12 May 2011
Supreme Court
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KALYANESHWARI Vs U.O.I. .

Bench: S.H. KAPADIA,K.S. PANICKER RADHAKRISHNAN,SWATANTER KUMAR, ,
Case number: W.P.(C) No.-000260-000260 / 2004
Diary number: 10045 / 2004


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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

SUO MOTU CONTEMPT IN WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 260 OF 2004

Kalyaneshwari             …Petitioner

Versus

Union of India & Ors.       …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Swatanter Kumar, J.

In  our  detailed  order  dated  21st January,  2011,  besides  

disposing of the Writ Petition No. 260 of 2004 with the directions as  

contained  in  paragraph  16  of  that  order,  we  noticed  the  

contemptuous behaviour of the petitioner NGO and its officials and  

had issued show-cause notice to the petitioner Kalyaneshwari and  

its  Secretary  Shri  B.K.  Sharma,  in  his  personal  capacity,  which  

reads as under:

“Keeping in view the conduct of the petitioner,  particularly,  B.K.  Sharma,  we  hereby  issue  notice to him as well as the petitioner to show  cause why proceedings under the Contempt of  Courts Act, 1971 be not initiated against them  and/or in addition/alternative, why exemplary  cost be not imposed upon them.  Further, we  also  call  upon  the  petitioner  to  show  cause  why the Registrar, Government of NCT, Delhi

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be not directed to take action against them in  accordance with law.”

In response to this show-cause notice, Shri B.K. Sharma had  

filed  a  response  affidavit  dated  22nd March,  2011  on  behalf  of  

Kalyaneshwari as well as himself.  This is a very short affidavit of  

seven  paragraphs  in  which  the  petitioner  has  rendered  his  

unconditional apology and prayed before this Court not to initiate  

proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. He further  

prayed to discharge the notice of contempt and drop proceedings for  

imposition of cost and revocation of license and registration of the  

NGO Kalayneshwari.  Relevant portion of the said affidavit reads as  

under:

“2.  THAT  deponent  herein  tenders  his  unconditional  apology  to  this  Hon’ble  Court  with  folded  hands  concerning  all  actions  in  respect of which this Hon’ble Court has been  pleased to issue Show Cause Notice as to why  proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act,  1971  be  not  initiated  against  the  Petitioner  and the deponent herein and further as to why  exemplary  costs  be  not  imposed  upon  them  and their license be not cancelled/revoked. 3.  THAT  deponent  herein  unconditionally  withdraws  each  and  every  averment  and  allegation made by the Petitioner in respect of  the  Judgment  of  the  Hon’ble  high  Court  of  Gujarat  dated  9.12.2004  passed  in  Special  Civil  Application  Nos.  14460,  14813  and

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14819 of 2004 titled B.K. Sharma v. Union of  India and others reported in AIR 2005 Gujarat  Page  203.   Petitioner  further  withdraws  all  such  pleadings  made  in  this  regard  in  the  affidavit  filed  by  the  petitioner  through  deponent  in  response  to  the  order  dated  13.8.2010 passed by the Hon’ble Court as well  as all the consequent proceedings.”

There  is  no  doubt  that  at  the  very  initial  stage,  the  

respondents have tendered apology and prayed for dropping of the  

contempt proceedings.  We are not quite certain as to the bona fide  

and intent of the respondents in tendering such an apology.  For a  

Court to accept the apology in a contempt action, it is required that  

such apology should be  bona fide and in actual repentance of the  

conduct  which  invited  initiation  of  contempt  proceedings.  

Furthermore,  the  conduct  should be such which can be ignored  

without  compromising  the  dignity  of  the  Court.   ‘Contempt’  is  

disorderly conduct of a contemner causing serious damage to the  

institution of justice administration. Such conduct, with reference  

to  its  adverse  effects  and  consequences,  can  be  discernibly  

classified into two categories: one which has a transient effect on  

the  system and/or  the  person concerned  and is  likely  to  wither  

away  by  the  passage  of  time  while  the  other  causes  permanent  

damage to the institution and administration of justice.  The latter

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conduct would normally be unforgivable.  

Institutional tolerance which the judiciary possesses, keeping  

in  mind  the  larger  interest  of  the  public  and  administration  of  

justice, should not be misunderstood as weakness of the system.  

Maintaining the magnanimity of law is the linchpin to the wheels of  

justice.  Therefore, in certain cases, it would be inevitable for the  

Court to take recourse to rigours of the statute.

It  is  the  seriousness  of  the  irresponsible  acts  of  the  

contemners and the degree of harm caused to the institution and  

administration  of  justice  which  would  decisively  determine  the  

course which the Court should adopt, i.e. either drop the contempt  

proceedings  or  continue  proceedings  against  the  contemner  in  

accordance with law.

The apology tendered even at the outset of proceedings has  

to be bona fide, should demonstrate repentance and sincere regret  

on the part of the contemner lest the administration of justice is  

permitted to be crudely hampered with immunity by the persons  

involved in the process of litigation or otherwise.  An apology which  

lacks bona fides and is intended to truncate the process of law with  

the  ulterior  motive  of  escaping  the  likely  consequences  of  such

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flagrant violation of the orders of the Court and disrespect to the  

administration of justice cannot be accepted.  In the case of  Prem  

Surana  v. Additional Munsif and Judicial Magistrate [(2002) 6 SCC  

722] this Court sternly reprimanded a contemner who had slapped  

the Presiding Officer in open court and held that “the slap on the  

face of the judicial officer is in fact a slap on the face of the justice  

delivery system in the country and as such question of acceptance  

of any apology or an undertaking does not and cannot arise, neither  

can there be any question of any leniency as regards the sentence.”  

The  rule  of  law  has  to  be  maintained  whatever  be  the  

consequences.  The ‘welfare of people’ is the supreme law and this  

enunciates  adequately  the  ideal  of  ‘law’.   This  could  only  be  

achieved when justice is administered lawfully, judiciously, without  

any fear and without being hampered or throttled by unscrupulous  

elements.  The  administration  of  justice  is  dependent  upon  

obedience  or  execution  of  the  orders  of  the  Court.   The  

contemptuous act which interfered with administration of justice on  

one hand and impinge upon the dignity of institution of justice on  

the other, bringing down its respect in the eye of the commoner, are  

acts which may not fall in the category of cases where the Court can

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accept the apology of the contemner even if  it  is tendered at the  

threshold of the proceedings.

The Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edn., 1999) defines ‘Contempt’  

as,  “Conduct  that  defies  the  authority  or  dignity  of  a  Court  or  

legislature.”   It  also  adds that  “Because  such conduct  interferes  

with the administration of justice, it is punishable.”

 This special jurisdiction has to be unquestionably invoked  

when the offending acts are intentional  by the contemner at the  

cost  of  eroding  the  system  of  administration  of  justice  which  

practice is necessarily required to be deprecated at the very initial  

stage.

In  the  case  of  Aligarh  Municipal  Board  v.  Ekka  Tonga  

Mazdoor  Union   [(1970) 3 SCC 98], this Court said that it is the  

seriousness  of  the  irresponsible  acts  of  the  contemners  and  the  

degree of harm caused to the administration of justice which would  

decisively  determine  whether  the  matter  should  be  tried  as  a  

criminal contempt or not.  

In the case of  M.Y.  Shareef  v.  The Hon’ble  Judges of  the  

High Court of Nagpur [AIR 1955 SC 19], this Court while explaining

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the requirements of genuine apology held as under:

“45…..With regard to apology in proceedings for  contempt  of  court,  it  is  well-settled  that  an  apology is not a weapon of defense to purge the  guilty  of  their  offence;  nor  is  it  intended  to  operate  as  a  universal,  panacea,  but  it  is  intended to be evidence of real contriteness.”

Similar observations were made by this Court in the case of  

L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P. [(1984) 3 SCC 405], wherein this Court  

held as under:

“6.  We do not think that merely because the  appellant has tendered his apology we should  set  aside  the  sentence  and  allow  him  to  go  unpunished.  Otherwise,  all  that  a  person  wanting to intimidate a Judge by making the  grossest imputations against him has to do, is  to go ahead and scandalize him, and later on  tender a formal empty apology which costs him  practically nothing. If such an apology were to  be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception,  we would in fact be virtually issuing a “licence”  to  scandalize  courts  and commit  contempt of  court with impunity…...”

Making  of  scandalous  allegations  against  the  judicial  

system always  needs  to  be  discouraged.  Moreover,  invoking  the  

extraordinary jurisdiction of the constitutional Courts allegedly in  

the name of public interest and using it as a platform for lowering  

the dignity of the institution of justice is an act which besides being  

contemptuous also is undesirable.  This Court, in the case of M.B.

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Sanghi Advocate v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana [(1991) 3 SCC  

600], has cautioned against the growing tendency of maligning the  

reputation of judicial officers by disgruntled elements who fail to  

secure desired orders. While observing that it was high time that  

such tendency is to be nipped in the bud, this Court said, “such  

causes raise larger issues touching the independence of not only  

the concerned Judge, but the entire institution…  It is high time  

that we realize that the much cherished judicial independence has  

to be protected not only from the executive or the legislature, but  

also from those who are an integral part of the system.”

We have referred to the above judgments of this Court with an  

intention to indicate the callous attitude of the contemners despite  

the directions of this Court in paragraph 16 of its order dated 21st  

January,  2011.   Such contemptuous  actions  of  the  contemners  

have increased with passage of time rather than being reduced.

In the present case, Shri B.K. Sharma has certainly abused  

the process  of  law by filing petitions,  under  the  guise  of  public  

interest, against one business rival at the behest of another.  The  

writ petition filed by him before this Court was obviously filed with  

the  intent  of  creating  impediments  in  the  establishment  and

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operation of industrial units dealing with the mining, manufacture  

and production of Asbestos and its products which are carrying out  

their operations in accordance with law and without infringing the  

rights of any person.   

This Court in the case of  Consumer Education and Research  

Center v.  Union  of  India [(1995)  3  SCC  42],  had  pronounced  a  

detailed judgment giving directions in relation to various matters  

pertaining  to  operation  of  units  engaged  in  manufacture  and  

production  of  asbestos  and  its  products.  This  resulted  in  

presentation of  a Bill  in this  regard by the  Central  Government  

before the  Rajya Sabha.   Despite  the detailed directions already  

given in the above judgment of this Court and introduction of a Bill  

before  the  Parliament,  Shri  B.K.  Sharma  persisted  in  filing  

petitions after petitions praying for complete ban on manufacture,  

import and use of asbestos to secure unlawful closure of asbestos  

industry for the purpose of settling business rivalry.  

Sh. B.K. Sharma had filed a writ petition before the Gujarat  

High Court titled as B.K. Sharma v. Union of India,  [AIR 2005 Guj  

203] in which every attempt was made to prevent respondent No.5  

in that case, M/s. Sopai Ltd., from completing construction of its

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asbestos production unit and proceeding further with any activity.  

In  fact,  it  was  prayed  that  construction  raised  by  them  be  

demolished which was declined by the  Gujarat  High Court.  The  

Gujarat High Court also declined to accept the prayer for closure of  

that asbestos manufacturing unit and held in specific terms that  

the petition had been filed at the behest of rival industrial groups  

and lacks bona fide.   

Shri B.K. Sharma, disregarding the fact that this judgment of  

the  Gujarat  High  Court  had  attained  finality  on  whole  factual  

matrix, filed Writ Petition No. 260 of 2004 before this Court and  

tried  to  brush  aside  the  judgment  of  the  Gujarat  High  Court  

stating, “Gujarat High Court had failed to apply its mind”.  Besides  

making  such irresponsible  statement  against  the  judgment  of  a  

constitutional Court, Shri B.K. Sharma miserably failed to explain  

and clarify as to why the present petition was filed in face of the  

judgment  of  this  court  in  the  case  of  Consumer  Education  and  

Research Centre (supra).

Shri B.K. Sharma even went to the extent of filing incorrect  

affidavits before this Court and the Court was compelled to pass an  

order on 27th August, 2010 directing him to explain his conduct in

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reference to the observations made by the Gujarat High Court in  

the said judgment.   

 It was argued before the Court, by several of the respondents,  

on different occasions that the whole purpose of filing the present  

writ petition was to secure a ban on mining and manufacture of  

asbestos which would inevitably result in increase in the demand  

of cast and ductile iron products as they are a suitable substitute  

for  asbestos.  It  was,  thus,  argued  that  the  petition  before  the  

Gujarat High Court as well as this petition has been filed at the  

behest of the industrial group engaged in production of cast and  

ductile iron products.

It  is  a settled principle  of  law that contempt is  a matter  

primarily between the Court and the contemner.  The Court has to  

take into consideration the behaviour of the contemner, attendant  

circumstances and its impact upon the justice delivery system.  If  

the conduct of the contemner is such that it hampers the justice  

delivery system as well lowers the dignity of the Courts, then the  

Courts  are  expected to  take  somewhat  stringent  view to  prevent  

further institutional damage and to protect the faith of the public in  

the justice delivery system.  In the case of Advocate-General, State  

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of  Bihar  v.  M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair  Industries  [(1980) 3 SCC  

311], this Court took the view that abuse of the process of court,  

calculated to hamper the due course of judicial proceedings or the  

orderly administration of justice, is contempt of court.  Where the  

conduct  is  reprehensible  as  to  warrant  condemnation,  then  the  

Court essentially should take such contempt proceedings to their  

logical end.  There cannot be mercy shown by the Court at the cost  

of injury to the institution of justice system.

The  respondent-contemners,  in  their  reply-affidavit,  have  

hardly disputed the observations made by this Court in the show  

cause notice issued to them.  They have only attempted to tender  

an  unconditional  apology  for  their  various  acts  and  omissions  

which certainly were prejudicial to the administration of justice and  

have even adversely affected the rights of the other parties in the  

disguise of a petition filed in public interest.  The contemners have  

abused the process of law by instituting various petitions under the  

garb  of  ‘Public  Interest  Litigation’  and  have  succeeded,  at  least  

partially, in damaging the asbestos industry in the country.  They  

even withheld  the  facts  from the  Court  which  were  within  their  

personal knowledge.  The examination of the factual matrix of the  

present  case  and  conduct  of  the  respondent-contemners,

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particularly the reply filed by them, places it beyond ambiguity that  

they have committed the following acts and omissions intentionally,  

which have undermined the dignity of this Court and the justice  

delivery system:

(a)The contemners have abused the process of  law to the extent  

that it impinged upon the dignity of the justice delivery system as  

well as prejudicially affected the rights of other private parties.

(b)The  contemners  have  withheld  material  facts  from  the  Court  

which were in their personal knowledge.  While withholding such  

material facts, they have also persisted upon filing petitions after  

petitions in the name of public interest with somewhat similar  

reliefs.

(c) The contemner,  B.K. Sharma, has made irresponsible remarks  

and  statements  against  the  Gujarat  High  Court  without  any  

justifiable cause in law.

(d)The public interest litigation [Writ Petition (C) No. 260 of 2004]  

instituted by the  contemner lacks  bona fide and,  in fact,  was  

instituted at  the  behest  of  a  rival  industrial  group which was  

interested in banning of the activity of mining and manufacturing  

of  asbestos  and  its  products  by  obtaining  certain  orders  and

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directions from this Court.  A definite attempt was made by the  

contemners  to  secure  a  ban  on  these  activities  with  ultimate  

intention  of  increasing  the  demand  of  cast  and  ductile  iron  

products  as it  has come on record that  they are  some of  the  

suitable substitutes for asbestos.  Thus, it was litigation initiated  

with ulterior motive of causing industrial imbalance and financial  

loss to the industry of asbestos through the process of court.

(e) The contemner has also filed petitions and affidavits either with  

incorrect facts or with facts which even to the knowledge of the  

contemner were not true.

Despite this, the Court has to keep in mind that there is a  

duty upon the courts to eliminate the cause of such litigation.  The  

maxim Justitia est duplex, viz., severe puniens, et vere praevenniens  

by  its  very  virtue  imposes  dual  obligation  upon  the  Courts  of  

considering various facets of severe punishment on the one hand  

and really and efficiently preventing crime on the other, with the  

ultimate object of maintaining the dignity of law.  In other words,  

the Court has to balance the quantum of punishment keeping in  

view the seriousness of the offence committed by the contemners.  

Repeated  contemptuous  behaviour  of  the  contemners  before  the

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Gujarat  High  Court  as  well  as  this  Court  certainly  needs  to  be  

deprecated and punished in accordance with law.  Even if we were  

to take somewhat liberal view, still it is the duty of this Court to  

ensure  that  such  unscrupulous  and  undesirable  public  interest  

litigation be not instituted in the Courts of law so as to waste the  

valuable  time of  the  Courts  as  well  as  preserve  the  faith  of  the  

public in the justice delivery system.   

The  contemners  when  asked  to  address  the  quantum  of  

sentence, again tendered an apology but none of the contemptuous  

behaviour spelled out in our order dated 21st January, 2011 was  

denied by the contemners at any stage of the proceedings or even in  

their reply affidavit to the show cause notice.

Having given our due consideration to all the relevant factors  

and behaviour of the contemners, we have no hesitation in holding  

that the contemners are liable to be punished for their offensive and  

contemptuous behaviour which has undermined the dignity of the  

Courts  of  law  and  justice  administration  system  as  well  as  

prejudicially affected the rights of third parties who, in fact, were  

not even impleaded as parties in the public interest petitions.  They  

have squandered the valuable time of this Court which could have

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been devoted more fruitfully in dealing with the pending cases and  

matters of greater urgency and importance.

In these circumstances, we direct as follows:

(1)We order and award sentence of simple imprisonment till rising  

of this Court to the contemner, Shri B.K. Sharma.

(2)We  also  impose  a  sentence  of  fine  of  Rs.2,000/-  on  the  

contemners, to be paid within one week from today.  In default,  

he shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one week.

(3)Lastly, we impose a cost of Rs.1,00,000/- upon the contemners  

to be paid to the S.C. Legal Services Committee.

(4)We also hereby direct the Registrar of Societies, Government of  

NCT  of  Delhi  to  take  action  against  the  contemner-society,  

namely Kalyaneshwari,  in accordance with law and submit  its  

action-taken  report,  interim  or  final,  to  this  Court  within  six  

weeks from today.

                                                                    ...…............................. ......CJI.

                    [S.H. Kapadia]

..………................................J.              [K.S.  Panicker  

Radhakrishnan]

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…........................................J. [Swatanter Kumar]

New Delhi May 12 ,  2011.