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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  2987 OF 2016 (@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 6825 of 2016)

Joint Secretary, Political Department,    …Appellant(s) Government of Meghalaya,  Main Secretariat, Shillong

Versus

High Court of Meghalaya    …Respondent(s) through its Registrar, Shillong

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.  

New York Times,  in  the  Editorial,  “The Frankfurter  

Legacy,”  on  September  2,  1962,  while  stating  about  the  

greatness  of  Felix  Frankfurter,  chose  the  following  

expression:-

“History will  find greatness in Felix Frankfurter  as  a  justice,  not  because  of  the  results  he  reached but because of  his attitude toward the  process  of  decision.  His  guilding  lights  were  detachment, rigorous integrity in dealing with the  facts  of  a  case,  refusal  to  resort  to  unworthy  means,  no  matter  how  noble  the  end,  and  dedication  to  the  Court  as  an  institution.

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Because he was human, Justice Frankfurter did  not  always  live  up  to  his  own  ideal.   But  he  taught us the lesson that there is importance in  the process.”

2. Almost two decades and two years back, the Court in  

Tata Cellular v. Union of India1 referred, with approval,  

the following passage from Neely, C.J.2 :-   

“82. … ‘I have very few illusions about my own  limitations as a Judge and from those limitations  I  generalise  to  the  inherent  limitations  of  all  appellate courts reviewing rate cases. It must be  remembered that this Court sees approximately  1262 cases a year with five Judges. I am not an  accountant, electrical engineer, financier, banker,  stock broker, or systems management analyst. It  is the height of folly to expect Judges intelligently  to  review  a  5000  page  record  addressing  the  intricacies of public utility operation.’ ”

3. Regard being had to the directions issued by the High  

Court, this Court in Census Commissioner and others v.   

R.  Krishnamurthy3 commenced  the  judgment  in  the  

following manner:-  

“The present appeal depicts and, in a way,  sculpts  the  non-acceptance  of  conceptual  limitation in every human sphere including that  

1

(1994) 6 SCC 651 2

Bernard Schwartz in Administrative Law, 2nd Edn., p. 584 3

(2015) 2 SCC 796

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of  adjudication.  No adjudicator  or  a Judge can  conceive the idea that the sky is the limit or for  that matter there is no barrier or fetters in one’s  individual  perception,  for  judicial  vision  should  not  be  allowed to  be  imprisoned  and have  the  potentiality  to  cover  celestial  zones.  Be  it  ingeminated,  refrain  and  restrain  are  the  essential  virtues  in  the  arena  of  adjudication  because  they  guard  as  sentinel  so  that  virtuousness  is  constantly  sustained.  Not  for  nothing,  centuries  back  Francis  Bacon4 had  to  say thus:

“Judges ought to be more learned than witty,  more  reverend  than  plausible,  and  more  advised  than  confident.  Above  all  things,  integrity is their portion and proper virtue. …  Let the Judges also remember that Solomon’s  throne was supported by lions on both sides:  let  them be  lions,  but  yet  lions  under  the  throne.”

4. The necessity  has  arisen again for  reiteration of  the  

fundamental principle to be adhered to by a Judge.  It is  

because  the  order  impugned  herein  presents  a  sad  sad  

scenario,  definitely  and  absolutely  an  impermissible  and  

unacceptable one.   

5. Presently,  to  the  facts  of  the  case.   A  writ  petition  

forming the subject matter of Writ Petition (Civil) No. 319 of  

2015  was  registered  under  the  caption  “Suo  motu  

4

Bacon, ”Essays: Of Judicature in I The Works of Francis Bacon” (Montague, Basil, Esq ed.,  Philadelphia: A Hart, late Carey & Hart, 1852), pp. 58-59.

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cognizance  of  appointment  of  Lokayukta  and  failure  to  

constitute Meghalaya State Human Rights Commission”. By  

the  impugned  order  dated  14.12.2015,  the  High  Court  

referred to clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the  

Meghalaya Lokayukta Act, 2014 (for brevity, “the Act”) and  

proceeded to deal with the same.  In that context,  it has  

passed the following order:-

“The provision providing such eligibility criterion  requires judicial scrutiny; for: the same eligibility  cannot be provided for the Chairperson and for a  Member other than the Judicial  Member of  the  Lokayukta.  Besides,  the  Central  Lokpal  and  Lokayukta  Act  of  2013  does  not  prescribe  any  eligibility  criteria  for  Lokayukta  and  Up- Lokayukta.  That  apart,  other  States  including  State of Karnataka and State of Madhya Pradesh,  looking  to  adjudicatory  nature  of  work,  has  provided the eligibility criteria like a former Judge  of Supreme Court; a Chief Justice of High Court  or a Judge of High Court, whereas, the eligibility  criteria provided in the Meghalaya Lokayukta Act,  2014, inter alia includes a criterion whereby an  eligible  non-Judicial  person  can  also  be  appointed  as  the  Chairperson.   Hence,  issue  notice.

During  the  pendency of  this  writ  petition,  the  portion  of  clause  (a)  of  sub-section  (2)  of  Section  3,  which  reads  as   “… or  an  eminent  person  who  fulfills  the  eligibility  specified  in  clause (b) of sub-section (3)”; and consequently,  “Sub-clause (b)  of  Sub-section (3)  of  Section 3”  insofar as it provides for the offending criterion

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for the appointment of the Chairperson is hereby  stayed.”

6. After  passing  the  said  order,  the  High  Court  has  

proceeded to deal with the appointment of the Chairperson  

and  Members  of  the  Meghalaya  State  Human  Rights  

Commission.  Dealing with the said facet, it had directed as  

follows:-  

“Now,  coming  to  the  appointment  of  the  Chairperson  and  Members  of  the  Meghalaya  State  Human  Rights  Commission,  Hon’ble  the  Apex Court  has,  vide order  dated 24.7.2015 in  Crl.M.P. No. 16086 of 1997 in Crl.M.P. No. 4201  of  1997  (Shri  Dilip  K.  Basu  v.  State  of  West  Bengal  and  Ors)  has  directed  various  States  including the State  of  Meghalaya to set up the  State  Human  Rights  Commission  within  six  months and to fill up the vacancy of Chairperson  and  Members  of  State  Human  Rights  Commission  within  3  (three)  months  from  the  date  of  order.   As  towards   compliance  of  the  aforesaid  directions  of  Hon’ble  the  Apex  Court,  the  State  of  Meghalaya  has  not  initiated  the  process of  appointment of  the Chairperson and  Members  of  the  State  Human  Rights  Commission, we direct the Chief Secretary, State  of Meghalaya, to file affidavit showing the status  of processing of the file for the appointment of the  Chairperson  and  other  Members  of  the  State  Human Rights Commission on the next date of  hearing.  Besides, we also make it clear, that the  State  shall  specify  the  name of  Hon’ble  former  Judge  of  Supreme  Court  and  Hon’ble  former  Chief  Justice  of  High  Court,  who  have  been  offered  the  appointment  as  Chairperson.   The  State shall also clearly indicate as to who are the  Judges  of  High  Court  and  other  non-Judicial

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persons who have been offered the appointment  as the Chairperson/Members of the Commission.  This  information  is  required  to  maintain  transparency in the process of  appointment on  the posts as aforesaid.”

7. Be  it  noted,  the  Division  Bench  has  appointed  two  

counsel  as  Amicus  Curiae and  directed  the  Registrar  

General  to  settle  their  professional  fee  to  be  paid  by  the  

Department of Law, Government of Meghalaya.

8. Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee learned counsel appearing for  

the appellant has submitted that the State has no cavil over  

the directions relating to constitution of the State Human  

Rights  Commission  by  appointment  of  Chairperson  and  

Members.  In  course  of  hearing,  the  learned  counsel  has  

submitted that the State shall appoint the Chairperson and  

Members of the State Human Rights Commission as per law  

by end of June, 2016.  That being the concession by Mr.  

Mukherjee  on  behalf  of  the  State  which,  we  think,  is  

absolutely fair, there is no need to advert to the said aspect.  

It is also urged by Mr. Mukherjee that the State would not  

have challenged the said part of the order as it understands  

its  responsibility  and  further  when  the  High  Court  has

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issued the direction, the State is obliged to respect the same  

as it is in consonance with the legal position. The cavil, Mr.  

Mukherjee would put it, pertains to the observations made  

by the High Court and the stay order passed in respect of  

the provision relating to eligibility prescribed under the Act.  

It  is  urged  by  him that  there  had been no  assail  to  the  

constitutional validity of the said provision and, therefore,  

the High Court could not have suo motu taken up the same,  

especially when the language employed is also similar to the  

Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 passed by the Parliament.

9. To appreciate the submission, it is necessary to note  

that  Chapter  II  of  the  Act  deals  with  Establishment  of  

Lokayukta.  Sections 3 reads as follows:-

“Section 3.  Establishment of  Lokayukta.—(1)  As soon as after the commencement of this Act,  there shall be established, by notification in the  Official  Gazette,  a  body  to  be  called  the  “Lokayukta”.  

(2) The Lokayukta shall consist of-  

(a) a Chairperson, who is or has been a Chief  Justice of the High Court or a Judge of the  High  Court  or  an  eminent  person  who  fulfils the eligibility specified in clause (b)  of sub-section (3); and

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(b)  such  number  of  members,  not  exceeding  four  out  of  whom  fifty  percent  shall  be  Judicial Members.  

(3) A person shall be eligible to be appointed,-  

(a) as a Judicial Member if he is or has been a  Judge of the High Court or is eligible to be  a Judge of the High Court;  

(b)  as  a  Member  other  than  a  Judicial  Member,  if  he  is  a  person of  impeccable  integrity, outstanding ability having special  knowledge and expertise of  not less than  twenty-five years in the matters relating to  anti-corruption  policy,  public  administration, vigilance, finance including  insurance  and  banking,  law,  and  management.  

(4) The Chairperson or a Member shall not be —

(i)  a member of Parliament or a member of  the  Legislature  of  any  State  or  Union  territory;  

(ii) a person convicted of any offence involving  moral turpitude;  

(iii)  a  person of  less  than forty-five  years  of  age,  on  the  date  of  assuming  office  as  Chairperson or Member, as the case may  be;

(iv)  a  member  of  any  Panchayat  or  Municipality or District Council;  

(v)  a  person  who  has  been  removed  or  dismissed from service of  the Union or a  State, and shall not hold any office of trust  or  profit  (other  than  his  office  as  the  Chairperson or a Member) or be connected  with  any  political  party  or  carry  on  any  business  or  practice  any  profession  and  accordingly,  before  he  enters  upon  his

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office,  a  person  appointed  as  the  Chairperson or a Member, as the case may  be, shall, if –  

(a)  he  holds  any office  of  trust  or  profit,  resign from such office; or  

(b)  he is carrying on any business,  sever  his  connection  with  the  conduct  and  management of such business; or  

(c) he is practicing any profession, cease to  practice such profession.”

10. Section 4 deals  with appointment  of  Chairperson or  

Members on recommendation of Selection Committee; and  

other provisions of the Act dwell upon various other facets  

which we need not refer to.  Submission of Mr. Mukherjee is  

that the High Court could not have  suo motu proceeded to  

deal with the appointment of Lokayukta and, in any case,  

could not have directed stay of the provision.

11. There can be no doubt, the court can initiate suo motu  

proceedings in respect of certain issues which come within  

the domain of public interest.  In Budhadev Karmaskar (1)  

v. State of W.B.5 the Court,  while dismissing an appeal,  

observed thus:-

5

(2011) 11 SCC 538

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“14. Although we have dismissed this appeal, we  strongly  feel  that  the  Central  and  the  State  Governments  through  Social  Welfare  Boards  should prepare schemes for rehabilitation all over  the  country  for  physically  and  sexually  abused  women commonly  known as  the  ‘prostitutes’  as  we are of the view that the prostitutes also have a  right to live with dignity under Article 21 of the  Constitution of India since they are also human  beings  and  their  problems  also  need  to  be  addressed.

15.  As  already  observed  by  us,  a  woman  is  compelled  to  indulge  in  prostitution  not  for  pleasure but because of abject poverty. If such a  woman  is  granted  opportunity  to  avail  some  technical or vocational training, she would be able  to earn her livelihood by such vocational training  and skill instead of by selling her body.

16.  Hence,  we direct  the  Central  and the  State  Governments  to  prepare  schemes  for  giving  technical/vocational training to sex workers and  sexually abused women in all cities in India. The  schemes should mention in detail  who will  give  the  technical/vocational  training  and  in  what  manner they can be rehabilitated and settled by  offering  them  employment.  For  instance,  if  a  technical  training  is  for  some  craft  like  sewing  garments,  etc.  then  some  arrangements  should  also  be  made  for  providing  a  market  for  such  garments, otherwise they will remain unsold and  unused, and consequently the woman will not be  able to feed herself.”

The purpose of the initiation in the aforesaid case is  

self-evident.

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12. Suo motu public interest litigation can be initiated to  

ameliorate  the  conditions  of  a  class  of  persons  whose  

constitutional or otherwise lawful rights are affected or not  

adequately looked into.  The Court has adopted the said tool  

so  that  persons  in  disadvantaged  situation  because  of  

certain reasons – social, economic or socio-economic – are  

in  a  position  to  have  access  to  the  Court.   The  Court  

appoints Amicus Curiae to assist the Court and also expects  

the  executive  to  respond  keeping  in  view  the  laudable  

exercise.

13. In Ramlila Maidan Incident, In Re6,  suo motu probe  

of incident was ordered by the Court against imposition of  

prohibitory order at night and hasty and forcible evacuation  

of public on the basis of media reports and CCTV camera  

footage.   In Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab &  

others7, the Court has held:-

“The  High  Court  while  entertaining  the  writ  petition formed a prima facie opinion as regards  the  systematic  commission  of  fraud.  While  dismissing the writ petition filed by the selected  

6

(2012) 5 SCC 1 7

(2009) 1 SCC 441

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candidates, it initiated a suo motu public interest  litigation. It was entitled to do so. The nature of  jurisdiction  exercised  by  the  High  Court,  as  is  well known, in a private interest litigation and in  a public interest litigation is different. Whereas in  the  latter  it  is  inquisitorial  in  nature,  in  the  former  it  is  adversarial.  In  a  public  interest  litigation,  the  court  need not  strictly  follow the  ordinary  procedure.  It  may  not  only  appoint  committees  but  also  issue  directions  upon  the  State  from  time  to  time.  (See  Indian  Bank  v.   Godhara  Nagrik  Coop.  Credit  Society  Ltd.&  another8 and  Raju  Ramsing  Vasave  v.  Mahesh  Deorao Bhivapurkar9.)”

14. In  Raju  Ramsing  Vasave  (supra),  the  Court  has  

observed that when a question is raised, this Court can take  

cognizance of a matter of such grave importance suo motu.  

It  may  not  treat  the  special  leave  petition  as  a  public  

interest litigation, but, as a public law litigation. It is, in a  

proceeding of that nature, permissible for the Court to make  

a detailed enquiry with regard to the broader aspects of the  

matter although it was initiated at the instance of a person  

having a private interest. A deeper scrutiny can be made so  

as to enable the Court to find out as to whether a party to a  

lis is guilty of commission of fraud on the Constitution. If  

8

(2008) 12 SCC 541 9

(2008) 9 SCC 54

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such an enquiry subserves the greater public interest and  

has a far-reaching effect on the society the Court will not  

shirk its responsibilities from doing so.

15. Be  it  noted,  the  constitutional  courts  can  entertain  

letter petitions and deal with them as writ petitions.  But it  

will  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the  issue  sought  to  be  

advanced.   There  cannot  be  uncontrolled  or  unguided  

exercise of epistolary jurisdiction.   

16. In the instant case, as is evident, the High Court has  

compared  the  provisions  pertaining  to  appointment  of  

Chairperson  and  Members  under  the  Act  with  the  

provisions  of  other  Acts  enacted  by  different  legislatures.  

The  legislature  has  passed  the  legislation  in  its  wisdom.  

There was no challenge to the constitutional validity of the  

provisions of the Act.  The suo motu petition was registered  

for giving effect to the Act by bringing the institutions into  

existence.  This  may  be  thought  of  in  very  rare  

circumstances depending on the nature of  legislation and  

the collective benefit but in that arena also the Court cannot  

raise the issue relating to any particular provision and seek  

explanation in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of

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the Constitution.  In the case at hand, as is manifest, the  

Division Bench of the High Court has, with an erroneous  

understanding of fundamental principle of law, scanned the  

anatomy of the provision and passed an order in relation to  

it  as  if  it  is  obnoxious  or  falls  foul  of  any  constitutional  

provision.   The  same is  clearly  impermissible.   A  person  

aggrieved or  with expanded concept  of  locus standi some  

one could have assailed the provisions.  But in that event  

there  are  certain  requirements  and  need  for  certain  

compliances.   

17. In  State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kartar Singh10, while  

dealing with the constitutional validity of Rule 5 of the Food  

Adulteration Rules, 1955, it has been opined as follows:-  

“….. if the rule has to be struck down as imposing  unreasonable  or  discriminatory  standards,  it  could  not  be  done  merely  on  any  a  priori  reasoning but only as a result of materials placed  before the Court by way of scientific analysis. It is  obvious  that  this  can  be  done  only  when  the  party  invoking  the  protection of  Art.  14  makes  averments with details to sustain such a plea and  leads evidence to establish his allegations. That  where a party seeks to impeach the validity of a  rule  made  by  a  competent  authority  on  the  ground that the rules offend Art. 14 the burden is  

10

 AIR 1964 SC 1135

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on him to plead and prove the infirmity is too well  established to need elaboration.”  

18. In  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh  and  another  v.  K.   

Jayaraman and others11, it has been ruled thus:-  

“It is clear that, if there had been an averment, on  behalf of the petitioners, that the rule was invalid  for  violating  Articles  14  and  16  of  the  Constitution, relevant facts showing how it  was  discriminatory ought to have been set out.”  

19. In  Union of  India v.  E.I.D.  Parry (India)  Ltd.12,  a  

two-Judge Bench of this Court has expressed thus:-  

“…  There  was  no  pleading  that  the  Rule  upon  which the reliance was placed by the respondent  was  ultra  vires  the  Railways  Act,  1890.  In  the  absence  of  the  pleading  to  that  effect,  the  trial  Court did not frame any issue on that question.  The High Court of its own proceeded to consider  the validity of the Rule and ultimately held that it  was  not  in  consonance  with  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  Railways  Act,  1890  and  consequently  held  that  it  was  ultra  vires.  This  view is contrary to the settled law…”  

11

(1974) 2 SCC 738 :  AIR 1975 SC 633 12

(2000) 2 SCC 223 :  AIR 2000 SC 831

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20. In State of Haryana v. State of Punjab & another13,  

the Court emphasizing on the facet of pleading, has opined  

that:-  

“…..  It  is  well  established  that  constitutional  invalidity (presumably that is what Punjab means  when  it  uses  the  word  “unsustainable”)  of  a  statutory  provision  can  be  made  either  on  the  basis of legislative incompetence or because the  statute is otherwise violative of the provisions of  the  Constitution.  Neither  the  reason  for  the  particular enactment nor the fact that the reason  for the legislation has become redundant, would  justify the striking down of the legislation or for  holding  that  a  statute  or  statutory  provision is  ultra vires. Yet these are the grounds pleaded in  subparagraphs (i), (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) to declare  Section  14  invalid.  Furthermore,  merely  saying  that  a  particular  provision  is  legislatively  incompetent  [ground  (ii)]  or  discriminatory  [ground  (iii)]  will  not  do.  At  least  prima  facie  acceptable grounds in support have to be pleaded  to sustain the challenge. In the absence of  any  such pleading the challenge to the constitutional  validity of a statute or statutory provision is liable  to be rejected in limine.”

21. This being the position in law, the High Court could  

not  have proceeded as if it was testing the validity of the  

provision  and  granted  stay.  The  approach  is  totally  

fallacious.   Having opined aforesaid, we have no option but  

to  set  aside  that  part  of  the  order  which  deals  with  the  

13

 (2004) 12 SCC 673

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provisions  of  the  Act.   We  do  not  intend to  express  any  

opinion with regard to validity of any provision contained in  

the Act.  We also do not think it condign to direct that the  

establishment  under  the  said  Act  should  become  

operational within any fixed time.  Suffice to say at present  

that  when  the  State  Legislature  has  introduced  the  

legislation to take steps as regards the institution, it shall  

be the endeavour of the executive to see that the office of the  

Lokayukta is in place.  We say no more for the present.   

22. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the appeal is partly  

allowed  and  the  direction  pertaining  to  the  stay  of  the  

provisions  of  the  Meghalaya  Lokayukta  Act,  2014  is  set  

aside. It is directed that State Human Rights Commission  

shall become functional by end of June, 2016.  As we have  

completely dealt with the matter, the writ petition initiated  

by the High Court shall be deemed to have been disposed of.  

There shall be no order as to costs.  

.................................J.                                [Dipak Misra]

    .................................J.            [Shiva Kirti Singh]

New Delhi; March 18, 2016