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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL     APPEAL     No.      7603              2012   (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3487 of 2011)

K. Suresh       ….. Appellant

Versus

New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and another       .… Respondents  

J     U     D     G     M     E     N     T      

Dipak      Misra,     J   

Leave granted.

2. Despite many a pronouncement in the field, it still remains  

a challenging situation warranting sensitive as well as  

dispassionate exercise how to determine the incalculable sum in  

calculable terms of money in cases of personal injuries.  In such  

assessment neither sentiments nor emotions have any role.  It  

has been stated in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associate

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Collieries Ltd.1 that it is a matter of Pounds, Shillings and  

Pence.  There cannot be actual compensation for anguish of the  

heart or for mental tribulations.  The quintessentiality lies in the  

pragmatic computation of the loss sustained which has to be in  

the realm of realistic approximation.  Therefore, Section 168 of  

the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity ‘the Act’) stipulates that  

there should be grant of “just compensation”.  Thus, it becomes a  

challenge for a court of law to determine “just compensation”  

which is neither a bonanza nor a windfall, and simultaneously,  

should not be a pittance.

3. In Jai Bhagwan v. Laxman Singh and others2, a three-

Judge Bench of this Court, while considering the assessment of  

damages in personal-injury-actions, reproduced the following  

passage from the decision by the House of Lords in H.West &  

Son, Ltd. v. Shephard3 : -

“My Lords, the damages which are to be awarded  for a tort are those which ‘so far as money can  compensate, will give the injured party reparation  for the wrongful act and for all the natural and  direct consequences of the wrongful act’  [Admiralty Comrs. v. Susquehanna (Owners), The  Susquehanna4]. The words ‘so far as money can  

1 1942 AC 601 2 (1994) 5 SCC 5 3 (1963) 2 All ER 625 4 (1926) All ER 124 : 1926 AC 655

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compensate’ point to the impossibility of equating  money with human suffering or personal  deprivations. A money award can be calculated  so as to make good a financial loss. Money may  be awarded so that something tangible may be  procured to replace something else of like nature  which has been destroyed or lost. But money  cannot renew a physical frame that has been  battered and shattered. All that judges and  courts can do is to award sums which must be  regarded as giving reasonable compensation. In  the process there must be the endeavour to  secure some uniformity in the general method of  approach. By common assent awards must be  reasonable and must be assessed with  moderation. Furthermore, it is eminently  desirable that so far as possible comparable  injuries should be compensated by comparable  awards. When all this is said it still must be that  amounts which are awarded are to a considerable  extent conventional.”

In the said case reference was made to a passage from Clerk  

and Lindsell on Torts (16th Edn.) which is apposite to reproduce  

as it relates to the awards for non-pecuniary losses: -

“In all but a few exceptional cases the victim of  personal injury suffers two distinct kinds of  damage which may be classed respectively as  pecuniary and non-pecuniary. By pecuniary  damage is meant that which is susceptible of  direct translation into money terms and includes  such matters as loss of earnings, actual and  prospective, and out-of-pocket expenses, while  non-pecuniary damage includes such  immeasurable elements as pain and suffering  and loss of amenity or enjoyment of life. In  respect of the former, it is submitted, the court

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should and usually does seek to achieve  restitutio in integrum in the sense described  above, while for the latter it seeks to award ‘fair  compensation’. This distinction between  pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage by no  means corresponds to the traditional pleading  distinction between ‘special’  and ‘general’  damages, for while the former is necessarily  concerned solely with pecuniary losses — notably  accrued loss of earnings and out-of-pocket  expenses —  the latter comprises not only non- pecuniary losses but also prospective loss of  earnings and other future pecuniary damage.”

4. In this regard, we may refer with profit the decision of this  

Court in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh and others5 wherein  

the observations of Lord Denning M.R. in Lim Poh Choo v.  

Camden and Islington Area Health Authority6 were quoted  

with approval.  They read thus: -

“The practice is now established and cannot be  gainsaid that, in personal injury cases, the award  of damages is assessed under four main heads:  first, special damages in the shape of money  actually expended; second, cost of future nursing  and attendance and medical expenses; third,  pain and suffering and loss of amenities; fourth,  loss of future earnings.”

5. While having respect for the conventional determination  

there has been evolution of a pattern and the same, from time to  

time, has been kept in accord with the changes in the value of  5 (2003) 2 SCC 274 6 (1979) 1 All ER 332

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money.  Therefore, in the case of Ward v. James7 it has been  

expressed thus: -

“Although you cannot give a man so gravely  injured much for his ‘lost years’, you can,  however, compensate him for his loss during his  shortened span, that is, during his expected  ‘years of survival’. You can compensate him for  his loss of earnings during that time, and for the  cost of treatment, nursing and attendance. But  how can you compensate him for being rendered  a helpless invalid? He may, owing to brain injury,  be rendered unconscious for the rest of his days,  or, owing to a back injury, be unable to rise from  his bed. He has lost everything that makes life  worthwhile. Money is no good to him. Yet judges  and juries have to do the best they can and give  him what they think is fair. No wonder they find  it well nigh insoluble. They are being asked to  calculate the incalculable. The figure is bound to  be for the most part a conventional sum. The  judges have worked out a pattern, and they keep  it in line with the changes in the value of money.”

6. While assessing the damages there is a command to exclude  

considerations which are in the realm of speculation or fancy  

though some guess work or some conjecture to a limited extent is  

inevitable.  That is what has been stated in C.K. Subramania  

Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair8.  Thus, some guess work, some  

hypothetical considerations and some sympathy come into play  

but, a significant one, the ultimate determination is to be viewed  

7 (1965) 1 All ER 563 8 AIR 1970 SC 376

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with some objective standards.  To elaborate, neither the tribunal  

nor a court can take a flight in fancy and award an exorbitant  

sum, for the concept of conventional sum, fall of money value  

and reasonableness are to be kept in view.  Ergo, in conceptual  

eventuality “just compensation” plays a dominant role.   

7. The conception of “just compensation”  is fundamentally  

concretized on certain well established principles and accepted  

legal parameters as well as principles of equity and good  

conscience.  In Yadav Kumar v. Divisional Manager, National  

Insurance Company Limited and another9, a two-Judge  

Bench, while dealing with the facet of “just compensation”, has  

stated thus: -

“It goes without saying that in matters of  determination of compensation both the  tribunal and the court are statutorily charged  with a responsibility of fixing a “just  compensation”.  It is obviously true that  determination of just compensation cannot be  equated to a bonanza.  At the same time the  concept of “just compensation”  obviously  suggests application of fair and equitable  principles and a reasonable approach on the  part of the tribunals and the courts.  This  reasonableness on the part of the tribunal and  the court must be on a large peripheral field.”  

9 (2010) 10 SCC 341

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8. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi10  

this Court has expressed thus: -

“The determination of the quantum must be  liberal, not niggardly since the law values life and  limb in free country in generous scales.”

9. In Mrs. Helen C. Rebello and others v. Maharashtra  

State Road Transport Corpn. and another11, while dealing  

with concept of “just compensation”, it has been ruled that the  

word ‘just’, as its nomenclature, denotes equitability, fairness  

and reasonableness having large peripheral field.  The largeness  

is, of course, not arbitrary; it is restricted by the conscience  

which is fair, reasonable and equitable, if it exceeds; it is termed  

as unfair, unreasonable, unequitable, not just.  The field of wider  

discretion of the tribunal has to be within the said limitations.  It  

is required to make an award determining the amount of  

compensation which in turn appears to be “just and reasonable”,  

for compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in  

golden scales as has been stated in “State of Haryana and  

another v. Jasbir Kaur and others”12.

10 (1979) 4 SCC 365 11 AIR 1998 SC 3191 12 (2003) 7 SCC 484

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10. It is noteworthy to state that an adjudicating authority,  

while determining quantum of compensation, has to keep in view  

the sufferings of the injured person which would include his  

inability to lead a full life, his incapacity to enjoy the normal  

amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries and  

his ability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have  

earned.  Hence, while computing compensation the approach of  

the tribunal or a court has to be broad based.  Needless to say, it  

would involve some guesswork as there cannot be any  

mathematical exactitude or a precise formula to determine the  

quantum of compensation.  In determination of compensation the  

fundamental criterion of “just compensation” should be inhered.   

11. Keeping in view the aforesaid aspects we shall proceed to  

state the factual score.  The factual matrix as unfurled, exposits  

that on 11.3.2002 about 4.00 p.m. the claimant-appellant  

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the claimant) was hit from the behind  

by an auto bearing registration number TN-9 C 7755 which was  

driven in a rash and negligent manner and in the accident he  

sustained triple fracture in spinal cord, fracture in left leg neck of  

femur, fracture in right hand shoulder, deep cut and degloving

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injury over right left thigh bone and multiple injuries all over the  

body.

12. After the accident the claimant was admitted in M.R.  

Hospital where he availed treatment.  After the treatment, the  

dislocation of the bones got reduced, pedical screws were inserted  

into pedicles of D11 vertebra and pedicle screws were passed into  

pedicles of L1 vertebra.  Two screws on left thigh were fixed using  

a rod each.  That apart, decompression of D12 vertebra was done  

and bone chips were placed in the intertransverse area on both  

sides.  He was hospitalized for 28 days.  The victim had  

numbness below the knee joint and was facing difficulty to stand  

and sit comfortably.  As the evidence on record would reveal he  

has been constantly availing physiotherapy treatment facing  

difficulty in carrying out his normal activities.  A disability  

certificate contained as Ex.P4 was filed before the tribunal which  

showed permanent disability at 75%.   

13. The tribunal, as it appears from the award, had also  

assessed the permanent disability at 75% as fixed by PW-4, Dr.  

Thiagarajan.  It had awarded Rs.25,00,000/- under various  

heads, namely, transport charges, extra nourishment, medical

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expenses, additional medical expenses, pain and sufferings  

suffered by family members of the claimant, mental agony,  

additional transport charges, inability of the appellant to  

participate in public functions, loss of marital life, pain and  

suffering, permanent disability and loss of earning capacity.   

14. Before the High Court as serious objections were raised  

pertaining to percentage of disability, the claimant was referred  

to the Medical Board and it was found that he had compression  

fracture which had healed with persistence of pain in the back  

with root involvement causing grade IV power in left lower limb  

and, accordingly, the Board fixed the permanent disability at  

40%.  The High Court adverted to the concept of “just  

compensation”  and opined that the quantum of damages fixed  

should be in proportionate to the injuries caused.  It referred to  

certain authorities and opined that Rs.2,00,000/- towards  

medical expenses, Rs.5,000/- each for transport charges and  

extra nourishment, Rs.2,50,000/- towards pain and suffering,  

Rs.50,000/- for medical expenses and Rs.4,68,000/- towards  

loss of earning capacity would be the just amount of  

compensation.  Thus, the total amount as determined by the  

High Court came to Rs.9,78,000/-.  The High Court reduced the

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interest to 7.5% from 9% as granted by the tribunal.  Be it noted,  

the said judgment and order dated 27.1.2010 passed by the High  

Court of Judicature at Madras in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.  

1989 of 2005 whereby the High Court has reduced the  

compensation granted by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (II  

Small Causes Court), Chennai, on an application being moved  

under Section 166 of the Act is the subject-matter of challenge  

herein.

15. Mr. Vipin Nair, learned counsel appearing for the appellant,  

has contended that the High Court has erroneously held that  

there cannot be grant of compensation under two heads, namely,  

“permanent disability” and “loss of earning power”.  It is urged by  

him that the tribunal had correctly appreciated the evidence on  

record and fixed certain sum under various heads but the High  

Court on unacceptable reasons has deleted the same.  It is also  

canvassed by him that the High Court without ascribing any  

cogent reasons has reduced the expenses for continuous  

treatment from Rs.2,00,000/- to Rs.50,000/- as a result of which  

the amount had been substantially reduced and the concept of  

“just compensation” has lost its real characteristics.

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16. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned counsel appearing for the  

respondent No. 1, supported the order passed by the High Court  

contending, inter alia, that the analysis made by the learned  

single Judge is absolutely flawless and the interference in the  

quantum cannot be faulted inasmuch as the tribunal has  

awarded a large sum on certain heads which are totally  

impermissible in law.  It is also urged by her that certain sums  

had been allowed by the tribunal without any material on record  

and, therefore, the High Court has correctly interfered with the  

award.

17. The seminal issues that really emanate for consideration are  

whether the analysis made by the High Court in not granting  

compensation under certain heads and further reduing the  

amount on certain scores, are justified.  Regard being had to the  

fundamental essence of “just compensation”, we shall presently  

deal with the manner in which the High Court has dwelled upon  

various heads in respect of which the tribunal had granted  

certain sums towards compensation.  On a perusal of the order  

passed by the High Court, it is manifest that the High Court  

relying on certain authorities of the said court has expressed the  

view that once a particular amount has been awarded towards

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`permanent disability’, no further amount can be awarded  

relating to `loss of earning capacity’.  The learned counsel for the  

appellant has commended us to the pronouncement of this Court  

in B. Kothandapani v. Tamil Nadu State Transport  

Corporation Ltd.13, wherein the High Court had placed reliance  

on the Full Bench decision in Cholan Roadways Corporation  

Ltd. v. Ahmed Thambi14.  This Court referred to the  

pronouncement in Ramesh Chandra v. Randhir Singh15,  

wherein it has been stated thus: -

“With regard to ground 19 covering the  question that the sum awarded for pain,  suffering and loss of enjoyment of life, etc.  termed as general damages should be taken to  be covered by damages granted for loss of  earnings is concerned that too is misplaced and  without any basis. The pain and suffering and  loss of enjoyment of life which is a resultant  and permanent fact occasioned by the nature of  injuries received by the claimant and the ordeal  he had to undergo.”

18. In Ramesh Chandra (supra) the learned Judges proceeded  

to address the issue of difficulty or incapacity to earn and how it  

13 (2011) 6 SCC 420 14 (2006) 4 CTC 433 (Mad) 15 (1990) 3 SCC 723

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stands on a different footing than pain and suffering affecting  

enjoyment of life and stated as under: -

“The inability to earn livelihood on the basis of  incapacity or disability which is quite different.  The incapacity or disability to earn a livelihood  would have to be viewed not only in praesenti  but in futuro on reasonable expectancies and  taking into account deprival of earnings of a  conceivable period. This head being totally  different cannot in our view overlap the grant of  compensation under the head of pain, suffering  and loss of enjoyment of life. One head relates  to the impairment of person’s capacity to earn,  the other relates to the pain and suffering and  loss of enjoyment of life by the person himself.”

19. After referring to the said passage, the Bench proceeded to  

state that it is true that compensation for loss of earning  

power/capacity has to be determined based on various aspects  

including permanent injury/disability, but at the same time, it  

cannot be construed that that compensation cannot be granted  

for permanent disability of any nature.  It has been mentioned by  

way of an example that in a case of a non-earning member of a  

family who has been injured in an accident and sustained  

permanent disability due to amputation of leg or hand, it cannot  

be construed that no amount needs to be granted for permanent  

disability.  It cannot be disputed that apart from the fact that the

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permanent disability affects the earning capacity of the person  

concerned, undoubtedly, one has to forego other personal  

comforts and even for normal avocation they have to depend on  

others.

20. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, the view of the  

High Court that no compensation can be granted towards  

permanent disability once compensation is computed for the loss  

of earning capacity and loss of future earnings is unsustainable.  

As is perceivable, the High Court has computed the loss of  

earning power at Rs.4,68,000/- instead of Rs.5,00,000/- as  

determined by the tribunal and deleted sum of Rs.3,00,000/-  

that was awarded by the tribunal towards permanent disability.  

In our considered opinion, total deletion is absolutely unjustified  

and, in fact, runs counter to the principles laid down by this  

Court in Ramesh Chandra (supra) and B. Kothandapani  

(supra).   

21. At this juncture, we think it seemly to state that it is a case  

where the victim has suffered serious injuries.  As far as the  

injuries are concerned, there is concurrence of opinion by the  

tribunal as well as by the High Court.  The High Court has only

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reduced the percentage of permanent disability on the basis of  

assessment made by the Medical Board as there was a serious  

cavil with regard to the said percentage.  While determining  

compensation payable to a victim of an accident the parameters  

which are to be kept in view have been succinctly stated in R.D.  

Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and others16: -

“9. Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of  compensation payable to a victim of an accident,  the damages have to be assessed separately as  pecuniary damages and special damages.  Pecuniary damages are those which the victim  has actually incurred and which are capable of  being calculated in terms of money; whereas non- pecuniary damages are those which are  incapable of being assessed by arithmetical  calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts  pecuniary damages may include expenses  incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance;  (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial;  (iii) other material loss. So far non-pecuniary  damages are concerned, they may include (i)  damages for mental and physical shock, pain and  suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered  in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss  of amenities of life which may include a variety of  matters i.e. on account of injury the claimant  may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages  for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on account  of injury the normal longevity of the person  concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience,  hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration  and mental stress in life.”

16 (1995) 1 SCC 551

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22. In Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance  

Company Limited and another17 a two-Judge Bench referred to  

the authority in Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas18 and  

applied the principle of multiplier for future earnings in a case of  

permanent disability.  We have referred to this decision solely for  

the purpose that multiplier principle has been made applicable to  

an application preferred under Section 166 of the Act.

23. In this context it is useful to refer to Raj Kumar v. Ajay  

Kumar and Another19, wherein a two-Judge Bench after  

referring to the award of compensation in personal injury cases  

reiterated the concepts of pecuniary damages (special damages)  

and non-pecuniary damages (general damages).  The Bench  

referred to the decisions in C.K. Subramania Iyer (supra), R.D.  

Hattangadi (supra) and Baker v. Willoughby20 and expressed  

the view that it is obligatory on the part of the court or the  

tribunal to assess the damages objectively and exclude from  

consideration any speculation or fancy, though some conjecture  

17 (2010) 10 SCC 254 18 (1994) 2 SCC 176 19 (2011) 1 SCC 343 20 1970 AC 467 : (1970) 2 WLR 50 : (1969) 3 All ER 1528 (HL)

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with reference to the nature of disability and its consequences, is  

inevitable.  A person is not only to be compensated for the  

physical injury, but also for the loss which he suffered as a result  

of such injury.  He is to be compensated for his inability to lead a  

full life, his inability to enjoy those normal amenities which he  

would have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inability to earn  

as much as he used to earn or could have earned.  

24.  It is worthy noting that the Bench referred to the pecuniary  

damages and non-pecuniary damages and opined thus: -

“Pecuniary damages (Special damages)

(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation,  medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and  miscellaneous expenditure.

(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured  would have made had he not been injured, comprising:

(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;

(b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent  disability.

(iii) Future medical expenses.

Non-pecuniary damages (General damages)

(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a  consequence of the injuries.

(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of  marriage).

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(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal  longevity).”

25. After so stating the Bench proceeded to opine that  

assessment of pecuniary damages under Item (i) and under Item  

(ii)(a) do not pose much difficulty as they involve reimbursement  

of actuals and are easily ascertainable from the evidence. Award  

under the head of future medical expenses—Item (iii)—depends  

upon specific medical evidence regarding need for further  

treatment and cost thereof. Assessment of non-pecuniary  

damages—Items (iv), (v) and (vi)—involves determination of lump  

sum amounts with reference to circumstances such as age,  

nature of injury/deprivation/disability suffered by the claimant  

and the effect thereof on the future life of the claimant. It has  

been observed therein that what usually poses some difficulty is  

the assessment of the loss of future earnings on account of  

permanent disability—Item (ii)(a).  Thereafter, the Bench adverted  

to the features which are necessary while assessing the loss of  

future earnings on account of permanent disability.  In the said  

case it has been opined that permanent disability can be either  

partial or total and the assessment of compensation under the

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heads of loss of future earnings would depend upon the factum  

and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity.  

It has been laid down that the tribunal should not mechanically  

apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of  

economic loss or loss of earning capacity.  It has been further  

observed that in most of the cases, the percentage of economic  

loss, i.e., the percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from  

a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of  

permanent disability.  However, in some cases on appreciation of  

evidence and assessment the percentage of loss of earning  

capacity as a result of the permanent disability would be  

approximately the same as the percentage of permanent  

disability in which case, of course, the court or tribunal would  

adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation.  To  

arrive at the said conclusion reliance was placed on Arvind  

Kumar Mishra (supra) and Yadav Kumar (supra).   

26. In the case at hand the High Court has determined the loss  

of earning capacity on the base of multiplier method and reduced  

the quantum awarded by the tribunal from Rs.5,00,000/- to  

Rs.4,68,000/-.  Applying the ratio in Yadav Kumar (supra) and  

Arvind Kumar Mishra (supra) and also Raj Kumar (supra) and

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regard being had to the serious nature of injury we do not find  

any error in the said method of calculation and, accordingly, we  

uphold the method of computation as well as the quantum.

27. Presently to the grant of compensation on other scores.  It is  

noticeable that the High Court has reduced the additional  

medical expenses from Rs.2,00,000/- to Rs.50,000/-.  In our  

considered opinion, the same is not correct as there is ample  

evidence on record as regards the necessity for treatment in  

future.  It is demonstrable that pedicle screws were passed into  

pedicles of D11 vertebra; pedicle screws were passed into  

pedicles of L1 vertebra; and two screws on left thigh were  

connected using a rod each.  That may be required to be removed  

or scanned from time to time depending upon other aspects.  

That apart, there is persistent pain and as medically advised  

physiotherapy is necessary and hence, continuous treatment has  

to be availed of.  Thus, the High Court was not justified in  

reducing the said amount.

28. The High Court has maintained the award in respect of  

transport charges, extra nourishment, medical expenses and,  

accordingly, they are maintained.  It has enhanced the award

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from Rs.2,00,000/- to Rs.2,50,000 on the head of pain and  

suffering, but has deleted the amount awarded on permanent  

disability from the total compensation awarded by the tribunal  

by relying on the decision in Cholan Roadways Corporation  

Ltd. (supra).  As has been stated earlier, the said decision has  

been considered in B. Kothandapani (supra) and is not  

accepted, and this Court has expressed the view that grant of  

compensation towards permanent disability is permissible.  

Regard been had to the totality of the facts and circumstances,  

we are inclined to think that compensation of Rs.2,50,000/-  

should be granted towards permanent disability and  

Rs.2,00,000/- towards pain and suffering.  We have so held as  

the injury is of serious nature and under the heading of non-

pecuniary damages compensation is awardable under the  

headings of pain and suffering and damages for loss of amenities  

of life on account of injury.  In the case of R.D. Hattangadi  

(supra) this Court has granted compensation under two heads,  

namely, “pain and suffering” and “loss of amenities of life”.  Quite  

apart from that compensation was granted towards future  

earnings.  In Laxman v. Divisional Manager, Oriental  

Insurance Co. Ltd. and another21 it has been ruled thus: - 21 2012 ACJ 191

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“The ratio of the above noted judgments is that if  the victim of an accident suffers permanent or  temporary disability, then efforts should always  be made to award adequate compensation not  only for the physical injury and treatment, but  also for the pain, suffering and trauma caused  due to accident, loss of earnings and victim’s  inability to lead a normal life and enjoy  amenities, which he would have enjoyed but for  the disability caused due to the accident.”

Thus, the deletion by the High Court was not justified.  However,  

we have restricted to the amount as stated hereinbefore.

29. The High Court has deleted the additional transport  

charges.  We are disposed to think that while availing treatment  

the said expenses would be imperative.  Hence, there was no  

justification to reduce the same and, accordingly, we restore it.

30. It is perceptible that the High Court has deleted the amount  

awarded under the head of pain and suffering by family members  

of the claimant and the amount granted towards loss of marital  

life.  There is no iota of evidence with regard to loss of marital  

life, hence, we do not find any error in the said deletion.  As far  

as grant of compensation on the score of pain and suffering  

suffered by the family members of claimant is concerned, the

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same is not permissible and, accordingly, we hold that that has  

been correctly deleted.

31. The High Court has deleted an amount of Rs.3,00,000/-  

and a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- towards mental agony and inability  

on the part of the claimant to participate in public functions  

respectively.  We have already determined Rs.2,00,000/- under  

the heading of pain and suffering already suffered and to be  

suffered and Rs.2,50,000/- under the heading of permanent  

disability and hence, no different sum need be awarded under  

the heading of mental agony.  As far as participation in public  

functions is concerned, there is no evidence in that regard and,  

therefore, we are disposed to think that the finding of the High  

Court on that score is totally justified and does not call for any  

interference.   

32. Calculated on the aforesaid base, the compensation would  

be payable on the headings, namely, transport charges, extra-

nourishment, medical expenses, additional medical expenses,  

additional transport charges, pain and suffering, loss of earning  

capacity and permanent disability and the amount on the  

aforesaid scores would be, in toto, Rs.13,48,000/-.  The said

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amount shall carry interest at the rate of 7.5% from the date of  

application till the date of payment.  The same shall be deposited  

before the tribunal within a period of two months and the  

tribunal shall disburse 50% of the amount in favour of the  

claimant and the rest of the amount shall be deposited in a  

nationalized bank for a period of three years.  Be it clarified if the  

earlier awarded sum has been deposited, the differential sum  

shall be deposited within the stipulated time as mentioned  

hereinabove and the disbursement shall take place accordingly.  

33. Consequently, the appeal is allowed in part leaving the  

parties to bear their respective costs.

……………………………….J. [K. S. Radhakrishnan]

……………………………….J. [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi; October 19, 2012.