JUGENDRA SINGH Vs STATE OF U.P.
Bench: B.S. CHAUHAN,DIPAK MISRA
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000082-000082 / 2008
Diary number: 24252 / 2007
Advocates: KAILASH CHAND Vs
ABHISTH KUMAR
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Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 82 OF 2008
JUGENDRA SINGH .....……..Appellant
Versus
STATE OF U. P. ………Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
From the days of yore, every civilised society has developed
various kinds of marriages to save the man from the tyranny of
sex, for human nature in certain circumstances has the
enormous potentiality of exhibiting intrigue, intricacy and
complexity, in a way, a labyrinth. Instances do take place where
a man becomes a slave to this tyrant and exposes unbridled
appetite and lowers himself to an unimaginable extent for
gratification of his carnal desire. The case at hand graphically
exposes the inferior endowments of nature in the appellant who
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failed to husband his passion and made an attempt to commit
rape on a nine year old girl and the tears of the child failed to
have any impact on his emotion and even an iota of compassion
did not surface as if it had been atrophied and eventually he
pressed her neck which caused instant death of the nervous
young girl.
2. Presently, we shall proceed with the narration. The facts as
unfolded by the prosecution, in brief, are that on 24.06.1994,
Vineshwari along with her brother, Dharam Veer, aged about five
years, was having a bath in the water that had accumulated in
front of the house of the informant, Pitambar, their father, due to
a crack in the nearby canal. Kali Charan and Ganeshi, PW 2,
were grazing their cattle in the field situate at a short distance.
The accused-appellant, a resident of the village, cajoled
Vineshwari to accompany him to the nearby field belonging to
one Layak Singh. The younger brother, Dharam Veer, innocently
followed them. At that juncture, the appellant took off her
undergarment and with the intention to have intercourse flung
her on the ground. The young girl cried aloud and her brother,
the five year old child, raised an alarm. Kali Charan and Ganeshi
who had seen the accused taking the girl followed by the brother
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to the field of Layak Singh rushed to the place and shouted for
Pitambar, PW-1. Hearing the shout, Pitambar with his elder son
Harpal rushed to the spot and witnessed that the accused was
pressing the neck of Vineshwari. By the time they could reach
the spot, the accused made an effort to run away but he was
apprehended. However, unfortunately by that time, the girl had
already breathed her last. Leaving the accused in the custody of
the villagers, Pitambar went to the police station and lodged an
FIR.
3. After the criminal law was set in motion, the accused was
arrested and the investigating officer, Balvir Singh, PW 7,
reached the spot and carried out the investigation. The dead
body of the deceased was sent for post mortem. The
Investigating Officer seized the garment of the deceased, the
clothes of the accused and certain other articles and prepared
the seizure memo. After recording the statements of the
witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
and completing further investigation, the prosecution submitted
the chargesheet under Sections 302 and 376 read with 511 of the
Indian Penal Code (for short “the IPC”) before the competent
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court which in turn committed the matter to the Court of Session
wherein it was registered as S.T. No. 1098 of 94.
4. The plea of the defence was one of denial and false
implication.
5. The accused chose not to adduce any evidence.
6. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined eight
witnesses, namely, Pitamber @ Pita, PW-1 (father of the
deceased), Ganeshi, PW-2, Dharam Veer, PW-3, Dr. S.K. Sharma,
PW-4, Head Constable Mahfooj Khan, PW-5, Dr. S.R.P. Mishra,
PW-6, Balvir Singh, S.I., PW-7 and Constable Vinod Kumar, PW-
8.
7. Pitamber @ Pita PW-1 stated on oath that the accused
influenced his daughter Vineshwari, who was taking bath in the
canal water to accompany him to the nearby field. He has
further stated that the accused attempted to commit rape on his
daughter and ultimately strangulated her throat that caused her
death. Ganeshi, PW-2 deposed that he along with Kali Charan
was there. On hearing the cry of the girl, he and Kali Charan
went to the field of Layak Singh and found that the accused was
trying to commit rape on Vineshwari and tied a shirt on her neck.
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Dharam Veer, PW-3, could not be examined because he was
unable to grasp the questions.
8. Dr. S.K. Sharma, PW-4 conducted the post mortem of
Vineshwari and found the following anti-mortem injuries:-
(1) Abrasion 5 cm. X 1 cm. over Rt. Ramus of jaw
extending neck region.
(2) Abrasion 3 cm. X 1 cm. over left Supra Clovicular
region.
No injury was found on the private parts and/or thighs nor
on chest and buttocks. However, two vaginal smears were
prepared and sent for pathological examination.
Over eternal pericardium larynxes and both the lungs of the
deceased, deposits of blood were found. Except this, the liver,
pancreas, spleen and both kidneys were filled with blood. On
interior examination, Larynx, Trachea, Bronchi and Lungs were
found congested. According to Dr. S.K. Sharma, the death of the
deceased took place due to asphyxia as a result of throttling.
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9. Dr. S.R.P. Mishra, PW-6 examined the accused Jugendra
and found certain contusions, abrasions and superfluous
injuries on his body.
10. Balvir Singh, S.I., PW-7 proved the site plan, recovery memo
of underwear of Vineshwari, panchnama, report to C.M.O. and
chargesheet.
11. The learned trial Judge appreciating the evidence on record
found that there were discrepancies and contradictions in the
testimony of the witnesses; that it was difficult to believe that the
accused was laying upon the deceased in the presence of Kali
Charan and Ganeshi; that the deposition of witnesses that they
had found blood on the spot had not received corroboration from
the examination of Dr. S. K. Sharma, P. W. 4, who had deposed
that the blood had not oozed out from the body of the deceased
girl; that the colour of the under garment of the girl as stated by
her father did not tally with the colour described in the recovery
memo; that as per the medical report there was no injury on the
private parts of the deceased; that there was difference in the
time mentioned by the witnesses as regards the lodging of the
FIR inasmuch as the investigating officer arrived at the spot
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between 1.30 to 2.00 p.m. whereas the FIR was lodged at 2.45
p.m.; and that the colour of the shirt was not properly stated by
the witnesses. Because of the aforesaid findings, the trial court
came to the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove
its case beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly acquitted the
accused of the charge.
12. The aforesaid judgment of acquittal came to be challenged
before the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 2644of 1998 on the
ground that the view expressed by the learned trial Judge was
totally perverse since minor discrepancies and contradictions had
been magnified and the real evidence had been ignored. It was
also put forth that the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that
the accused was apprehended at the spot and nothing had been
brought on record to dislodge the same. It was also urged that
the view expressed by the trial court was totally unreasonable
and defied logic in the primary sense.
13. The High Court perused the evidence on record and opined
that unnecessary emphasis had been laid on minor discrepancies
by the trial court and the view expressed by it was absolutely
perverse and remotely not a plausible one. Being of this view, it
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over-turned the judgment of acquittal to that conviction and
sentenced the accused to undergo life imprisonment for the
offence under Section 302 IPC and to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for ten years for the offence under Section 376
read with 511 of IPC with the stipulation that both the sentences
shall run concurrently.
14. We have heard Mr. Lav Kumar Agrawal, learned counsel for
the appellant, and Mr. R. K. Dash, learned counsel for the State.
15. It is contended by Mr. Agrawal that the High Court has not
kept in view the parameters on which the judgment of acquittal is
to be interfered with and has converted one of acquittal to
conviction solely by stating that the judgment is perverse. It is
urged by him that the discrepancies and contradictions have
been discussed in detail by the trial court and he has expressed a
well reasoned opinion that the prosecution has failed to bring
home the charge, but the said conclusion has been unsettled by
the High Court by stating that the said discrepancies are minor
in nature. It is his further submission that the ocular evidence
has not received any corroboration from the medical evidence
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and further the material particulars have been totally overlooked
and hence, the judgment of conviction is sensitively vulnerable.
16. Mr. Dash, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent,
has canvassed that the learned trial judge had treated the
ordinary discrepancies which are bound to occur when rustic
witnesses have been accentuated as if they are in the realm of
high degree of contradiction and inconsistency. It is submitted
by him that when the judgment of the trial court suffers from
perversity of approach especially in relation to the appreciation of
evidence and the view cannot be treated to be a possible one, no
flaw can be found with the judgment of reversal by the High
Court.
17. To appreciate the submissions raised at the bar and to
evaluate the correctness of the impugned judgment, we think it
appropriate to refer to certain authorities in the field which deal
with the parameters for reversing a judgment of acquittal to that
of conviction by the appellate court.
18. In Jadunath Singh and Others v. State of U.P.1, a three
Judge Bench of this Court has held thus:-
1 AIR 1972 SC 116
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“This Court has consistently taken the view that an appeal against acquittal the High Court has full power to review at large all the evidence and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. This power of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal was formulated by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor,2 and Nur Mohammad v. Emperor3. These two decisions have been consistently referred to in judgments of this Court as laying down the true scope of the power of an appellate court in hearing criminal appeals: see Surajpal Singh v. State4 and Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan5. ”
19. In Damodar Prasad Chandrika Prasad and Others v.
State of Maharashtra6 it has been held that once the Appellate
Court comes to the conclusion that the view of the trial court is
unreasonable, that itself provides a reason for interference. The
two-Judge Bench referred to the decision in State of Bombay v.
Rusy Mistry,7 to hold that if the finding shocks the conscience of
the Court or has disregarded the norms of legal process or
substantial and grave injustice has been done, the same can be
interfered with.
2 61 Ind App 398 = AIR 1934 PC 227 3 AIR 1945 PC 151 4 1952 SCR 193 = AIR 1952 SC 52 5 (1961) 3 SCR 120 = AIR 1961 SC 715 6 AIR 1972 SC 622 7 AIR 1960 SC 391
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20. In Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade and another v. State of
Maharashtra8, the three-Judge Bench opined that there are no
fetters on the plenary power of the Appellate Court to review the
whole evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded and,
indeed, it has a duty to scrutinise the probative material de novo,
informed, however, by the weighty thought that the rebuttable
innocence attributed to the accused having been converted into
an acquittal the homage of our jurisprudence owes to individual
liberty constrains the higher court not to upset the finding
without very convincing reasons and comprehensive
consideration. This Court further proceeded to state that the
cherished principles of golden thread to prove beyond reasonable
doubt which runs through the wave of our law should not be
stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree
of doubt. Emphasis was laid on the aspect that a balance has to
be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to
set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of preponderant
probability to punish the marginal innocents.
21. In State of Karnataka v. K. Gopala Krishna9, it has been
held that where the findings of the Court below are fully
8 AIR 1973 SC 2622 9 AIR 2005 SC 1014
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unreasonable or perverse and not based on the evidence on
record or suffer from serious illegality and include ignorance and
misreading of record, the Appellate Court will be justified in
setting aside such an order of acquittal. If two views are
reasonably possible and the view favouring the accused has been
accepted by the courts below, that is sufficient for upholding the
order of acquittal. Similar view was reiterated in Ayodhya
Singh v. State of Bihar and others.10
22. In Anil Kumar v. State of U.P.11, it has been stated that
interference with an order of acquittal is called for if there are
compelling and substantial reasons such as where the impugned
judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing
materials have been unjustifiably eliminated.
23. In Girija Prasad (dead) by LRs. v. State of M. P.12, it has
been observed that in an appeal against acquittal, the Appellate
Court has every power to re-appreciate, review and reconsider the
evidence as a whole before it. It is, no doubt, true that there is a
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and that
presumption is reinforced by an order of acquittal recorded by the
10 2005 9 SCC 584 11 2004 13 SCC 257 12 2007 7 SCC 625
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trial court, but that is not the end of the matter. It is for
Appellate Court to keep in view the relevant principles of law to
re-appreciate and reweigh as a whole and to come to its own
conclusion in accord with the principle of criminal jurisprudence.
24. In State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran13, it has been
reiterated that the Appellate Court can peruse the evidence and
interfere with the order of acquittal only if the approach of the
lower court is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the decision
is perverse.
25. In State of U. P. v. Ajai Kumar14, the principles stated in
State of Rajasthan v. Sohan lal15 were reiterated. It is worth
noting that in the case of Sohan Lal, it has been stated thus:-
“This Court has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be reappreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no
13 2007 3 SCC 755 14 AIR 2008 SC 1269 15 (2004) 5 SCC 573
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distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal.”
26. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka16, this Court held
as under: -
“42 From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the
16 (2007) 4 SCC 415
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court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
27. In S. Ganesan v. Rama Raghuraman and others17, one of
us (Dr. B.S. Chauhan,J.), after referring to the decision in Sunil
Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) v. State of Maharashtra18,
considered various aspects of dealing with a case of acquittal and
after placing reliance upon earlier judgments of this Court,
particularly in Balak Ram v. State of U.P.19, Budh Singh v.
State of U.P.20, Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy21, Aruvelu v.
State22 and Babu v. State of Kerala23, held that unless there
17 (2011) 2 SCC 83 18 (2010) 13 SCC 657 19 (1975) 3 SCC 219 20 (2006) 9 SCC 731 21 (2008) 5 SCC 535 22 (2009) 10 SCC 206 23 (2010) 9 SCC 189
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are substantial and compelling circumstances, the order of
acquittal is not required to be reversed in appeal. Similar view
has been reiterated in Ranjitham v. Basvaraj & Ors.24 and State
of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram @ Vishnu Dutta25.
28. Keeping in view the aforesaid well-settled principles, we are
required to scrutinize whether the judgment of the High Court
withstands the close scrutiny or conviction has been recorded
because a different view can be taken. First we shall refer to the
ante mortem injuries which were found on the deceased – (i)
abrasion 5 cm x 1 cm over right ramus of jaw extending to the
neck and (ii) abrasion 3 cm x 1 cm over left supra clavicular
region. On internal examination, larynx, trachea and bronchi
were found congested. Both the lungs were congested. Brain was
congested. Partially digested food was found in the stomach.
Small and large intestine were half full. The doctor who
conducted the post mortem has opined that the cause of death
was due to asphyxia as a result of throttling.
29. PW-6 Dr. S.R.P. Mishra had examined the accused and had
found four contusions and two abrasions on his forehead, left
ear, neck, left side chest and right shoulder. The learned trial 24 (2012) 1 SCC 414 25 (2012) 1 SCC 602
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Judge has given some emphasis on these injuries but the High
Court has expressed the view that when the accused was
apprehended at the spot by the witnesses, he had been given a
beating for the criminal act and hence, the minor injuries had no
significance.
30. The question is whether the trial court was justified in
coming to hold that there were discrepancies and contradictions
in the evidence of the witnesses and, therefore, the case of the
prosecution did not deserve acceptance. The discrepancies that
have been found have been described while we have dealt with
the trial court judgment. The medical report clearly says that the
death was caused due to asphyxia as a result of throttling. PW-4,
the surgeon, who has conducted the autopsy, stated that the
deceased was wearing a shirt. PW-1, the father, has stated that
she was strangulated by a bush shirt. The learned trial Judge
has given much emphasis by drawing a distinction between a
shirt and a bush shirt. The High Court has treated that it is not
a material contradiction. In the FIR, it was clearly mentioned
that the accused strangulated the deceased with the help of her
shirt. The medical report supports the same and, therefore, the
nature of the shirt which has been given importance by the
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learned trial Judge, in our considered opinion, has been rightly
not accepted. The learned trial Judge has doubted the testimony
of Ganeshi, PW-2, that he had not seen the children taking the
bath and further he has also opined that it would not have been
possible for the accused to lay upon the deceased in their
presence. In this regard, the distance has been taken into
consideration to discard the testimony. The High Court has
perused the testimony or deposition of PW-2 wherefrom it is
evincible that the spot was at the distance of 100 paces where he
was grazing the cattle. The Investigating Officer has deposed that
there was water in about half kilometre area as there was a crack
in the canal as a consequence of which water was flowing in front
of the house of the informant. Thus, the High Court has opined
that the variance with regard to the details of distance cannot be
made the edifice to discard their testimony. The High Court has
treated Ganeshi as a natural and neutral witness and it has also
observed that his evidence could not have been thrown overboard
on the ground of absence of precise description of distance and
the fact that he had not seen the children bathing in the water.
That apart, the inference by the trial court is that when they had
arrived on the scene, the accused could not have been laying on
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the deceased in their presence. On a perusal of his deposition as
well as analysis made by the learned trial Judge, it is evident that
there was some time gap and distance. The accused was laying
on the deceased and throttled her neck with the shirt. The other
witnesses had arrived after five to ten minutes. The High Court
has taken note of the distance, time and the age of the deceased
and has found that the reasoning ascribed by the trial court to
disbelieve the version of PW-2 is unacceptable.
31. The learned trial Judge has noticed that both Pitambar and
Ganeshi had deposed that they had seen blood on the spot,
though the medical report clearly showed that there was no
oozing of blood from any part of the body of the deceased and
further that there was no injury on the private parts of the girl. It
is apt to note here that there was some frothy liquid coming out
from the nose of the deceased. The High Court, while analysing
the said evidence, has observed that the witnesses though had
stated to have seen blood on the spot in their cross-examination,
yet that would not really destroy the version of the prosecution
regard being had to the many other facts which have been proven
and further there was no justifiable reason to discard the
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testimony of the father and others who were eye witnesses to the
occurrence.
32. The learned trial Judge has taken note of the fact that PW-1
had stated in his cross-examination that the underwear of the
deceased was printed green in colour while PW-2 had stated that
the colour of the underwear was red in colour and according to
the recovery memo, the colour was red, white and yellow. The
High Court has perused the memo, Ext. Ka2, prepared by the
Investigating Officer wherein it has been described that the
printed underwear was of red, white, yellow and black colour.
That apart, when the witnesses were deposing almost after a
span of three years, it was not expected of them to remember the
exact colour of the printed underwear. In any case, the High
Court has observed that the said discrepancy, by no stretch of
imagination, could be treated as a discrepancy of any
significance.
33. Another aspect which has weighed with the learned trial
Judge was about the time of the lodging of the FIR. The said
timing has no bearing on the case of the prosecution inasmuch
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as rustic and uneducated villagers could not have been precise
on the time concept.
34. At this juncture, we may remind ourselves that it is the duty
of the court to shift the chaff from the grain and find out the
truth from the testimony of the witnesses. A testimony of the
witness is required to inspire confidence. It must be
creditworthy. In State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony26, this Court has
observed that in case of minor discrepancies on trivial matters
not touching the core of the case, hypertechnical approach by
taking the sentences torn out of context here or there from the
evidence, attaching importance to some technical error
committed by the investigating officer and not going to the root of
the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence
as a whole.
35. In Rammi alias Rameshwar v. State of Madhya
Pradesh27, this Court has held as follows: -
“24. When eye-witness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true witness can possibly escape from making some discrepant details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored can successfully make his testimony totally
26 AIR 1985 SC 48 27 AIR 1999 SC 3544
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non-discrepant. But Courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the Court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. But too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.”
36. In Appabhai and another v. State of Gujarat28, this
Court has ruled thus: -
“The Court while appreciating the evidence must not attach undue importance to minor discrepancies. The discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution case may be discarded. The discrepancies which are due to normal errors of perception or observation should not be given importance. The errors due to lapse of memory may be given due allowance. The Court by calling into aid its vast experience of men and matters in different cases must evaluate the entire material on record by excluding the exaggerated version given by any witness. When a doubt arises in respect of certain facts alleged by such witness, the proper course is to ignore that fact only unless it goes into the root of the matter so as to demolish the entire prosecution story. The witnesses nowadays go on adding embellishments to their version perhaps for the fear of their testimony being rejected by the Court. The courts, however, should not disbelieve the evidence of such
28 AIR 1988 SC 696
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witnesses altogether if they are otherwise trustworthy.”
37. Judged on the aforesaid principles of law, we are of the
considered opinion that the learned trial Judge had given
unnecessary importance on absolutely minor discrepancies
which do not go to the root of the matter and the High Court has
correctly treated the analysis to be perverse. Quite apart from
that, it is noticeable from the judgment of the trial court that the
learned trial Judge has proceeded on a wrong footing by saying
that the case of the prosecution was that the accused had
committed rape on the deceased whereas on a perusal of the FIR,
it is quite clear that the allegation was that the accused has
pulled the underwear of the girl with the intention to commit
rape. Similar is the testimony of Ganeshi (PW-1) who has stated
that the accused was laying on the girl. It is difficult to
understand how the learned trial Judge has conceived that the
case of the prosecution was that the accused had committed
rape.
38. Thus, from the aforesaid analysis, there can be no trace of
doubt that the view taken by the learned trial Judge was
absolutely unreasonable, perverse and on total erroneous
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appreciation of evidence contrary to the settled principles of law.
It can never be treated as a plausible view. In our considered
opinion, only a singular view is possible that the accused had
made an attempt to commit rape and he was witnessed while he
was strangulating the child with a shirt. The result was that a
nine year old child breathed her last. The reasoning ascribed by
the learned trial Judge that she did not die because of any injury
makes the decision more perverse rather than reasonable. That
apart, nothing has been brought on record to show that there
was any kind of enmity between the family of the deceased and
that of the accused appellant. There is no reason why the father
and the other witnesses would implicate the accused appellant in
the crime and would spare the real culprit. Quite apart from the
above, he was apprehended on the spot. The accused had taken
the plea that the deceased had died as she had drowned in the
water. The medical report runs absolutely contrary inasmuch
there was no water in her stomach or in any internal part of the
body. There was no motive on the part of any of the witnesses to
falsely involve the accused in the crime. In view of our aforesaid
analysis, we entirely agree with the view expressed by the High
Court.
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39. Before parting with the case, we may note that the appellant
has created a situation by which a nine year old girl who believed
in him as a co-villager and went with him in total innocence
breathed her last before she could get into her blossom of
adolescence. Rape or an attempt to rape is a crime not against
an individual but a crime which destroys the basic equilibrium of
the social atmosphere. The consequential death is more
horrendous. It is to be kept in mind that an offence against the
body of a woman lowers her dignity and mars her reputation. It
is said that one’s physical frame is his or her temple. No one has
any right of encroachment. An attempt for the momentary
pleasure of the accused has caused the death of a child and had
a devastating effect on her family and, in the ultimate eventuate,
on the collective at large. When a family suffers in such a
manner, the society as a whole is compelled to suffer as it creates
an incurable dent in the fabric of the social milieu. The cry of the
collective has to be answered and respected and that is what
exactly the High Court has done by converting the decision of
acquittal to that of conviction and imposed the sentence as per
law.
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40. Consequently, the appeal, being sans merit, stands
dismissed.
..............................................J. [Dr. B. S. Chauhan]
..............................................J. [Dipak Misra]
New Delhi; May 29, 2012