KALPANA VYAS Vs RAJ KUMAR RANGWANI
Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDU MALHOTRA
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Case number: C.A. No.-010811-010811 / 2018
Diary number: 11622 / 2018
Advocates: IRSHAD AHMAD Vs
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 10811 OF 2018 [Arising out of SLP (C) No. 9716 of 2018]
KALPANA VYAS ... Appellant
Versus
RAJ KUMAR RANGWANI … Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the final
judgment and order dated 02.01.2018 passed by the
High Court of Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur in S.B. Civil
Writ Petition No. 5403/2015 whereby the High Court
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has allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent
herein.
3. The issue involved in the appeal is short, as
also the facts of the case lie in a narrow compass,
which would be clear from the narration infra.
4. The appellant is the applicant, whereas the
respondent is the nonapplicant in the eviction
petition filed by the appellant against the
respondent before the Rent Control Tribunal,
Rajasthan out of which this appeal arises.
5. The appellant a landlady of the suit premises
filed the eviction petition against the respondent
tenant of the suit premises under Section 9 of the
Rajasthan Rent Control Act (for short called “The
Act”) before the Rent Tribunal Kota (R84/2005)
praying therein for respondent's eviction from the
tenanted suit premises.
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6. The appellant claimed respondent's eviction
from the suit premises on the ground of her
personal bona fide need for raising construction in
the existing suit premises to be used for her
children and for stay of appellant's guest in the suit
premises.
7. The respondent denied the appellant's need
and, inter alia, contended that the appellant is in
possession of an alternative accommodation in the
city and hence her alleged need set up in the
eviction petition can be accomplished by using the
alternative accommodation available in the city.
8. By order dated 8.2.2011, the Rent Tribunal
dismissed the appellant's eviction petition holding
that appellant's need can be accomplished with an
alternative space available with her in the city.
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9. The appellant (landlady) felt aggrieved and filed
an appeal (144/2014) before the Appellate Tribunal.
The Appellate Tribunal by order dated 12.2.2015
allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Rent
Tribunal, decreed the appellant's eviction petition
and passed the eviction decree against the
respondent, in relation to the suit premises.
10. The respondent (tenant) felt aggrieved and filed
writ petition before the High Court of Rajasthan
(Jaipur). By impugned order, the learned Single
Judge allowed the respondent's writ petition and set
aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal and
restored the order of the Rent Tribunal which gives
rise to filing of the special leave to appeal in this
Court by the landlady.
11. So the short question, which arises for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the High
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Court was justified in allowing the respondent's
(tenant’s) writ petition thereby justified in setting
aside the appellate order of the Rent Appellate
Tribunal and restoring that of the Rent Tribunal.
12. Heard Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned counsel for
the appellant and Mr. Purvish Jitendra Malkan,
learned counsel for the respondent.
13. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
are inclined to allow the appeal, modify the
impugned order and remand the case to the Rent
Appellate Tribunal for deciding the appeal
(144/2014) afresh on merits.
14. In our opinion, the need to remand the case to
the Rent Appellant Tribunal has occasioned because
the High Court, while allowing the respondent's writ
petition, came to a conclusion and accordingly held
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that the Rent Appellate Tribunal allowed the
appellant's (landlady's) appeal with a casual
approach and failed to record any categorical
finding on the plea of bona fide need. The operative
part of the High Court order reads as under:
“Taking into consideration the fact aforesaid, I do not find any reason for Rent Appellate Tribunal for setting aside the order of the Rent Tribunal. The perusal of the impugned order shows a casual approach of the Rent Appellate Tribunal in reversing the finding of the Rent Tribunal, that too, without going into the issue of personal bonafide necessity. The Rent Appellate Tribunal was expected to first decide the issue as to whether respondent is having personal bonafide necessity or not. Accordingly, impugned order passed by the Rent Appellate Tribunal is set aside.” (emphasis supplied)
15. Having held that, the High Court had two
options: first either to remand the case to the Rent
Appellate Tribunal for deciding the appeal afresh on
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merits in accordance with law and second, to decide
the matter itself on merits in accordance with law.
16. Since the High Court heard the matter in its
writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution, it was not possible to examine the
issue on facts in detail like an Appellate Court. It is
for this reason, in our view, the High Court ought to
have resorted to first option and remanded the case
back to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for deciding the
appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law.
17. The High Court, therefore, committed an error
in not taking recourse to any option and without
deciding the issue arising in the case on its merit,
simply restored the order of the Rent Tribunal.
18. This approach of the High Court caused
prejudice to the appellant (landlady) because there
was no factual finding recorded either by the first
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appellate Court or the High Court on the question of
bona fide need.
19. It is for this reason that we uphold the finding
of the High Court in relation to the approach and
the manner in which the Rent Appellate Tribunal
decided the appellant's appeal but consider it just
and proper to remand the case to the Rent Appellate
Tribunal for its decision on merits afresh in
accordance with law.
20. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal
succeeds and is allowed. Impugned order is
modified to the extent that the case is remanded to
the Rent Appellate Tribunal for deciding the appeal
(No. 144/2014)(Old No. 41/11) afresh on merits in
accordance with law.
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21. Since the matter pertains to bona fide need
and eviction, the Rent Appellate Tribunal will decide
the appeal within six months as an outer limit
strictly in accordance with law without being
influenced by any observations made by this Court
and the High Court.
22. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed
of.
………………………………..J. (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
..………………………………J. (INDU MALHOTRA)
New Delhi, October 29, 2018
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