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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 33 OF 2009

K.B. Nagur M.D. (Ayu.) … Appellant

Versus

Union of India          … Respondent

WITH

I.A. NOS. 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 AND 11

AND

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 249 OF 2011

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 736 OF 2011

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 737 OF 2011

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 738-739 OF 2011

J U D G M E N T

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1. The Central Council of Indian Medicine (for short ‘the  

Central Council’) is a statutory body, constituted in terms of  

Section 3 of the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 (for  

short ‘the Act’).   Section 4 of the Act mandates that election  

under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of  

the  Act  shall  be  conducted  by  the  Central  Government  in

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accordance  with  the  rules  as  may  be  made  in  this  behalf.  

Where any dispute arises regarding any election to the Central  

Council, it shall be referred to the Central Government whose  

decision shall be final.   Sub-section (1)(a) of Section 3 provides  

that  the  Central  Council  shall  consist  of  such  number  of  

members,  not  exceeding  five,  as  may be  determined  by  the  

Central  Government in accordance with the provisions of the  

First Schedule of the Act for each of the Ayurveda, Siddha and  

Unani systems of medicine, from each State, in which a State  

Register of  the Indian Medicine is maintained,  to be elected  

from  amongst  themselves,  by  the  persons  enrolled  on  that  

Register as registered practitioners of the respective systems.  

Section 3(1)(b) of the Act states that one member each of the  

Ayurveda, Siddha and Unani  systems of medicine from each  

University were to be elected from amongst themselves by the  

members  of  the  Faculty  or  Department  of  the  respective  

system  of  medicine  of  that  University.   The  Central  

Government could also nominate such number of members,  

not  exceeding  thirty  percent  of  the  total  members  elected,  

under the above mentioned clauses (a) and (b) to the Central  

Council,  from amongst  persons having special  knowledge or  

practical  experience  in  respect  of  Indian  medicine,  in

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accordance  with  Section  3(1)(c)  of  the  Act.    These  elected  

members are to elect their President, to be known as President  

of  the  Central  Council  and a  Vice-President  for  each of  the  

systems of medicine.

2. This  elected  Central  Council,  so  constituted,  is  to  

discharge various functions and duties as contemplated under  

the  provisions  of  the  Act,  which  include  the  grant  of  

recognition  to  medical  colleges/courses,  maintenance  of  

education standards, appointment of Inspectors, conduct and  

supervision  of  examinations,  and  even  the  withdrawal  of  

recognition, if necessary.    A register is to be maintained of the  

persons  possessing  requisite  qualification  in  the  type  of  

medicine  which the member  is  eligible  to  practice  and who  

have been registered by the State Board and which register  

has to be updated with regard to the qualification attained by  

members of the respective professions subsequently.    

3. As is evident from the above narrated provisions, the  

Central  Council  discharges  very  significant  and  important  

functions which would affect not only education in these three  

systems but even their practice and treatment of thousands of  

patients  under  these  systems.   The  statute  places  an  

obligation  upon  the  Central  Government  to  hold  these

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elections and ensure that the Central Council works smoothly  

and in accordance with the provisions of the Act.    Section 7 of  

the Act refers to the tenure that an elected member is entitled  

to  enjoy,  upon  his  election  to  the  Central  Council.    This  

Section deals with the term of the Office of the President, Vice-

President and the members of the Central Council.   The term  

of  office  for  all  these persons is  five  years  from the date  of  

election  or  nomination,  as  the  case  may  be,  or  until  a  

successor has been duly elected or nominated,  whichever is  

longer.     The  latter  part  of  this  Section  caused  serious  

impediment in the proper functioning of the Central Council  

primarily for two reasons : (a) the Central Government did not  

take  appropriate  steps  to  hold  fresh  elections  and  (b)  the  

persons who were elected and were interested in continuing as  

such, took advantage of this provision and continued in office  

far beyond five years as nobody was duly elected to replace  

them.   

4. The petitioner  is  an Ayurvedic  doctor and holds the  

degree  of  Ayurvedic  Medicine,  namely  BAMS,  has  done  his  

post  graduation MD (Ayurvedic)  degree  subsequently.    The  

petitioner claims that he held and still holds various offices in  

different  organizations  dealing  with  Ayurveda  system  of

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medicine.    He  claims  to  be  the  General  Secretary  of  the  

Medical  Association  of  India  and  member  of  the  Governing  

Body of  All  India Ayurvedic Congress Committee,  New Delhi  

and Indian Association of Blood Bank, Delhi.    His aim is to  

ensure proper functioning of the Central Council, which has  

not been properly constituted and for which elections have not  

been held for the last  20-25 years.    The petitioner,  having  

failed  to  achieve  any  results  at  the  hands  of  the  Central  

Government or the Central Council, despite the fact that he  

was  holding  various  offices  directly  connected  with  the  

functioning  of  the  Central  Council,  filed  a  petition  under  

Article  32 of  the Constitution of  India,  1950 (hereafter,  ‘the  

Constitution’) with the following prayers :

“(a) An appropriate writ, order or direction directing  the Union of India to hold elections to the Central  Council  of  Indian Medicines  and to  constitute  the  same in accordance with law;

(b)  further  direct  the  Union of  India  to  fill  up the  posts of any member who has completed five years  within one month;

(c) Strike down and quash the last clause in section  7  of  Indian  Medicine  Central  Council  Act,  1970  reading as “or until  his successor shall  have been  duly elected or nominated, whichever is longer” as  contrary  to  the  very  Act,  unconstitutional  and  undemocratic and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of  the Constitution of India.”

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5. Obvious from the above prayers is that the petitioner,  

firstly, wants a direction to the Union of India to discharge its  

statutory duty in terms of Section 3 of the Act, to fill up the  

membership of the Governing Body of the Central Council with  

regard to the members who have completed the term of five  

years within the stipulated period and secondly, the striking  

down of provision of Section 7 of the Act as unconstitutional,  

undemocratic  and  violative  of  Articles  14  and  16  of  the  

Constitution.   It is the contention of the petitioner that the  

elected members of the Central Council are adopting delaying  

tactics and even invoking the jurisdiction of the High Courts to  

stop the holding of elections or the declaration of result of the  

elections wherever held, notwithstanding the fact that there is  

an alternative remedy available to them of filing an election  

petition.   The inaction on the part of the Government borders  

on complicity  and with the passage of time vested interests  

have developed.   There is a specific averment in the petition  

that the Union of India and even the members of the Central  

Council are not evincing any interest in the functioning of the  

Central  Council  and a  few unelected members,  whose  term  

expired  long  back,  are  squatting  for  an  inordinately  long

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period  as  being  erstwhile  elected  members  of  the  Central  

Council with the aid of language of Section 7 of the Act.   To  

contend  that  the  delay  is  prejudicial  to  the  working  of  the  

Central Council and is also opposed to the spirit of Section 3  

of the Act, they rely on the decision of this Court in the case of  

Kishansing  Tomar  v.  Municipal  Corporation  of  the  City  of   

Ahmedabad and Others  [(2006) 8 SCC 352], which held that  

the Election Commission should take steps by following due  

process of law, but that too should be done in a timely manner  

and in no circumstances, shall such elections be delayed, so  

as to cause gross violation of mandatory provisions contained  

in Articles 243-U of the Constitution.    This buttresses their  

submission  that  timeliness  in  conduct  of  elections  is  

mandatory.

6. Lastly,  challenge  has  been  raised  to  the  following  

portion of Section 7 of the Act as unconstitutional, violative of  

Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution:-

“ or until his successor shall have been duly elected  or nominated, whichever is longer”  

7. First and foremost, we will deal with the contention of  

the  provision  being  ultra  vires of  Articles  14 and 16 of  the

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Constitution  of  India,  raised  on  behalf  of  the  petitioner.  

Article 14 guarantees equality before law whereas Article 16  

talks of equal opportunities in matters of public employment.  

This  concept  of  equality  has  to  be  patently  infringed  by  a  

provision  before  that  provision  or  any  part  thereof,  can  be  

declared  as  unconstitutional.    The  mere  fact  that  there  is  

some inconvenience arising from the language of a provision  

and its due implementation, cannot be a ground for declaring  

a provision violative of fundamental rights.  The impugned part  

of Section 7 of the Act is intended to ensure that there is no  

vacuum in the membership of the Central Council.  The term,  

as  prescribed  under  Section  7  of  the  Act,  is  five  years.  

Elections  are  expected  to  be  held  within that  period of  five  

years to ensure that immediately after expiry of  the specific  

term,  the  members  holding  the  office  quit  and  the  newly  

elected members assume the charge.  However, there can be  

situations where the elections in the entire country or in any  

part thereof cannot be held within the prescribed time and for  

valid reasons.   It may even be because of the situation that is  

created  by  the  people  who  are  holding  the  office  of  the  

members of the Central Council for their personal ends.   In  

such cases also,  the  elections  may be  delayed.     It  is  the

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former  situation  which  is  intended  to  be  protected  by  the  

challenged words of Section 7 of the Act.   The legislative intent  

is clear that there cannot be a vacuum in the working of a  

statutory body and it cannot be rendered non-existent even for  

a  short  period  by  lapse  of  membership  term  or  otherwise.  

Thus, to provide a safeguard for the interregnum period, of the  

earlier  members  of  the  Central  Council  vacating  their  office  

and  newly  elected  members  assuming  their  office,  the  

provisions of Section 7 have been enacted by the Legislature.

8. Still  another  aspect  is  that  presumption  of  

constitutionality is always in favour of a legislation, unless the  

contrary is shown.   Furthermore, a Legislature, in enacting a  

law, operates on a presumption, in law and practice, both, that  

all other forums and entities constituted under one or other  

Act would, in their functioning, act in accordance with law and  

expeditiously.   As it is a settled precept in the application of  

economic principles, that all other things will remain the same  

i.e., ceteris paribus, similarly, for the proper interpretation and  

examination of  a  provision of  a  statute,  all  bodies  must  be  

presumed to act effectively and in accordance with law.

9. A statute is construed so as to make it effective and  

operative as per the principle expressed in ut res valeat potius

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quam pereat.    There  is,  therefore,  a  presumption  that  the  

Legislature does not exceed its jurisdiction and the burden of  

establishing  that  the  Act  is  not  within  the  competence  of  

Legislature  or  that  it  has  transgressed  other  constitutional  

mandates,  such  as  those  relating  to  fundamental  rights,  is  

always on the person who challenges its vagaries.  

10. Here, we may also notice that there are two rules, of  

most general application, in construing a written instrument  

which are pari materia, applicable to statutes as well.    First, if  

possible, the written instrument shall be interpreted in light of  

the above mechanism and secondly, such a meaning shall be  

given  to  it,  as  may  carry  out  and  effectuate,  to  the  fullest  

extent, the intention of the parties or the framers of law.   Of  

course, such interpretation will be subject to the limitations of  

uniformity in the meaning given to such expressions etc.

11. It  is  also  a  settled  and  deeply  rooted  canon  of  

constitutional  jurisprudence,  that  in  the  process  of  

constitutional  adjudication,  the  courts  ought  not  to  pass  

decisions  on  questions  of  constitutionality  unless  such  

adjudication is unavoidable.   In this sense, the courts have  

followed  a  policy  of  strict  necessity  in  disposing  of  a  

constitutional  issue.    In  dealing  with  the  issues  of

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constitutionality,  the  courts  are  slow  to  embark  upon  an  

unnecessary, wide or general enquiry and should confine their  

decision as far as may be reasonably practicable, within the  

narrow limits required on the facts of a case.   From the above  

discussion,  it  is  clear  that question of  constitutionality  of  a  

provision  is  a  matter  which  the  courts  would  venture  to  

examine only for valid, proper and sustainable grounds.    We  

do not see that the provisions of Section 7 of the Act, or any  

part  thereof,  suffer  from  any  legal  infirmity,  excessive  

legislative  power  or  violate  any  legal  right  of  any  person,  

including  the  petitioner,  much  less  a  constitutional  right.  

Keeping the principle of strict necessity in mind, the courts do  

not  venture  to  examine  the  constitutional  validity  of  a  

provision and even strike down such provisions,  if  they are  

constitutional and a Court does so only if the situation created  

by such legislation is irremediable or unredeemable.  None of  

these circumstances exist in the present case.

12. In fact, it is not necessary for us to deliberate on this  

issue  at  any  greater  length  to  notice  that  in  a  case  under  

Regulation  23  of  the  Dental  Council  (Election)  Regulations,  

1952, where it was provided that the President shall, no later  

than  60  days  before  the  date  of  occurrence  of

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vacancy/vacancies, forward a notice by registered post to the  

Registrar of each University concerned, requesting him to hold  

an  election  not  later  than  the  date  specified  in  the  notice.  

These regulations are framed under the Dentists Act,  1948.  

Sections 6 and 7 of that Act deal with the tenure and election  

of the President, Vice President and the Members of the Dental  

Council  of  India.    Section  6(1)  of  the  Dentists  Act  further  

provides  that,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  that  Section,  an  

elected  or  a nominated member would hold the  office  for  a  

term of five years from the date of his election or nomination,  

or  until  his  successor  has been duly  elected  or  nominated,  

whichever was longer.   The language of that Section is  pari  

materia with that of Section 7 of the Act.  Challenge was raised  

to the constitutional validity of Section 6(1) of the Dentists Act,  

read  with  Regulation  23  of  the  Dental  Council  (Election)  

Regulations, 1952, framed thereunder.   A Constitution Bench  

of this Court repelled the said challenge in the case of Dental   

Council  of  India and Anr.  v.  Dr.  H.R.  Prem Sachdeva & Ors.   

(1999) 8 SCC 471 and held as under:-

“7. A conjoint reading of the various provisions of the  Act and the Regulations referred to above go to show  that the term of office of the members of the Council is  five years from the date of the election or nomination,

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as  the  case  may  be.  Section  6(1),  however,  also  provides that a nominated or elected member, after the  expiry of the term, may continue “until his successor  has  been  duly  elected  or  nominated,  whichever  is  longer”.  The  expression  “whichever  is  longer”  does  suggest the continuation after the expiry of the term.  Can  it,  however,  be  construed  to  mean  that  if  the  authorities fail to act as per clauses (a) to (f) of Section  3, the member concerned can continue to remain in  office till perpetuity? In our opinion that could not be  the intention of the law-makers. Regulation 23 (supra)  does give an indication of what we have said above.

8. A reasonable interpretation of the provisions of  the  Act  and  the  Regulations  would  be  that  elections/nominations to the Council should normally  be held/made once in five years. However, if for some  valid reasons the elections cannot be held during the  term of five years, the same should be held within a  reasonable  time  thereafter  and  the  continuance  in  office  of  the elected/nominated members should not  go on for perpetuity. The continuance in office, after  the  expiry  of  the  term,  should  only  be  a  stopgap  arrangement  to  avoid  a  vacuum.  The  obligation  to  nominate/hold  elections  is  of  various  authorities  obliged  to  elect/nominate  members  to  the  Council  under clauses (a) to (f). The Act and the Regulations  are  silent  about  the  period  during  which  elections/nominations  should  be  made/held  as  also  about the consequences of not holding the elections or  making nominations within the five-year term or soon  thereafter  and this lacuna gives  rise to unnecessary  litigation.  We  hope  that  the  authorities  concerned  shall  take  appropriate  measures  by  amending  the  provisions of the statute or the Regulations or frame  appropriate rules so that the ambiguity regarding the  maximum period, after the expiry of the five-year term  during  which  election/nomination  should  be  held/made is removed.”

13. For  the  reasons  recorded  above,  we  follow  the  view  

expressed by the Constitution Bench.   Therefore, we have no

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hesitation in repelling the challenge raised by the petitioner  

regarding the constitutionality of Section 7 of the Act.

14. Now,  we  shall  proceed  to  deal  with  the  other  

contention,  that  the  Central  Government  is  liable  to  be  

directed to hold the elections to the Central Council, as well as  

to  promptly  fill  up  the  vacancies  occurring  in  the  Central  

Council due to efflux of time.   This relief, to a large extent, has  

become  infructuous.   During  the  pendency  of  this  writ  

petition,  various  orders  had  been  passed  by  this  Court,  

directing  the  Central  Government  as  well  as  the  Central  

Council to conduct elections in accordance with the provisions  

of the Act.   On 3rd July, 2010, both the Central Council and  

the Union of India had agreed to complete the election process  

within a period of six months from that date.  It took some  

more time to complete the process, but when the matter came  

up  before  us  for  hearing  on  18th July,  2011,  and  on  

subsequent  dates,  we  were  informed  that  elections  to  the  

Central Council have been completed in all the States.   

15. The  election  process  in  regard  to  Siddha  system of  

medicine in the States of Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh  

and  Jammu  &  Kashmir  had  not  been  completed,  though  

elected  candidates  under  the  Unani  and  Ayurvedic  systems

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had been notified.   This was because there were no Siddha  

practitioners in those states.   In all other States, the election  

process in regard to the three medicine systems i.e., Ayurveda,  

Unani  and  Siddha  had  been  completed  and  the  elected  

candidates duly notified.    

16. It  was  also  pointed  out  before  us  that  the  Central  

Government had not made its nomination in terms of Section  

3(c) of the Act, under all the three systems of medicine.

17. We may notice that  this  petition has been rendered  

infructuous, though to a limited extent.   Section 3 of the Act  

imposes a statutory obligation upon the Central Government  

to hold elections to the Central Council,  in accordance with  

the  statutory  provisions,  which  we  have  discussed  above.  

Furthermore,  the  Central  Government  is  responsible  for  

nominating such number of  members  not  exceeding 30 per  

cent of the total members elected under Sections 3(1)(a) and  

3(1)(b) of the Act to the Central Council.   In other words, the  

Central  Government  has  a  major  role  to  play  in  the  

constitution, establishment and carrying on of activities by the  

Central Council.   This is an onerous and significant duty.  We  

cannot  understand  any  reason  whatsoever  for  the  Central  

Government not to perform its  statutory duties,  particularly

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when it concerns with the systems of medicine catering to a  

country of one billion people.   The Court would take judicial  

notice of the fact that a large number of people depend upon  

these systems of medicine for treatment of various diseases.  

The standards of education as well as the professionalism in  

practice  of  medicine  in  these  fields  is  bound  to  suffer  a  

setback, if the Central Government fails to exercise its powers  

and discharge its functions and duties in accordance with law.  

As  already  indicated,  the  Central  Council  exercises  

supervisory, administrative and regulatory powers in relation  

to education and practice of all these three systems.   If the  

Central  Government  wishes  to  exercise  such  control  over  

statutory bodies discharging important and diverse functions  

in the field of medicine, then it is undoubtedly expected of the  

Central  Government  to  discharge  its  functions  and  duties  

without failure and on time.   It cannot justify its conduct in  

unduly  delaying  the  proper  constitution  of  such  bodies  in  

accordance with the provisions of the statutes and create faux  

pas which shall  prejudicially  affect  all  concerned,  including  

the people at large.

18. We are conscious of  the fact  that this  Court  has to  

adopt a purely judicial approach.   The Constitution and the

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Rule of Law are the only supreme powers in any democracy  

and no higher duty rests upon this Court, than to enforce, by  

its decree, the will of the Legislature, as expressed in a statute,  

unless such statute is plainly and unmistakably in violation of  

the Constitution or Rule of Law.

19. In the case of  Kishansing  Tomar  (supra),  this  Court  

while dealing with the question of revision of electoral rolls by  

the  State  Election  Commission,  noticed  that  the  Election  

Commission shall complete the election before the expiration  

of the duration of five years' period as stipulated in Clause (9)  

of Article 243-U of the Constitution and not yield to situations  

that may be created by vested interests to postpone elections  

beyond the stipulated time.   The State Election Commission  

shall take steps to prepare the electoral rolls, by following due  

process  of  law,  but  that  too,  should  be  done  in  a  timely  

manner  and  in  no  circumstances,  shall  the  elections  be  

delayed  so  as  to  cause  gross  violation  of  the  mandatory  

provisions  contained  in  Article  243U of  the  Constitution.  

Further, while drawing a distinction between severe man-made  

calamities  such  as  rioting,  breakdown  of  law  and  order  or  

natural calamities, which could distract the authorities from  

holding  elections  to  the  Municipality  and  other  reasons  for

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delay,  this  Court  noted  that  the  former  are  exceptional  

circumstances  and under  no  other  circumstance  would  the  

Election  Commission  be  justified  in  delaying  the  process  of  

election  after  consulting  the  State  Government  and  other  

authorities.   This Court  laid  significant  emphasis  on  the  

independence of the State Election Commission and expected  

all other authorities to fully cooperate, and in default, granted  

liberty to the State Election Commission to approach the High  

Court  and/or  the  Supreme  Court,  as  the  case  may  be  for  

relief/directions.   However, no final or time-bound directions  

were issued, in the petition above-referred, because election to  

the  Ahmedabad  Municipal  Corporation  in  that  case  had  

already been held in the meanwhile.

20. Statutory  or  constitutional  independence  is  a  pre-

requisite to the proper functioning of such statutory bodies.  

Their  appropriate  constitution,  in  accordance  with  the  

provisions  of  the  statute  is  mandatory.  All  concerned,  

including the Central and State Governments have the onus to  

discharge  their  duties  and  functions  effectively  and  

expeditiously,  in coordination and within the time specified.  

No Court can permit any authority, much less the Central or  

State Government to frustrate the statutory requirements of a

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provision and also the very object of an Act.   

21. The language of  Section 7 of  the  Act  is  intended to  

provide  for  a  situation  which  is  interregnum  by  its  very  

existence.  Whatever be the methods adopted, by whichever  

agency including the Government, to extend beyond a regular  

term the tenure of members, would not only be impermissible  

in law, but would also be illegal.

22. As already referred above, the provisions of Section 3  

are concerned with the constitution of the Central Council by  

election  and  nomination.   Section  4  requires  the  Central  

Government  to  conduct  elections  in  accordance  with  the  

Rules.   Section 7 provides the  term of  office.    Once  these  

provisions  are  read  together,  it  is  clear  that  the  legislative  

intent is that election to the Central Council should be held  

within  the  period  of  five  years  which  is  the  term  of  office  

prescribed  for  the  elected  and/or  nominated  members.  

However,  if  for  any  reason,  the  elections  are  not  held  and  

newly  elected  members  do  not  join  their  office  immediately  

after  expiry  of  five  years,  then  the  latter  part  of  Section  7  

comes into play.  This is an extra-ordinary situation that the  

elected  members  continue  beyond  their  prescribed  term  

because  the elections  had not  been held  and newly  elected

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members cannot join the Central Council.   Though,  no outer  

limit  has  been  specified  by  the  Legislature  for  which  such  

previously  elected  members  can continue in  office,  but  this  

certainly cannot be for indefinite period.  For whatever reason,  

once recourse to this exceptional situation becomes necessary,  

then the concept of reasonable time would come into play.   It  

is a settled rule of statutory interpretation that wherever no  

specific time limit is prescribed, the concept of reasonable time  

shall hold the field for completing such an action. The courts  

in the process of interpretation can supply the lacuna, which  

would help to achieve the object of the Act and the legislative  

intent and make the provisions effective and operative.  

23. Neither the Government, nor the Central Council can  

abjure their obligation to complete the election process within  

five years, or in any case, within a reasonable time thereafter.  

Thus,  in  our  considered  opinion,  a  period  of  three  months  

would  be  more  than  sufficient  for  completing  the  election  

process in accordance with law.   This time limit shall operate  

only  and  as  and  when  the  Central  Government  and  the  

Central Council jointly and severely are not able to hold the  

fresh  elections  within  the  term  of  office  of  the  previously  

elected members, i.e., five years from the date on which the

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members first assumed office.  

24. The  words  of  Section  7  of  the  Act  are  intended  to  

operate in an extra-ordinary situation, as the normal course  

should  be  that  the  Central  Government  hold  the  elections  

within a period of five years from the date of notification of the  

elected  candidates  for  the  previous  tenure.    Even  where  

recourse to this exceptional situation becomes necessary, even  

there, the concept of reasonable time would come into play, in  

a situation where no definite period has been prescribed by the  

Legislature itself.   The courts can always supply such lacuna  

in the interpretation of provisions of a law so as to achieve the  

object of the Act particularly when such interpretation would  

be  in  consonance  with  the  legislative  object  of  the  statute.  

Thus,  in  our  considered  opinion,  a  period  of  three  months  

would be more than sufficient time for completing the election  

process, in the event of exceptional circumstances and if the  

elections had not been commenced and completed within the  

period of previous tenure of five years, as is the requirement of  

law, and the Government cannot abjure its obligation to do so  

within a maximum period of three months.

25. For the reasons afore-recorded, we partially allow this  

Public Interest Litigation, with the above observations and the

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following directions:-

(A)  Section 7 of the Indian Medicine Central Council Act,  

1970  or  any  part  thereof  is  neither  ultra  vires  nor  

violative of Articles 14 and/or 16 of the Constitution of  

India.

(B)We hereby mandate that the Central Government shall  

discharge all its duties and functions as contemplated  

under  Sections  3,  4  and  7  of  the  Indian  Medicine  

Central Council Act, 1970, without default, delay and  

within the required intervals.   We make it clear that it  

is  the  obligation of  the  Central  Government  to  hold  

election to the Central Council within the period of five  

years i.e.,  before expiry of ,  the term of office of the  

President/Vice-President  and Member  of  the  Central  

Council, as provided under Section 7 of the Act.

(C)In the eventuality of exceptional circumstances, if the  

Central  Government  is  not  able  to  hold  elections  

within  the  period  of  the  prescribed  term,  it  shall  

complete  the  process  within  a  reasonable  time  

thereafter  and  in  no  case,  exceeding  three  months  

from the date on which the term of the members in  

office expires.

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(D)No elected Member, under any of the three systems of  

medicine,  Ayurveda,  Unani or Siddha shall  hold the  

office  of  the  President,  Vice  President  or  Member,  

beyond a period of  three months from the expiry of  

their term.

(E)We direct the Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family  

Welfare  and the President  of  the  Central  Council  to  

circulate copies of this judgment, for strict compliance  

by all concerned.

26. During the pendency of this writ petition, another writ  

petition being Writ Petition (Civil) No. 249 of 2011, was filed  

with  identical  prayers.  In  view  of  this  judgment,  that  writ  

petition  has  been  rendered  infructuous  and  is  liable  to  be  

dismissed as such.   

27. I.A.  No.  8  is  an  application  for  intervention  in  the  

present writ petition, by one Dr. Vinod Kumar Chauhan.   I.A.  

No. 9 is an application by the same party, with the prayer that  

the  election  to  Central  Council,  held  from  the  State  of  

Uttarakhand be set aside and that fresh selection process be  

ordered.   I.A.  No.  9  is  dismissed,  with  the  liberty  to  that  

petitioner  to  approach  the  court  of  competent  jurisdiction,  

seeking appropriate relief and in accordance with law.

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28. In view of the order of I.A. No. 9, I.A. No. 8 does not  

survive and is dismissed as such.    

29. Transfer  Petition  (Civil)  No.  736  of  2011  is  also  

dismissed, with liberty to the petitioner to pursue his remedy,  

if  the  cause  of  action  survives,  before  the  concerned  High  

Court.

30. All  Transfer  Petitions  and  Interlocutory  Applications  

for impleadment are hereby dismissed.   Other applications do  

not survive for consideration.

31. Before we part with this judgment, we would like to  

place  on record  our  appreciation  for  the  valuable  and  able  

assistance rendered by the learned ASG and all counsel and  

assisting counsel appearing in the present PIL.

                                                             .….............................. CJI.

        [S.H. Kapadia]

  …………………………….,J.                  [A.K. Patnaik]

…………………………….,J.             [Swatanter Kumar]

New Delhi; February 24, 2012

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