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REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

 Civil Appeal No. 9046 of 2019  

 (Arising out of SLP (C) No 18110 of 2019)  

K Sivaraman & Ors                       .... Appellants  

        Versus  

 P Sathishkumar & Anr                       ....Respondents    

J U D G M E N T         Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J      

 1 This appeal arises from a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madurai Bench of  

the Madras High Court dated 1 June 2017.  In an appeal arising from a decision of the  

Deputy Commissioner for Employee‘s Compensation, the High Court enhanced the  

compensation payable under the Employee‘s Compensation Act 1923 1  from Rs  

4,33,060 to Rs 8,86,120. The High Court has awarded interest at the rate of 12% per  

annum from the date of the accident.    

2 In the present proceedings which have been instituted under Article 136 of the  

Constitution, notice was issued on 26 July 2019. Since the appellants were  

 1  ―1923 Act‖

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represented by the first appellant in person, this Court, by its order dated 26 July 2019,  

directed that an amicus curiae be nominated by the Supreme Court Legal Services  

Committee. Accordingly, Mr S Mahendran, learned counsel, has been nominated as  

the amicus curiae, whom we have heard in support of the appeal.  

 3 The appellants are the father, mother, sister and brother of Dinesh Kumar, who  

died in the course of an accident on 31 January 2008.  On the date of the incident, the  

deceased was 26 years of age and was engaged as a driver of a trailor lorry. While the  

vehicle was being driven on NH 12 in Kota, Rajasthan, a truck bearing registration No  

MH 19 Z 1696 came from the opposite direction and dashed against the trailor,  

resulting in the death of Dinesh Kumar. At the time of the accident, the deceased was  

in the employment of the first respondent.  A claim under the 1923 Act was lodged  

before the Deputy Commissioner for Employee‘s Compensation, Madurai on 29 April  

2013.  On 26 March 2014, the claim was allowed by an award in the amount of Rs  

4,33,060.  The Deputy Commissioner had proceeded ex parte. The appellants filed an  

appeal 2  before the Madras High Court for enhancement of the compensation.   

 4 The High Court, by its judgment dated 23 November 2015, remanded the  

proceedings to the Deputy Commissioner for determination afresh. While remanding  

the proceedings, the High Court noted that though the appellants had filed a salary  

certificate as Exhibit P5 to establish that the monthly income of the deceased was Rs  

32,000, no witness was examined on behalf of the employer to prove the salary  

certificate.  However, acceding to the request of the appellants that they should be  

furnished with an opportunity to examine the employer‘s witness in support of Exhibit  

 2  CMA (MD) 344 of 2014

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P5, the High Court considered it in the interests of justice to remand the proceedings.  

5 On remand, the Commissioner for Workmen‘s Compensation, Madurai, by an  

order dated 4 March 2016, maintained the award of compensation in the amount of Rs  

4,33,060.  Before the Commissioner, on remand, the appellants examined PW2, the  

owner of the vehicle which was being driven by the deceased.  During the course of  

his evidence, he stated as follows:  

―I am the 1 st  respondent in this case under W.C. Case  

No.74/2011 is under tail in this court is known to me.  I  

received summons 3 times from the court.  For the last two  

summons, as my own lorries were working in the other states  

and I also have to go there, I was unable to come and adduce  

witness for the court summon.  The accident platform trailor  

lorry TN 28 AB 1933 belongs to Sathishkumar.  The  

deceased Dinesh Kumar S/o Sivaraman worked as a driver.   

In 2008, (31.1.2008) when going to Pandicheri to Rajasthan  

Sironi before Kotta town the opposite coming tarras lorry  

dashed face to face and caused accident.  As soon as the  

accident occurred in the same occurrence place Dineshkumar  

died.  Before accident he worked for about 3 years.  He was  

having proper driving license. He was having license for  

driving heavy vehicles. The Ex.P.5 monthly pay certificate  

was issued by me. In it, for deceased Dinesh Kumar I was  

paying Rs 32,000 per month (including food expenses) but  

pay of Rs 25,000. The vehicle involved in the accident has  

been properly insured with 2 nd

respondent company of M/s  

Reliance General Insurance Company. At the time of  

accident, the insurance was in current.‖  

6 The Commissioner, however, proceeded on the basis that in terms of the  

notification issued under Section 4(1B) of the 1923 Act, whatever be the monthly pay  

received by a person, the jurisdiction of the adjudicating authority was subject to a  

ceiling of Rs 4,000 per month in computing the monthly wages of the employee.  

Taking the monthly salary at Rs 4,000, the Commissioner applied a multiplicand of  

215.28 in terms of Schedule IV (the deceased being 26 years of age) and arrived at a

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figure of Rs 4,30,560 to which an additional amount of Rs 2,500 was added towards  

funeral expenses. A total award in the amount of Rs 4,33,060 was decreed as the  

compensation payable to the appellants.  

 7 In an appeal filed before the High Court, the Division Bench took note of the fact  

that in pursuance of the order of remand, the salary of deceased employee had been  

proved to be Rs 32,000 per month.  The High Court noticed that though the accident  

had taken place on 31 January 2008, the petition for compensation had been lodged  

on 28 January 2011 and was decided by the Commissioner on 4 March 2016.    

 8 In the meantime, a notification was issued by the Central Government on 31  

May 2010 in the following terms:  

―S.O.1258(E) – In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-

section (1B) of Section 4 of the Employee's Compensation  

Act, 1923, (g of 1923), the Central Government hereby  

specified, for the purpose of Sub-Section (1) of the said  

section, the following amount as monthly wages, with effect  

from the date of publication of this notification in the official  

gazette, namely – Eight thousand rupees.‖  

9 The High Court was of the view that having due regard to the fact that the  

legislation in question is a social welfare legislation, the enhanced income of Rs 8,000  

per month should form the basis of the computation. Thus, applying the multiplicand in  

terms of Schedule IV, the High Court enhanced the compensation to Rs 8,86,120.  

 10 In appeal before this Court, the learned amicus curiae urged that both the  

Commissioner and the High Court have erred - the Commissioner having adopted a  

figure of Rs 4,000 per month and the High Court, Rs 8,000 per month.  The learned  

amicus curiae submitted that in terms of the provisions of Section 4(1)(a) of the 1923

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Act, where death has resulted from injury, the compensation payable is an amount  

equal to fifty per cent of the monthly wages of the deceased employee multiplied by  

the relevant factor.  The relevant factor is specified in Schedule IV and for the  

deceased who was 26 years old on the date of the accident, the multiplicand would be  

215.28.  The learned amicus curiae submitted that under sub-section (1B) of Section 4,  

the Central Government is empowered to issue a notification specifying, for the  

purposes of sub-section (1), the monthly wages in relation to an employee as it may  

consider necessary.  However, it was submitted that the notification does not impose a  

cap or ceiling on the monthly wages which form the basis of calculating the  

compensation due and payable.  Where the actual wages of an employee are proved  

to be in excess of the amount which is specified in the notification, there is no bar in  

adopting the monthly wages so proved in terms of Section 4(1)(a). The learned  

counsel buttressed this submission by adverting to Act 45 of 2009, which took effect  

from 18 January 2010 and deleted the deeming provision in Explanation II to Section  

4 3 .  Moreover, it was urged by the learned amicus curiae that the method of calculating  

wages is specified in Section 5. It was urged that clause (a) of Section 5 will be  

attracted to the present case where the employee was, during a continuous period of  

not less than twelve months immediately preceding the accident, in the service of the  

employer.  

11 The learned amicus curiae, at a belated stage, sought to distinguish the  

judgments of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v Srinivas Sabata 4  (―Pratap  

 3  ―Explanation II – Where the monthly wages of a workman exceed four thousand rupees, his monthly wages for the  

purposes of clause(a) and clause(b) shall be deemed to be four thousand rupees only.‖  4  (1976) 1 SCC 289

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Narain Singh‖) and Kerala State Electricity Board v Valsala K 5  (―Valsala‖) in which  

it was held that the date relevant for the determination of compensation payable under  

the 1923 Act is the date of the accident and that the benefit of an amendment  

enhancing the amount of compensation shall not apply to accidents that take place  

prior to its coming into force. To support this, the amicus curiae relied on the judgments  

of this Court in New India Assurance Company Ltd. v Neelakandan  

(―Neelakandan‖), 6  and National Insurance Co Ltd. v Mubasir Ahmed

7  (―Mubasir  

Ahmed‖).  

12 Section 4(1)(a) of the Act contains the following provision:  

―4. Amount of compensation.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act,  the amount of compensation shall be as follows, namely:—  

(a) where death results   

from the injury  

an amount equal to fifty per cent of the  monthly wages of the deceased  employee multiplied by the relevant  factor;  

   or  

   an amount of one lakh and twenty  thousand rupees, whichever is more;‖  

 13 The proviso to the above provision stipulates that the Central Government may,  

by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time, enhance the amount of  

compensation mentioned in clauses (a) and (b).  Clause (b) deals with a case involving  

permanent total disablement resulting from the injury.  The expression ―relevant factor‖  

is defined in Explanation I to be the factor specified in Schedule IV.  Prior to Act 45 of  

 5  (1999) 8 SCC 254  

6  Civil Appeal Nos. 16904-09 of 1996  

7  (2007) 2 SCC 349

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2009, Section 4 contained Explanation II, which was in the following terms:  

―Explanation II – Where the monthly wages of a workman  

exceed four thousand rupees, his monthly wages for the  

purposes of clause(a) and clause(b) shall be deemed to be  

four thousand rupees only.‖  

14 By Act 45 of 2009, which came into force on 18 January 2010, Explanation II  

came to be deleted. Sub-section (1B) was introduced in Section 4 to read as follows:  

―(1-B) The Central Government may, by notification in the  

Official Gazette, specify, for the purposes of sub-section (1),  

such monthly wages in relation to an employee as it may  

consider necessary.‖  

15 The question before this Court is whether the benefit of Act 45 of 2009 deleting  

the deeming provision in Explanation II which capped the monthly wages of an  

employee at Rs 4,000 would also apply to accidents which took place prior to the  

coming into force of its provisions i.e. 18 January 2010 and where final adjudication is  

pending. In assessing whether the Act 45 of 2009 applies retrospectively, it is  

necessary to analyze the relevant precedents of this Court. In Pratap Narain Singh,  

the first respondent was in the employment of the appellant and suffered injuries which  

arose out of and in the course of employment. It was contended that the Commissioner  

committed an error of law in imposing a penalty on the appellant under Section 4A(3)  

of the 1923 Act as the compensation payable had not fallen due until it was ‗settled‘ by  

the Commissioner under Section 19 of the 1923 Act. Section 4A reads:  

―4A. Compensation to be paid when due and penalty for default.-   (1) Compensation under section 4 shall be paid as soon as it  

falls due.  (2) In cases where the employer does not accept the liability  

for compensation to the extent claimed, he shall be bound  to make provisional payment based on the extent of  liability which he accepts, and, such payment shall be  deposited with the Commissioner or made to the

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employee, as the case may be, without prejudice to the  right of the employee to make any further claim.  

(3) Where any employer is in default in paying the  compensation due under the Act within one month from  the date it fell due, the Commissioner shall –   (a) Direct that the employer shall, in addition to the  

amount of the arrears, pay simple interest thereon at  the rate of twelve percent per annum or at such higher  rate not exceeding the maximum of the lending rates  of any scheduled bank as may be specified by the  Central Government, by notification in the Official  Gazette, on the amount due; and   

(b) If, in his opinion, there is no justification for the delay,  direct that the employer shall, in addition to the  amount of arrears and interest thereon, pay a further  sum not exceeding fifty per cent of such amount by  way of penalty…‖  

 16 In terms of Section 4A(1), compensation under Section 4 is payable ―as soon as  

it falls due.‖ Section 4A(2) contemplates a situation wherein the employer, though  

accepting the liability to pay compensation to the injured employee, disputes the  

quantum of compensation payable. In such cases, sub-section (2) enjoins the  

employer to make a provisional payment based on the extent of accepted liability by  

depositing it with the Commissioner or by paying it directly to the employee. Section  

4A(3) stipulates that where an employer defaults in paying compensation within one  

month from the date on which it falls due, the Commissioner is empowered to direct  

the payment of interest as well as an additional amount as arrears for an unjustifiable  

delay in making payment. Section 19 of the Act reads:  

―19. Reference to Commissioners.- (1) If any question arises  in any proceedings under this Act as to the liability of any  person to pay compensation (including any question as to  whether a person injured is or is not an employee or as to the  amount or duration of compensation (including any question  as to the nature or extent of disablement), the question shall,  in default of agreement be settled by a Commissioner…‖  

   17 Section 19 stipulates that any question arising in any proceeding under the Act  

shall, in the default of an agreement, be settled by the Commissioner. A four judge

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Bench of this Court rejected the contention urged by the appellant and held that  

compensation ―falls due‖ on the date of the accident. Consequently, the Commissioner  

was empowered to impose interest or penalty for the duration prior to the settling of the  

claim or where there was unjustified delay in making good the payment of  

compensation. The Court held:  

―18…The employer therefore became liable to pay the  compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was  caused to the workman by the accident which admittedly  arose out of and in the course of the employment. It is  therefore futile to contend that the compensation did not fall  due with after the Commissioner's order dated May 6, 1969  under section 19. What the section provides is that if any  question arises in any proceeding under the Act as to the  liability of any person to pay compensation or as to the  amount or duration of the compensation it shall, in default of  an agreement, be settled by the Commissioner. There is  therefore nothing to justify the argument that the employer's  liability to pay compensation under section 3, in respect of the  injury, was suspended until after the settlement contemplated  by section…  

19. The appellant was thus liable to pay compensation as  soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the  appellant, and there is no justification for the argument to the  contrary. It was the duty of the appellant, under section  4A(1) of the Act, to pay the compensation at the rate provided  by section 4 as soon as the personal injury was caused to the  respondent. He failed to do so. What is worse, he did not  even make a provisional payment under sub-section (2)  of section 4 for, as has been stated, he went to the extent of  taking the false pleas that the respondent was a casual  contractor and that the accident occurred solely because of  his negligence. Then there is the further fact that he paid no  heed to the respondent's personal approach for obtaining the  compensation. It will be recalled that the respondent was  driven to the necessity of making and application to the  Commissioner for settling the claim, and even there the  appellant raised a frivolous objection as to the jurisdiction of  the Commissioner and prevailed on the respondent to file a  memorandum of agreement setting the claim for a sum which  was so grossly inadequate that it was rejected by the  Commissioner. In these facts and circumstances, we have no  doubt that the Commissioner was fully justified in making an  order for the payment of interest and the penalty.‖  

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18 The Court held that though Section 19 empowered the Commissioner to decide  

claims or objections under the Act, the obligation to pay compensation to an injured  

employee was not suspended until the Commissioner settled the amount payable in  

the case of a dispute between the employer and the employee. Section 4A deals with  

when the obligation for the payment of compensation as required under the 1923 Act  

arises. For the purposes of Section 4A of the 1923 Act, the obligation to pay  

compensation arises on the date of the accident. Where an employer disputes the  

quantum of compensation payable, it is enjoined to make a provisional payment to the  

Commissioner or the employee pending the settlement of the claim. This is in order to  

ensure that an employer does not escape its obligation to make good the payment of  

compensation or unduly delay its payment on frivolous grounds.  

 19 In Neelakandan, the accident had taken place prior to the coming into force of  

an amendment to the 1923 Act whereunder the deemed income had been increased  

from Rs 1000 to Rs 2000. The question before the Court was whether the benefit of  

the amendment would extend to accidents which took place prior to its coming into  

force and where the final adjudication of the amount payable was pending.  A two  

judge Bench of this Court held that though the accident in question took place in 1981,  

the benefit of the amendment would apply to accidents that took place prior to the  

coming into force of the amendment in the following terms:  

―It is not disputed that Section 4 of the Act was amended in  1995 by Amendment Act 30 whereunder the deemed income  has been increased from Rs 1000 to Rs 2000. Learned  counsel for the Insurance Company has vehemently  contended that since the accident took place in the year  1981, the law operating on that date is applicable and as such  the workmen are not entitled to the benefit of the amendment.  We do not agree with the learned counsel. We are finally  determining the right of workmen today. The Act is a  special legislation for the benefit of the labour. Keeping  in view the scheme of the Act we are of the view that the

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only interpretation which can be given to the amendment  is that is any benefit is conferred on the workmen and the  said benefit is available on the date when the case is  finally adjudicated, the said benefit should be extended  to the workmen. We, therefore, hold that the compensation  to be paid to the heirs of the workmen has to be calculated on  the basis of the actual wages – Rs 1800 – drawn by them…‖  

(Emphasis supplied)  

 20 The Court noted that the 1923 Act is a social welfare legislation for the benefit of  

employees. Consequently, taking into account the scheme of the Act, the court must  

adopt an interpretation which extends a benefit to the employee on the date of the final  

adjudication of the claim. Where a case is pending final adjudication and an  

amendment is enacted increasing the amount of compensation payable, the enhanced  

amount would be applicable in the determination of the quantum of compensation  

payable. Conspicuous in its absence in the submission advanced by the learned  

amicus curiae is how a subsequent Bench of this Court dealt with the position of law  

laid down in Neelakandan.  

 21 In Valsala, the question before a three judge Bench of this Court was whether  

an amendment to Section 4 and 4A of the 1923 Act enhancing the amount of  

compensation and the rate of interest would be applicable to cases where the accident  

took place prior to the coming into force of the amendment. This Court noted that  

various High Courts in the country had taken the uniform position that the relevant date  

for determining the rights and liabilities of the parties is the date of the accident.  

Relying on the judgment of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh, the Court overruled the  

judgment in Neelakandan and held that the benefit of an amendment whereunder the  

compensation payable was increased, would not apply to accidents that took place  

prior to its coming into force. The Court held:  

―4. A two-judge Bench of this Court in New India Assurance  

Co Ltd. v. V.K. Neelakandan however, took the view that the

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Workmen‘s Compensation Act being a special legislation for  

the benefit of the workmen, the benefit as available on the  

date of adjudication should be extended to the workmen and  

not the compensation which was payable on the date of the  

accident. The two-judge Bench in Neelakandan case  

however, did not take notice of the judgment in Pratap Narain  

Singh Deo case as it presumably was not brought to the  

notice of their Lordships. Be that as it may, in view of the  

categorial law laid down by the larger Bench in Pratap Singh  

Deo case the view expressed by the two-judge Bench in  

Neelakandan case is not correct.‖  

22 In the course of the judgment in Valsala, the three judge Bench also affirmed  

the full judge Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court in Alavi ―to the extent it is in  

accord with the judgment of the larger bench‖ in Pratap Narain Singh. The Court held:  

―5. Our attention has also been drawn to a judgment of the  

Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in United India Insurance  

Co. Ltd v. Alavi wherein the Full Bench precisely considered  

the same question and examined both the above-noted  

jugdments. It took the view that the injured workman becomes  

entitled to get compensation the moment he suffers personal  

injuries of the types contemplated by the provisions of the  

Workmen‘s Compensation Act and it is the amount of  

compensation payable on the date of the accident and not the  

amount of compensation payable on account of the  

amendment made in 1995, which is relevant. The decision of  

the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, to the extent it is on  

accord with the judgment of the larger Bench of this Court in  

Pratap Narain Singh Deo v Srinivas Sabata lays down the  

correct law and we approve it.‖  

23 In Alavi, a full judge Bench of the Kerala High Court was required to adjudicate  

whether Sections 4 and 4A of the 1923 Act as amended in 1995 enhancing the amount  

of compensation and rate of interest would be applicable to claims in respect of death  

and permanent disablement resulting from accidents which occurred prior to 15  

September 1995 i.e. the date on which the amended provisions came into force. In all  

the appeals before the Court, the accident as well as settling of the claims by the  

Commissioner took place prior to the coming into force of the amending provisions

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enhancing the quantum of compensation payable. The Court relied on the decision of  

this Court in Pratap Narain Singh and held that the Amending act enhancing  

compensation would apply only to accidents that took place after the coming into force  

of the amendment. The Court held:   

―17. Right to claim compensation as well as the obligation to  

pay the same are created by the statute itself. It is well-settled  

rule of interpretation that if the law is procedural, there is, no  

doubt, a presumption that it applies to pending proceedings. If  

the law is substantive in nature, the normal presumption  

against retrospectivity still holds good, subject to the principle  

that the Court must look to the question whether the rights of  

the parties at the commencements of the proceedings were  

intended to be modified either expressly or by necessary  

implication: Neeli v. Narayana Pilla [(1992) 2 K.L.J. 937, 950].  

If the amended provisions are given effect to in the matter of  

awarding enhanced compensation even with regard to the  

accident which occurred prior to 15 September 1995, and the  

claim was decided prior to the same date, the law applicable  

is the unamended provisions of the Workmen‘s  

Compensation Act, 1923. But if the claim could not be settled  

prior to 15 September 1995 going by the Division Bench  

decision in Asokan case (vide supra), those claimants would  

get the benefit of the Amendment Act. In other words, the  

benefit would depend on when the case is decided either  

prior to 15 September 1995 or subsequent. This was never  

the intention of the Legislature…‖  

   24 The question before the Bench in Valsala was clearly whether an amendment to  

Section 4 and 4A of the 1923 Act enhancing the amount of compensation and the rate  

of interest would be applicable to cases where the accident took place prior to the  

coming into force of the amendment. The Bench held that the benefit of an Amending  

act enhancing the quantum of compensation would not apply to accidents that took  

place prior to the coming into force of the amendment. Though the learned amicus  

curiae sought to rely on the two judge Bench judgment of this Court in Mubasir  

Ahmed, it is sufficient at this stage to note that the subsequent judgment of this Court

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in Oriental Insurance Company v Siby George 8  noted that the judgment in Mubasir  

Ahmed is contrary to the judgments of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh and Valsala  

and hence not a binding precedent.  

 25 The 1923 Act is a social beneficial legislation and its provisions and  

amendments thereto must be interpreted in a manner so as to not deprive the  

employees of the benefit of the legislation. The object of enacting the Act was to  

ameliorate the hardship of economically poor employees who were exposed to risks in  

work, or occupational hazards by providing a cheaper and quicker machinery for  

compensating them with pecuniary benefits. The amendments to the 1923 Act have  

been enacted to further this salient purpose by either streamlining the compensation  

process or enhancing the amount of compensation payable to the employee.   

 26 Prior to Act 45 of 2009, by virtue of the deeming provision in Explanation II to  

Section 4, the monthly wages of an employee were capped at Rs 4000 even where an  

employee was able to prove the payment of a monthly wage in excess of Rs 4,000.  

The legislature, in its wisdom and keeping in mind the purpose of the 1923 Act as a  

social welfare legislation did not enhance the quantum in the deeming provision, but  

deleted it altogether. The amendment is in furtherance of the salient purpose which  

underlies the 1923 Act of providing to all employees compensation for accidents which  

occur in the course of and arising out of employment. The objective of the amendment  

is to remove a deeming cap on the monthly income of an employee and extend to  

them compensation on the basis of the actual monthly wages drawn by them.  

However, there is nothing to indicate that the Legislature intended for the benefit to  

 8  (2012) 12 SCC 540

15    

extend to accidents that took place prior to the coming into force of the amendment.   

27 The learned amicus curiae relied on the judgment of this Court in  

Commissioner of Income Tax v Vatika Township Private Limited 9  to contend that  

amendments that confer a benefit upon individuals must be given retrospective  

application. In that case, the question before a Constitution Bench of this Court  

concerned whether the proviso to Section 113 which was inserted by the Finance Act  

2002 applied retrospectively. The scheme for block assessment was introduced in  

Chapter XIV-B to the Finance Act (w.e.f 1 July 1995) to curb tax evasion and expedite  

as well as simplify the assessments in such search cases. By virtue of the proviso, a  

date was specified with reference to which the rate of surcharge is payable upon block  

assessments. This Court noted that the chapter for block assessment was a self-

contained code and that the effect of the proviso was to impose an additional burden  

on the assessee. Consequently, it was held that the proviso did not operate  

retrospectively. In the course of the judgment, this Court held:   

 ―30. We would also like to point out, for the sake of  completeness, that where a benefit is conferred by a  legislation, the rule against a retrospective construction is  different. If a legislation confers a benefit on some persons  but without inflicting a corresponding detriment on some other  person or on the public generally, and where to confer such  benefit appears to have been the legislators' object, then the  presumption would be that such a legislation, giving it a  purposive construction, would warrant it to be given a  retrospective effect. This exactly is the justification to treat  procedural provisions as retrospective. In Govt. of India v.  Indian Tobacco Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 396], the doctrine of  fairness was held to be relevant factor to construe a statute  conferring a benefit, in the context of it to be given a  retrospective operation. The same doctrine of fairness, to hold  that a statute was retrospective in nature, was applied in Vijay  v. State of Maharashtra [(2006) 6 SCC 289]. It was held that  where a law is enacted for the benefit of community as a  whole, even in the absence of a provision the statute may be  held to be retrospective in nature. However, we are (sic not)  

 9  (2015) 1 SCC 1

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confronted with any such situation here.‖  

28 This Court held, in line with settled precedent of this Court, that where (i) a  

legislation confers a benefit on some persons, (ii) without inflicting a corresponding  

detriment on some other persons or the public generally and (iii) where the conferral of  

such benefit appears to be the intention of the legislature, the presumption of  

prospective application may stand displaced. Though amendments enhancing the  

compensation payable under the 1923 Act confer a benefit upon employees, a  

corresponding burden is imposed on employers to pay a higher rate of compensation.  

It is presumably for this reason that the three judge Bench of this Court in Valsala and  

the Kerala High Court in Alavi held that the benefit of an amendment enhancing the  

rate of compensation does not have retrospective application to accidents that took  

place prior to the coming into force of the amendment. Further, as we have already  

noted, there is nothing in Act 45 of 2009, either express or implied, to denote an  

intention of the legislature to confer the benefit of the amendment to accidents that  

took place prior to its coming into force.  

29 We also briefly note the position of law regarding the date relevant for the  

determination of compensation payable under the Railways Act 1989 10

. Chapter XIII of  

the 1989 Act titled ‗Liability of Railway Administration for Death and Injury to  

Passengers due to accidents‘ stipulates an obligation on the railway administration to  

pay compensation to such extent ―as may be prescribed‖ on the account of untoward  

accidents. In Rathi Menon v Union of India 11

, the question before a two judge Bench  

 10

1989 Act   11

(2001) 3 SCC 714

17    

of this Court was whether the benefit of an amendment enhancing the rate of  

compensation can be extended to accidents that took place prior to the coming into  

force of the amendment. The Court assessed the scheme of the 1989 Act and held  

that the date relevant for the determination of compensation payable shall be the date  

of adjudication. Consequently, the benefit of an amendment enhancing compensation  

would be extended to accidents that took place prior to the coming into force of the  

amendment. In the course of the judgment, this Court differentiated between the  

scheme of the 1923 Act and the 1989 Act and addressed the contention raised on the  

basis of the judgments of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh and Valsala in the  

following terms:  

―…The scheme of the provision under the W.C. Act is  

materially different from the scheme indicated in Chapter XIII  

of the Railways Act. In the former, compensation payable is  

fixed in the Act itself through the schedule incorporated  

thereto. Section 4 of the W.C. Act shows that such  

compensation is to be linked with the monthly wages of the  

workman concerned. It also provides that the liability to pay  

compensation on the employer would arise not when the  

Commissioner passes the order but on the date of sustaining  

the injury itself. A provision is made in Section 4A of W.C. Act  

that where any employer is in default of paying the  

compensation due within one month the Commissioner shall  

direct the employer to pay not only interest but in appropriate  

cases a penalty ranging up to 50% of the amount payable.  

The said scheme cannot be equated with the scheme in  

Chapter XIII of the Railways Act, as the principles involved  

have differences…‖  

   Having distinguished the scheme of the 1923 Act and the 1989 Act, the Court held that  

the judgments in Pratap Narain Singh and Valsala have no bearing on claims under  

the 1989 Act.   

18    

30 Recently, a two judge Bench of this Court in Union of India v Rina Devi 12

,  

considered an apparent conflict between the judgments in Rathi Menon and Kalandi  

Charan Sahoo v General Manager, South-East Central Railway, Bilaspur 13

(―Kalandi‖) regarding the date relevant for the determination of compensation under  

the 1989 Act. It was contended that the judgment in Rathi Menon was premised on  

the basis that there was no provision for the payment of interest under the 1989 Act  

and that there would be injustice if compensation is paid at money value prevalent at  

the time of the accident. It was on this basis that the judgment in Pratap Narain Singh  

was distinguished. This Court noted that in Thazhathe Purayil Sarabi v Union of  

India 14

(―Thazhathe‖), it was held that under the 1989 Act, a claimant is also entitled to  

the payment of interest which accrues from the date of the incident. The decision in  

Thazhathe was subsequently followed by this Court in Kalandi and Mohamadi v  

Union of India. 15

Consequently, this Court held that since interest is now payable  

under the 1989 Act, the basis of the judgment in Rathi Menon has changed. The  

Court held:  

 ―15.3…We are of the view that law in the present context  

should be taken to be that the liability will accrue on the date  

of the accident and the amount applicable as on that date will  

be the amount recoverable but the claimant will get interest  

from the date of accident till the payment at such rate as may  

be considered just and fair from time to time. In this context,  

rate of interest applicable in motor accident claim cases can  

be held to be reasonable and fair. Once concept of interest  

has been introduced, principles of Workmen  

Compensation Act can certainly be applied and judgment  

of 4- Judge Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deo (supra) will  

fully apply. Wherever it is found that the revised amount of  

applicable compensation as on the date of award of the  

Tribunal is less than the prescribed amount of compensation  

 12

(2019) 3 SCC 572  13

(2019) 12 SCC 387  14

(2009) 7 SCC 372  15

(2019) 12 SCC 389

19    

as on the date of accident with interest, higher of the two  

amounts ought to be awarded on the principle of beneficial  

legislation…  

15.4 Accordingly, we conclude that compensation will be  

payable as applicable on the date of the accident with interest  

as may be considered reasonable from time to time on the  

same pattern as in accident claim cases. If the amount so  

calculated is less than the amount prescribed as on the date  

of the award of the Tribunal, the claimant will be entitled to  

higher of the two amounts…The 4-Judge Bench judgment  

in Pratap Narain Singh Deo (supra) holds the field on the  

subject and squarely applies to the present situation.‖  

(Emphasis supplied)  

 This Court held that compensation under the 1989 Act would be calculated with  

reference to the date of the accident along with interest payable. However, if the  

amount calculated is less than the amount prescribed as on the date of the award of the  

Tribunal under the 1989 Act, the claimant will be entitled to higher of the two amounts.   

 31 The judgment in Rathi Menon and Rina Devi were both rendered by a Bench of  

two judges of this Court. In Rina Devi, this Court resolved the apparent conflict  

between Rathi Menon and Kalandi by taking into account the judgment in Rathi  

Menon as well as the change in the position of law following the judgment. The  

position of law under the 1989 Act has thus been brought closer to the judgment of this  

Court in Pratap Narain Singh which held that the date relevant for the determination  

of compensation would be the date of the accident. The judgment in Rina Devi was  

recently followed by this Court in Union of India v Radha Yadav 16

.   

 32 It is pertinent to note that no similar position of law for the determination of the  

higher amount of compensation payable was adopted under the 1923 Act by this Court  

in Pratap Narain Singh and Valsala. This Court, being a Bench of two judges, is  

 16

(2019) 3 SCC 410

20    

bound by the categorical position of law laid down in Pratap Narain Singh and  

Valsala, both being judgments rendered by larger Benches of this Court.  

Consequently, we hold that the relevant date for the determination of compensation  

payable is the date of the accident and the benefit of Act 45 of 2009 does not apply to  

accidents that took place prior to its coming into force.  

33 In the present case, the accident occurred on 31 January 2008 i.e. prior to the  

coming into force of Act 45 of 2009. Consequently, the High Court erred in extending  

the benefit of Act 45 of 2009 which deleted Explanation II to Section 4 to the present  

case. The High Court was required to determine the compensation payable on the  

date of the accident on which date, the deemed cap of Rs 4000 as monthly wages was  

applicable.   

 34 Though the accident took place in 2008, the appeal is being decided over 12  

years later. We take note of the fact that following the order of remand by the High  

Court, the employer deposed as PW2 and stated that the deceased had worked in his  

establishment for about three years. The employer duly proved Exhibit P5 in the  

course of his evidence which was the monthly pay certificate indicating that the  

deceased was drawing a monthly wage of Rs 32,000, including expenses towards  

food. Significantly, no appeal was filed by the respondents against the judgment of the  

High Court enhancing the compensation. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined  

to interfere with the award of compensation ordered by the High Court in exercise of  

the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to do complete justice under Article 142 of the  

Constitution. Having clarified the law as noted above, the appeal shall stand  

dismissed.  

21    

 35 Before concluding the judgment, it would be necessary to note that in the office  

report dated 14 October 2019 and 18 November 2019, it has been stated that service  

is complete on the respondents.  

 36 The total compensation payable to the appellant shall stand quantified at Rs  

8,86,120 on which interest shall be payable at 12% per annum from the date of the  

accident. The liability for the payment of compensation shall be joint and several. The  

compensation shall be payable to the first and the second appellants jointly and  

severally by the respondents. The compensation shall be paid over within a period of  

two months from the receipt of a certified copy of the order. There shall be no order as  

to costs.  

…………...…...….......………………........J.                                                                        [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]  

…..…..…....…........……………….…........J.                                  [Ajay Rastogi]   

      New Delhi;   February 13, 2020.