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     REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 1213  OF 2006

K.SRINIVAS .….. APPELLANT

vs

K. SUNITA   ….. RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAMAJIT SEN,J.   1 In this Appeal, counsel for the Appellant has sought to  

draw  our  attention  to  all  the  arguments  that  had  been  

addressed before the High Court on behalf of the Appellant-

Husband  in  support  of  his  claim  for  dissolution  of  his  

marriage to the Respondent by a decree of divorce under  

Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.   We  

have,  however,  restricted  him  to  the  ground  of  alleged  

cruelty on account of the filing of a criminal complaint by  

the Respondent against the Appellant and several members of  

his family under Sections 498A and 307 of the Indian Penal  

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Code (IPC).  We did this for the reason that if this ground  

is successfully substantiated by the Petitioner, we need not  

delve any further i.e. whether a marriage can be dissolved  

by the Trial Court or the High Court on the premise that the  

marriage has irretrievably broken down.   This nature of  

cruelty, in the wake of filing of a false criminal case by  

either of the spouses, has been agitated frequently before  

this Court, and has been discussed so comprehensively and  

thoroughly that yet another Judgment on this well-settled  

question of law, would be merely a waste of time.   A  

complete discourse and analysis on this issue is available  

in a well-reasoned judgment in  K. Srinivas Rao vs. D.A.  Deepa, 2013(5) SCC 226, in which numerous decisions have  

been cited and discussed.   It is now beyond cavil that if a  

false criminal complaint is preferred by either spouse it  

would  invariably  and  indubitably  constitute  matrimonial  

cruelty, such as would entitle the other spouse to claim a  

divorce.

2 The marriage of the parties was celebrated according to  

Hindu rites at Hyderabad on 11th February, 1989.  A male  

child was born to the parties on 8th May, 1991, after which  

the Respondent-Wife, as per her pleadings, started suffering  

from Sheehan’s syndrome.   On the night of 29th/30th June,  

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1995, the Respondent left the matrimonial house and ever  

since then she has been living with her brother, who is a  

senior IAS officer.   On 14th July, 1995, the Appellant  

filed an original petition praying for divorce on the ground  

of cruelty as well as of the irretrievable breakdown of  

their marriage.   The Respondent-Wife retorted by filing a  

criminal complaint against the Appellant as well as seven  

members of his family for offences under Section 307 read  

with Sections 34, 148A, 384, 324 of the IPC, and Sections 4  

and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.   It is pursuant  

to this complaint that the Appellant-Husband and seven of  

his family members were arrested and incarcerated.    The  

Respondent-Wife also filed a petition under Section 9 of the  

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for restitution of conjugal rights.  

On 30th June, 2000, the Learned Vth Additional Metropolitan  

Sessions  Judge,  Mahila  Court,  Hyderabad,  acquitted  the  

Appellant  and  his  family  members,  and  this  Order  has  

attained finality.  Meanwhile, by its Judgment dated 30th  

December, 1999, the Family Court at Hyderabad, granted a  

divorce to the Appellant on the ground of cruelty as also  

irretrievable  breakdown  of  marriage;  it  rejected  the  

Respondent’s petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage  

Act.    The Respondent-Wife successfully appealed against  

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the said Judgment in the High Court, and it is this Order  

dated 7th November, 2005 that is impugned before us.    

3 Irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for  

divorce has not found statutory acceptance till date.  Under  

Article  142  of  the  Constitution,  the  Supreme  Court  has  

plenary powers “to pass such decree or make such order as is  

necessary for doing complete justice in any case or order  

pending  before  it”.   This  power,  however,  has  not  been  

bestowed by our Constitution on any other Court.    It is  

for these reasons that we have confined arguments only to  

the  aspect  of  whether  the  filing  of  a  false  criminal  

complaint sufficiently proves matrimonial cruelty as would  

entitle the injured party to claim dissolution of marriage.  

It will be relevant to mention that the Law Commission of  

India  in  its  Reports  in  1978  as  well  as  in  2009  has  

recommended the introduction of irretrievable breakdown of  

marriage  as  a  ground  for  dissolution  of  marriage;  the  

Marriage Laws (Amendment) Bill of 2013 incorporating the  

ground has even received the assent of the Rajya Sabha.  It  

is,  however,  highly  debatable  whether,  in  the  Indian  

situation, where there is rampant oppression of women, such  

a ground would at all be expedient.   But that controversy  

will be considered by the Lok Sabha.   

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4. In  the  case  in  hand,  learned  counsel  for  the  

Respondent-Wife  has  vehemently  contended  that  it  is  not  

possible to label the wife’s criminal complaint detailed  

above as a false or a vindictive action.    In other words,  

the acquittal of the Appellant and his family members in the  

criminal complaint does not by itself, automatically and  

justifiably, lead to the conclusion that the complaint was  

false;  that  only  one  complaint  was  preferred  by  the  

Respondent-Wife,  whereas,  in  contradistinction,  in  

K.Srinivas Rao a series of complaints by the wife had been  preferred.   The argument was premised on the averment that  

the investigation may have been faulty or the prosecution  

may have been so careless as to lead to the acquittal, but  

the acquittal would not always indicate that the Complainant  

had intentionally filed a false case.  What should be kept  

in  perspective,  it  is  reasonably  argued,  that  the  

Complainant  is  not  the  controlling  conductor  in  this  

Orchestra, but only one of the musicians who must deliver  

her rendition as and when and how she is called upon to do.  

Secondly, according to the learned counsel, the position  

would have been appreciably different if a specific finding  

regarding  the  falsity  of  the  criminal  complaint  was  

returned, or if the Complainant or a witness on her behalf  

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had committed perjury or had recorded a contradictory or  

incredible testimony.   Learned counsel for the Respondent-

Wife states that neither possibility has manifested itself  

here and, therefore, it would be unfair to the Respondent-

Wife to conclude that she had exhibited such cruelty towards  

the  Appellant  and  her  in-laws  that  would  justify  the  

dissolution of her marriage.

5 The  Respondent-Wife  has  admitted  in  her  cross-

examination that she did not mention all the incidents on  

which her Complaint is predicated, in her statement under  

Section 161 of the Cr.P.C.   It is not her case that she had  

actually  narrated  all  these  facts  to  the  Investigating  

Officer, but that he had neglected to mention them.   This,  

it seems to us, is clearly indicative of the fact that the  

criminal  complaint  was  a  contrived  afterthought.     We  

affirm  the  view  of  the  High  Court  that  the  criminal  

complaint was “ill advised”. Adding thereto is the factor  

that the High Court had been informed of the acquittal of  

the Appellant-Husband and members of his family.  In these  

circumstances, the High Court ought to have concluded that  

the  Respondent-Wife  knowingly  and  intentionally  filed  a  

false complaint, calculated to embarrass and incarcerate the  

Appellant and seven members of his family and that such  

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conduct unquestionably constitutes cruelty as postulated in  

Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act.    

6 Another argument which has been articulated on behalf  

of the learned counsel for the Respondent is that the filing  

of  the  criminal  complaint  has  not  been  pleaded  in  the  

petition itself.  As we see it, the criminal complaint was  

filed by the wife after filing of the husband’s divorce  

petition, and being subsequent events could have been looked  

into by the Court.   In any event, both the parties were  

fully aware of this facet of cruelty which was allegedly  

suffered by the husband.   When evidence was lead, as also  

when arguments were addressed, objection had not been raised  

on behalf of the Respondent-Wife that this aspect of cruelty  

was beyond the pleadings.   We are, therefore, not impressed  

by this argument raised on her behalf.

7 In these circumstances, we find that the Appeal is well  

founded and deserves to be allowed.  We unequivocally find  

that  the  Respondent-Wife  had  filed  a  false  criminal  

complaint,  and  even  one  such  complaint  is  sufficient  to  

constitute matrimonial cruelty.    

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8 We, accordingly, dissolve the marriage of the parties  

under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act.   The  

parties shall bear their respective costs.  

      ...............................J. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]  

...............................J. [PRAFULLA C. PANT]

New Delhi; 19th November, 2014.  

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