15 September 2011
Supreme Court
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JEET SINGH Vs UNION OF INDIA .

Bench: MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA,ANIL R. DAVE
Case number: C.A. No.-005195-005196 / 2004
Diary number: 18874 / 2003
Advocates: PRAMOD DAYAL Vs TARUN JOHRI


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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 5195-5196  OF 2004

JEET SINGH & ANR. .....APPELLANTS.

        VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.          .....RESPONDENTS.

J U D G M E N T

ANIL R. DAVE, J.

1. Being aggrieved by the judgment delivered by the High Court  

of Delhi in CWP No. 3193 of 2003 dated 1st August, 2003 and  

in  CM No. 9049 of 2003 in  CWP No. 3193 of 2003 dated 25th  

August, 2003,  these appeals have been filed by the claimants-

appellants, whose land had been acquired .

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2. The appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court praying  

that the land acquisition proceedings in question be quashed as  

the award dated 21st April, 2003 made in respect of the land in  

question  was  made  in  violation  of  the  provisions  of  Section  

11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to  

as  ‘the  Act’).  It  was  submitted  before  the  High  Court  that  

according  to  the  provisions  of  Section  11A  of  the  Act,  the  

award under Section 11 should be made within two years from  

the date  on which declaration  under  Section 6 of  the  Act  is  

made.   According to the appellants,  who were the petitioners  

before the High Court, the declaration under Section 6 of the  

Act  was made  on 9th April, 1997 and it was published on 14th  

April, 1997 whereas  the award was made on 21st April, 2003.  

As there was delay beyond the period of two years in making  

the  award,  according  to  the  appellants,  the  acquisition  

proceedings had lapsed as per the provisions of Section 11A of  

the Act.   Of course, it was submitted before the High Court that  

the proceedings had been stayed for sometime by virtue of an  

order dated 12th February, 1999 passed in CWP No. 6687 of  

1998 but the said stay order had been vacated on 23rd July, 2002  

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and even after ignoring the period during which the stay was  

operating,  the  authority  had  taken  more  than  two  years  for  

making the award and, therefore, the proceedings had lapsed.  

3. The High Court dismissed the petition as it was of the view that  

though  the  stay  granted,  in  CWP  No.  6687  of  1998,  was  

vacated on 23rd July, 2002, the said order was communicated to  

the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  on  27th March,  2003  and,  

therefore, the award was made within the period prescribed in  

Section 11A of the Act.  

4. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the petition and a review  

petition, which was filed subsequently, these appeals have been  

filed by the claimants whose lands have been acquired.

5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that  

by virtue of an interim order dated 12th February, 1999, parties  

to  the  acquisition  proceedings  had been directed  to  maintain  

status quo in CWP No. 6687 of 1998. The said interim order  

was  vacated  on  23rd July,  2002.   In  the  circumstances,  the  

period commencing from 12th February, 1999 to 23rd July, 2002  

would be excluded while considering the period available to the  

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authority for making an award as per the provisions of Section  

11A of the Act.  According to him, the date on which the order  

was  communicated  to  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  is  not  

relevant and, therefore, it can be very well said that the award  

was made beyond the period prescribed under Section 11A of  

the  Act.    Therefore,  the  proceedings  ought  to  have  been  

quashed by the High Court and as the High Court committed an  

error by not quashing the proceedings, this Court should quash  

the same.  So as to substantiate his case, he  relied upon the  

judgments  delivered by this  Court  in  Padma Sundara Rao  

(Dead)  and  Others vs.  State  of  Tamil  Nadu and  Others  

[(2002) 3 SCC 533];  N. Narasimhaiah and Others vs. State  

of Karnataka and Others [1996) 3 SCC 88];  Mohan and  

Another vs. State of Maharashtra and Others [(2007) 9 SCC  

431];   Ravi  Khullar  and Another vs.  Union of  India and  

Others [(2007) 5 SCC 231)] &  Vijay Narayan Thatte and  

Others vs. State of Maharashtra and Others [(2009) 9 SCC  

92].

    

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6. On  the  other  hand,   Shri  P.P.  Malhotra,  learned  Additional  

Solicitor  General  appearing  for  the  respondents-Government  

authorities submitted that though the  interim order, whereby  

the  Government-authorities  were  directed  to  maintain  status  

quo was vacated on 23rd July, 2002,  intimation of the said order  

was  given  to  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  i.e.  respondent  

no.3, for the first time, on 27th March, 2003 and if the period  

upto 27th March, 2003 is considered as period during which the  

government  authorities  were  prevented  from  taking  further  

proceedings by the court, there would be no violation of Section  

11A of the Act. He further submitted that at the time when the  

aforestated order dated 23rd July, 2002 was passed by the High  

Court, respondent no.3 and even other government authorities  

were not represented by any counsel and, therefore, respondent  

no.3, who had to make an award under Section 11 of the Act,  

was  not  informed  about  the  said  order  and,  therefore,  

respondent no.3 was under an impression that the stay which  

was  granted  on  12th February,  1999  had  not  been  vacated.  

Upon getting a certified copy of the order on 27th March, 2003  

and intimation of the said order for the first time, respondent  

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no.3 immediately did the needful for making an award under  

Section 11 of the Act and in fact, he made the award on 21st  

April, 2003.

7. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that an effort  

was being made to stall  the proceedings by the appellants.   He drew our  

attention  to  the  proceedings  of  CWP No.6687 of  1998,  which  had been  

initiated by the father of the present appellants.  By virtue of an interim order  

passed in the said proceedings, the acquisition proceedings for the land in  

question had been stayed for some time.  When the said proceedings had  

been disposed of, the present appellants filed another petition being CWP  

No.3845 of 2002, wherein a grievance was made that though the lands had  

been acquired, they had not been paid compensation.  It is pertinent to note  

that the father of the appellants had challenged the acquisition proceedings  

and  by  virtue  of  an  interim order  passed  in  the  said  petition,  the  entire  

proceedings  had been  stayed,  whereas  the  present  appellants  had  filed  a  

petition  praying  for  compensation.   Ultimately,  the  petition  filed  by  the  

appellants as well as by their father had been disposed of.  Thus, the learned  

counsel made an effort to show that all possible efforts were made by the  

appellants and their father to delay the proceedings.

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8. The learned counsel further submitted that the land in question had to  

be  acquired  for  the  purpose  of  construction  of  Delhi  Metro  Rail.   He  

submitted that looking to the increase in vehicular traffic, the government  

authorities wanted the Delhi Metro Rail to operate at all places as per the  

schedule,  as  soon  as  possible  and  because  of  the  hurdles  created  in  the  

process of land acquisition, the entire project was being delayed and not only  

cost  of  the  project  was  increasing  but  people  were  also  put  to  lot  of  

inconvenience.    He further  submitted that  the  possession  of  the  land in  

question was also been taken long back and the land in question was also  

being used for the purpose for which it was acquired.

9. Upon hearing the learned counsel and upon perusing the facts of the  

case, we find that the following facts are not in dispute.

(i) Declaration  under  Section  6  of  the  Act  was  made  on  

9th April, 1997 and it was published on 14th April, 1997.

(ii) Award was made on 21st April, 2003.

(iii) By virtue of proceedings in CWP No. 6687 of 1998 on  

12th February, 1999,  the parties were directed to maintain  

status quo and the said order was vacated on 23rd July,  

2002  but  a  certified  copy  of  the  said  order  was  

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communicated to the Land Acquisition Collector on 27th  

March, 2003.

10. Thus, what has to be considered is whether the period commencing  

from 23rd   July, 2002, the date on which the interim relief granted by the  

High Court in CWP No. 6687 of 1998 was vacated should be considered for  

the purpose of calculating the period covered under Explanation to Section  

11A or whether the date on which the order was actually communicated, i.e.  

dated 27th March, 2003 should be considered.

11 .Section 11A of the Act is reproduced hereinbelow:

“11-A. Period within which an award shall be made –  The Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within  a period of two years from the date of the publication of the  declaration and if no award is made within that period, the  entire  proceedings,  for  the  acquisition  of  the  land  shall  lapse:

Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been  published  before  the  commencement  of  the  Land  Acquisition  (Amendment)  Act,  1984,  the  award  shall  be  made  within  a  period  of  two  years  from  such  commencement.

Explanation- In computing the period of two years referred  to in  this  Section,  the period during which any action or  proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration  is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.”

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12. Upon perusal of Section 11-A of the Act, it is clear that the award  

should be made within two years from the date of the publication of the  

declaration made under Section 6 of the Act.  The purpose is to see that the  

award is made at an early date so that the claimants, whose lands have been  

acquired, get compensation as soon as possible.    By acquiring the land and  

by  not  making  the  award,  the  government  would  be  acting  against  the  

interest of the persons whose lands had been acquired.  If the government  

acquires the land and does not give the amount of compensation to the land  

owners at an early date, it would adversely affect the land owners because  

they would be without their land and, therefore, they would be losing their  

source  of  income  and  at  the  same  time,  they  would  also  not  get  the  

compensation.    So as to make sure that such a situation does not  arise,  

Section 11A had been introduced.    Thus, the purpose behind introduction  

of the said Section was to see that the award is made at least within two  

years  so  that  the  compensation  is  paid  to  the  persons  whose  lands  are  

acquired at an early date.

13. It is also pertinent to note that the explanation to Section 11A of the  

Act is of vital importance.   At times the land owners or some persons, at the  

instance of the land owners, might initiate proceedings for challenging the  

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land  acquisition  with  an  oblique  motive  or  so  as  to  create  hurdles  and  

hindrances in the process of acquisition of the land.    In such a process,  

sometimes acquisition proceedings are stayed by the court and after some  

time, upon knowing the facts, stay is vacated. Whatever may be the object  

behind initiation of the legal proceedings for challenging the acquisition, the  

result  is  that  the  authorities  are  prevented  from taking further  action for  

some  time,  if  the  proceedings  are  stayed  and  in  such  an  event,  the  

proceedings are delayed due to interim orders passed by the court.  So as to  

see that the land acquisition proceedings do not lapse, the explanation to the  

Section  provides that the period during  which the proceedings are stayed by  

an order of a court, the said period would be excluded while computing the  

period of two years.

14. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants  made an effort  to  

compare the provisions of Section 11A with the provisions of Section 6 of  

the Act so as to show that the law laid down in Padma Sundara Rao’s case  

(supra) would also be applicable in case of Section 11A of the Act.  It was  

his submission that the period commencing from 12th February, 1999 to 23rd  

July, 2002 only should be excluded for the purposes of Section 11A as the  

stay was operating only for the said period.  According to him, the period  

during which intimation of the order, whereby the stay was vacated, was  

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given to Land Acquisition Collector will have to be ignored.  Looking to the  

facts of the case we do not accept the said submission because in the instant  

case the appellants and their father had made all possible efforts to stall the  

proceedings  and  only  on  account  of  the  litigation  initiated  by  them,  the  

acquisition proceedings had been stayed.  Ultimately, the stay granted by the  

High Court had been vacated but intimation of the order, whereby stay was  

vacated, i.e. dated 23rd July, 2002 was communicated, for the first time, to  

the Land Acquisition Collected on 27th March, 2003.  When the order dated  

23rd July,  2002,  vacating  the  earlier  stay  order  was  passed,  the  counsel  

appearing for respondent no.3, namely, the Land Acquisition Collector or  

the government was not present and, therefore, intimation of the said order  

was not given to the Land Acquisition Collector, who was duty bound to  

make an award as per the provisions of Section 11 A of the Act within two  

years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the  

Act.    

15. The  purpose  behind  enactment  of  Section  6  and  Section  11A  is  

different though the language used in both the Sections is similar.  Section 6  

pertains  to  pre-acquisition  stage  whereas  Section  11A  pertains  to  post-  

acquisition  stage,  the  stage  at  which  the  award  is  to  be  made  by  the  

Collector.

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16. In  our  opinion,  once  Section  4  notification  is  issued,  necessary  

declaration under Section 6 must be made as soon as possible for the reasons  

that the owner of the land would not be in a position to use the land as per  

his desire because of the uncertainty prevailing prior to declaration made  

under  Section  6  of  the  Act.   A  prudent  owner  would  not  put  up   any  

construction  on  the  land   and  normally  no  one  would  come forward  to  

purchase  the  land  also  as  there  would  be  possibility  of  the  land  being  

acquired.  Therefore, declaration under Section 6 is required to be made as  

soon  as  possible.   So  far  as  provisions  of  Section  11A  of  the  Act  are  

concerned, they expect the acquiring authorities to make the award within  

two years so that the land owner can get compensation after the award is  

made.  He must get his compensation at an early date because his land is  

acquired, but in case of delay caused in paying the compensation, the land  

owner would be sufficiently compensated in terms of money for the reason  

that he would be getting interest on the amount of compensation payable to  

him as per the provisions of the Act.  Thus, in fact, not much harm is caused  

to the land owner if some delay is caused.  

17. In the instant case, the facts are peculiar.  The land owners, i.e. the  

appellants and their father made all possible efforts to delay the proceedings.  

In fact, the proceedings were delayed because of the litigation initiated by  

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them. In fact they wanted the acquisition proceedings to fail.  Let us look at  

their  conduct  and  behaviour.   The  father  challenged  the  acquisition  

proceedings and in the said proceedings,  an interim direction to maintain  

status  quo  was  granted.   On  the  other  hand,  another  petition  was  filed  

making  a  grievance  that  no  compensation  was  paid  to  them and  in  that  

petition a direction was given to pay compensation to them.  Thus, they had  

shown their intention to claim and get compensation and compensation can  

be given only if their land was acquired.  Again they filed another petition  

submitting that the proceedings had lapsed.  We do take notice of the above  

conduct and attitude of the appellants and their father and we believe that in  

such a  set  of  facts  and circumstances,  they would not  be entitled to any  

discretionary relief in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of  

India.

18.   In  the  aforestated  set  of  circumstances,  in  our  opinion,  the  

acquisition proceedings cannot be permitted to lapse, especially when the  

Land Acquisition Collector had acted promptly after getting a certified copy  

of  the  order  whereby  the  stay  granted  in  CWP  No.  6687  of  1998  was  

vacated.  As his counsel was absent when the abovestated order was passed,  

he could not know about the said order earlier and as per findings of the  

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High Court, he came to know about vacation of the stay order for the first  

time on 27th March, 2003.

19. We also note the fact that possession of the land in question was taken  

long back and the land in question has been put to the use for which it has  

been acquired.

20. We do not find any fault with the Land Acquisition Collector for not  

making the award before getting a certified copy of the order dated 23rd July,  

2002 on 27th March, 2003 especially when he was not informed about the  

said fact earlier. There cannot be any doubt that no person would ever think  

of taking an action when he has been restrained by any interim order of any  

court  from doing  so.   Once  a  person  has  been  restrained  by  a  court  of  

competent jurisdiction from doing something, the person concerned is not  

expected to do anything till  he gets communication from the court to the  

effect that the earlier order was modified or vacated.  No officer would ever  

think of taking a chance upon any unauthentic communication with regard to  

vacation of  interim relief  because in that  event,  if  the information is  not  

correct,  he might be held guilty under the provisions of the Contempt of  

Courts Act.  In the instant case, there is nothing on record that prior to 27th  

March,  2003,  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  had  received  any  

communication  that  the  stay  granted  on  12th February,  1999  had  been  

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vacated and, therefore, he was absolutely right in not taking any action for  

proceeding further for making an award till 27th March, 2003.

21. In view of the above circumstances, one can surely believe that the  

Land  Acquisition  Collector  could  have  proceeded  further  for  making  an  

award only after 27th March, 2003, when a certified copy of the order dated  

23rd July, 2002 was communicated to him.

22. In  view  of  the  afore-stated  undisputed  facts  with  regard  to  

communication of the said order dated 23rd July, 2002 on 27th March, 2003,  

and taking notice of all the aforestated facts we are of the view that the High  

Court was right in dismissing the writ  petition.   

23. For the aforestated reasons, we are of the view that the High Court  

was  justified  in  dismissing  the  petition.   Accordingly,  the  appeals  are  

dismissed with no order as to costs.   

………..……………......................J.                                                   (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)

                           ………...........................................J.                                                                (ANIL R. DAVE)

New Delhi September 15, 2011.  

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