 4 read with Rule 11 makes  it clear that the appeal can be heard only  after  the  legal  representatives  are  brought on record.”

27. Keeping in view the abovesaid principle of law and  

applying the same to the facts of this case, we are of  

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the considered opinion, the High Court committed an  

error of law when it proceeded to allow the application  

filed by K. Sanjiva Rao (respondent no.1) under Order  

XXII  Rule 4 ibid by its order dated 19.12.2008, for more  

than one reason mentioned hereinbelow.

28. In  the  first  place,  the  High  Court  should  have  

remanded the case to the trial court by taking recourse  

to the provision of Order XXII Rule 5 proviso for deciding  

the question as to whether K. Sanjiva Rao (respondent  

no.1 herein) was the legal representative of deceased  

defendant  no.1  (Gangula  Ramanamma)  and  if  so,  in  

what capacity - adopted son or legatee on the strength  

of  Will  dated  02.01.1984.   Secondly,  without  first  

deciding this  material  question,  the High Court  could  

not have either allowed the application and nor it could  

have proceeded to decide the appeal on merits. Thirdly,  

the High Court simply allowed the application without  

recording a finding as to whether any right in the suit  

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property  was  devolved  in  favour  of  K.  Sanjiva  Rao  

(respondent no.1) after  the death of defendant no. 1  

and if  so,  in  what  capacity.  This  finding alone would  

have enabled K. Sanjiva Rao to become the appellant  

and prosecute the appeal on merits and lastly, this was  

a case where inquiry into the question was necessary  

and it could be done only by the trial court.

29. Indeed, this question, in our opinion, has assumed  

significance  for  three  reasons.  Firstly,  because  K.  

Sanjiva Rao is not the natural son born out of wedlock  

of defendant no.1 and late K. Satyanarayana and nor he  

had  any  blood  relations  with  late  K.  Satyanarayana.  

Secondly,  due  to  death  of  defendant  no.1  during  

pendency of appeal, the question has arisen as to who  

should succeed to her interest and thirdly,  this Court  

having  upheld  the  finding  of  the  High  Court  that  

defendant no.1 was the legally married wife of late K.  

Satyanarayana Rao, it is now necessary to give effect to  

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this  finding and the same is  possible  only when it  is  

decided as to who is her legal representative.

30. In the light of foregoing discussion and as rightly  

argued by the learned senior counsel for the appellant,  

the  order  dated  09.10.2000  allowing  the  application  

filed by K. Sanjiva Rao under order XXII Rule 4 of the  

CPC is not legally sustainable and hence deserves to be  

set aside.  

31. Now in such situation arising in a case, we have  

two options. First, to remand the case to the High Court  

which in turn will remand the case to the trial court to  

decide  the  application  filed  by  K.  Sanjiva  Rao  under  

Order XXII Rule 4 as provided in proviso to Order XXII  

Rule  5  of  the  CPC  and  depending  upon  the  inquiry  

report,  will  decide the appeal  and second,  this  Court  

should  retain  the session of  this  appeal  to  itself  and  

remand the case to the trial  court as provided under  

Order XLI Rule 25 read with Order XXII Rule 5 proviso  

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for  holding  an  inquiry  and  on  receipt  of  the  finding,  

finally  decide  the  appeal  in  the  light  of  finding  so  

recorded by the trial court.

32. Having  given  our  anxious  consideration  to  this  

question,  we are of  the considered view that  second  

course suggested above seems to be more appropriate.  

It is for the reason that firstly, retaining the session of  

the  appeal  and  inviting  finding  from  the  trial  court  

would save time, avoid incurring cost and curtail stages  

of  litigation  and  secondly,  the  litigation  which  is  

pending since 1985 would come to an end early and  

lastly  by  taking  such  recourse,  no  prejudice  of  any  

nature would cause to any parties because so far  as  

other issues on merits are concerned, we have already  

decided  and  lastly,  the  expression  “Appellate  Court”  

occurring in Order XLI Rule 25 read with Order XXII Rule  

5  proviso  would  not  only  include  the  first  Appellate  

Court, but also include second Appellate Court and this  

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Court once this Court grant the leave to file appeal to  

the appellant. In such event, this Court being the last  

Appellate  Court,  can  always  exercise  the  powers  

available under Order XLI Rule 25 read with Order XXII  

Rule 5 proviso and specially when the High Court  as  

first Appellate Court failed to exercise such powers for  

proper determination of rights of the parties.

33. In  the  light  of  foregoing  discussion,  though  we  

have  decided  the  appeal  on  merits  on  some  issues  

arising in the case but having regard to the nature of  

controversy  involved  and  now  keeping  in  view  the  

subsequent  event  which  have  come  into  existence  

pending appeal and having a material bearing over the  

rights of the parties in relation to the suit house, we  

retain the session of this appeal and remand the case  

to  the  concerned  trial  court  i.e.,(Second  Additional  

Subordinate Judge Vijayawada) for holding an inquiry to  

enable  this  Court  to  pass  appropriate  orders  on  the  

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application  filed  by  respondent  no.1,  K.  Sanjiva  Rao  

under Order XXII Rule 4 of the CPC (CMP No.17902 of  

2000 in A.S. No.1842 of 1996).

34. The trial court will decide the question keeping in  

view the provisions of Order XXII Rule 4 and 5 ibid and  

record a finding on the questions (1) whether K. Sanjiva  

Rao is the adopted son of defendant no.1 and if so, how  

and  on  what  basis,  (2)  whether  defendant  no.1  

executed Will dated 01.02.1984 in favour of K. Sanjiva  

Rao and if so, whether it is a genuine Will as per law  

and  (3)  if  Will  dated  01.02.1984  is  held  as  genuine,  

whether bequeath of the suit property is made by such  

Will in favour of  K. Sanjiva Rao?

35. Let  the  inquiry  be  held  by  the  trial  court  after  

affording an opportunity to all parties concerned to file  

reply to application and adduce evidence in addition to  

evidence already led in suit and reasoned findings be  

returned to this Court within three months along with  

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documents and evidence led in the inquiry proceedings.

36. The Registry to remit the record of the trial court  

and that of the High Court in relation to this case to the  

concerned trial court forthwith to enable the trial court  

to hold the inquiry and submit the report as directed  

within the time fixed.

37. Let the appeal be listed for hearing on receipt of  

finding from the trial court.

        ….….…...............................J.

                   [M.Y. EQBAL]

                             ….….…...............................J.                               [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

New Delhi; December 04, 2014

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