K.V.S.RAM Vs BANGALORE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORT CORP
Bench: V. GOPALA GOWDA,R. BANUMATHI
Case number: C.A. No.-000412-000412 / 2015
Diary number: 27098 / 2013
Advocates: V. N. RAGHUPATHY Vs
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURIDISCTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 412 OF 2015 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.5236/2014)
K.V.S. RAM .. Appellant
Versus
BANGALORE METROPOLITAN ..Respondent TRANSPORT CORPN.
J U D G M E N T
R. BANUMATHI, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal by special leave arises out of the judgment
dated 3.9.2012 passed by the High Court of Karnataka, in and by
which, the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant-
workman thereby, confirming the termination of the appellant.
3. Brief facts which led to the filing of this appeal are as
under:- The appellant was appointed on the post of Driver in the
Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation on 3.9.1985 and was
working on the same post since then. The appellant was served
with article of charge dated 3.9.1990 alleging that he had secured
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appointment by producing a false transfer certificate. An enquiry
was initiated on 15.7.1992 and the appellant submitted his
explanation to the aforesaid charges. The Enquiry Officer submitted
his report on 13.3.2002 holding the appellant guilty for his
misconduct. After affording opportunity to the appellant to show
cause against the proposed punishment, the disciplinary authority
passed the order imposing punishment of dismissal from service
vide order dated 1.10.2004.
4. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the appellant raised
an industrial dispute bearing I.D.No.39/2005 before the III Additional
Labour Court, Bangalore. The Labour Court vide award dated
14.2.2007 directed the management of the corporation to reinstate
the appellant in his original post with continuity of service but
without backwages. The Labour Court modified the punishment
directing withholding of four annual increments with cumulative
effect. In the Labour Court, appellant has produced notarized copies
of orders passed by the respondent-Corporation in respect of other
workmen, who have committed similar misconduct but were
awarded lesser punishments. Referring to Exs. W.5 to W.11 which
are the notarized copies of the orders passed in respect of other
workmen who have committed similar misconduct, Labour Court
held that those workmen were reinstated in service with minor
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punishment of withholding of few annual increments, whereas the
appellant was imposed grave punishment of dismissal from service
and thus was discriminated. Referring to another judgment of the
High Court in W.P.No.17316/2005 (L/K) dated 8.8.2005, Labour Court
observed that when similarly situated workmen were imposed lesser
punishment and the appellant cannot be discriminated by imposing
punishment of dismissal from service and the Labour Court in
exercise of its discretion under Section 11A set aside the
punishment imposed on the appellant and directed reinstatement of
the appellant without backwages.
5. Being aggrieved, respondent-corporation filed a writ
petition before the High Court. Vide order dated 31.1.2008, learned
Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition holding that
the punishment of dismissal from service was proportionate to the
proved misconduct against the appellant. Aggrieved by the same,
the appellant-workman preferred appeal before the Division Bench
challenging the legality and correctness of the said order. The
Division Bench dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant on the
ground that the charges levelled against the appellant are serious in
nature and that the punishment of dismissal from service imposed
by the disciplinary authority was just and proper. In this appeal, the
appellant assails the correctness of the above judgment.
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6. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the High
Court erroneously held that the long delay of twelve years in holding
the enquiry is not fatal to the case, although it is clearly evident that
no reasonable explanation is forthcoming for the inordinate delay of
twelve years in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. It was
further submitted that in the similar cases of other workmen who
produced bogus certificate, they were reinstated in the service
withholding of few increments with cumulative effect and while so,
the appellant alone cannot be discriminated by imposing harsh
punishment of dismissal from service.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation
contended that the finding of guilt was based on appreciation of
evidence on record and having regard to the gravity of the charges,
the Labour Court was not justified in interfering with the punishment
imposed by the disciplinary authority and the learned Single Judge
as well as the Division Bench of the High Court rightly set aside the
award passed by the Court.
8. We have carefully considered the rival contentions and
perused the impugned judgment and other materials on record.
9. The appellant joined the services of the corporation in the
year 1985. In the year 1990, charges were framed against the
appellant alleging that he had secured appointment by producing a
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false certificate and enquiry was initiated in the year 1992 and the
Enquiry Officer submitted his report only in the year 2002, nearly
twelve years after framing of charges. Even though the Enquiry
Officer submitted his report on 13.3.2002, order of dismissal from
service was passed only on 1.10.2004. Enquiry report was thus
submitted after a lapse of twelve years and there was a delay of
twelve years in conducting and completing the enquiry. As pointed
out by the Labour Court, there was no plausible explanation for such
inordinate delay in completing the enquiry. The appellant continued
in service from 1990 to 2004. Having allowed the appellant-
workman to work for fourteen years, by the time punishment of
dismissal from service was imposed on the appellant, the appellant
had reached the age of forty five years. As observed by the Labour
Court, the appellant having crossed forty five years, he could not
have sought for alternative employment. Further, as seen from Exs.
W.5 to W.11, similarly placed workmen were ordered to be reinstated
with lesser punishment of stoppage of few increments. While so,
there is no reason as to why for the similar misconduct the appellant
should be imposed harsh punishment of dismissal from service.
10. It is settled proposition of law that while considering the
management’s decision to dismiss or terminate the services of a
workman, the Labour Court can interfere with the decision of the
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management only when it is satisfied that the punishment imposed
by the management is highly disproportionate to the degree of guilt
of the workman concerned. Considering the delay in completing the
enquiry and the age of the appellant and the fact that similarly
situated workmen were reinstated with lesser punishment, the
Labour Court ordered reinstatement, in exercise of its discretion
under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act.
11. In the Writ Petition, while setting aside the award of the
Labour Court, learned Single Judge placed reliance upon the
judgment of this Court passed in the case of Punjab Water Supply
Sewerage Board & Anr. vs. Ramsajivan & Anr., reported in 2007 (2)
SCC (L&S) 668 = (2007) 9 SCC 86 and also another judgment of the
High Court and observed that a person who practices fraud for
securing employment cannot perpetuate on the ground of delay and
the learned Single Judge faulted the Labour Court for exercising
discretion under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act and
interfering with the punishment of dismissal from service. In our
considered view, in exercise of its power of superintendence under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere
with the order of the Tribunal, only, when there has been a patent
perversity in the orders of tribunal and courts subordinate to it or
where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the
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basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. In our view,
when the Labour Court has exercised its discretion keeping in view
the facts of the case and the cases of similarly situated workmen,
the High Court ought not to have interfered with the exercise of
discretion by the Labour Court.
12. In Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477,
the Constitution Bench of this Court considered the scope of the
High Court’s jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in cases
involving challenge to the orders passed by the authorities entrusted
with quasi-judicial functions under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
Speaking for the majority of the Constitution Bench,
Gajendragadkar, J. observed as under: (AIR pp. 479-80, para 7)
“7. …A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously
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admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. In the case of Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar vs. Paschim
Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. & Anr., (2004) 6 SCC 434, it was held as
under:-
“15. We find the judgment and award of the labour court well reasoned and based on facts and evidence on record. The High Court has erred in its exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to annul the findings of the labour court in its award as it is well settled law that the High Court cannot exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution as an appellate court or reappreciate evidence and record its findings on the contentious points. Only if there is a serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower court. The Labour Court in the present case has satisfactorily exercised its original jurisdiction and properly appreciated the facts and legal evidence on record and given a well reasoned order and answered the points of dispute in favour of the appellant. The High Court had no reason to interfere with the same as the award of the Labour Court was based on sound and cogent reasoning, which has served the ends of justice.
16. It is relevant to mention that in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 with regard to the limitations of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227, it was held in para 49 that: (SCC p. 348)
“49. (m) … The power of interference under [Article 227] is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice
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does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.” It was also held that: (SCC p. 347, para 49)
“49. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it.”
14. Emphasizing that while exercising jurisdiction under
Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India, Courts are to
keep in view the goals set out in the Preamble and in Part IV of the
Constitution while construing social welfare legislations, in Harjinder
Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, (2010) 3 SCC 192,
this Court has held as under:
“21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty-bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that:
“10. …The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State. (State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines, AIR 1958 SC 923 at page 928 para 10)”
15. Once the Labour Court has exercised the discretion
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judicially, the High Court can interfere with the award, only if it is
satisfied that the award of the Labour Court is vitiated by any
fundamental flaws. We do not find that the award passed by the
Labour Court suffers from any such flaws. While interfering with the
award of the Labour Court, the High Court did not keep in view the
parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of jurisdiction by the
High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India
and the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.
16. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned
judgment passed by the High Court is set aside and the award
passed by the Labour Court is restored. In the facts and
circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
………………………….J. (V. Gopala Gowda)
.…………………………J. (R. Banumathi)
New Delhi; January 14, 2015
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ITEM NO.1C-For Judgment COURT NO.11 SECTION XV
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 5236/2014
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 03/09/2012 in WA No. 390/2008 passed by the High Court Of Karnataka At Bangalore)
K.V.S.RAM Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
BANGALORE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORT CORP Respondent(s)
Date : 14/01/2015 This petition was called on for pronouncement of JUDGMENT today.
For Petitioner(s) Mr. V. N. Raghupathy,Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. S. N. Bhat,Adv.
Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi pronounced the
judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.
Gopala Gowda and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi.
Delay condoned.
Leave granted.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
(VINOD KR. JHA) (RENU DIWAN) COURT MASTER COURT MASTER
(Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)