28 November 2014
Supreme Court
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K. RAVI KUMAR Vs STATE OF KARNATAKA

Bench: FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA,ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Case number: Crl.A. No.-002494-002494 / 2014
Diary number: 37968 / 2010
Advocates: JITENDRA KUMAR Vs V. N. RAGHUPATHY


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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL  APPEAL No. 2494  OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 2307 of 2012)

K. Ravi Kumar                   Appellant(s)

Versus

State of Karnataka               Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This  appeal  arises  out  of  a  judgment  and  

order dated 27.01.2010 passed by the High Court  

of  Karnataka  at  Bangalore  whereby  Criminal  

Appeal No. 689/2006 filed by the appellant herein  

arising  out  of  judgment  and  order  dated

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01.02.2006  passed  by  the  Additional  Sessions  

Judge,  Mysore  in  S.C.  No.  306/2004  has  been  

dismissed  thereby  upholding  the  appellant's  

conviction  for  the  offence  of  murder  punishable  

under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860  

(hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  IPC”)  and  the  

sentence of  imprisonment  for  life  with  a  fine  of  

Rs.10,000/- awarded to him. In default of payment  

of  fine,  the  appellant  has  been  sentenced  to  

undergo rigorous imprisonment for further period  

of  six  months.   The  appellant  has  also  been  

convicted for the offence punishable under Section  

498-A  of  the  IPC  and  sentenced  to  undergo  

rigorous imprisonment for two years with a fine of  

Rs.2,000/-.  In  default  of  payment  of  fine,  the  

appellant has been sentenced to undergo rigorous  

imprisonment  for  further  period  of  two  months.  

Substantive  sentence  for  both  the  offences  are  

directed to run concurrently.

3. The  factual  matrix  in  which  the  appellant  

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came to be prosecuted and convicted has been set  

out  in  detail  by  the trial  Court  as  also  the High  

Court in the orders passed by them. Therefore, we  

need  not  recapitulate  the  same  all  over  again  

except to the extent it is necessary to do so for the  

disposal of this appeal.

4. Briefly  stated,  the  incident  that  eventually  

culminated into the death of the appellant's wife,  

Padma  and  the  consequent  prosecution  of  the  

appellant/husband are as follows:

(a) On  22.5.1995,  Padma,  the  daughter  of  

Lakshmi, PW-2 (complainant) was married to the  

appellant.  At the time of marriage, the appellant  

was a trainee constable in KSRP at Bangalore. On  

completion  of  the  training,  the  appellant  was  

posted at Bangalore and started living with his in-

laws.  In 1996, the couple was blessed with their  

first child, a son named ‘Nandan’.  The appellant  

with  his  wife  and  son  (Nandan)  shifted  to  his  

parental  house at  Mandya,  a  nearby village and  

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started living with his parents. After sometime, the  

appellant sent his wife to her parents’ house for  

delivery  where  she  gave  birth  to  their  second  

child,  a son named ‘Keerthan’. In the meantime,  

the appellant was transferred to Mysore, therefore,  

he  shifted  with  his  family  (wife  Padma and two  

sons) to a place called Kurubarahalli  and started  

living  there  in  house  bearing  No.  1326/A  I  St.  

Cross.

(b) On 11.8.2004, around 10.30-11.00 p.m., the  

appellant got a message that his old father, who  

was  living  at  Mandya,  was  seriously  ill.   The  

appellant asked Padma to accompany him to leave  

for  Mandya  immediately  to  see  his  father's  

condition. However, Padma did not agree to leave  

immediately  but  said  that  they can go the next  

day. This issue led to heated exchange between  

them and eventually resulted in appellant loosing  

his  mental  balance  to  the  extent  that  he  first  

alleged  to  have  stabbed  Padma  with  knife  and  

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then  poured  Kerosene  and  set  her  on  fire.  The  

appellant then took his two minor sons and locked  

the  house  by  leaving  Padma  in  the  house  in  

injured condition and left  for  Mandya to  see his  

ailing father.  He gave Rs.20/-  and Rs.10/-  to  his  

sons and told them not to disclose the incident to  

anyone, which they had noticed. After two days,  

the appellant with his sons returned from Mandya  

and,  in  an effort  to  make everyone believe that  

Padma  was  alone  in  the  house,  called  the  

neighbours to open the door.  The door lock was  

then opened with the help of skilled labour.  The  

neighbours, Jvaramma and others, who lived near  

the house, entered the house with the appellant  

and  found  the  burnt  dead  body  of  Padma.  

Someone informed the  appellant's  brother-in-law  

at Bangalore, that Padma has been taken to K.R.  

Hospital for treatment for the injuries sustained by  

her.  On receiving the information, PW-2 (Lakshmi)  

- mother of Padma, rushed to Kurubarahalli along  

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with  her  son,  Raghu,  and  younger  brother,  

Basavaraju. On reaching there, they saw the burnt  

dead  body  of  Padma  lying  in  the  room.   They  

made enquiry with the children, who were with the  

neighbours,  as  to  what  actually  happened  with  

their  mother.   Nandan  –  the  elder  son  of  the  

appellant narrated the entire incident.  This led to  

lodging of the complaint (Ex-P-3) by  Lakshmi -PW-

2 to Nazarbad Police Station.

(c) S.G.  Vijay  Kumar-  P.W-5  (Police  Inspector)  

registered  the  complaint  (Ex.  P-3)  against  the  

appellant  for  the  offences  punishable  under  

Section 302 read with Section 498-A of the  IPC  

and registered the FIR (Ex-P-5). He got the inquest  

done of the dead body as per (Ex-P-4), recorded  

the  statements  of  the  sons  -  Nandan  and  

Keerthan, the neighbours - Ashok and Javaramma  

during inquest, and sent the dead body for post-

mortem. He also prepared the scene of occurrence  

Panchnama as  per  (Ex-P-1),  seized  kerosene  tin  

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(M.O.-1),  match box (M.O.-2)  and burnt  piece of  

nighty (M.O.-3) along with blood stained cloth.  

(d) The appellant was arrested the same day and  

was produced before the Court the following day,  

i.e.  on  14.08.2004.  P.W.-5,  then  recorded  the  

statement of witnesses and on receipt of the post-

mortem  report  (Ex-P-6)  transferred  the  case  to  

Mahila Police station for further investigation and  

for submission of final report. Thereafter, Nirmala  

Harish,  Police  Inspector  (P.W.-6)  registered  the  

case as Crime No. 75/2004 and on receipt of FSL  

report  (Ex-P-9)  and  additional  report  of  Medical  

officer (Ex-P-10) filed a charge sheet against the  

appellant  for  offences punishable under Sections  

302  and  498-A  of  IPC.  The  case  was  then  

committed  to  the  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  

Mysore.  

(e) The appellant was explained of the charges  

against  him,  which  he  denied  and  claimed  to  

undergo a trial.  The prosecution examined seven  

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witnesses  (PW-1  to  PW-7)  and  exhibited  

documents  (Ex-P1  to  P10)  and  seized  articles  

(M.O.1 to M.O.3). The statement of the appellant  

under  Section  313  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure, 1973 was recorded, wherein he denied  

all  material  incriminatory  statements  in  the  

evidence adduced by the prosecution.

(f) By judgment dated 01.02.2006, the learned  

Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Mysore  held  the  

appellant  guilty  of  commission  of  offences  

punishable under Sections 302 and  498-A IPC for  

committing  murder  of  his  wife-  Padma  and  the  

cruelty  meted  out  to  her  and  accordingly  while  

convicting  him  directed  to  undergo  sentence  

mentioned above which was to run concurrently.   

(g) Aggrieved  by  the  said  judgment,  the  

appellant  filed appeal  being Criminal  Appeal  No.  

689 of 2006 before the High Court.   By impugned  

judgment,  the  High  Court  concurred  with  the  

judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Mysore  

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and dismissed the appellant's appeal. It is against  

this  concurrent  conviction  and  sentence,  the  

appellant has filed this appeal by way of special  

leave.

5. Learned  Counsel  for  the  appellant  while  

assailing the impugned judgment has urged only  

one point.  According to him, the appellant's case  

squarely falls within Exception 4 to Section 300 of  

IPC. Learned Counsel submitted that the incident  

in  question,  which  eventually  led  to  Padma’s  

death,  took  place  due  to  sudden  fight  ensued  

between  the  couple  without  any  premeditation  

and the act of the appellant in allegedly stabbing  

and pouring kerosene on Padma was an outcome  

of the heat of passion upon such sudden quarrel.  

Learned  counsel  referred  to  the  evidence  while  

supporting his submission and contended that no  

evidence was adduced by the prosecution to show  

that either relation between the appellant and his  

wife was not cordial or/and that they were fighting  

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intermittently on issues or that some violence or  

overt  act  was  shown  by  the  appellant  towards  

Padma or any threat was given by the appellant to  

her or that there was any pre-determined motive  

in  the  appellant’s  mind  to  kill  her.   Learned  

counsel pointed out that during the 9 years of their  

marriage,   the  couple  was  blessed  with  two  

children  and  the  appellant  never  made  any  

demand  of  dowry  from  the  deceased  or  her  

parents.   Learned  counsel,  therefore,  contended  

on the  basis  of  the principles  laid  down by  this  

Court in several decisions cited at the bar that the  

benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be  

given  to  the  appellant  while  awarding  the  

sentence.   Finally,  learned  counsel  urged  that  

since this aspect was not examined by the courts  

below  much  less  in  its  proper  perspective  and  

hence  this  Court  should  examine  the  same and  

accordingly  grant  its  benefit  by  altering  the  

sentence.

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6. Though learned counsel for the respondent-  

State opposed the aforementioned submission of  

learned counsel for the appellant and contended  

that  no  case  is  made  out  to  interfere  in  the  

quantum of punishment much less by taking re-

course  to  Exception  4  to  Section  300  IPC  and  

hence  this  Court  should  uphold  the  conviction  

under  Section  302  IPC.  We,  however,  find  

considerable force in the submissions urged by the  

learned counsel for the appellant.

7. Before we turn to the facts of this case, it is  

apposite to take note of the principle of law laid  

down by this Court as to in which circumstances,  

the accused is held entitled to claim the benefit of  

Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC thereby is entitled  

to seek conversion of  the offence committed by  

him  from  murder  to  culpable  homicide  not  

amounting to murder.  Indeed, the principle of law  

on this  issue remains  no longer  res  integra and  

settled by a series of decisions of this Court. What  

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has varied is its application to every case.

8. Exception 4 to Section 300 reads as under:

“300. Murder – Except in the cases hereinafter  excepted, culpable homicide is murder,  if  the  act by which the death is caused is done with  the intention of causing death, or –  …………………………………………………………….. …………………………………………………………….. Exception 4 : Culpable homicide is not murder  if  it  is  committed  without  premeditation  in  a  sudden  fight  in  the  heat  of  passion  upon  a  sudden  quarrel  and  without  the  offender  having taken undue advantage or  acted in  a  cruel or unusual manner.

Explanation  –  It  is  immaterial  in  such  cases  which partly offers the provocation or commits  the first assault.”

9. In  Surinder  Kumar  v.  Union  Territory,  

Chandigarh,  (1989) 2 SCC 217,  this Court on the  

same  issue  held  that  if  on  a  sudden  quarrel  a  

person  in  the  heat  of  the  moment  picks  up  a  

weapon which is handy and causes injuries out of  

which only one proves fatal, he would be entitled  

to the benefit of the Exception provided he has not  

acted cruelly.  This Court held that the number of  

wounds caused during the occurrence in  such a  

situation was not the decisive factor.  What was  

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important  was  that  the  occurrence  had  taken  

place on account of a sudden and unpremeditated  

fight and the offender must have acted in a fit of  

anger.  Dealing with the provision of Exception 4  

to Section 300, this Court observed:

“7. To invoke this exception four requirements must  be  satisfied,  namely,  (i)  it  was  a  sudden fight;  (ii)  there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in  a  heat  of  passion;  and  (iv)  the  assailant  had  not  taken  any  undue  advantage  or  acted  in  a  cruel  manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor  is it relevant who offered the provocation or started  the  assault.  The  number  of  wounds  caused during  the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is  important  is  that  the  occurrence  must  have  been  sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must  have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender  must not have taken any undue advantage or acted  in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a  person in the heat of the moment picks up a  weapon  which  is  handy  and  causes  injuries,  one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled  to the benefit of this exception provided he has  not acted cruelly…….”  (Emphasis supplied)

10. In Ghapoo Yadav and Ors. v. State of M.P.,  

(2003)  3  SCC 528,  this  Court  held  that  in  a  heat  of  

passion there must be no time for the passion to cool  

down and that the parties had in that case before the  

Court worked themselves into a fury on account of the  

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verbal  altercation  in  the  beginning.   Apart  from  the  

incident being the result  of  a sudden quarrel  without  

premeditation, the law requires that the offender should  

not have taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or  

unusual  manner  to  be  able  to  claim  the  benefit  of  

Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.   Whether  or  not  the  

fight  was  sudden,  was  declared  by  the  Court  to  be  

decided in the facts and circumstances of each case.  

The following passage from the decision is apposite:

“10. ……….  The  help  of  Exception  4  can  be  invoked  if  death  is  caused:  (a)  without  premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without  the offender’s having taken undue advantage  or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d)  the  fight  must  have  been  with  the  person  killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the  ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is  to  be  noted  that  the  “fight”  occurring  in  Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in  the Indian Penal Code. It takes two to make a  fight. Heat of passion requires that there must  be no time for the passions to cool down and in  this case, the parties have worked themselves  into a fury on account of the verbal altercation  in the beginning. A fight is a combat between  two and more persons whether with or without  weapons.  It  is  not  possible  to  enunciate  any  general rule as to what shall be deemed to be  a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and  whether  a  quarrel  is  sudden  or  not  must  necessarily  depend upon  the  proved  facts  of  each case. For the application of Exception 4,  

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it is not sufficient to show that there was  a  sudden  quarrel  and  there  was  no  premeditation.  It must further be shown  that  the  offender  has  not  taken  undue  advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual  manner. The  expression  “undue  advantage”  as  used  in  the  provision  means  “unfair  advantage”.(Emphasis supplied) xxx xxx xxx  

“11………  After the injuries were inflicted  the injured had fallen down, but there is  no material  to show that  thereafter  any  injury  was  inflicted  when  he  was  in  a  helpless  condition.  The  assaults  were  made  at  random.  Even  the  previous  altercations were verbal and not physical.  It is not the case of the prosecution that  the  accused-appellants  had  come  prepared  and  armed  for  attacking  the  deceased. …………. This goes to show that in  the  heat  of  passion  upon  a  sudden  quarrel  followed by  a  fight  the  accused persons  had  caused injuries on the deceased, but had not  acted in a cruel or unusual manner. That being  so,  Exception  4  to  Section  300 IPC is  clearly  applicable…….”(Emphasis supplied)

11. In  Sukbhir  Singh  v.  State  of  Haryana,  

(2002) 3 SCC 327, the appellant caused two Bhala  

blows on the vital part of the body of the deceased  

that was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature  

to  cause  death.  The  High  Court  held  that  the  

appellant  had  acted  in  a  cruel  and  unusual  

manner.  Reversing  the  view  taken  by  the  High  

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Court this Court held that all fatal injuries resulting  

in death cannot be termed as cruel or unusual for  

the purposes of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. In  

cases where after the injured had fallen down, the  

appellant-accused did not inflict any further injury  

when he was in a helpless position, it may indicate  

that  he  had  not  acted  in  a  cruel  or  unusual  

manner. This Court observed:  

“19……….All  fatal  injuries  resulting  in  death  cannot be termed as cruel or unusual for the  purposes  of  not  availing  the  benefit  of  Exception  4  of  Section  300  IPC.  After  the  injuries were inflicted and the injured had  fallen down, the appellant is not shown to  have  inflicted  any other  injury  upon his  person  when  he  was  in  a  helpless  position. It  is  proved  that  in  the  heat  of  passion upon a sudden quarrel  followed by a  fight, the accused who was armed with bhala  caused injuries at random and thus did not act  in  a  cruel  or  unusual  manner.”(Emphasis  supplied)

12. In  Mahesh v. State of M.P., (1996) 10 SCC 668,  

where the appellant had assaulted the deceased in a  

sudden fight and after giving him one blow he had not  

caused any further injury to the deceased which fact  

situation was held by this Court to be sufficient to bring  

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the case under Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC.  This  

Court held:

“4.  …………..Thus, placed as the appellant  and the deceased were at the time of the  occurrence,  it  appears  to  us  that  the  appellant assaulted the deceased in that  sudden  fight  and  after  giving  him  one  blow took to his heels. He did not cause  any  other  injury  to  the  deceased  and  therefore it cannot be said that he acted  in  any  cruel  or  unusual  manner.  Admittedly,  he  did  not  assault  PW 2  or  PW 6 who were also present along with the  deceased  and  who  had  also  requested  the  appellant not to allow his cattle to graze in the  field of PW 1. This fortifies our belief that the  assault  on  the  deceased was  made during  a  sudden quarrel  without  any premeditation.  In  this fact situation,  we are of the opinion that  Exception  4  to  Section  300  IPC  is  clearly  attracted to the case of the appellant and the  offence of which the appellant can be said to  be guilty would squarely fall under Section 304  (Part I) IPC………” (Emphasis supplied)

13. The law laid down in the aforesaid cases was  

considered and applied recently by this Court in  

the case reported in Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad vs.  

State  of  Maharashtra,  (2013)  6  SCC  770.  

In  this  case  also,  the  appellant-accused  while  

passing on the field of the deceased on a spur of  

moment indulged in heated talk with the deceased  

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which resulted in hitting a blow by the appellant-

accused  to  the  deceased  with  the  rod  causing  

death  of  the  deceased.    Justice  T.  S.  Thakur,  

speaking for the Bench, accepted the plea raised  

by the appellant-accused and accordingly altered  

the sentence falling under Section 304 Part II IPC  

by giving him the benefit of Exception 4 of Section  

300 IPC.  It was  held by this Court as under:  

“27……… we are of the opinion that the nature  of  the simple injury  inflicted by  the accused,  the part of the body on which it was inflicted,  the weapon used to inflict  the same and the  circumstances in which the injury was inflicted  do  not  suggest  that  the  appellant  had  the  intention to kill  the deceased. All that can be  said is  that the appellant had the knowledge  that  the  injury  inflicted  by  him was  likely  to  cause  the  death  of  the  deceased.  The  case  would, therefore, more appropriately fall under  Section 304 Part II IPC.”

14. Keeping in view the approach of this Court for  

giving benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC in  

cases mentioned above and applying the same to  

the  facts  of  this  case,  we  are  inclined  to  give  

benefit  of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC to the  

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appellant by altering his sentence awarded to the  

appellant punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC.  

This we say so in the facts of this case for more  

than one reason.   Firstly,  even according to the  

prosecution,  there  was  no  premeditation  in  the  

commission of crime. Secondly, there is not even a  

suggestion  or  we  may  say  conclusive  evidence  

that the appellant had any pre-determined motive  

or  enmity  to  commit  the  offence  against  the  

deceased  leave  alone  a  serious  offence  like  

murder. Thirdly, incident that occurred was due to  

sudden  quarrel  which  ensued  between  the  

appellant-accused  and  the  deceased-Padma  on  

the issue of  going to  village Mandya to see the  

ailing  appellant's  father.   The  appellant,  on  

receiving  this  news,  had  become  upset  and,  

therefore,  his  insistence  to  see  his  ailing  father  

immediately  was  natural  and at  the  same time,  

Padma's  refusal  to  leave  could  lead  to  heated  

exchange of words between them. True, it is that it  

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reached to its extreme inasmuch as the appellant  

in  heated  exchange  of  words  lost  his  mental  

balance  and  poured  kerosene  on  Padma setting  

her to burn.  However, the fact remains that it was  

an  outcome  of  sudden  outburst  and  heated  

exchange with no predetermined motive per se to  

kill  her.   Fourthly,   no  conclusive  evidence  was  

adduced by the prosecution to prove any kind of  

constant  quarrel  ever  ensued in  the  last  9  long  

years between the couple and that too for a cause  

known to others which could lead to killing Padma  

or  whether  any  unsuccessful  attempt  was  ever  

made  by  the  appellant  to  kill  her  in  past  and  

lastly, we have not been able to see from the post-

mortem report  that  any  stab  injury  on  Padma's  

body  was  caused  nor  prosecution  was  able  to  

prove that any blood stained knife from the place  

of occurrence was recovered  at the instance of  

the appellant or of any witness.   

15.  In the light of the aforementioned reasons,  

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which, in our opinion, emerge from the evidence  

on  record,  we  are  of  the  considered  view  that  

these  reasons  are  sufficient  to  give  benefit  of  

Exception 4 to  Section 300 IPC to the appellant  

and enables the Court to hold that the offence in  

question was not murder but it was an offence of  

culpable  homicide  not  amounting  to  murder  as  

specified in Exception 4 to Section 300 and hence  

punishable under Section 304 part II IPC  

16. In the result, we allow the appeal but only to  

the  extent  that  instead  of  Section  302  IPC,  the  

appellant shall stand convicted for the offence of  

culpable  homicide  not  amounting  to  murder  

punishable  under  Section  304  Part  II  IPC  and  

accordingly  sentenced  to  undergo  rigorous  

imprisonment  for  a  period  of  10  years.  The  

conviction  and  sentence  imposed  under  Section  

498-A as also the fine imposed upon the appellant  

and  the  default  sentence  awarded  to  him  shall  

remain unaltered which shall run concurrently.  

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17. The  appeal  is  accordingly  disposed  of  in  

above terms in modification of the orders passed  

by the courts below.   

    ……………………………………………………J.      [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA]

                               .….…...............................J.                               [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

New Delhi; November 28, 2014

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