16 October 2012
Supreme Court
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KANWAR SINGH MEENA Vs STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Bench: AFTAB ALAM,RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001662-001662 / 2012
Diary number: 34851 / 2011
Advocates: VARINDER KUMAR SHARMA Vs IRSHAD AHMAD


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CRIMINAL     APPEAL     NO.     1662      OF     2012   [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.155 of 2012]

KANWAR SINGH MEENA …        APPELLANT

Vs.

STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR. …        RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

(SMT.)     RANJANA     PRAKASH     DESAI,     J.   

1. Leave granted.  

2.  The appellant is the brother of one Purna Singh Meena.  

On 20/5/2009, he lodged a complaint in respect of murder of  

Purna Singh Meena (“the deceased”) against Khushi Ram  

Meena, who is respondent 2 herein and five others at Gandhi  

Nagar Police Station, District Jaipur City (East), which was  

registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 364 and 302 of the

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Indian Penal Code (for short, “the IPC”).  By the impugned  

order, the Rajasthan High Court released Khushi Ram Meena  

(“the accused”) on bail.  The appellant has challenged the said  

order in this appeal.    

3. The grievance of the appellant as stated by his counsel  

Mr. Lekh Raj Rehalia is that the High Court committed a grave  

error in releasing the accused on bail.  According to him the  

High Court ignored the well established principles which guide  

the courts in exercise of their discretion to grant bail.  It is  

inter alia contended that the High Court overlooked extremely  

vital evidence collected by the investigating agency and,  

without assigning any reasons, it released the accused on bail.  

The High Court failed to notice that there is more than prima  

facie case against the accused and that the brother of the  

accused who is an IPS Officer is trying to exert pressure on the  

investigating officers.  It is submitted that the High Court’s  

order being perverse must be set aside and the accused must  

be directed to be taken in custody.  

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4. Mr. Ajay Vir Singh, learned counsel for respondent 1-

State supported the appellant.  He relied on the affidavit of Mr.  

Yogesh Dadhich, Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police,  

Jaipur City (East), Jaipur in support of his submissions.  He  

also drew our attention to an extract from the relevant station  

diary which indicates that the brother of the accused tried to  

pressurize the investigating agency.   

5. Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel appearing for the  

accused submitted that though the High Court has not  

assigned any reasons for releasing the accused on bail, it has  

made a reference to various important features of the matter.  

The High Court has observed that the information was  

received by the police at 6.10 a.m. on 20/5/2009 on mobile;  

however, no FIR was registered immediately; that the FIR  

came to be filed at 3.15 p.m. on 20/5/2009; that though the  

investigation was transferred to CID (CB) on 5/6/2009, the  

same officer continued the investigation and got the  

statements of witnesses recorded under Section 164 of the  

Criminal Procedure Code (for short, “the Code”) on  

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10/6/2009;   that when the matter was investigated by CID  

(CB), the factual report of investigation was submitted by  

Sandeep Singh and Rajesh Sharma which reveals that the  

accused was not involved in this case;   that the location of the  

mobile of the accused as per the investigation was at Sikar  

and that the trial court had rejected the application filed by  

the investigating agency to declare the accused as absconder.  

The High Court also considered the fact that the other co-

accused have been enlarged on bail by the High Court.  

Counsel submitted that the impugned order was passed after  

taking all the above vital features into account and, therefore,  

it cannot be said that there is any non application of mind.  

Counsel submitted that each of the above circumstances is  

very relevant and makes out a case of false implication of the  

accused.  Counsel pointed out that there is nothing on record  

to indicate that after release on bail, the accused had tried to  

bring pressure on the police.  The diary entry produced in this  

court pertains to an earlier period.  Counsel submitted that  

the accused is on bail for a considerable period.  There is  

nothing on record to show that he has tried to tamper with the  

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evidence or he has obstructed the course of administration of  

justice.  It would be, therefore, improper to cancel his bail.  

6. Cancellation of bail is a serious matter.  Bail once  

granted can be cancelled only in the circumstances and for the  

reasons which have been clearly stated by this court in a  

catena of judgments.  It would be appropriate to refer to a few  

of them before dealing with the rival contentions.   

7. In Gurcharan     Singh     and     others     etc.      v.      State     (Delhi    

Administration)1, the appellant Gurcharan, who was  

Superintendent of Police, was charged along with other police  

personnel under Section 120-B read with Section 302 of  the  

IPC.  During the preliminary enquiry six alleged eye-witnesses,  

who were police personnel, did not support the prosecution  

case.  However, after the FIR was lodged during the course of  

investigation, seven witnesses including the said six police  

personnel gave statements implicating appellant Gurcharan  

Singh.  One eye-witness A.S.I. Gopal Das made a statement  

1 (1978) 1 SCC 118

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under Section 164 of the Code in favour of the prosecution.  

Learned Sessions Judge released appellant Gurcharan Singh  

on bail after observing that there was little to gain by him by  

tampering with the witnesses who had, themselves, already  

tampered with their evidence by making contradictory  

statements.  Learned Sessions Judge further observed that  

after reviewing the entire material he was of the opinion that  

there was little probability of appellant Gurcharan Singh  

fleeing from justice or tampering with the witnesses.  He noted  

that having regard to the character of evidence he was inclined  

to grant bail.  The prosecution moved the High Court under  

Section 439 (2) of the Code for cancellation of the said order.  

The High Court inter alia observed that considering the nature  

of the offence and the character of the evidence, the  

reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with  

and all other relevant factors, it had no option but to cancel  

the bail.  The High Court observed that learned Sessions  

Judge did not exercise his judicial discretion on relevant well-

recognized principles.  An appeal was carried from the said  

order to this court.  This court observed that the powers of the  

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High Court and the Sessions Court under Section 439 (1) of  

the Code are much wider than those conferred on a court  

other than the High Court and Sessions Court in respect of  

bail. However, certain considerations which have to be taken  

into account are common to all courts. This court noted that  

gravity of the circumstances in  which the offence is  

committed; the position and the status of the accused with  

reference to the victim and the witnesses; the likelihood of the  

accused fleeing from justice; of repeating the offence; of  

jeopardizing his own life being faced with a grim prospect of a  

possible conviction in the case; of tampering witnesses; the  

history of the case as well as its investigation and  such other  

relevant grounds will have to be taken into account.  To  

ascertain whether there is prima facie case against the  

accused, character of the evidence will have to be considered.  

While confirming the High Court’s interference with the  

discretion exercised by the Sessions Court, this court  

expressed its displeasure about the unwarranted premature  

comments made by the Sessions Court on the merits of the  

case when at that stage it was only called upon to consider  

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whether prima facie case was made out against the accused or  

not.  This court particularly referred to statement of ASI Gopal  

Das, recorded under Section 164 of the Code and observed  

that this witness had made no earlier contradictory statement  

and the taint of unreliability could not be attached to his  

statement at that stage as was done by the Sessions Court.  

This court found that the Sessions Court was not alive to legal  

position that there was no substantive evidence recorded  

against the accused until the eye-witnesses were examined in  

the trial.  Serious note was taken of the fact that the Sessions  

Court had not focused its attention on relevant considerations.  

The approach of the Sessions Judge was viewed as suffering  

from serious infirmity and cancellation of bail was endorsed.  

8. In Puran      v.      Rambilas     &     Anr.  2  ,   the appellant therein  

was charged under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the IPC.  The  

Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur released the appellant  

therein, on bail.  The High Court cancelled the bail granted to  

the appellant.  The said order was under challenge before this  

2 (2001) 6 SCC 338

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court.  It was argued that rejection of bail in a non-bailable  

case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail already  

granted have to be considered and dealt with on different  

basis.  Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are  

necessary for an order directing the cancellation of bail already  

granted.  It was argued that generally speaking the grounds  

for cancellation of bail broadly are interference or attempt to  

interfere with the due course of justice or evasion or attempt  

to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession  

granted to the accused in any manner.  Reliance was placed  

on Dolat     Ram      v.      State     of     Haryana  3 in support of this  

submission.  This court observed that in Dolat     Ram  , it was  

clarified that the above instances are merely illustrative and  

not exhaustive and one such ground for cancellation of bail  

would be where ignoring material and evidence on record a  

perverse order granting bail is passed in a heinous crime and  

that too without giving any reasons.  This court observed that  

such an order would be against the principles of law and,  

interest of justice would require that such a perverse order be  

3 (1995) 1 SCC 349

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set aside and bail be cancelled.  This court found that  

inasmuch as the Sessions Court had ignored vital materials  

while granting bail, the High Court had rightly cancelled the  

bail.  It was further observed that such orders passed in  

heinous crimes would have serious impact on the society and  

an arbitrary and wrong exercise of discretion by the trial court  

has to be corrected.  

9. In Dinesh      M.N.      (S.P.)      v.      State     of     Gujarat  4  ,   the  

appellant therein - a police officer was involved in a case of  

fake encounter.  Learned Sessions Judge released him on bail.  

It was evident from the bail order that learned Sessions Judge  

was influenced by the fact that the deceased was a dreaded  

criminal, against whom as many as 25 FIRs were lodged.  An  

application for cancellation of bail was moved before the High  

Court under Section 439(2) of the Code.  The High Court  

cancelled the bail holding that learned Sessions Judge had not  

kept in view the seriousness of the offence in which the high  

ranking police officer was involved.  It was observed that past  

4 (2008) 5 SCC 66

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conduct or antecedents of the deceased could not have been a  

ground for grant of bail to the accused.  This court while  

dealing with the challenge to the said order held that though it  

is true that parameters for grant of bail and cancellation of  

bail are different, if the trial court while granting bail acts on  

irrelevant materials, bail can be cancelled.  It was observed  

that perversity of a bail order can flow from the fact that  

irrelevant materials have been taken into consideration adding  

vulnerability to the order granting bail.  On the facts of the  

case, this court held that that the deceased had a shady  

reputation and criminal antecedents, was certainly not a  

factor which should have been taken into consideration while  

granting bail to the accused.  It was the nature of the act  

committed by the accused which ought to have been taken  

into consideration.  The order of the High Court was confirmed  

on the ground that the bail was granted on untenable  

grounds.  The argument that supervening circumstances such  

as attempt to tamper with the evidence and interference with  

the investigation were absent and, therefore, bail could not  

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have been cancelled by reappreciating evidence, was rejected  

by this court.  

10. Thus, Section 439 of the Code confers very wide powers  

on the High Court and the Court of Sessions regarding bail.  

But, while granting bail, the High Court and the Sessions  

Court are guided by the same considerations as other courts.  

That is to say, the gravity of the crime, the character of the  

evidence, position and status of the accused with reference to  

the victim and witnesses, the likelihood of the accused fleeing  

from justice and repeating the offence, the possibility of his  

tampering with the witnesses and obstructing the course of  

justice and such other grounds are required to be taken into  

consideration.  Each criminal case presents its own peculiar  

factual scenario and, therefore, certain grounds peculiar to a  

particular case may have to be taken into account by the  

court.  The court has to only opine as to whether there is  

prima facie case against the accused.  The court must not  

undertake meticulous examination of the evidence collected by  

the police and comment on the same.   Such assessment of  

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evidence and premature comments are likely to deprive the  

accused of a fair trial.  While cancelling bail under Section  

439(2) of the Code, the primary considerations which weigh  

with the court are whether the accused is likely to tamper with  

the evidence or interfere or attempt to interfere with the due  

course of justice or evade the due course of justice.  But, that  

is not all.  The High Court or the Sessions Court can cancel  

bail even in cases where the order granting bail suffers from  

serious infirmities resulting in miscarriage of justice.  If the  

court granting bail ignores relevant materials indicating prima  

facie involvement of the accused or takes into account  

irrelevant material, which has no relevance to the question of  

grant of bail to the accused, the High Court or the Sessions  

Court would be justified in cancelling the bail.  Such orders  

are against the well recognized principles underlying the power  

to grant bail.  Such orders are legally infirm and vulnerable  

leading to miscarriage of justice and absence of supervening  

circumstances such as the propensity of the accused to  

tamper with the evidence, to flee from justice, etc. would not  

deter the court from cancelling the bail.  The High Court or the  

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Sessions Court is bound to cancel such bail orders  

particularly when they are passed releasing accused involved  

in heinous crimes because they ultimately result in weakening  

the prosecution case and have adverse impact on the society.  

Needless to say that though the powers of this court are much  

wider, this court is equally guided by the above principles in  

the matter of grant or cancellation of bail.  

11. It is necessary now to briefly note the facts of the case.  

The complaint lodged by the appellant stated that on  

19/5/2009, the deceased came to his house at about 7.00  

p.m.  After the deceased received a phone call, he told the  

appellant that he had to take money from someone and asked  

him to drop him by his bike at Gandhi Nagar.  Accordingly, he  

dropped the deceased near Janta Store, Opp. Shyam Hawans  

Paradise Apartment, Gandhi Nagar at 12.00 in the night. The  

deceased told him that he will come back next morning.  Since  

the deceased did not return as promised, the appellant  

reached Padawa near Shyam Hawans Paradise Apartment at  

about 11.00 a.m. and inquired about the deceased.  

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Chowkidar Kuldip Prajapati told him that the deceased was  

with Rita madam in Flat No.603 and in the morning at about  

6.00 a.m., the accused, who used to meet Rita madam came  

with his four/five men in a jeep bearing Registration No.RJ-

14-UB-294.  All of them went into Flat no.603; beat up the  

deceased; dragged him out of the flat, dumped him in the jeep  

and left the place in the jeep.  After that, he searched for the  

deceased.  He ultimately went to the police station and gave  

the information to the police.   Thereafter, he went to the  

mortuary in SMS Hospital.  At the mortuary he saw the dead  

body of the deceased and identified it.  The appellant stated  

that he was sure that the deceased was murdered by the  

accused and his associates.  On the basis of this FIR,  

investigation was started.   

12. During investigation, on 10/6/2009, statements of  

Kuldip Prajapati, the Chowkidar of Shyam Hawans Paradise  

Apartment and Rita were recorded under Section 164 of the  

Code by Judicial Magistrate, First Class No.15, Jaipur City,  

Jaipur.  Copies of these statements have been perused by us.  

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Kuldip Prajapati inter alia stated in his statement that Rita  

came to reside in Flat No.603 situate in Shyam Hawans  

Paradise Apartment belonging to R.P. Singh on 7/5/2009.  

The accused was a usual visitor at the said flat. On  

19/5/2009 at about 8.30 p.m., he received a phone call from  

the accused.  The accused asked him whether Rita was in the  

flat to which he answered in the affirmative.  He further stated  

that on 20/5/2009 at about 6.00 a.m., the accused came  

there in a jeep along with three to four men.  He went to Rita’s  

flat.  After sometime, Rita came to him and told him that there  

was a dispute going on in her house.  He went upstairs with  

Rita.  He saw the accused along with three to four persons  

dragging a man.  On his enquiry, the accused told him that a  

wicked man had entered his flat.  The accused did not tell him  

where he was taking the man.  He put the man inside the jeep  

and took him away.       

13. In her statement, recorded under Section 164 of the  

Code, Rita, inter alia, stated that she was married to one  

Ramgopal Meena.  Ramgopal Meena became insane and,  

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therefore, she deserted him.  She was staying with her  

parents.  Since her elder brother was dealing in wine, the  

accused, an Excise Officer used to visit their house frequently.  

On his request, she began residing with him.  Later on,  

physical relations developed between both of them.  The  

accused made arrangement for her in a rented house wherever  

he was posted.  When she was residing in Deepak Colony, she  

came in contact with the deceased, who was also residing in  

Deepak Colony.  Intimate friendship developed between her  

and the deceased.  Rita further stated that disputes arose  

between her and the accused.  She stated that the accused  

knew that she was staying with the deceased.  In the absence  

of the deceased, the accused came to her and threatened her.  

He told her not to reside with the deceased and vacate the  

house.  He made her vacate the house and put her up in a  

rented accommodation in Gandhi Nagar.  On 19/5/2009, the  

accused was continuously making telephone calls to her.  Last  

call was received at 11.30 p.m.  He was threatening her and  

asking her as to why she was in touch with the deceased.  The  

deceased came to her flat at about 5.30 a.m.   When they were  

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taking tea at about 6.00 a.m., the accused came there.  He  

was accompanied by Rai Singh and two others.  Those two  

other persons caught her.  They pushed her outside the flat.  

They closed the door.  She went downstairs to call the guard  

Kuldip Prajapati.  She told him that some dispute was going  

on in her flat.  When both of them were going upstairs, she  

saw all the four persons dragging the deceased down.  She did  

not know where the deceased was taken.  She informed the  

brother of the deceased that the accused had taken away the  

deceased.  She concluded that the accused, Rai Singh, Vijay  

and Subhash jointly committed the murder of the deceased.  

14. From the complaint and the aforementioned two  

statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code, it prima  

facie appears that there was illicit relationship between the  

accused and Rita.  However, Rita came in contact with the  

deceased and intimate relationship developed between the two,  

which was not liked by the accused.  It appears to be the case  

of the investigating agency that, therefore, the accused  

eliminated the deceased with the help of his companions.   

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15. At this stage, we do not want to comment on the  

credibility or otherwise of the evidence collected by the  

prosecution.  Whether the statements of Kuldip Prajapati and  

Rita would ultimately help the prosecution to establish its case  

can be ascertained only when the trial is concluded.  That is  

the function of the trial court.  It would be inappropriate to  

discuss the evidence in depth at this stage because it is likely  

to influence the trial court.  We, therefore, refrain from doing  

so.  But, we must make it clear that the statements of Kuldip  

Prajapati and Rita, recorded under Section 164 of the Code,  

appear to be relevant as they prima facie indicate involvement  

of the accused in the crime in question.  The High Court ought  

not to have ignored those statements.  It is true that the High  

Court has referred to certain features of the prosecution case,  

but that reference is in the form of submissions made by  

counsel for the accused.  The High Court has not discussed  

those features.  It has expressed no opinion as to why it was  

releasing the accused on bail.  It was imperative for the High  

Court to do so.  We have been shown an extract from a  

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relevant diary entry which does indicate that brother of the  

accused tried to bring pressure on the investigating agency.  

In his affidavit filed in this court, Mr. Yogesh Dadhich,  

Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police, Jaipur City (East),  

has confirmed that the accused had made an effort to  

influence the investigation.  The fact that brother of the  

accused is an IPS officer is not denied by his counsel.  This  

fact is not noticed by the High Court.  If it was not brought to  

the notice of the High Court by the investigating agency, then,  

it will have to be said that the investigating agency adopted a  

very casual approach before the High Court.  In any case, the  

order passed by the High Court releasing the accused involved  

in a heinous crime on bail, ignoring the relevant material, is  

legally not tenable.  It suffers from serious infirmities.  The  

High Court has exercised its discretionary power in an  

arbitrary and casual manner.   We have also noticed that the  

incident took place on 19/5/2009 and the accused could be  

arrested only on 1/6/2011. His two attempts to get  

anticipatory bail, one from the Sessions Court and the other  

from the High Court, did not succeed.  Assuming that the  

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accused is not likely to flee from justice or after release on bail  

he has not tried to tamper with the evidence, that is no reason  

why a legally infirm and untenable order passed in arbitrary  

exercise of discretion releasing the accused involved in a  

gruesome crime on bail should be allowed to stand.  This order  

needs to be corrected because it will set a bad precedent.  

Besides, it will have adverse effect on the trial.   

16. Taking an overall view of the matter, we are of the  

opinion that in the interest of justice, the impugned order  

granting bail to the accused deserves to be quashed and a  

direction needs to be given to the police to take the accused in  

custody.  We enquired with learned counsel for respondent 1-

State of Rajasthan as to what is the stage of the case.  We  

were shocked to know that till date, even the charges are not  

framed.  We feel that the matter brooks no further delay.   A  

direction needs to be given to the trail court to frame the  

charges and conclude the trial at the earliest.  In the  

circumstances, the impugned order dated 19/8/2012 granting  

bail to accused – Khushi Ram Meena is quashed.  The police  

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are directed to take accused - Khushi Ram Meena in custody.  

The trial court is directed to frame charges within a period of  

one month from the date of receipt of this order.  The trial  

court is further directed to proceed with the case and conclude  

it at the earliest independently and in accordance with law  

without being influenced by any observations made by us  

which may touch merits of the case as they are merely prima  

facie observations.   

17. The appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms.  

……………………………………………..J.        (AFTAB ALAM)

……………………………………………..J.     (RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)

NEW DELHI, OCTOBER 16, 2012.

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