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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1794 OF 2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4782 of  

2007)

K. SRINIVAS RAO … APPELLANT

Versus

D.A. DEEPA … RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1. Leave granted.  

2.  This appeal,  by special  leave,  has been filed by the  

appellant-husband,  being  aggrieved  by  the  judgment  and  

order dated 8/11/2006 passed by the Andhra Pradesh High  

Court in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.797/03, setting aside  

the decree of divorce granted in his favour.

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3. The appellant-husband is working as Assistant Registrar  

in the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The marriage between the  

appellant-husband and the respondent-wife was solemnized  

on 25/4/1999 as per Hindu rites and customs. Unfortunately,  

on the very next day disputes arose between the elders on  

both sides which resulted in their abusing each other and  

hurling  chappals  at  each  other.  As  a  consequence,  on  

27/4/1999, the newly married couple got separated without  

consummation of the marriage and started living separately.  

On  4/10/1999,  the  respondent-wife  lodged  a  criminal  

complaint against the appellant-husband before the Women  

Protection Cell alleging inter alia that the appellant-husband  

is  harassing  her  for  more  dowry.  This  complaint  is  very  

crucial to this case. We shall  advert to it more in detail  a  

little  later.   Escalated  acrimony  led  to  complaints  and  

counter  complaints.  The  respondent-wife  filed  a  petition  

under  Section  9  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955  for  

restitution  of  conjugal  rights  before  the  Family  Court,  

Secunderabad.  The appellant-husband filed a counter-claim  

seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty and  

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desertion  under  Section  13(1)(i-a)  and  (b)  of  the  Hindu  

Marriage Act, 1955.  

4. The  Family  Court  while  dismissing  the  petition  for  

restitution of conjugal rights and granting decree of divorce  

inter  alia held  that  the  respondent-wife  stayed  in  the  

appellant-husband’s house only for a day, she admitted that  

she did not have any conversation with anyone and hence  

any amount of oral evidence adduced by her will not support  

her plea that she was harassed and driven out of the house;  

that the story that the appellant-husband made a demand of  

dowry of Rs.10,00,000/- is false; that by filing false complaint  

against  the  appellant-husband  and  his  family,  alleging  

offence under Section 498-A of the IPC in the Metropolitan  

Magistrate  Court,  Hyderabad  and  by  filing  complaints  

against the appellant-husband in the High Court where he is  

working, the respondent-wife caused mental cruelty to the  

appellant-husband and that reunion was not possible.  The  

Family  Court  directed  the  appellant-husband  to  repay  

Rs.80,000/-  given  by  the  respondent-wife’s  father  to  him  

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with interest at 8% per annum from the date of the marriage  

till payment.  

5. By the impugned judgment the High Court allowed the  

appeal  carried  by  the  respondent-wife  against  the  said  

judgment  and  set  aside  the  decree  of  divorce  granted in  

favour of the appellant-husband. The High Court  inter alia  

observed that the finding of the Family Court that lodging a  

complaint  with  the  police  against  the  appellant-husband  

amounts to cruelty is perverse because it is not a ground for  

divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.  The High Court  

further held that the appellant-husband and the respondent-

wife did not live together for a long time and, therefore, the  

question of their treating each other with cruelty does not  

arise.  According to the High Court, the conclusion that the  

respondent-wife  caused  mental  cruelty  to  the  appellant-

husband is based on presumptions and assumptions.  

6. Mr. Jayanth Muth Raj, learned counsel for the appellant-

husband assailed  the  conduct  of  the  respondent-wife  and  

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submitted that it disentitles her from getting any relief from  

this Court.   Counsel took us through the complaint lodged  

by  the  respondent-wife  with  the  Superintendent  of  Police,  

Women  Protection  Cell,  Hyderabad,  making  defamatory  

allegations against the mother of the appellant-husband and  

drew our attention to the various legal proceedings initiated  

by  her  against  the  appellant-husband  and  his  family.  

Counsel submitted that she also lodged complaints with the  

High Court asking for the removal of the appellant-husband  

from his job.  Counsel submitted that by lodging such false  

complaints  the  respondent-wife  caused  extreme  mental  

cruelty to  the appellant-husband.   Counsel  submitted that  

the  High  Court  fell  into  a  grave  error  in  observing  that  

because the respondent-wife did not live with the appellant-

husband for long she could not have caused mental cruelty  

to him.  Counsel submitted that this observation is erroneous  

and is contrary to the law laid down by this Court.  False and  

defamatory allegations made in the pleadings can also cause  

mental  cruelty.   Counsel  submitted that  the marriage has  

irretrievably broken down and, therefore, it is necessary to  

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dissolve  it  by  a  decree  of  divorce.   In  support  of  his  

submissions counsel placed reliance on G.V.N. Kameswara  

Rao vs. G. Jabilli1, Parveen Mehta vs. Inderjit Mehta2,  

Vijayakumar R. Bhate vs.  Neela Vijayakumar Bhate3,  

Durga  Prasanna  Tripathy vs.  Arundhati  Tripathy4,  

Naveen Kohli vs.  Neelu Kohli5 and  Samar Ghosh vs.  

Jaya Ghosh6.

7. Mr.  D.  Rama Krishna  Reddy,  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondent-wife,  on  the  other  hand,  submitted  that  the  

father of the respondent-wife had given Rs.80,000/- and 15  

tolas  of  gold  as  dowry  to  the  appellant-husband’s  family.  

However, they demanded additional cash of Rs.10,00,000/-.  

Because this demand could not be met, the respondent-wife  

and her family was humiliated and ill-treated. Therefore, the  

parents of the respondent-wife had to return to their house  

along with her immediately after marriage.  The father of the  

respondent-wife  made  efforts  to  talk  to  the  appellant-

1 (2002) 2 SCC 296 2 (2002) 5 SCC 706 3 (2003) 6 SCC 334 4 (2005) 7 SCC 353 5 (2006) 4 SCC 558 6 (2007) 4 SCC 511

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husband’s family,  but,  they did not respond to his efforts.  

They  persisted  with  their  demands  and,  therefore,  the  

respondent-wife had no alternative but to lodge complaint  

against  them  under  Section  498-A  of  the  IPC  before  the  

Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad.  The appellant-husband  

thereafter gave a false assurance that he will not harass her  

and, therefore, she withdrew the complaint and went to the  

matrimonial house.  However, the approach of the appellant-

husband and his family did not change. She had to therefore  

renew her complaint.  Counsel submitted that only because  

of  the  obstinate  and  uncompromising  attitude  of  the  

appellant-husband and his family  that the respondent-wife  

had  to  take  recourse  to  court  proceedings.   Counsel  

submitted that the respondent-wife values the matrimonial  

tie.   She  wants  to  lead  a  happy  married  life  with  the  

appellant-husband.  She had, therefore, filed a petition for  

restitution of conjugal rights which should have been allowed  

by the Family Court.  Counsel submitted that after properly  

evaluating all the circumstances the High Court has rightly  

set  aside  the  decree  of  divorce  and  granted  a  decree  of  

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restitution of  conjugal  rights.   The High Court’s  judgment,  

therefore, merits no interference.  

8. The matrimonial dispute started with a quarrel between  

the  elders  of  both  sides  in  which  initially  the  appellant-

husband and the respondent-wife were not involved.   The  

ego  battle  of  the  elders  took  an  ugly  turn.   Parties  were  

dragged  to  the  court  and  the  inevitable  happened.  The  

relations between the two families got strained. With a fond  

hope that we could bring about a settlement we requested  

the counsel to talk to the parties and convey our wishes that  

they should bury the hatchet and start living together. We  

also tried to counsel them in the court.  The respondent-wife  

appears to be very keen to go back to the matrimonial home  

and start life afresh, but the appellant-husband is adamant.  

He  conveyed  to  us  through  his  counsel  that  by  filing  

repeated  false  complaints  against  him and  his  family  the  

respondent-wife  has  caused  extreme cruelty  to  them and  

therefore it will not be possible to take her back.  In view of  

this we have no option but to proceed with the case.  

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9. The  High  Court  has  taken  a  view  that  since  the  

appellant-husband  and  the  respondent-wife  did  not  stay  

together,  there  is  no  question  of  their  causing  cruelty  to  

each other.  The High Court concluded that the conclusion  

drawn by the Family Court that the respondent-wife caused  

mental cruelty to the appellant-husband is erroneous.  We  

are unable to agree with the High Court.

10. Under  Section  13(1)(i-a)  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  

1955, a marriage can be dissolved by a decree of divorce on  

a petition presented either by the husband or the wife on the  

ground that the other party has, after solemnization of the  

marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty.  In a series of  

judgments this Court has repeatedly stated the meaning and  

outlined the scope of the term ‘cruelty’.  Cruelty is evident  

where one spouse has so treated the other and manifested  

such feelings towards her or him as to cause in her or his  

mind  reasonable  apprehension  that  it  will  be  harmful  or  

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injurious  to  live  with  the  other  spouse.   Cruelty  may  be  

physical or mental.   

11. In  Samar Ghosh this Court set out illustrative cases  

where inference of ‘mental cruelty’ can be drawn.  This list is  

obviously  not  exhaustive  because  each  case  presents  it’s  

own peculiar  factual  matrix  and existence or  otherwise of  

mental cruelty will have to be judged after applying mind to  

it.  We must quote the relevant paragraph of Samar Ghosh.  

We have reproduced only the instances which are relevant  

to the present case.

“101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down  for  guidance,  yet  we  deem  it  appropriate  to   enumerate  some  instances  of  human  behaviour   which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of   “mental  cruelty”.  The instances  indicated in  the   succeeding  paragraphs  are  only  illustrative  and   not exhaustive:

(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life   of  the  parties,  acute  mental  pain,  agony  and  suffering  as  would  not  make  possible  for  the   parties to live with each other could come within   the broad parameters of mental cruelty.

(ii)  On  comprehensive  appraisal  of  the  entire   matrimonial  life  of  the  parties,  it  becomes  abundantly  clear  that  situation  is  such  that  the   

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wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put   up  with  such  conduct  and continue  to  live  with   other party.

(iii) xxx xxx xxx

(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling  of  deep  anguish,  disappointment,  frustration  in   one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a   long time may lead to mental cruelty.

(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating   treatment  calculated  to  torture,  discommode  or   render miserable life of the spouse.

(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour   of  one  spouse  actually  affecting  physical  and   mental health of the other spouse. The treatment   complained  of  and  the  resultant  danger  or   apprehension must be very grave, substantial and   weighty.

(vii) xxx xxx xxx

(viii) xxx xxx xxx

(ix) xxx xxx xxx  

(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole   and a few isolated instances over a period of years   will not amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be   persistent  for  a  fairly  lengthy  period,  where the   relationship  has  deteriorated  to  an  extent  that   because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse,   the wronged party  finds  it  extremely  difficult  to   live with the other party any longer, may amount   to mental cruelty.

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(xi) xxx xxx xxx

(xii) xxx xxx xxx  

(xiii) xxx xxx xxx

(xiv)  Where  there  has  been  a  long  period  of   continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded   that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair.  The  marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a   legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in   such  cases,  does  not  serve  the  sanctity  of   marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard   for  the  feelings  and  emotions  of  the  parties.  In   such  like  situations,  it  may  lead  to  mental   cruelty.”

It is pertinent to note that in this case the husband and  

wife had lived separately for more than sixteen and a half  

years.   This  fact  was  taken  into  consideration  along  with  

other  facts  as  leading  to  the  conclusion  that  matrimonial  

bond  had  been  ruptured  beyond  repair  because  of  the  

mental cruelty caused by the wife.  Similar view was taken in  

Naveen Kohli.

12. In V. Bhagat  v.  D. Bhagat7  in the divorce petition  

filed by the husband the wife filed written statement stating  7 (1994) 1 SCC 337

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that the husband was suffering from mental  hallucination,  

that  his  was  a  morbid  mind  for  which  he  needs  expert  

psychiatric  treatment  and  that  he  was  suffering  from  

‘paranoid  disorder’.   In  cross-examination her  counsel  put  

several  questions  to  the  husband  suggesting  that  several  

members  of  his  family  including  his  grandfather  were  

lunatics.   This court held that these assertions cannot but  

constitute mental cruelty of such a nature that the husband  

cannot  be  asked  to  live  with  the  wife  thereafter.   Such  

pleadings  and  questions  it  was  held,  are  bound  to  cause  

immense  mental  pain  and  anguish  to  the  husband.   In  

Vijaykumar Bhate disgusting accusations of unchastity and  

indecent  familiarity  with  a  neighbour  were  made  in  the  

written statement.  This Court held that the allegations are  

of  such  quality,  magnitude  and  consequence  as  to  cause  

mental  pain,  agony  and  suffering  amounting  to  the  

reformulated concept of cruelty in matrimonial law causing  

profound and lasting disruption and driving the wife to feel  

deeply  hurt  and  reasonably  apprehend  that  it  would  be  

dangerous to live with her husband.  In  Naveen Kohli the  

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respondent-wife got an advertisement issued in a national  

newspaper that her husband was her employee.   She got  

another news item issued cautioning his business associates  

to  avoid  dealing  with  him.   This  was  treated  as  causing  

mental cruelty to the husband.  

13. In Naveen Kohli the wife had filed several complaints  

and  cases  against  the  husband.   This  Court  viewed  her  

conduct as a conduct causing mental cruelty and observed  

that  the finding of  the High Court  that  these proceedings  

could not be taken to be such which may warrant annulment  

of marriage is wholly unsustainable.

14. Thus,  to  the  instances  illustrative  of  mental  cruelty  

noted in Samar Ghosh, we could add a few more.  Making  

unfounded  indecent  defamatory  allegations  against  the  

spouse  or  his  or  her  relatives  in  the  pleadings,  filing  of  

complaints or issuing notices or news items which may have  

adverse impact on the business prospect or the job of the  

spouse and filing repeated false complaints and cases in the  

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court  against  the  spouse  would,  in  the  facts  of  a  case,  

amount to causing mental cruelty to the other spouse.

15. We shall apply the above principles to the present case.  

Firstly, it is necessary to have a look at the legal proceedings  

initiated  by  both  sides  against  each  other.   The  facts  on  

record disclose that after the marriage, due to some dispute  

which  arose  between  the  elders,  both  sides  abused  and  

virtually  attacked  each  other.   The  respondent-wife  was  

taken  by  her  parents  to  their  house.   According  to  the  

respondent-wife, her father made efforts to bring about an  

amicable  settlement  but  the  other  side  did  not  respond  

favourably  and,  therefore,  on  4/10/1999  she  lodged  a  

complaint  with  the  Superintendent  of  Police,  Women  

Protection Cell against the appellant-husband and members  

of his family.   In our opinion, this complaint is, to a large  

extent, responsible for widening the rift between the parties.  

In this complaint, after alleging ill-treatment and harassment  

for dowry, it is alleged that mother of the appellant-husband  

asked the respondent-wife to  sleep with the father  of  the  

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appellant-husband.  When  she  was  cross-examined  in  the  

Family Court during the hearing of her petition for restitution  

of conjugal rights the respondent-wife admitted that she had  

lodged  the  complaint.  PW-2  her  mother,  in  her  cross-

examination stated that though they had asked her not to  

lodge the complaint, the respondent-wife lodged it.  She told  

them  that  she  had  lodged  the  complaint  because  the  

appellant-husband was not listening to her.  Thus, it appears  

that this complaint was lodged out of frustration and anger  

and was a reaction to the appellant-husband’s refusal to live  

with her.  It was, perhaps, felt by her that because of the  

pressure of such a complaint the appellant-husband would  

take  her  back  to  his  house.   Far  from  helping  the  

respondent-wife,  the  complaint  appears  to  have  caused  

irreparable  harm  to  her.   It  increased  the  bitterness.  

Perhaps,  the  respondent-wife  was misguided by someone.  

But, such evidence is not on record.  Even in this court, this  

complaint appears to us to be a major factor amongst others  

impeding settlement.  Pursuant to the said complaint, Crime  

No.8/2000  was  registered  by  C.I.D.,  Hyderabad,  in  the  

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Metropolitan Magistrate  (Mahila  Court),  Hyderabad against  

the appellant-husband and his family under Section 498-A of  

the IPC.  It is the respondent-wife’s case that the appellant-

husband gave an assurance before the police that he will not  

harass her.   She,  therefore,  withdrew the complaint.   The  

police  then  filed  a  closure  report.   According  to  the  

respondent-wife, the appellant-husband did not abide by the  

promise  made  by  him and,  therefore,  she  filed  a  protest  

petition.   The  Magistrate  Court,  Hyderabad,  then,  took  

cognizance  of  the  case  and  renumbered  the  case  as  

C.C.No.62/2002.

16. In  the  meantime,  the  respondent-wife  filed  

O.P.No.88/2001  in  the  Family  Court,  Secunderabad,  for  

restitution of conjugal rights.  The appellant-husband filed a  

counter claim for divorce on 27/12/2002.  The Family Court  

dismissed the petition for restitution of conjugal rights and  

allowed the counter claim for divorce filed by the appellant-

husband.  The respondent-wife challenged the Family Court  

judgment in the High Court.  On 8/12/2006 the High Court  

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reversed the Family Court’s order and allowed the petition  

for restitution of conjugal rights.  The present appeal is filed  

by the appellant-husband against the said judgment.  

17. According to the respondent-wife, on 17/9/2007 when  

she, along with her mother, came out of the court after a  

case  filed  by  her  against  the  appellant-husband  was  

adjourned,  the  appellant-husband  beat  her  mother  and  

kicked her on her stomach.  Both of them received injuries.  

She,  therefore,  filed  complaint  for  the  offence  punishable  

under Section 324 of the IPC against the appellant-husband  

(C.C.No. 79/2009).  It may be stated here that on 19/10/2009  

the appellant-husband was acquitted in this case.

18. On 24/6/2008 the judgment was delivered by Additional  

Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate,  Hyderabad  in  C.C.No.  

62/2002.   The  appellant-husband  was  convicted  under  

Section 498-A of the IPC and was sentenced to undergo six  

months  simple  imprisonment.   He  and  his  parents  were  

acquitted of the offences under the Dowry Prohibition Act.  

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His parents were acquitted of the offence under Section 498-

A of the IPC.  After this judgment the respondent-wife and  

her parents filed a complaint in the High Court saying that  

since  the  appellant-husband  was  convicted  he  should  be  

dismissed from service.  Similar letters were sent to the High  

Court by the maternal uncle of the respondent-wife.   

19. On  14/7/2008  the  appellant-husband  filed  Criminal  

Appeal No.186/2008 challenging his conviction under Section  

498-A of the IPC before the Metropolitan Sessions Judge.  It is  

pertinent  to  note  that  the  respondent-wife  filed  Criminal  

Appeal  No.1219/2008  in  the  High  Court  questioning  the  

acquittal  of  the  appellant-husband and his  parents  of  the  

offences  under  the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act  and  also  the  

acquittal  of  his  parents  of  the  offence  punishable  under  

Section 498-A of the IPC.  This appeal is pending in the High  

Court.  Not being content with this, the respondent-wife filed  

Criminal  Revision  Case  No.1560/2008  in  the  High  Court  

seeking  enhancement  of  punishment  awarded  to  the  

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appellant-husband  for  offence  under  Section  498-A  of  the  

IPC.

20. According to the appellant-husband on 6/12/2009 the  

brother  of  the  respondent-wife  came  to  their  house  and  

attacked his mother.  His mother filed a complaint and the  

police registered a complaint under Section 354 of the IPC.  

The brother of the respondent-wife also lodged a complaint  

and an offence came to be registered.  Both the cases are  

pending.

21. On 29/6/2010 Criminal Appeal No. 186/2010 filed by the  

appellant-husband challenging his conviction for the offence  

under  Section  498-A  of  the  IPC  was  allowed  by  the  

Metropolitan  Sessions  Judge  and  he  was  acquitted.   The  

respondent-wife has filed criminal appeal in the High Court  

challenging the said acquittal which is pending.  

22. We need to now see the effect of the above events.  In  

our opinion, the first instance of mental cruelty is seen in the  

scurrilous,  vulgar  and defamatory statement  made by the  

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respondent-wife in her complaint dated 4/10/1999 addressed  

to the Superintendent of Police, Women Protection Cell.  The  

statement that the mother of the appellant-husband asked  

her to sleep with his father is bound to anger him.  It is his  

case  that  this  humiliation  of  his  parents  caused  great  

anguish to him.  He and his family were traumatized by the  

false and indecent statement made in the complaint.   His  

grievance appears to us to be justified. This complaint is a  

part of the record.  It is a part of the pleadings.  That this  

statement is false is evident from the evidence of the mother  

of the respondent-wife, which we have already quoted.  This  

statement cannot be explained away by stating that it was  

made because the respondent-wife was anxious to go back  

to the appellant-husband.  This is  not the way to win the  

husband back.  It is well settled that such statements cause  

mental cruelty.  By sending this complaint the respondent-

wife has caused mental cruelty to the appellant-husband.  

23.     Pursuant to this complaint, the police registered a  

case under Section 498-A of the IPC.  The appellant-husband  

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and his parents had to apply for anticipatory bail, which was  

granted to them.  Later, the respondent-wife withdrew the  

complaint.   Pursuant  to  the  withdrawal,  the  police filed a  

closure  report.   Thereafter,  the  respondent-wife  filed  a  

protest petition.  The trial court took cognizance of the case  

against  the  appellant-husband  and  his  parents  (CC  No.  

62/2002).  What is pertinent to note is that the respondent-

wife filed criminal appeal in the High Court challenging the  

acquittal  of  the  appellant-husband and his  parents  of  the  

offences  under  the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act  and  also  the  

acquittal  of  his  parents  of  the  offence  punishable  under  

Section 498-A of the IPC.   She filed criminal revision seeking  

enhancement of the punishment awarded to the appellant-

husband for the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC in  

the High Court  which is  still  pending.   When the criminal  

appeal  filed  by  the  appellant-husband  challenging  his  

conviction for the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC was  

allowed  and  he  was  acquitted,  the  respondent-wife  filed  

criminal  appeal  in  the  High  Court  challenging  the  said  

acquittal. During this period respondent-wife and members  

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of her family have also filed complaints in the High Court  

complaining about the appellant-husband so that he would  

be removed from the job.  The conduct of the respondent-

wife in filing a complaint making unfounded, indecent and  

defamatory  allegation  against  her  mother-in-law,  in  filing  

revision seeking enhancement of the sentence awarded to  

the  appellant-husband,  in  filing  appeal  questioning  the  

acquittal  of  the  appellant-husband  and  acquittal  of  his  

parents indicates that she made all attempts to ensure that  

he and his parents are put in jail and he is removed from his  

job.   We have no manner  of  doubt  that  this  conduct  has  

caused mental cruelty to the appellant-husband.   

24. In  our  opinion,  the  High  Court  wrongly  held  that  

because the appellant-husband and the respondent-wife did  

not stay together there is no question of the parties causing  

cruelty to each other.  Staying together under the same roof  

is not a pre-condition for mental cruelty.  Spouse can cause  

mental cruelty by his or her conduct even while he or she is  

not  staying  under  the  same roof.   In  a  given  case,  while  

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staying  away,  a  spouse  can  cause  mental  cruelty  to  the  

other spouse by sending vulgar and defamatory letters or  

notices or filing complaints containing indecent allegations  

or by initiating number of judicial  proceedings making the  

other spouse’s life miserable.  This is what has happened in  

this case.   

25. It  is also to be noted that the appellant-husband and  

the respondent-wife are staying apart from 27/4/1999.  Thus,  

they  are  living  separately  for  more  than  ten  years.   This  

separation has created an unbridgeable distance between  

the two.  As held in Samar Ghosh, if we refuse to sever the  

tie, it may lead to mental cruelty.  

26. We  are  also  satisfied  that  this  marriage  has  

irretrievably broken down. Irretrievable  breakdown  of  

marriage  is  not  a  ground  for  divorce  under  the  Hindu  

Marriage Act, 1955.  But, where marriage is beyond repair on  

account of bitterness created by the acts of the husband or  

the  wife  or  of  both,  the  courts  have  always  taken  

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irretrievable  breakdown  of  marriage  as  a  very  weighty  

circumstance  amongst  others  necessitating  severance  of  

marital tie.  A marriage which is dead for all purposes cannot  

be  revived  by  the  court’s  verdict,  if  the  parties  are  not  

willing. This is because marriage involves human sentiments  

and emotions and if they are dried-up there is hardly any  

chance of their springing back to life on account of artificial  

reunion created by the court’s decree.   

27. In V. Bhagat this Court noted that divorce petition was  

pending for eight years and a good part of the lives of both  

the parties had been consumed in litigation, yet the end was  

not in sight.  The facts were such that there was no question  

of reunion, the marriage having irretrievably broken down.  

While  dissolving  the  marriage  on  the  ground  of  mental  

cruelty this Court observed that irretrievable breakdown of  

marriage is not a ground by itself, but, while scrutinizing the  

evidence  on  record  to  determine  whether  the  grounds  

alleged are made out  and in  determining the relief  to  be  

granted  the  said  circumstance  can  certainly  be  borne  in  

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mind.  In Naveen Kohli, where husband and wife had been  

living separately for more than 10 years and a large number  

of  criminal  proceedings  had  been  initiated  by  the  wife  

against the husband, this Court observed that the marriage  

had been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage and public  

interest and interest of all concerned lies in the recognition  

of the fact and to declare  defunct de jure  what is already  

defunct de facto.  It is important to note that in this case this  

Court made a recommendation to the Union of India that the  

Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955  be  amended  to  incorporate  

irretrievable  breakdown  of  marriage  as  a  ground  for  the  

grant of divorce.  

28. In the ultimate analysis, we hold that the respondent-

wife  has  caused  by  her  conduct  mental  cruelty  to  the  

appellant-husband and the marriage has irretrievably broken  

down.  Dissolution of marriage will relieve both sides of pain  

and anguish.  In this Court the respondent-wife expressed  

that  she wants  to  go back to the appellant-husband,  but,  

that  is  not  possible  now.   The  appellant-husband  is  not  

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willing to take her back.  Even if we refuse decree of divorce  

to the appellant-husband, there are hardly any chances of  

the respondent-wife leading a happy life with the appellant-

husband  because  a  lot  of  bitterness  is  created  by  the  

conduct of the respondent-wife.   

29. In Vijay Kumar, it was submitted that if the decree of  

divorce is set aside, there may be fresh avenues and scope  

for reconciliation between parties.  This court observed that  

judged in the background of all surrounding circumstances,  

the claim appeared to be too desolate, merely born out of  

despair  rather  than  based  upon  any  real,  concrete  or  

genuine purpose or aim.  In the facts of this case we feel the  

same.  

30. While we are of the opinion that decree of divorce must  

be granted, we are alive to the plight of the respondent-wife.  

The appellant-husband is working as an Assistant Registrar  

in  the Andhra  Pradesh High Court.   He is  getting  a  good  

salary.  The respondent-wife fought the litigation for more  

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than 10 years.  She appears to be entirely dependent on her  

parents and on her brother, therefore, her future must be  

secured  by  directing  the  appellant-husband  to  give  her  

permanent alimony.  In the facts and circumstance of this  

case,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  appellant-husband  

should be directed to pay a sum of Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees  

Fifteen Lakhs only) to the respondent-wife as and by way of  

permanent alimony.  In the result, the impugned judgment is  

quashed  and  set  aside.   The  marriage  between  the  

appellant-husband - K. Srinivas Rao and the respondent-wife  

-  D.A.  Deepa  is  dissolved  by  a  decree  of  divorce.   The  

appellant-husband  shall  pay  to  the  respondent-wife  

permanent alimony in  the sum of  Rs.15,00,000/-,  in  three  

instalments.   The first instalment of Rs.5,00,000/-  (Rupees  

Five  Lakhs  only)  should  be  paid  on  15/03/2013  and  the  

remaining amount of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only)  

should be paid in instalments of Rs.5,00,000/- each after a  

gap  of  two  months  i.e.  on  15/05/2013  and  15/07/2013  

respectively.  Each instalment of Rs.5,00,000/- be paid by a  

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demand draft drawn in favour of the respondent-wife “D.A.  

Deepa”.  

31. Before parting, we wish to touch upon an issue which  

needs  to  be  discussed  in  the  interest  of  victims  of  

matrimonial  disputes.   Though  in  this  case,  we  have  

recorded a finding that by her conduct, the respondent-wife  

has caused mental cruelty to the appellant-husband, we may  

not be understood, however, to have said that the fault lies  

only  with  the  respondent-wife.    In  matrimonial  disputes  

there  is  hardly  any  case where  one  spouse  is  entirely  at  

fault.   But,  then,  before  the  dispute  assumes  alarming  

proportions, someone must make efforts to make parties see  

reason.   In  this  case,  if  at  the  earliest  stage,  before  the  

respondent-wife  filed  the  complaint  making  indecent  

allegation  against  her  mother-in-law,  she  were  to  be  

counselled by an independent and sensible elder or  if  the  

parties were sent to a mediation centre or if they had access  

to  a  pre-litigation clinic,  perhaps the  bitterness  would  not  

have escalated.  Things would not have come to such a pass  

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if, at the earliest, somebody had mediated between the two.  

It is possible that the respondent-wife was desperate to save  

the marriage.  Perhaps, in desperation, she lost balance and  

went  on  filing  complaints.   It  is  possible  that  she  was  

misguided.   Perhaps,  the  appellant-husband  should  have  

forgiven  her  indiscretion  in  filing  complaints  in  the  larger  

interest  of  matrimony.   But,  the  way the  respondent-wife  

approached the problem was wrong.  It portrays a vindictive  

mind.  She caused extreme mental cruelty to the appellant-

husband.  Now the marriage is beyond repair.   

32. Quite  often,  the  cause  of  the  misunderstanding  in  a  

matrimonial dispute is trivial and can be sorted. Mediation as  

a  method  of  alternative  dispute  resolution  has  got  legal  

recognition  now.   We  have  referred  several  matrimonial  

disputes to mediation centres.  Our experience shows that  

about 10 to 15% of matrimonial disputes get settled in this  

Court through various mediation centres.  We, therefore, feel  

that at the earliest stage i.e. when the dispute is taken up by  

the Family Court or by the court of first instance for hearing,  

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it  must  be  referred  to  mediation  centres.   Matrimonial  

disputes  particularly  those  relating  to  custody  of  child,  

maintenance, etc. are preeminently fit for mediation. Section  

9 of the Family Courts Act enjoins upon the Family Court to  

make efforts to settle the matrimonial disputes and in these  

efforts, Family Courts are assisted by Counsellors.  Even if  

the Counsellors fail in their efforts, the Family Courts should  

direct  the  parties  to  mediation  centres,  where  trained  

mediators  are  appointed  to  mediate  between  the  parties.  

Being trained in the skill  of mediation, they produce good  

results.   

33. The idea of pre-litigation mediation is also catching up.  

Some mediation centres have, after giving wide publicity, set  

up “Help  Desks”  at  prominent  places including facilitation  

centres  at  court  complexes  to  conduct  pre-litigation  

mediation.   We  are  informed  that  in  Delhi  Government  

Mediation and Conciliation Centres, and in Delhi High Court  

Mediation Centre, several matrimonial disputes are settled.  

These  centres  have  a  good  success  rate  in  pre-litigation  

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mediation.   If  all  mediation  centres  set  up  pre-litigation  

desks/clinics  by giving sufficient  publicity  and matrimonial  

disputes  are  taken  up  for  pre-litigation  settlement,  many  

families will be saved of hardship if, at least, some of them  

are settled.    

34. While  purely  a  civil  matrimonial  dispute  can  be  

amicably  settled  by  a  Family  Court  either  by  itself  or  by  

directing the parties to explore the possibility of settlement  

through mediation, a complaint under Section 498-A of the  

IPC  presents  difficulty  because  the  said  offence  is  not  

compoundable except in the State of Andhra Pradesh where  

by a State amendment,  it  has been made compoundable.  

Though  in  Ramgopal  &  Anr.   v.   State  of  Madhya  

Pradesh & Anr.  8  , this Court requested the Law Commission  

and the Government of  India to  examine whether  offence  

punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC could be made  

compoundable, it has not been made compoundable as yet.  

The  courts  direct  parties  to  approach  mediation  centres  

8 (2010) 13 SCC 540

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where  offences  are  compoundable.   Offence  punishable  

under  Section  498-A  being  a  non-compoundable  offence,  

such a course is not followed in respect thereof.  This Court  

has  always  adopted  a  positive  approach  and  encouraged  

settlement  of  matrimonial  disputes  and  discouraged  their  

escalation.  In this connection, we must refer to the relevant  

paragraph from G.V. Rao  v. L.H.V. Prasad & Ors.9, where  

the  complaint  appeared  to  be  the  result  of  matrimonial  

dispute,  while  refusing  to  interfere  with  the  High  Court’s  

order quashing the complaint, this court made very pertinent  

observations, which read thus:

“12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in   recent  times.  Marriage  is  a  sacred  ceremony,  the  main   purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle   down  in  life  and  live  peacefully.  But  little  matrimonial   skirmishes  suddenly  erupt  which  often  assume  serious   proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in   which elders of the family are also involved with the result   that those who could have counselled and brought about   rapprochement  are  rendered  helpless  on  their  being  arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many   other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not   encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may  ponder  over  their  defaults  and  terminate  their  disputes   amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in   a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude   and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in   chasing their “cases” in different courts.”

9 (2000) 3 SCC 693

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In B.S. Joshi & Ors.  v.  State of Haryana & Anr.  10  ,  

after referring to the above observations, this Court stated  

that the said observations are required to be kept in view by  

courts while dealing with matrimonial disputes and held that  

complaint involving offence under Section 498-A of the IPC  

can be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its powers  

under  Section  482  of  the  Code  if  the  parties  settle  their  

dispute.    Even in  Gian Singh  v.  State of Punjab &  

Anr.11,  this  Court  expressed  that  certain  offences  which  

overwhelmingly  and  predominantly  bear  civil  flavour  like  

those  arising  out  of  matrimony,  particularly  relating  to  

dowry, etc. or the family dispute and where the offender and  

the victim had settled all disputes between them amicably,  

irrespective of  the fact  that  such offences have not  been  

made compoundable, the High Court may quash the criminal  

proceedings if it  feels that by not quashing the same, the  

ends of justice shall be defeated.   

10 AIR 2003 SC 1386 11 (2012) 10 SCC 303

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35. We,  therefore,  feel  that  though  offence  punishable  

under  Section  498-A  of  the  IPC  is  not  compoundable,  in  

appropriate cases if the parties are willing and if it appears  

to the criminal court that there exist elements of settlement,  

it  should  direct  the  parties  to  explore  the  possibility  of  

settlement  through  mediation.   This  is,  obviously,  not  to  

dilute the rigour, efficacy and purport of Section 498-A of the  

IPC, but to locate cases where the matrimonial dispute can  

be nipped in bud in an equitable manner.  The judges, with  

their expertise, must ensure that this exercise does not lead  

to the erring spouse using mediation process to get out of  

clutches of the law. During mediation, the parties can either  

decide to part company on mutually agreed terms or they  

may decide to patch up and stay together.  In either case for  

the settlement to come through, the complaint will have to  

be  quashed.   In  that  event,  they  can  approach  the  High  

Court and get the complaint quashed.  If however they chose  

not to settle, they can proceed with the complaint.  In this  

exercise, there is no loss to anyone. If there is settlement,  

the parties will be saved from the trials and tribulations of a  

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criminal case and that will reduce the burden on the courts  

which will  be in the larger public interest.   Obviously,  the  

High Court will quash the complaint only if after considering  

all circumstances it finds the settlement to be equitable and  

genuine.  Such a course, in our opinion, will be beneficial to  

those  who  genuinely  want  to  accord  a  quietus  to  their  

matrimonial disputes.  We would, however, like to clarify that  

reduction of burden of cases on the courts will, however, be  

merely an incidental benefit and not the reason for sending  

the parties for mediation.  We recognize ‘mediation’ as an  

effective  method  of  alternative  dispute  resolution  in  

matrimonial matters and that is the reason why we want the  

parties  to  explore  the  possibility  of  settlement  through  

mediation in matrimonial disputes.  

36. We,  therefore,  issue  directions,  which  the  courts  

dealing with the matrimonial matters shall follow:  

(a) In terms of Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, the  

Family  Courts  shall  make  all  efforts  to  settle  the  

matrimonial disputes through mediation.  Even if the  

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Counsellors submit a failure report, the Family Courts  

shall,  with  the  consent  of  the  parties,  refer  the  

matter  to  the  mediation  centre.   In  such  a  case,  

however,  the  Family  Courts  shall  set  a  reasonable  

time  limit  for  mediation  centres  to  complete  the  

process  of  mediation  because  otherwise  the  

resolution of the disputes by the Family Court may  

get delayed. In a given case, if there is good chance  

of settlement, the Family Court in its discretion, can  

always extend the time limit.  

  (b) The criminal courts dealing with the complaint under  

Section 498-A of the IPC should,  at  any stage and  

particularly,  before they  take up the complaint  for  

hearing, refer the parties to mediation centre if they  

feel that there exist elements of settlement and both  

the parties are willing.  However,  they should take  

care to see that in this exercise, rigour, purport and  

efficacy of  Section 498-A of  the IPC is  not  diluted.  

Needless to say that the discretion to grant or not to  

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grant  bail  is  not  in  any  way  curtailed  by  this  

direction. It will be for the concerned court to work  

out the modalities taking into consideration the facts  

of each case.  

(c) All  mediation  centres  shall  set  up  pre-litigation  

desks/clinics;  give  them  wide  publicity  and  make  

efforts to settle matrimonial disputes at pre-litigation  

stage.  

37. The appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms.  

……………………………………………..J.      (AFTAB ALAM)

……………………………………………..J.                                       (RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)

NEW DELHI, FEBRUARY 22, 2013.

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