K. RAVI KUMAR Vs STATE OF KARNATAKA
Bench: FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA,ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Case number: Crl.A. No.-002494-002494 / 2014
Diary number: 37968 / 2010
Advocates: JITENDRA KUMAR Vs
V. N. RAGHUPATHY
Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2494 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 2307 of 2012)
K. Ravi Kumar Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Karnataka Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises out of a judgment and
order dated 27.01.2010 passed by the High Court
of Karnataka at Bangalore whereby Criminal
Appeal No. 689/2006 filed by the appellant herein
arising out of judgment and order dated
Page 2
01.02.2006 passed by the Additional Sessions
Judge, Mysore in S.C. No. 306/2004 has been
dismissed thereby upholding the appellant's
conviction for the offence of murder punishable
under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as “the IPC”) and the
sentence of imprisonment for life with a fine of
Rs.10,000/- awarded to him. In default of payment
of fine, the appellant has been sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for further period
of six months. The appellant has also been
convicted for the offence punishable under Section
498-A of the IPC and sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for two years with a fine of
Rs.2,000/-. In default of payment of fine, the
appellant has been sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for further period of two months.
Substantive sentence for both the offences are
directed to run concurrently.
3. The factual matrix in which the appellant
2
Page 3
came to be prosecuted and convicted has been set
out in detail by the trial Court as also the High
Court in the orders passed by them. Therefore, we
need not recapitulate the same all over again
except to the extent it is necessary to do so for the
disposal of this appeal.
4. Briefly stated, the incident that eventually
culminated into the death of the appellant's wife,
Padma and the consequent prosecution of the
appellant/husband are as follows:
(a) On 22.5.1995, Padma, the daughter of
Lakshmi, PW-2 (complainant) was married to the
appellant. At the time of marriage, the appellant
was a trainee constable in KSRP at Bangalore. On
completion of the training, the appellant was
posted at Bangalore and started living with his in-
laws. In 1996, the couple was blessed with their
first child, a son named ‘Nandan’. The appellant
with his wife and son (Nandan) shifted to his
parental house at Mandya, a nearby village and
3
Page 4
started living with his parents. After sometime, the
appellant sent his wife to her parents’ house for
delivery where she gave birth to their second
child, a son named ‘Keerthan’. In the meantime,
the appellant was transferred to Mysore, therefore,
he shifted with his family (wife Padma and two
sons) to a place called Kurubarahalli and started
living there in house bearing No. 1326/A I St.
Cross.
(b) On 11.8.2004, around 10.30-11.00 p.m., the
appellant got a message that his old father, who
was living at Mandya, was seriously ill. The
appellant asked Padma to accompany him to leave
for Mandya immediately to see his father's
condition. However, Padma did not agree to leave
immediately but said that they can go the next
day. This issue led to heated exchange between
them and eventually resulted in appellant loosing
his mental balance to the extent that he first
alleged to have stabbed Padma with knife and
4
Page 5
then poured Kerosene and set her on fire. The
appellant then took his two minor sons and locked
the house by leaving Padma in the house in
injured condition and left for Mandya to see his
ailing father. He gave Rs.20/- and Rs.10/- to his
sons and told them not to disclose the incident to
anyone, which they had noticed. After two days,
the appellant with his sons returned from Mandya
and, in an effort to make everyone believe that
Padma was alone in the house, called the
neighbours to open the door. The door lock was
then opened with the help of skilled labour. The
neighbours, Jvaramma and others, who lived near
the house, entered the house with the appellant
and found the burnt dead body of Padma.
Someone informed the appellant's brother-in-law
at Bangalore, that Padma has been taken to K.R.
Hospital for treatment for the injuries sustained by
her. On receiving the information, PW-2 (Lakshmi)
- mother of Padma, rushed to Kurubarahalli along
5
Page 6
with her son, Raghu, and younger brother,
Basavaraju. On reaching there, they saw the burnt
dead body of Padma lying in the room. They
made enquiry with the children, who were with the
neighbours, as to what actually happened with
their mother. Nandan – the elder son of the
appellant narrated the entire incident. This led to
lodging of the complaint (Ex-P-3) by Lakshmi -PW-
2 to Nazarbad Police Station.
(c) S.G. Vijay Kumar- P.W-5 (Police Inspector)
registered the complaint (Ex. P-3) against the
appellant for the offences punishable under
Section 302 read with Section 498-A of the IPC
and registered the FIR (Ex-P-5). He got the inquest
done of the dead body as per (Ex-P-4), recorded
the statements of the sons - Nandan and
Keerthan, the neighbours - Ashok and Javaramma
during inquest, and sent the dead body for post-
mortem. He also prepared the scene of occurrence
Panchnama as per (Ex-P-1), seized kerosene tin
6
Page 7
(M.O.-1), match box (M.O.-2) and burnt piece of
nighty (M.O.-3) along with blood stained cloth.
(d) The appellant was arrested the same day and
was produced before the Court the following day,
i.e. on 14.08.2004. P.W.-5, then recorded the
statement of witnesses and on receipt of the post-
mortem report (Ex-P-6) transferred the case to
Mahila Police station for further investigation and
for submission of final report. Thereafter, Nirmala
Harish, Police Inspector (P.W.-6) registered the
case as Crime No. 75/2004 and on receipt of FSL
report (Ex-P-9) and additional report of Medical
officer (Ex-P-10) filed a charge sheet against the
appellant for offences punishable under Sections
302 and 498-A of IPC. The case was then
committed to the Additional Sessions Judge,
Mysore.
(e) The appellant was explained of the charges
against him, which he denied and claimed to
undergo a trial. The prosecution examined seven
7
Page 8
witnesses (PW-1 to PW-7) and exhibited
documents (Ex-P1 to P10) and seized articles
(M.O.1 to M.O.3). The statement of the appellant
under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 was recorded, wherein he denied
all material incriminatory statements in the
evidence adduced by the prosecution.
(f) By judgment dated 01.02.2006, the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Mysore held the
appellant guilty of commission of offences
punishable under Sections 302 and 498-A IPC for
committing murder of his wife- Padma and the
cruelty meted out to her and accordingly while
convicting him directed to undergo sentence
mentioned above which was to run concurrently.
(g) Aggrieved by the said judgment, the
appellant filed appeal being Criminal Appeal No.
689 of 2006 before the High Court. By impugned
judgment, the High Court concurred with the
judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Mysore
8
Page 9
and dismissed the appellant's appeal. It is against
this concurrent conviction and sentence, the
appellant has filed this appeal by way of special
leave.
5. Learned Counsel for the appellant while
assailing the impugned judgment has urged only
one point. According to him, the appellant's case
squarely falls within Exception 4 to Section 300 of
IPC. Learned Counsel submitted that the incident
in question, which eventually led to Padma’s
death, took place due to sudden fight ensued
between the couple without any premeditation
and the act of the appellant in allegedly stabbing
and pouring kerosene on Padma was an outcome
of the heat of passion upon such sudden quarrel.
Learned counsel referred to the evidence while
supporting his submission and contended that no
evidence was adduced by the prosecution to show
that either relation between the appellant and his
wife was not cordial or/and that they were fighting
9
Page 10
intermittently on issues or that some violence or
overt act was shown by the appellant towards
Padma or any threat was given by the appellant to
her or that there was any pre-determined motive
in the appellant’s mind to kill her. Learned
counsel pointed out that during the 9 years of their
marriage, the couple was blessed with two
children and the appellant never made any
demand of dowry from the deceased or her
parents. Learned counsel, therefore, contended
on the basis of the principles laid down by this
Court in several decisions cited at the bar that the
benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be
given to the appellant while awarding the
sentence. Finally, learned counsel urged that
since this aspect was not examined by the courts
below much less in its proper perspective and
hence this Court should examine the same and
accordingly grant its benefit by altering the
sentence.
10
Page 11
6. Though learned counsel for the respondent-
State opposed the aforementioned submission of
learned counsel for the appellant and contended
that no case is made out to interfere in the
quantum of punishment much less by taking re-
course to Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC and
hence this Court should uphold the conviction
under Section 302 IPC. We, however, find
considerable force in the submissions urged by the
learned counsel for the appellant.
7. Before we turn to the facts of this case, it is
apposite to take note of the principle of law laid
down by this Court as to in which circumstances,
the accused is held entitled to claim the benefit of
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC thereby is entitled
to seek conversion of the offence committed by
him from murder to culpable homicide not
amounting to murder. Indeed, the principle of law
on this issue remains no longer res integra and
settled by a series of decisions of this Court. What
11
Page 12
has varied is its application to every case.
8. Exception 4 to Section 300 reads as under:
“300. Murder – Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or – …………………………………………………………….. …………………………………………………………….. Exception 4 : Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
Explanation – It is immaterial in such cases which partly offers the provocation or commits the first assault.”
9. In Surinder Kumar v. Union Territory,
Chandigarh, (1989) 2 SCC 217, this Court on the
same issue held that if on a sudden quarrel a
person in the heat of the moment picks up a
weapon which is handy and causes injuries out of
which only one proves fatal, he would be entitled
to the benefit of the Exception provided he has not
acted cruelly. This Court held that the number of
wounds caused during the occurrence in such a
situation was not the decisive factor. What was
12
Page 13
important was that the occurrence had taken
place on account of a sudden and unpremeditated
fight and the offender must have acted in a fit of
anger. Dealing with the provision of Exception 4
to Section 300, this Court observed:
“7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (i) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor is it relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly…….” (Emphasis supplied)
10. In Ghapoo Yadav and Ors. v. State of M.P.,
(2003) 3 SCC 528, this Court held that in a heat of
passion there must be no time for the passion to cool
down and that the parties had in that case before the
Court worked themselves into a fury on account of the
13
Page 14
verbal altercation in the beginning. Apart from the
incident being the result of a sudden quarrel without
premeditation, the law requires that the offender should
not have taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or
unusual manner to be able to claim the benefit of
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. Whether or not the
fight was sudden, was declared by the Court to be
decided in the facts and circumstances of each case.
The following passage from the decision is apposite:
“10. ………. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused: (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Indian Penal Code. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4,
14
Page 15
it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provision means “unfair advantage”.(Emphasis supplied) xxx xxx xxx
“11……… After the injuries were inflicted the injured had fallen down, but there is no material to show that thereafter any injury was inflicted when he was in a helpless condition. The assaults were made at random. Even the previous altercations were verbal and not physical. It is not the case of the prosecution that the accused-appellants had come prepared and armed for attacking the deceased. …………. This goes to show that in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel followed by a fight the accused persons had caused injuries on the deceased, but had not acted in a cruel or unusual manner. That being so, Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is clearly applicable…….”(Emphasis supplied)
11. In Sukbhir Singh v. State of Haryana,
(2002) 3 SCC 327, the appellant caused two Bhala
blows on the vital part of the body of the deceased
that was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
to cause death. The High Court held that the
appellant had acted in a cruel and unusual
manner. Reversing the view taken by the High
15
Page 16
Court this Court held that all fatal injuries resulting
in death cannot be termed as cruel or unusual for
the purposes of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. In
cases where after the injured had fallen down, the
appellant-accused did not inflict any further injury
when he was in a helpless position, it may indicate
that he had not acted in a cruel or unusual
manner. This Court observed:
“19……….All fatal injuries resulting in death cannot be termed as cruel or unusual for the purposes of not availing the benefit of Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC. After the injuries were inflicted and the injured had fallen down, the appellant is not shown to have inflicted any other injury upon his person when he was in a helpless position. It is proved that in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel followed by a fight, the accused who was armed with bhala caused injuries at random and thus did not act in a cruel or unusual manner.”(Emphasis supplied)
12. In Mahesh v. State of M.P., (1996) 10 SCC 668,
where the appellant had assaulted the deceased in a
sudden fight and after giving him one blow he had not
caused any further injury to the deceased which fact
situation was held by this Court to be sufficient to bring
16
Page 17
the case under Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC. This
Court held:
“4. …………..Thus, placed as the appellant and the deceased were at the time of the occurrence, it appears to us that the appellant assaulted the deceased in that sudden fight and after giving him one blow took to his heels. He did not cause any other injury to the deceased and therefore it cannot be said that he acted in any cruel or unusual manner. Admittedly, he did not assault PW 2 or PW 6 who were also present along with the deceased and who had also requested the appellant not to allow his cattle to graze in the field of PW 1. This fortifies our belief that the assault on the deceased was made during a sudden quarrel without any premeditation. In this fact situation, we are of the opinion that Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is clearly attracted to the case of the appellant and the offence of which the appellant can be said to be guilty would squarely fall under Section 304 (Part I) IPC………” (Emphasis supplied)
13. The law laid down in the aforesaid cases was
considered and applied recently by this Court in
the case reported in Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad vs.
State of Maharashtra, (2013) 6 SCC 770.
In this case also, the appellant-accused while
passing on the field of the deceased on a spur of
moment indulged in heated talk with the deceased
17
Page 18
which resulted in hitting a blow by the appellant-
accused to the deceased with the rod causing
death of the deceased. Justice T. S. Thakur,
speaking for the Bench, accepted the plea raised
by the appellant-accused and accordingly altered
the sentence falling under Section 304 Part II IPC
by giving him the benefit of Exception 4 of Section
300 IPC. It was held by this Court as under:
“27……… we are of the opinion that the nature of the simple injury inflicted by the accused, the part of the body on which it was inflicted, the weapon used to inflict the same and the circumstances in which the injury was inflicted do not suggest that the appellant had the intention to kill the deceased. All that can be said is that the appellant had the knowledge that the injury inflicted by him was likely to cause the death of the deceased. The case would, therefore, more appropriately fall under Section 304 Part II IPC.”
14. Keeping in view the approach of this Court for
giving benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC in
cases mentioned above and applying the same to
the facts of this case, we are inclined to give
benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC to the
18
Page 19
appellant by altering his sentence awarded to the
appellant punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC.
This we say so in the facts of this case for more
than one reason. Firstly, even according to the
prosecution, there was no premeditation in the
commission of crime. Secondly, there is not even a
suggestion or we may say conclusive evidence
that the appellant had any pre-determined motive
or enmity to commit the offence against the
deceased leave alone a serious offence like
murder. Thirdly, incident that occurred was due to
sudden quarrel which ensued between the
appellant-accused and the deceased-Padma on
the issue of going to village Mandya to see the
ailing appellant's father. The appellant, on
receiving this news, had become upset and,
therefore, his insistence to see his ailing father
immediately was natural and at the same time,
Padma's refusal to leave could lead to heated
exchange of words between them. True, it is that it
19
Page 20
reached to its extreme inasmuch as the appellant
in heated exchange of words lost his mental
balance and poured kerosene on Padma setting
her to burn. However, the fact remains that it was
an outcome of sudden outburst and heated
exchange with no predetermined motive per se to
kill her. Fourthly, no conclusive evidence was
adduced by the prosecution to prove any kind of
constant quarrel ever ensued in the last 9 long
years between the couple and that too for a cause
known to others which could lead to killing Padma
or whether any unsuccessful attempt was ever
made by the appellant to kill her in past and
lastly, we have not been able to see from the post-
mortem report that any stab injury on Padma's
body was caused nor prosecution was able to
prove that any blood stained knife from the place
of occurrence was recovered at the instance of
the appellant or of any witness.
15. In the light of the aforementioned reasons,
20
Page 21
which, in our opinion, emerge from the evidence
on record, we are of the considered view that
these reasons are sufficient to give benefit of
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC to the appellant
and enables the Court to hold that the offence in
question was not murder but it was an offence of
culpable homicide not amounting to murder as
specified in Exception 4 to Section 300 and hence
punishable under Section 304 part II IPC
16. In the result, we allow the appeal but only to
the extent that instead of Section 302 IPC, the
appellant shall stand convicted for the offence of
culpable homicide not amounting to murder
punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC and
accordingly sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of 10 years. The
conviction and sentence imposed under Section
498-A as also the fine imposed upon the appellant
and the default sentence awarded to him shall
remain unaltered which shall run concurrently.
21
Page 22
17. The appeal is accordingly disposed of in
above terms in modification of the orders passed
by the courts below.
……………………………………………………J. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA]
.….…...............................J. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi; November 28, 2014
22